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Abstract 
On the 17th of July 2008 Australia ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Article 12(2) of the Convention provides that 
parties to the Convention shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
Every state and territory of Australia has enacted adult guardianship legislation, one 
of the aims of which is to appoint guardians and administrators to assist or protect 
adults lacking decision-making capacity. The question this thesis poses is to what 
extent do Australian guardianship tribunals and courts comply with the Convention in 
relation to residential accommodation decisions. In order to do this, benchmark 
criteria were developed from Article 12: Was there compliance with the person’s will 
and preferences? Was the decision the least restrictive alternative 
available? Features which might affect the decision – the presence of a positive 
informal support network, and the negative issues of a conflict of interest with, or 
between, others, or undue influence on the person – were also used and applied. 
All publicly available guardianship cases from Victoria, NSW and Queensland, juris-
dictions representing approximately 80% of Australia’s population, were analysed 
from the date of application of the Convention to Australia up to July 2015. The 
results from over 300 cases showed that although there was significant compliance 
with the evaluation criteria ranging from almost one-third (Queensland and NSW) to 
nearly one-half (Victoria), the principle of protecting individuals by maintaining their 
welfare and best interests was given priority over the Convention right of a person to 
exercise their own legal capacity.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
1.0 Introduction 
All Australian states and territories have enacted adult guardianship legislation.1 The 
main purpose of these enactments is to appoint guardians and administrators for 
adults lacking decision-making capacity, where there is a perceived need to assist or 
protect the adult in question. The role of a guardian is as a substitute decision-maker 
for decisions, such as, where a person lives, provision of personal services and 
health decisions; an administrator is a substitute decision-maker for financial 
decisions such as the payment of bills, residential accommodation costs and the 
investment of the adult’s property. These decisions can cover all aspects of an 
adult’s life.  
Adults with cognitive disabilities are those persons most frequently subject to adult 
guardianship legislation. These disabilities include persons with an intellectual 
impairment, psycho-social disability (previously termed mental disability), acquired 
brain injury and various types of dementia. Persons with physical or age-related 
conditions that affect their ability to make major life decisions may also be subject to 
an appointment under guardianship legislation.2 
During a 14-year period, from 1986 to 2000, all Australian states and territories 
underwent legal reform and developed a ‘modern’ guardianship system.3 The main 
features of such a system include an inexpensive, readily accessible tribunal for 
hearings (except for the Northern Territory), creation of a statutory body (Public 
Guardian or Public Advocate) to act as a potential guardian and the creation of a set 
of general principles for decision-making to promote both autonomy and protection. 
The impetus for creating the current Australian adult guardianship regime arose from 
deinstitutionalisation for persons with an intellectual disability, who formerly resided 
in institutions but were now to live in the community. This created a perceived need 
to protect persons with an intellectual disability to assist them to reside in the 
                                            
1
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC); Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW); Adult Guardianship 
Act 1988 (NT); Penelope A. Hommel, Lu-in Wang and James A Bergman, 'Trends in Guardianship 
Reform: Implications for the Medical and Legal Professions' (1990) 18 Law, Medicine & Health Care 
213; Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT); Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1993 (SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (TAS); Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (QLD). 
2
 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 3 (definition of ‘person who has a disability’); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1986 (VIC) s 3. 
3
 Nick O'Neill and Carmelle Peisah, Chapter 5 The Development of Modern Guardianship and 
Administration, Capacity and the Law (Sydney University Press, 1st ed, 2011). 
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community.4 Prior to deinstitutionalisation, appointments of a guardian could only be 
made by a Supreme Court of a state or territory. Supreme Court guardianship 
appointments were very infrequently made due to expense, time and unwieldy 
procedures. 5  There are now vastly more appointments of guardians and 
administrators made annually in Australia via the more accessible tribunal system.6 
The appointment of a guardian or administrator due to dementia is rapidly increasing 
and outnumbers appointments due to intellectual disabilities.7 
Every appointment of a guardian or administrator results in some loss of the person’s 
decision-making ability. When an appointment is made the decision-making ability is 
transferred to a substituted decision-maker (guardian or administrator), albeit for a 
specified time and specified decisions. As discussed below, this concept of adult 
guardianship creates a tension with Australia’s obligations under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
On 17 July 2008 Australia ratified the CRPD. This is the first United Nations 
convention specifically drafted for persons with disabilities. Although the convention 
creates no new rights for persons with disabilities it is important to increase the 
visibility and specificity of currently existing human rights for over 650 million persons 
with disabilities.8  
The CRPD represents a paradigm shift away from acceptance of the loss of legal 
capacity through the appointment of a guardian or administrator towards the 
retention of decision-making capacity with the provision of support to exercise this 
                                            
4
 Colleen Pearce, 'Strengths and Tensions in the Current Guardianship System' (Office of the Public 
Advocate of Victoria, 2011) <http:www.publicadvocate.vic.gove.au/>. 
5
 Queensland Law Reform Commission, 'Assisted and Substituted Decisions Decision-making by and 
for people with a decision-making disability' (Report Number 49, Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, June 1996); see also Nick O'Neill and Carmelle Peisah, 'Chapter 6 "Guardianship"' in 
Sydney University Press Law Books (ed), Capacity and the Law (SydUP Law, 1st ed, 2011) 107. Only 
a handful of guardianship appointments were made by State or Territory Supreme Courts. 
6
 Liz Dearn, 'Too much Gurardianship? Reflections on Guardianship in Victoria 1988-2008' 
(Department of Justice, 2010). 
7
 Liz Dearn, 'Guardianship Trends in Victoria 1988-2008' (Department of Justice Victoria, December 
2009); Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report  2012-2013' (OPA Victoria, 2013) 
<www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>; see also New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 
'NCAT Annual Report 2014-2015' (NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2015) 
<www.ncat.new.gov.au/.../ncat_annual_report_2014_2015.pdf> 40. Over the past 5 years 44% of the 
cases before the NSW Guardianship Tribunal and now NCAT were for persons with dementia, 16% 
for persons with an intellectual disability and 16% for persons with a mental disability. These figures 
correspond with the other Australian guardianship jurisdictions except for Queensland which has 
more persons with an intellectual disability than dementia subject to guardianship; see Office of Public 
Guardian Queensland, 'Annual report Office of the Public Guardian of Queensland' (2014) 
<www.publicguardian.qld.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0007/360925/AnnualReport-2013-2014.pdf> 
26-7. 44% of persons subject to a guardianship order in Queensland have an intellectual disability in 
contrast to the other Australian guardianship jurisdictions. 
8
 Theresia Degener, Human Rights and Disability: the Current Use and Future Potential of U.N. 
Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability, Chapter 4.1.1 Disability and Freedom: the 
ICCPR (UN, 2002). 
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capacity.9 ‘Support’ may come about through a group of one or more trusted others, 
chosen by the person, to assist the person to make and communicate decisions. The 
decision is that of the individual, who at all times retains decision-making capacity.10  
This paradigm shift comes about due to the inclusion of Article 12 of the CRPD, 
entitled ‘Equal recognition before the law’. Article 12(2) of the CRPD gives all adults 
regardless of decision-making ability, the right to full legal capacity. This 
encompasses both the right to make decisions and the right to exercise or act on 
these decisions.11 Article 12(3) requires the State Party to provide supports to enable 
the person to exercise their legal capacity. 12  In light of Article 12, the CRPD 
Committee, charged with the obligation of observing State compliance with the 
CRPD, has called for all countries that have ratified the Convention to immediately 
abandon guardianship for supported decision-making alternatives.13  However, no 
country that has elements of supported decision-making in legislation or practices 
has eliminated substituted decision-making.14 It is anticipated that adult guardianship 
legislation will be retained in Australia in both the short and medium term.15 This 
accords with Australia’s interpretive Declaration it made when it ratified the CRPD.16 
Article 12 of the CRPD has also been the subject of recent review in terms of 
compliance with Commonwealth laws and programs by the Australian Law Reform 
                                            
9
 Bernadette McSherry, 'Legal capacity under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities' (2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 22; Penelope Weller, 'The Convention  on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Social Model of Health: New Perspectives' (2011) 21 
Journal of Mental Health Law 10 ; Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, 'Supported Decision Making an 
Alternative to Guardianship' (Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, 2009) 
<www.globalmentalhealth.org/sites/default/filesdocs/MDAC>. 
10
 Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, 'A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal 
Capacity' (2011) <http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/disabilities-call-for-papers--bach-kerzner>. 
11
 United Nations, 'Background Conference Document  Legal Capacity' (UN 
August 2005) <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc6documents>; Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 
2008) art 12(2). 
12
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(3). 
13
 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 'General Comment on Article 12: Equal 
recognition before the law' (United Nations, 14 April 2014) 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBpdies/CRPD/GC/DGCAricle12.doc>; United Nations Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 'Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Sixth 
Session 19-23 September' (2011) <http://www.ohcr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Session6.aspx>. 
14
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Guardianship around the world a resource on 
international adult guardianship systems' (OPA Victoria, 2012) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>. 
15
 Advocacy for inclusion, 'Supported Decision Making, Legal Capacity and Guardianship' (2012) 
<http://www.advocacyforinclusion.org/publications/supported_decision_making_legal_capacity_and_g
uardianship2012final.pdf>. 
16
 Australian Law Reform Commission, 'Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
(ALRC Report 124)' (ALRC, November 2014) 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc_124_whole_pdf_file.pdf> Chapter 1. 
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Commission.17 Changes to Australia’s adult guardianship regime remain a primary 
concern of the Australian state and territory governments. 
Therefore, how can guardianship legislation that is protective in nature and removes 
the right to exercise legal capacity when a guardian is appointed, apply and conform 
to the rights of self-determination contained in Article 12 of the CRPD?  
Central Research Question 
The central research question of this thesis is to identify to what extent do current 
Australian state guardianship tribunals comply with and apply the principles of full 
legal capacity for all persons and the provision of support to exercise legal capacity, 
in accommodation decisions, as required by Article 12 of the CRPD? This is with a 
view to investigating how Australia’s compliance with Article 12 can be increased 
while maintaining guardianship legislation.  
The literature review that follows this introduction will reveal some of the gaps in 
knowledge and research in this area. The research questions raised by the literature 
review will be set out at the end of this chapter.  
Scope of Thesis 
In light of the need of the Australian guardianship regime to respond to Article 12 of 
the CRPD, this thesis looks at accommodation decisions made by three Australian 
guardianship jurisdictions. The term ‘accommodation’ in this thesis includes 
anywhere where the person subject to adult guardianship resides. This may include 
a house, unit, townhouse, caravan, retirement village, residential care facility, 
institution, hospital or any other form of residence. 
Accommodation was selected for the focus of the research for a number of reasons. 
First, it is the most frequently made appointment in the area of adult guardianship.18 
Second, Gerard Quinn has stated that unless a person is able to choose where and 
                                            
17
 Ibid; Australian Government and Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Equity, Capacity and 
Disability in Commonwealth Law: A Discussion Paper’ (DP81, ALRC, 2014).  
18
 Office of the Public Advocate of South Australia, 'Annual Report 2010-2011' (OPA South Australia, 
5 January 2012) <http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/documents/09_Publications/Annual_Report>; Office of 
the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report OPA 2008-2009' (OPA Victoria, 2009) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gove.au>; Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report 
2011-12' (OPA Victoria, 2012) <http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/file/OPA_AReport20111-12>; 
Queensland Public Advocate, 'Annual Report of Queensland Public Advocate of Queensland 2010-
2011' (2011). 
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with whom they live, then a person is not free to exercise their legal capacity.19 This 
means that the choice of residence is a central feature to the exercise of self-
determination. Third, where a person is unable to choose their own accommodation 
there is a restriction upon many other rights found in the CRPD. A person in an 
institution is restricted in their ‘liberty and security’ (Article 14); their ‘access to 
justice’ may be restricted (Article 13); they may be at risk of ‘exploitation violence 
and abuse’ (Article 16); they may be restricted in ‘liberty of movement’ (Article 18); 
they cannot ‘live independently in the community’ (Article 19); they may be limited in 
‘respect for their home and family’ (Article 23); there may be limits to ‘education’ 
(Article 24); limitations to ‘employment’ (Article 27) and a limitation to ‘participation in 
political and public life’ (Article 29). In short, a restriction in residential 
accommodation affects many other rights, such as employment, education, 
community access, family relationships, contacts and access to services. 
Cases that deal with both financial administration and the appointment (or avoidance 
of an appointment) of a guardian for accommodation decisions are included in this 
research, though the focus will be on the aspect of guardianship accommodation 
decisions. An area for future research may be the application of Article 12 in 
decisions involving solely financial administration. 
The approach taken for this research is doctrinal.20  The literature review which 
provides the background to this analysis will examine relevant published academic 
articles, government documents, conference papers, legislation, cases, human rights 
instruments, books, reports and other academic works concerning the topics of 
supported decision-making, adult guardianship, development of the CRPD, the 
meaning of legal capacity and overseas forms of supported decision-making. No 
empirical research was undertaken. 
The research focuses upon Article 12 of the CRPD as it contains the right to full legal 
capacity, the right to be supported to exercise full legal capacity and safeguards in 
the exercise of full legal capacity. This Article is the foundation of the CRPD as legal 
capacity is necessary for the enjoyment of nearly all other CRPD rights.   
The thesis will touch upon other Articles in the CRPD but only tangentially as they 
relate to Article 12 rights. For example, Article 5 (non-discrimination) will be 
                                            
19
 Gerard Quinn and Suzanne Doyle, 'Taking the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities Seriously: The Past and Future of the EU Structural Funds  as a Tool to Achieve 
Community Living' (2012) 9 The Equal Rights Review 69; Gerard Quinn, 'Rethinking Personhood: 
New directions in Legal Capacity Law and Policy (An Idea Paper) How to Put the 'shift' into Paradigm 
Shift' (University of British Columbia, 29 April 2011) 
<http://www.arts.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/CIC/July_2011/Gerard_Quinn_s_Keynote_April_29_2
011.pdf>; Gerard Quinn, 'Concept Paper "Personhood and Legal Capacity" Perspectives on the 
Paradigm shift of Article 12 of the CRPD' (Harvard Law School, 2010) 
<www.inclusiveirelandie/document/HarvardLegalcapacitygqdraft2.doc>; Gerard Quinn, 'An ideas 
paper' (4 June 2009) 
<http://www.onclusionireland.ie/documents/AnIdeasPaperbyGerardQuinnJune2009pdf>. 
20
 T. Roux, 'Judging the Quality of Legal Research: A qualified response to the demand for greater 
methodological rigour' (2014) 24(i-ii) Legal Education Review 173. 
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discussed in the literature review regarding a right to reasonable adjustments.21 
These accommodations or reasonable adjustments may include supports that may 
be needed for people with disabilities in order to exercise their legal capacity.22 The 
inter-relationship between Article 5 and Article 12 of the CRPD is crucial for the 
provision of supports to exercise legal capacity. 23  Another Article relevant to an 
examination of Article 12 is Article 3, the general principles of which are: ‘(a) respect 
for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own 
choices and the independence of persons’. Article 16, ‘Freedom from exploitation, 
violence and abuse’, has been used as a rationale for the continuation of protective 
adult guardianship legislation.24 There will be a brief consideration in the literature 
review of the countervailing human right to be protected from exploitation and abuse 
through the appointment of a guardian. 25  Article 19 of the CRPD, ‘Living 
Independently and being included in the community’, is a further important Article 
related to Article 12, and is of particular relevance for the choice of a person’s 
residence. Its inclusion in the CRPD was one of the reasons for selecting 
guardianship decisions dealing with accommodation as the focus of the research. It 
may not be possible to fully exercise legal capacity where the person resides in an 
institution or residential care facility against their will. 
The research focuses upon an analysis of guardianship tribunal cases dealing with 
accommodation matters in three Australian jurisdictions decided after 16 August 
2008. This is the date of application of the CRPD in Australia (28 days following 
Australia’s ratification).26 
The methodology for this research was first to develop a benchmark set of criteria 
and features against which I can evaluate and assess current compliance with Article 
12 by Australian guardianship tribunals. Then, three guardianship jurisdictions were 
selected to benchmark Article 12 compliance. The jurisdictions of Victoria, 
Queensland and NSW were selected for this purpose. They represented nearly 80 
percent of Australia’s population and therefore offered the greatest opportunity to 
obtain a significantly large representative case sample. Victoria’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (VIC), through its maintenance of international 
                                            
21
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 5(3). 
22
 Bach and Kerzner, above n 10. 
23
 People with Disabilities, 'Everyone, Everywhere: Recogniton of Persons with Disabilities as 
Persons before the Law' (PWD, 2009) 
<http:www.pwd.org.au/documents/pubs/EveryoneEverywhere2009.pdf>. 
24
 Barbara Carter, 'Seeking the Essence of Guardianship: Beyond the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2012) <http://www.agac.org.au/>; Barbara Carter, 'Ideas That 
Shape Adult Guardianship' (29 July 2011) <www.public.advocate.vic.gov.au>; Barbara Carter, 'Adult 
Guardianship: Human Rights or Social Justice' (2010) 18 JLM 143. 
25
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'The role of the Public Advocate' (OPA Victoria, 2010) 
<http:www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/>; Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Principles and 
values in Victorian guardianship legislation' (OPA Victoria, 2009) 
<http://www.publicadvcate.vic.gov.au>. 
26
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 45. 
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law, 27  gave it the potential for greater CRPD compliance than other Australian 
guardianship jurisdictions without a charter of human rights. Queensland was 
selected as a jurisdiction for case evaluation as its Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (QLD) contains a broad set of human rights principles and contains 
provisions recognising and requiring supports to be provided to exercise legal 
capacity.28 NSW was selected as a jurisdiction for comparison as it did not have a 
charter of human rights; nor did it have an elaborate set of guardianship principles. In 
addition, NSW in its guardianship principles placed protection above autonomy 
principles.29 Hence, NSW, with the largest population, was anticipated to have a 
lower compliance level than Queensland or Victoria with the benchmark criteria. 
All guardianship cases involving accommodation that were reported and publicly 
available on Austlii up to 1 July 2015 were included in the research.  
What this thesis does not purport to do is provide a ‘best practice’ model for 
Australian guardianship jurisdictions. While a number of overseas models of 
supported decision-making exist, and these are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there 
is a paucity of evaluative research involving legislative forms of supported decision-
making.30 Second, this research is entirely doctrinal, based upon an examination of 
decided cases and legislation. I have not undertaken any empirical research of 
existing supported decision-making models. Third, the development of a ‘best 
practice’ model will be a matter of governmental policy and costing beyond the scope 
of this research. 
Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter 1 includes this introduction and the 
literature review. The literature review considers the development of the CRPD in the 
human rights context with the focus upon the meaning of Article 12; adult 
guardianship legislation in Australia; differences in the meaning of ‘legal capacity’ in 
Article 12 of the CRPD as compared with ‘capacity’ in Australian guardianship 
legislation; the meaning of supported decision-making; and a summation of the 
various models of legislative and non-legislative support currently in use together 
with their risks and safeguards. 
Chapter 2 develops the benchmark criteria and important features that will be used 
as the basis of the case analysis in subsequent chapters. The benchmark criteria 
found to determine the incorporation of Article 12 of the CRPD was derived from the 
direct words and necessary implication of Article 12 itself.   
                                            
27
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) art 5. 
28
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD). General Principles (G.P.) in second schedule 
including G.P. 2 same human rights and G.P. 7(3)(a) the adult must be given any necessary support 
and access to information to enable the adult to participate in decisions affecting the adult’s life. 
29
 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4(a) where the welfare and interests of the person are paramount. 
30
 Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal and Amy T. Campbell, 'Supported Decision-Making: A Viable 
alternative to Guardianship?' (2013) 117(4) Penn State Law Review 1111; Shih-Ning Then, 'Evolution 
and Innovation in Guardianship Laws' (2013) 35(1) Sydney Law Review 34. 
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Methodology for this research is contained in Chapter 3. This chapter discusses the 
reasons for selecting Victoria, NSW and Queensland as the guardianship 
jurisdictions for case selection and examination. It also discusses how the research 
was conducted, the search terms used, databases searched, and how relevant 
cases were identified and irrelevant cases eliminated from the research. Further, it 
outlines how the benchmark criteria and important features were applied to the case 
data. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are the individual chapters in which the benchmark criteria 
developed in chapter 2 are applied to Victoria, NSW and Queensland respectively. 
There is also a discussion of the distinctions that may affect criteria compliance with 
Article 12 in the individual jurisdictions. 
Chapter 7 synthesises the trends from Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and discusses the 
implications of these findings. It ties together and analyses the trends found in more 
than 300 guardianship cases involving accommodation in the three jurisdictions 
chosen for analysis. The analysis reveals the tension between autonomy and 
protection that underpins guardianship legislation in Australia. The key findings were 
a significant compliance with Article 12, but without direct references to Article 12 of 
the CRPD. Compliance was due to application of guardianship autonomy principles 
present in the legislation. These principles were applied after a consideration of the 
protective guardianship principle (which was regarded as more important than 
autonomy). 
The final chapter recommends changes which would better incorporate Article 12 of 
the CRPD into the Australian guardianship regime.  
Significant and Original Contributions 
This thesis offers four significant and original contributions to knowledge. Drawing on 
Article 12 of the CRPD, both directly and by implication, this research has developed 
a benchmark to measure compliance with supported decision-making and full legal 
capacity in Article 12 of the CRPD in current Australian guardianship legislation. This 
benchmark may be used to measure CRPD compliance in other guardianship 
jurisdictions or potentially with cases from Australian mental health legislation 
involving a loss of decision-making capacity. 
Secondly, the research has identified and analysed all relevant available 
guardianship cases involving accommodation in three Australian guardianship 
jurisdictions. This research is significant as it analyses over 300 guardianship cases 
involving accommodation over almost 7 years since the application of the CRPD in 
Australia. 
Thirdly, the benchmark developed and applied to the cases has noted compliance 
with the CRPD. This analysis has uncovered important trends. These are discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
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Finally, this thesis recommends ways to improve compliance with Article 12 of the 
CRPD, while retaining guardianship legislation, through changes to law, policy and 
practice. These recommendations are based entirely upon the findings and trends 
identified from this research. 
Conclusion 
Australia’s response to Article 12 of the CRPD with its current guardianship regime 
remains a vexed and very important question. Guardianship legislation, while 
professing the maintenance of autonomy, has as its main and possibly only tool, the 
removal of autonomy with its transfer to a substitute decision-maker.31 It is hoped 
that this research will assist in the understanding of current compliance with Article 
12 with a view to increasing compliance by guardianship tribunals with their human 
rights obligations. 
The literature review that immediately follows this introduction will discuss in detail a 
number of concepts briefly mentioned in this introduction. They include adult 
guardianship; a comparison between supported decision-making and guardianship; 
the development of Article 12 of the CRPD and the human rights basis for the 
CRPD; the difference between legal capacity in the CRPD and mental capacity in the 
general law of Australia; and legislative and non-legislative models of supported 
decision-making. 
  
                                            
31
 Terry Carney and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment: Tribunals and popular justice 
(Federation Press, 1997) 55. 
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The Literature Review   
1.1 Initial steps towards supported decision-making 
Adult guardianship is a legal mechanism where another person or entity is appointed 
to make decisions for an adult. There is a corresponding loss of decision-making 
capacity, equivalent to the length and breadth of the appointment. There are various 
terms to describe a guardian. In this literature review the terms ‘substitute’, 
‘surrogate’ or ‘proxy’ will be used interchangeably with the word ‘guardian’. 
Conversely, a supported decision-maker assists the adult to make his/her own 
decisions. It is the adult’s decision and the adult retains full legal decision-making 
capacity. The words ‘assistant’ or ‘supporter’ as well as ‘supported decision-maker’ 
will be used for the role in this review. Guardianship and supported decision-making 
will be further defined in the literature review, particularly in sections 1.3 and 1.7.  
Supported decision-making is a relatively new concept worldwide. It had its main 
origins in the Canadian Association for Community Living (CACL) movement more 
than 20 years ago.32 It has advanced to formalised support systems, incorporated 
within guardianship in a number of Canadian provincial jurisdictions, as well as 
northern Europe.33 
On 13 September 2013 the United Nations CRPD Committee, charged with the 
responsibility for investigating compliance of participating Member States with CRPD 
obligations, reported on compliance by Australia. The CRPD Committee noted 
Australia’s recent inquiry into equal recognition before the law for persons with 
disabilities and legal capacity, but was concerned that guardianship would be 
retained and that there was a lack of a framework for the implementation of 
supported decision-making. 34The CRPD Committee recommended that Australia 
should take immediate steps to replace guardianship legislation with supported 
decision-making.35 
                                            
32
 Canadian Association for Community Living Task Force, 'Alternatives to Guardianship' (CACL, 
August 1992) <http://www.worldenable.net/rights/adhoc3meet_guardianship.htm>; see also Leslie 
Salzman, 'Rethinking Guardianship (again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the 
Integration Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act ' (2010) 81 University of Colorada Law 
Review 74. For a discussion of the Swedish support method of ‘godman’ or ‘good man’ that 
commenced in 1989 discussed later in this chapter at 1.8. 
33
 Circles Network, Circles of support 
<http://www.circlesnetwork.org.uk/index.asp?slevel=0z114z115&parent)id_115>; Sally Richards, 
'Circles of Support' (2008) <http://www.cru.org.au/crutimes/CT38/SR38.doc>; Kim Davis, 'Building 
Support Networks' (2005) 
<http://www.resourcingfaminiles.org.au/index.php/building.support.networks>; Mental Disability 
Advocacy Centre, above n 9. 
34
 United Nations, 'Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Concluding observations on 
the initial report of Australia, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session (2-13 September)' (2013) 
<http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG>. 
35
 Ibid [25], [26]. 
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These comments by the CRPD Committee indicate that the move towards supported 
decision-making, to replace or be in addition to, substituted decision-making, is a 
very important topic on both a national and international level.  It is anticipated that 
this will result in changes to law, policy and practice in the near future. 
In Australia, there are currently no supported decision-making options expressed 
within existing guardianship legislation. The Victorian Law Reform Commission 
(VLRC), in its final report to amend the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 
(VIC), has recommended a number of supported decision-making alternatives for the 
new guardianship legislation.36 Victoria has chosen one legislative method of support 
for their new guardianship legislation,37  which is a tribunal appointed supportive 
guardian. At the time of writing this bill had lapsed with the election of a new 
Victorian parliament and no new Victorian guardianship legislation had been 
introduced into the Victorian parliament.  However, the Powers of Attorney Act 2014 
(VIC) includes the appointment of a supportive attorney to assist the principal 
(grantor of the power) to make their own decisions. The assistance or support is in 
gathering information, communication and in giving effect to the decision.38 This Act 
will be discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis when addressing legislative reforms to 
increase compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD. 
South Australia completed a two-year pilot project on supported decision-making at 
the end of 2012. 39  The ACT has completed a similar, but smaller, supported 
decision-making project in 2013. 40  New South Wales has recommended the 
consideration of supported decision-making in its guardianship legislation, through a 
report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Social Issues. 41  New South 
                                            
36
 Victorian Law Reform Commission, 'Guardianship Final Report Number 24' (VLRC, 2012) 
<http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/Guardianship_FinalReport_Full%20text.pdf>. 
37
 Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC) cl 86-103. 
38
 Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (VIC) Part 7 ss 84-114. As contrasted with guardianship legislation, 
the grantor of the power must have full legal capacity based upon understanding, retention and 
communication in s 4 to appoint a supportive attorney to assist in decision-making. See the 
discussion in chapter 8 of this thesis regarding the relevance of supportive attorneys to Article 12 of 
the CRPD. 
39
 Office of the Public Advocate of South Australia, 'SA supported decision making project August 
2011 update' (2011) <http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/cgi-bin/wf.pl?pid=&hi=&mode=show&fo>. 
40
 Aged and Carer Advocacy Service ACT Disability, 'Spectrums of Support: A Report on a project 
Exploring Supported Decision Making for People with Disability in the ACT' (2013) 
<www.adacas.org.au/decision-support/copy_of_Supported>. 
41
 NSW Parliament Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, 'Substitute decision-
making for people lacking capacity' (Report No. 43, 25 February 2010); NSW Trustee and Guardian, 
'Annual Report 2010-2011' (2011) 
<http://www.tag.nsw.gov.au/verve/_resources/10973_NSWTG_Annual_Report_2011_V15_WEB.pdf>
. 
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Wales has recently completed a small supported decision-making pilot project.42 
Victoria has recently completed a supported decision-making pilot project for 18 
isolated persons in rural Victoria with intellectual disabilities.43 
New South Wales has conducted a parliamentary standing committee inquiry, but 
this has not resulted in Law Commission recommendations or legislative changes for 
supported decision-making. The VLRC made recommendations for legislative reform 
to include a variety of supported measures (see the stepped model in section 1.8).44 
The Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC) has not yet had its 2010 
recommendations accepted by the Queensland Attorney-General. In any event, they 
do not include a supported decision-making regime. 45  The supported decision-
making pilots may lead to legislative changes, but at the time of writing no such 
changes are currently drafted. 
The following paragraphs describe a move towards supported decision-making in 
Australia and overseas. 
In Australia there have been recent moves commensurate with, or in favour of, 
supported decision-making in the National Disability Strategy,46 and in the planning 
for a National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).47 The Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s (ALRC) inquiry into equal recognition before the law incorporating 
Article 12 of the CRPD into Commonwealth laws has recommended incorporating 
supported decision-making. 48  The ALRC condensed its recommendations into 4 
principles derived from Article 12. They are:  
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 Piers Gooding, 'Navigating the Flashing Amber Lights of the right to Legal Capacity in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Responding to Major Concerns' (2015) 
15(1) Human rights Law Review 45; see also Disability & Home Care NSW Government: Family & 
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Decision Making Pilot' (2015) 
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 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, above n 7; see also NSW Trustee and Guardian, above n 
18; see also Office of th Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria Annual 
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 Office of the Public Advocate of South Australia, 'Developing a Model of Practice for Supported 
Decision Making' (Office of the Public Advocate of South Australia, 2011) 
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 Queensland Law Reform Commission, ‘A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws’ (2010) 
<http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au>. 
46
 Commonwealth of Australia, 'National Disability Strategy 2010-2020' (2011) 
<http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our.responsibilities/disability.au>. 
47
 Council of Australian Governments, 'Progress Report: Building a National Disability Insurance 
Scheme' (COAG, 2012) <http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2012-04-
13/docs/NDIS_progress_report.pdf>. 
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 Commission, above n 16. The ALRC recommending full legal capacity, right to support, recognition 
of will and preferences and prevention of conflict of interest and undue influence be incorporated into 
Commonwealth laws and programs. 
24 
 
All adults have an equal right to make decisions that affect their lives and have those 
decisions respected. Second, persons who require support in decision-making must 
be provided with access to the support necessary for them to make, communicate 
and participate in decisions that affect their lives. Third, the will, preferences and 
rights of persons who may require decision-making support must direct decisions 
that affect their lives. Finally, laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate 
safeguards in relation to interventions for persons who may require support including 
preventing abuse and undue influence.49  
0Collectively, these four recommendations have been termed the ‘National decision-making 
principles. 50  These principles will be applied when discussing the ALRC’s approach to 
existing guardianship legislation later in this chapter after considering ‘legal capacity’51and in 
Chapter 2 when considering ‘will and preferences’ and conflict of interest and undue 
influence.52 
In overseas jurisdictions – for example, in British Columbia through its 
Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996 – there are moves towards supported 
decision-making in place of guardianship. 
Briefly, the literature review is divided into a number of thematic topics. In section 
1.2, the background to the CRPD and the rationale for a separate convention for 
persons with disabilities is discussed. Article 12 of the CRPD is introduced as the 
main Article for this thesis, potentially covering guardianship issues. Section 1.3, 
discusses the concept and principles of supported decision-making, as it was 
developed in Canada over 20 years ago. Section 1.4 will look at the current 
guardianship system in Australian jurisdictions. Because of the tension between the 
maintenance of autonomy (self-determination) and the need to protect vulnerable 
adults from abuse, neglect and exploitation, section 1.5 will look at the human rights 
of autonomy and equality in the CRPD, as well as the interrelationship between 
Article 5 of the CRPD (dealing with non-discrimination and equality) and Article 12. 
Section 1.6 will look more closely at Article 12 of the CRPD, to see if guardianship is 
compatible with the CRPD. Arguments are provided for and against the continued 
existence of guardianship, as well as tracing the drafting of Article 12 of the CRPD, 
to understand the intention of the UN drafting committee in the current formulation of 
the Article. In section 1.7, the issue of ‘legal capacity’ under Article 12 of the CRPD is 
canvassed because its meaning may be entirely different from Australian concepts of 
mental capacity that depend upon functioning, or the ability to understand the 
context of what is to be decided.  The last substantive section is 1.8. This provides 
an overview of various supported decision-making models, their risks, safeguards 
and criticisms.   
                                            
49
 Ibid 11. Recommendation 3-1 Principles 1-4. 
50
 Ibid16. Chapter 3 discussion of the National decision-making principles. 
51
 See this discussion at 1.7 infra. 
52
 See the discussion at Chapter 2.3 in relation to obtaining the benchmark criteria and important 
features. 
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1.2 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
This section will examine the background to the CRPD, the effect of its ratification for 
Australia, the justifications for a new convention and an introduction to Article 12 of 
the convention.  
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the first UN 
convention of the twenty-first century. It covers the largest minority group in the 
world, comprising over 650 million persons. It was the quickest convention to be 
drafted and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, taking less 
than five years until its assent by the General Assembly of the UN on 13 December 
2006. It is the first convention to use electronic media and the internet for drafting 
and submissions. It is also the first UN convention to involve non-government 
organisations and disability groups in its extensive consultations and drafting.53  
Australia was among the first 80 countries to sign the CRPD when it opened for 
signature on 30 March 2007. Signature does not officially bind Australia to the 
convention but sets up parliamentary debate concerning the next stage for becoming 
ratified.54 Australia ratified the CRPD on 17 July 2008 and became bound by its 
Optional Protocol on 21 August 2009. 55  This ratification binds Australia on an 
international basis to the convention, and the Optional Protocol allows individual 
complaints to be taken to the CRPD Committee for resolution.56  
Unlike the United States of America, where simple ratification of a convention allows 
enforceable domestic remedies, ratification of a convention in Australia does not until 
domestic legislation has been enacted to give force to the convention.57 Federal anti-
discrimination legislation is an example of binding domestic law that has 
incorporated international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Since the High 
Court decision in Teoh’s case,58  there has been a doctrine of implied rights or 
legitimate expectation. This doctrine means a person has a right to expect Australia 
to follow an international convention it has ratified, rather than disregard it. 
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Unfortunately, Australia’s record regarding compliance with international treaties 
(mainly in the areas of migration, refugees and children’s rights in administrative 
decisions) has been especially poor during the term of office of recent Australian 
governments. 59  Furthermore, the High Court has taken a more conservative 
approach to implied rights since the retirement in 1995 of Sir Anthony Mason CJ.60 
The history of the CRPD suggests that it was formulated for a number of reasons, 
even though it creates no new human rights for persons with disabilities.61 Two main 
reasons are given in the literature for its establishment. Firstly, because the 
International Bill of Rights (which comprises the 1948 UN Declaration of Human 
Rights; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) did not specifically 
mention persons with disabilities, the CRPD has increased their visibility and brought 
issues for persons with disabilities to the fore. 
Secondly, it has provided specificity (that is, specific applications to persons with 
disabilities) in defining how the convention should apply.  62 By having a specific 
convention with a committee to monitor Member States’ compliance, there is some 
assurance that persons with disabilities will not be forgotten.63 Specificity emerges 
from the drafting of the individual Articles. For example, Article 9 of the CRPD 
describes the removal of physical and attitudinal barriers to allow equal participation. 
Article 21 of the CRPD considers the right to information and does so by specifying 
braille and sign language for persons with sensory impairements.64 
 A third justification postulated by Gerard Quinn is the requirement of 
accommodations from governments, rather than relying upon charity and welfare, to 
achieve substantive equality and provide supports to exercise legal capacity. 65 This 
can be demonstrated in the equality paradigm, to be discussed below in section 1.5, 
where immediate accommodations are required by a Member State to achieve 
actual (substantive) equality and not simply the removal of attitudinal barriers to 
achieve formal equality.   
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Over the past century three models have been utilised to describe the treatment of 
disabilities: the medical model, the social welfare model, and the human rights/social 
model of disability. The medical model looks at the individual as the cause of 
disability, deserving of treatment. If the person’s impairment cannot be treated this 
may be cause for institutionalisation and the removal of rights.66 The second model 
of disability is social welfare, whereby persons with disabilities are considered 
objects of pity and recipients of welfare, with no entitlement to enforceable rights. 
This has been a justification for sheltered workshops and was a model for disability 
during the formulation of discrimination law currently in existence in Australia.67 
The CRPD takes a social and human rights approach to disability, rather than a 
medical or welfare model. The social model has society as the cause of the disability 
rather than the individual.68 Under this model the problem does not lie with the 
individual’s disability but with the state for creating the disability. For example, if a 
building has no stairs, mobility impairment may not be a disability. This approach is 
combined with the notion that people with disabilities are citizens with enforceable 
rights, rather than objects of pity and charity. These aspects create the human rights 
paradigm, or human rights model of disability found in the CRPD.   
It is important to obtain substantive equality for persons with disabilities because the 
disability itself creates the need for accommodations.69 It is insufficient to treat a 
person with a disability equally to a person without a disability to achieve equality; 
something more is needed – accommodations are required to achieve substantive 
equality. Formal equality would treat a person with a disability exactly the same as a 
person without a disability. Substantive equality may require different treatment 
(accommodations such as an elevator to enter a building with steps) to achieve 
actual equality. The concept of disability has moved away from notions of formal 
equality towards one of universality, and substantive equality through the celebration 
of difference and the removal of barriers through the provision of accommodations.70 
Article 12 of the CRPD – Equal Recognition before the Law 
The main article in the Convention dealing with legal capacity and potential 
guardianship issues is Article 12, which consists of five sub-clauses: 
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law. 
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2. States Parties shall recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal 
capacity. 
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of 
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent 
abuse in accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards 
shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect 
the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest 
and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s 
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular 
review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. 
The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures 
affect the person’s rights and interests. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this Article, States Parties shall take all 
appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal rights of persons with 
disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and 
to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial 
credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily 
deprived of their property.71 
Gerard Quinn has called Article 12 of the CRPD the most important article in the 
convention, and the platform for the exercise of personhood (decision-making 
ability).72 It is a move away from guardianship to a provision of support to exercise 
legal capacity. In the CRPD, recognition as a person before the law is antecedent to 
the exercise of all other rights. Until that recognition occurs, persons do not have the 
capacity to exercise other rights in the CRPD such as a right to life, liberty, justice or 
freedom from torture.73 This right is something that a person has from birth until 
death, and distinguishes human beings from slaves without the right to life or 
freedom from torture.   
The implications of this Article will be considered later in the Literature Review, after 
addressing guardianship and supported decision-making in more detail. 
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1.3 Supported Decision-Making Compared to Guardianship 
This section commences by describing in more detail the distinction between 
guardianship and supported decision-making. It then goes on to provide the 
principles and theory behind supported decision-making, laying a foundation for later 
subsections.   
Guardianship occurs when a substitute decision-maker is appointed to make a 
decision for another person, usually with a disability. With such an appointment a 
person will lose decision-making capacity, albeit for a specified period in a specified 
area.74 
In contrast, supported decision-making may be seen as a community-based model 
of support, where a person with cognitive disabilities is assisted to make and 
communicate his or her own decisions, rather than have this ability transferred to a 
substitute or guardian. The person retains decision-making capacity at all times, 
whereas, under the traditional guardianship model, this capacity is lost through the 
appointment of a guardian.75 
Browning, Bigby and Douglas describe three meanings of supported decision-
making. 76  First, it is used as a process of providing support to exercise legal 
capacity, where there is no appointed guardian and the individual retains full legal 
capacity. Further, it is used as an end result to distinguish it from guardianship. 
Finally, it could occur when an appointed guardian provides support for the individual 
to make their own decisions. In this last case legal capacity has been transferred 
from the individual to the guardian. I agree with the first two meanings of supported-
decision-making given by Browning, Bigby and Douglas as they are consistent with 
the United Nations interpretation of the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with 
others in all aspects of life.77 However, the final meaning of supported decision-
making requires a transfer of decision-making ability to a substitute (guardian). This 
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is not supported decision-making for this thesis. It is only the decision of the guardian 
that will enable the individual to exercise autonomy. There is nothing to prevent the 
guardian from making a decision against the inidvidual’s will and preferences. 
A further model is co-decision-making. This involves a joint decision being made with 
another person where some decision-making ability is lost: the individual does not 
make the decision on his/her own. Lana Kerzner classifies this as neither supported 
or substituted decision-making, but a hybrid form of decision-making with elements 
of support and substitution.78 
The principles of supported decision-making can largely be traced to the seminal 
work by the Canadian Task Force on Independent Living, of which Michael Bach 
was a founding member and continues to be the executive director.79   
The principles are: 
1. All adults have the right of self-determination; to be supported to make 
decisions with the assistance of trusted others. 
2. All persons have a will and are capable of making choices. 
3. Persons with disabilities have a right to be supported in communication, 
understanding material, gathering information, explaining choices, 
understanding will and preferences, and communicating decisions. 
4. Decisions are interdependent. Persons without decision-making disabilities 
normalise their decision-making process by relying on others for information 
and advice. 
5. Persons have a right to refuse support. 
6. The essential element of support is a trusted relationship with one person or a 
network of persons. 
7. If a person is isolated and has no support network, the government has a duty 
to provide resources to develop a network. 
8. The individual chooses the supporter or support network; it is not forced upon 
the individual. 
9. There must be no undue influence or conflict of interest between the individual 
and the supporter. 
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10. A monitoring or appeal structure should be in place, not to override the 
decisions of the individual but to ensure freedom from conflict of interest or 
undue influence by the supporter.80  
These principles are mentioned as guidance for an understanding of supported 
decision-making in later sections of this review. They are the traditional viewpoint of 
supported decision-making. They nearly comprise the opinion of the writer, with the 
exception that occasionally not every person’s will and preferences are capable of 
ascertainment.81 
The first description of the elements of supported decision-making comes from the 
original and seminal work in this area by the CACL. The second, developed by other 
writers, is included to demonstrate the importance of communication as a universal 
feature of humanity.  
1. All human beings communicate. 
2. Everyone expresses responses to an experience. These can become clear 
preferences with support. 
3. The preferences and choices are the building blocks of decisions. 
4. Everyone uses support networks when making difficult decisions. 
5. Everyone can make their own decisions with support.82 A key factor is that at 
least one person is able to ascertain the will and preferences of another 
person.83  
It is through communication that intent, will, preferences and choice may be derived. 
Communication is a link to determining the will of an individual.  The inclusion of this 
restatement of supported decision-making is to illustrate the importance of human 
beings as social animals who communicate, formulate preferences, and generally 
have a will that is capable of ascertainment. 
In order to understand the types of support mentioned in the CACL principle No 3 
above, the right to support, it is necessary to more fully describe what is meant by 
support,84 as compared and contrasted with the role of a guardian. Support may 
range from the provision of interpreters, communication aids, assistance in gathering 
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information, understanding material, going over choices, ascertaining a will and 
preference and communicating a will, intent and decision to third parties.85 
An appointed guardian has a number of factors to consider and apply when making 
a decision for an individual. The guardian considers the wishes of the person, their 
interests, and their participation in the community, maintenance of supportive family 
relationships, cultural and community values and least restrictive alternatives. A 
guardian may include the person in the decision-making process, make the decision 
the way the individual would have, or in some cases allow the individual to make the 
decision. Although the wishes of the individual are required to be taken into account 
by the guardian it is a substituted decision of the guardian.86 The guardian’s decision 
may be the way the individual would have made without a guardian (substituted 
judgement) but it is frequently overridden by the welfare and best interests 
considerations in the opinion of the appointed guardian. 
Substituted judgement is where the guardian makes the decision the way the 
individual would have made it if they had the ability to do so. Substituted judgement 
is theoretically the individual’s decision made by the guardian. This is contrasted to 
‘best interests’, which is what the guardian thinks is best for the individual, despite 
the individual having different opinions or wishes. A review of the literature on best 
interests and substituted judgement will be considered in the next subsection. The 
point is raised here to distinguish guardianship from supported decision-making. The 
fundamental difference is: the decision becomes that of the guardian, whereas with 
supported decision-making it is always the decision of the individual. 
1.4 Current Australian Guardianship: Autonomy versus 
Protection 
This section traces the rationale for the development of the current Australian 
guardianship model. It mentions the features that apply to every guardianship 
jurisdiction in Australia, and how this system goes some way to achieving autonomy 
for persons with decision-making difficulties. It also mentions protection from abuse 
as a human right and the tension this causes when a guardian is appointed. The 
section illustrates the partial preservation of autonomy rights under a present 
Australian guardianship regime that does not include supported decision-making. 
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This gap in Australian guardianship legislation will become more evident in the 
remaining sections of the Literature Review and in the body of the thesis. 
Prior to the introduction of the first modern guardianship statute in Victoria in 1986,87 
the appointment of a guardian could only be made by the Supreme Court of a 
territory or state in Australia. This was a costly, infrequently used, and time 
consuming process. 88  New South Wales had the greatest number of these 
appointments, being 80 over a 60-year period, until 1987, when its new guardianship 
legislation was enacted.89 Each Supreme Court was vested with guardianship power 
as its parens patriae (parent of the nation) jurisdiction.90   
During this period many persons with intellectual disabilities and psychosocial 
impairments were placed in institutions. Decisions were made for them and there 
was little or no perceived need for the appointment of a substitute decision-maker.91 
This was in contrast to a statutory and automatic process of a person with a psycho-
social disability coming under the protection of a state public trustee—a process of 
certification by two doctors could lead to automatic control of finances by the state 
Public Trustee.92 
De-institutionalisation in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s brought a perceived 
need for guardianship legislation, to protect the interests of persons with intellectual 
and psychosocial impairments who were residing in the community. This was made 
clear by the Cocks Report in 1982. 93  From 1986-2000, all eight Australian 
jurisdictions formulated new guardianship legislation based on the Cocks model. 
This legislation had a number of common features, including the following: 
1. A tribunal system (except for the Northern Territory). This system generally 
has no fees, is accessible, and is not bound by the rules of evidence or 
procedure. Lawyers are generally not required for hearings. Limited, as well 
as plenary, orders can be made that are reviewable and finite, with the adult 
able to participate at the hearing and able to seek review. 
2. A separation between guardianship, personal and health matters, and 
administration (financial matters), with statutory bodies as guardian and 
administrator of last resort. The statutory guardian does not charge a fee. 
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3. Formulation of a set of general principles that include a least restrictive option, 
best interest and wishes of the adult (to be discussed later in this section).94 
It has been stated that Australia’s guardianship tribunal system is the envy of many 
overseas jurisdictions, due to the free accessible tribunal system and the availability 
of statutory guardians of last resort.95 Many overseas jurisdictions charge substantial 
fees for the court hearing, capacity assessment and payment for the guardian, all to 
be met out of the adult’s funds.96  
Writers such as Hommel and Glass are of the opinion that autonomy is preserved or 
protected by the very things that Australia has achieved with its guardianship reform 
in the late twentieth century. Autonomy is achieved by allowing limited orders, 
reviewable by the person, applying for a finite period and with procedural fairness for 
the individual. This is considered to be preserving the right of self-determination.97   
In contrast to the significant attempts to preserve autonomy in Australian 
guardianship legislation, countries such as Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary have 
guardianship orders that are plenary, indefinite, non-reviewable by the adult, and 
remove many civil and political rights.98 Such restrictions are not limited to Eastern 
Europe. In the USA, guardianship orders are often plenary, may not be reviewable 
by the adult, and result in a loss of voting rights in 42 states.99 It is evident that in 
many countries across the world, guardianship results in a very extreme or near total 
loss of autonomy rights. This is not the case in Australia. 
It has been suggested that autonomy is not an all or nothing concept. Just as there is 
a sliding scale of cognition and cognitive ability, there can be a sliding scale of 
autonomy.100 In order to protect from abandonment or neglect, Holland postulates 
that minimal restrictions on autonomy are needed for protection, while autonomy in 
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other areas is preserved.101 There is a delicate balance between autonomy rights 
and a need to protect an adult from abuse, neglect and exploitation.102  
The concept of a sliding scale of autonomy has been advanced by Browning, Bigby 
and Douglas with a notion of ‘shared capacity’.103 Capacity is ascertained with the 
provision of supports. Autonomy is no longer ‘all or nothing,’ by providing support, 
autonomy will be reached for all but a few cases. Persons in a coma or advanced 
dementia may be unable to be supported under this model. 
Barbara Carter has expressed the view on behalf of the OPA in Victoria that the 
underlying concept is dignity of the adult, and the right to be protected from abuse, 
neglect and exploitation in Article 16 of the CRPD, is as important a human right as 
autonomy in Article 12. 104  It has also been postulated that autonomy may be 
enhanced through the appointment of a guardian while balancing and maintaining 
protection from abuse. This abuse may occur in a situation where there is an overly 
restrictive family network, which prevents the wishes of the adult from being 
recognised.105 A guardian may also be able to prevent sexual abuse or allow medical 
treatment. This may both preserve dignity and prevent abuse. 106  The tension 
between autonomy and protection is the classic question for guardianship, which a 
review of the literature has not resolved.107   
The general principles of the guardianship acts in Australia are designed to preserve 
autonomy in two ways. First, by adopting a least restrictive approach, an 
appointment is not made unless absolutely necessary.108 For example, if a person 
has cognitive deficits but informal supports are working, then following this principle 
no appointment is made.109 
The second means of preserving autonomy under the general principles is the 
reliance on the wishes of the adult. This is called a substituted judgement test. The 
guardian (substitute) makes the decision the way the adult would. This is to be 
contrasted with the best interest test, where the guardian makes the decision with 
the best interests of the adult in mind.110 It has been argued that the substituted 
judgement test best preserves the individual’s autonomy and any legislative reform 
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should reflect this change, as the preservation of a best interest principle and the 
wishes of the adult (substituted judgement) may be in conflict.111 Danuta Mendelson 
suggests an alternative view: substituted judgement is based upon the views, 
emotions, values and experiences of the guardian and will not be the wishes of the 
individual; therefore, a best interest approach is more appropriate.112 In Queensland, 
the general principles do not have a best interest test but the general principle 
incorporating substituted judgement has a care and protection provision, which the 
former president of the tribunal considered, to enable a best interest approach.113 It 
is the opinion of Harmon 114  that the best interest and substituted judgement 
approaches are decisions of the guardian and will be affected by the guardian’s 
experiences, values and judgements. As these may not be the values, experiences 
and judgements of the adult, the result could be a restriction of autonomy. I agree 
with this later opinion. 
A tension exists between autonomy and protection. Guardianship legislation goes 
some way towards preserving autonomy rights, while protecting from abuse, neglect 
and exploitation. However, it is not evident from surveying the  literature whether the 
rights to autonomy and dignity in the Convention can be preserved to any greater 
extent by supported decision-making, while still maintaining the same (or greater) 
protection for the adult against abuse, neglect and exploitation. There is a need for 
research reviewing the efficacy of overseas models of supported decision-making.115 
1.5 The Human Rights Rationale for Supported Decision-Making 
This section considers the normative values of dignity, autonomy and equality in the 
CRPD, from the standpoint of those groups and individuals who seek supported 
decision-making as a complete replacement for guardianship. It also highlights a 
current excessive use of guardianship that may further reduce the human rights of 
dignity and autonomy by being a more, rather than less, restrictive option. 
Human rights can be classified as positive or negative. For example, those in the 
major human rights convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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Rights, 116  are predominantly negative or civil rights; that is, rights designed to 
prevent the unnecessary and arbitrary intrusion of power by a state. Such rights 
include a right to life, and freedom of speech, religion and assembly. This is 
contrasted with the concept of positive rights found in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.117 These rights require something to be done 
by the State Member; for example, to provide accommodation, health, education and 
employment.118 The CRPD contains civil and political as well as economic, social 
and cultural rights.   These rights are construed by writers as a mixture of positive 
(economic, social and cultural rights) and negative (civil and political rights), with a 
potential for all to be immediately realisable.119 
Dignity as the underlying basis for human rights 
Human rights are said to be fundamental, individual, inalienable, international and 
normative. The source of human rights is the dignity (self worth and self respect)120 
as a human being of every individual. 121  Barbara Carter views dignity as the 
underlying basis of guardianship legislation.122 She approves of Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities argument, based on the dignity of every individual’s worth, that 
underlying the theory of justice for persons with disabilities is a positive duty to 
provide capabilities. These capabilities are based upon an amalgam of positive and 
negative, civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights, all immediately 
realisable. For example, Nussbaum’s first capability is the right to live a full life of 
normal lifespan.123 Generally – economic, social and cultural rights such as the right 
to work, health or accommodations are only progressively realisable,124 whereas, 
civil and political rights such as the right to life, non-discrimination or freedom from 
torture are immediately realisable.125  
Guardianship is said by Martha Nussbaum to be a social good.126  I do not share her 
views of guardianship as a social good based upon Nussbaum’s capabilities 
argument because they appear to be subsumed within the wider concept of 
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autonomy in the CRPD.  The view of Amartya Kumar Sen, who describes living a life 
that is full within the constraints or capabilities of a disability,127 has developed a 
concept of capabilities similar to Nussbaum. Sen argues that a person with a 
sensory or cognitive disability should be able to enjoy life within the limits or 
capabilities of his or her disability. I agree with this argument of Sen but I do not see 
capabilities as a basis for human rights. The capabilities theory  appears to add little 
more than the human rights enumerated in various Articles of the CRPD. Their 
views, however, were formulated prior to the CRPD. I do however believe that the 
capabilities argument strengthens the position of dignity as the source or foundation 
for all human rights. There is dignity in being able to exercise rights expressed under 
the CRPD to the extent of individual capabilities. 
Autonomy 
The imposition of a guardian removes part or all of the ability of the individual to 
exercise autonomy and self-determination over their own lives. This was one of the 
prime considerations for the removal of any form of wording signifying the 
continuation of guardianship in the CRPD; namely, that substituted decision-making 
is in conflict with the general principles of the CRPD, and supported decision-making 
is the only model that is consistent with self-determination.128 
The main catalyst for the paradigm shift in the CRPD away from substituted 
decision-making and towards supported decision-making was evidence of abuses of 
plenary guardianship provided by the International Disability Caucus (IDC) to the Ad 
Hoc Committee meetings for the drafting of the CRPD.129 This demonstrated how 
human rights abuses of guardianship could result in near total loss of civil and 
political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. For example, in 
eastern Europe and numerous other regions of the world, guardianship may mean 
the loss of the right to vote, hold political office, hold property, marry, and choose 
employment and accommodation. There may be no review rights of the decisions to 
appoint a guardian.130 Minkowitz terms this state of affairs ‘civil annihilation’.131 While 
there is no commensurate abolition of civil and political rights with guardianship in 
Australia, there may be a partial or total loss of self-determination.132 Though the 
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best decisions may be those made by the individual and not a substitute,133 there is 
an arguement that it must be possible to ascertain the will and preferences of the 
individual. 
Following the least restrictive alternative principle, Australian guardianship legislation 
generally appoints a guardian as a last resort.134 However, if guardianship is to be a 
last resort, there must be a first resort. It follows, by the right to support created by 
Article 12(3) of the CRPD,135  the first resort is to support or assist a person to make 
his/her own decisions.136 
Guardianship legislation in Australia, with its lack of alternatives, forms a paradox. 
On one hand it professes to promote human rights, autonomy, dignity and freedom. 
On the other hand it has as its main, or possibly only legal alternative, the stripping 
away of legal rights with the appointment of a substitute decision-maker.137  For 
example, section 6 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) has as its 
purpose the preservation of autonomy, yet there are no supported decision-making 
options available for the tribunal: only a limited order or no order is available for the 
preservation of autonomy.138 
Equality and non-discrimination 
The CRPD provides rights to equality and non-discrimination. These rights are 
important in a discussion of Article 12. Anti-discrimination has been treated as a civil 
and political right that means it is justiciable, immediately realisable and negative.139   
Equality rights in Article 5 interrelate with Article 12 of the CRPD. The duty to provide 
reasonable accommodations (adjustments) can be used to justify the provision of 
supports to exercise legal capacity in Article 12.140 Thus the duty to provide supports 
to exercise legal capacity is inextricably linked to the duty to provide 
accommodations (adjustments) in Article 5 of the CRPD. 
The drafting of Article 5 of the CRPD was controversial.141 This was because anti-
discrimination was seen as a civil and political right which is immediately justiciable. 
This means that through the use of ‘reasonable accommodation’, as contained in 
Article 5(3) and defined in Article 2 of the CRPD, support rights in Article 12 could be 
immediately enforceable. 
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Generally, civil and political rights have been viewed as negative, justiciable and of 
immediate application. On the other hand, economic, social and cultural rights were 
seen as non-justiciable, progressive and positive.142 There is now a blurring of this 
distinction in the CRPD; many of the rights are seen as hybrid, containing civil and 
political, economic, social and cultural in the same Article. For example, Article 12(1), 
(2) and (3), which address legal capacity and the right to receive supports to 
exercise this right, may be viewed as civil and political; while Article 12(4) and (5), 
relating to the provision of safeguards and the right to hold property, may be 
economic and social.143 It has been suggested there is no longer a clear distinction 
between civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights.144   
A fusion or blurring of the distinction between civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights will make it possible to utilise Article 5 to immediately obtain 
accommodations. These accommodations will be through Article 5(3) to the limit of 
proportionality or undue hardship in Article 2 of the CRPD, rather than to wait for 
progressive realisation in Article 4(2) of the CRPD.145 
Article 5 of the CRPD has four important elements. First, Article 5(1) reinforces legal 
personality or the ability to be a rights-bearing person, commensurate with Article 
12(1).146 
This demonstrates the relationship between Article 12 and Article 5; namely, that a 
person with a disability is a person with legal rights. These rights exist from birth until 
death and enable the foundation for all other rights.147 This is a right recognised in 
Article 6 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16 of the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Second, there is the non-discrimination paradigm consistent with all UN conventions 
in Article 5(2). This is important for challenging the status model of guardianship or 
appointing a substitute, simply because of the presence of an irrelevant physical or 
sensory disability.148  
The third importance is the duty to provide accommodations to the extent of undue 
hardship in Article 5(3) and Article 2 of the CRPD. Undue hardship is a concept from 
anti-discrimination law that sets a limit to the extent to which accommodations are 
required. In the CRPD these accommodations must not be an undue or 
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disproportionate burden. 149  Bach and Kerzner, and others, argue that the 
combination of the duty to provide reasonable accommodations in Article 5(3), and 
the requirement to provide supports to exercise legal capacity, places an obligation 
upon governments to provide supports.150 French speaks of the inter-relationship 
between Article 5 and Article 12 as the most important in the convention.151 Because 
of the positive duty to provide accommodations in Article 12(3), these 
accommodations may be in the form of supports to exercise legal capacity in Article 
12(3) of the CRPD. Without the positive obligation to provide accommodations, there 
may be little or no duty upon Member States to provide supports for persons with 
disabilities who require them to exercise decision-making capacity. By considering 
‘support’ as an accommodation or adjustment, one finds the duty to provide 
immediate accommodations or supports from Article 5(3) of the CRPD. 
The final point of Article 5 comes from Article 5(4) that allows affirmative action, 
positive action, or special measures to exist to favour a person or group with 
disabilities in order to overcome the effects of past discrimination. This may enable 
greater supports to be provided as well as greater access measures for persons with 
disabilities. 152  Therefore, Article 5 of the CRPD, providing a non-discrimination 
paradigm and a general duty to provide accommodations or adjustments, is closely 
linked to Article 12 as the driving force for a specific accommodation. This 
accommodation is the provision of supports to exercise legal capacity. 
The excessive use of Australian guardianship legislation 
A worrying aspect raised by the review of current guardianship legislation is that it is 
being excessively utilised for reasons not supported by the legislation, with the effect 
of reducing autonomy. While some Australian government organisations,153 as well 
as individuals, are currently of the opinion that Australia’s guardianship legislation is 
close to compliance with the normative values and requirements of the CRPD, it 
would seem that the least restrictive approach means that guardianship tribunals are 
hesitant to appoint guardians, tending to allow the continuation of existing informal 
decision-making and supports if they are sufficient to protect the individual from 
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abuse, neglect and exploitation. 154  The ‘least restrictive’ approach may not be 
currently adopted by Australian guardianship tribunals. 
There is however the demographic argument that Australia’s aging population and 
low fertility rate has led to and will continue to drive an increasing need for adult 
guardianship.155 The aging population leads to increases in age-related cognitive 
disabilities, such as dementia. The rate of Alzheimer’s disease is anticipated to rise 
10% every 10 years with a corresponding increase in the need for guardianship 
appointments.156 
This view can be contrasted with Dearn’s view that there has been an explosion of 
guardianship appointments, which are being used as a legal risk avoidance 
technique by service providers.157 State bodies and residential facilities are often 
only willing to deal with a legally appointed substitute decision-maker to avoid legal 
risk. For example, in Victoria, guardianship appointments increased from 225 in 1988 
to 1574 in 2008. These figures may be explained by de-institutionalisation, lack of 
advocacy and services, and risk avoidance.158 From the inception of its Guardianship 
and Administration Tribunal in 2000, Queensland has experienced an even greater 
explosion in guardianship appointments, where only 20 per cent of applications for 
guardianship have come from family members; the vast majority are initiated by 
social workers and service providers as a risk management issue. This is not the 
least restrictive alternative.159 This issue will be addressed in Chapter 6 of the thesis, 
which will deal with Queensland guardianship cases involving accommodation.  
There is a paucity of literature and research on how current Australian guardianship 
legislation and cases comply with supported decision-making which upholds the 
normative principles of dignity, autonomy and equality in the CRPD.  
1.6 Article 12 of the CRPD: Can Guardianship Still Exist? 
Article 12 of the CRPD was the most contentious section of the convention during 
the drafting period; its meaning remained controversial to the very last day before the 
adoption of the convention in 2006.160 The Article engendered arguments both for 
and against the continued existence of guardianship. In its present form Article 12 
only mentions supports; it does not mention guardianship. The discussion 
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commences with the drafting of the CRPD, as guardianship was originally in the text 
but removed in the final draft of the convention. 
Following the Third Ad Hoc Committee meeting, which came together for the specific 
purpose of drafting the CRPD, a working text of the convention was developed using 
the terms ‘legal representative’ and ‘guardianship’ within the formal text of paragraph 
2(b). ‘Legal representative’ was highly criticised by the International Disability 
Caucus (IDC) as being a ‘term of art’, meaning a substitute decision-maker.161   
Much of the debate during the Fifth Ad Hoc Committee meeting in January and 
February 2005 was devoted to the subject of guardianship and legal capacity. 
Broadly, there were two lines of argument. On one side were disability organisations 
that comprised the International Disability Caucus (IDC), including the Hungarian 
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (MDAC) and the Worldwide Network of Users and 
Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP). IDC was able to point to the human rights abuses 
of guardianship through the years. The caucus included a number of outspoken 
individuals such as Tina Minkowitz, Gabor Gombos, Gerard Quinn, David Webb and 
Amita Dhanda. Their philosophy was that the support model for decision-making 
could be used to tackle every situation: a person should not have a cognitive deficit 
impede his or her legal capacity; they should be allowed to make bad decisions from 
which genius might emerge.162 The ‘genius’ argument, propounded by IDC, is not a 
new one. It was suggested in 1972 that people with disabilities should be free to 
make bad decisions as part of a dignity of risk; everyone is able to learn and grow 
from one’s mistakes.163 
A contrasting opinion was held by Australia, China, Russia, Arabic states and certain 
Australian community organisations such as People with Disability Australia Inc 
(PWD) and the National Association of Community Legal Centres (NACLC 
Australia). It was thought that the retention of guardianship or substituted decision-
making was necessary as a human right to protect persons with the most severe 
disabilities, or persons at risk of harm and abuse from a spouse or family member. It 
was submitted it was wrong to assume that persons with disabilities would have 
someone to assist with medical and dental decisions, or that a trusted family 
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member would not subject the person to physical or financial harm. This group 
wanted guardianship retained with safeguards.164 
Following the Sixth Ad Hoc Session, the chair of the CRPD Ad Hoc Committee 
incorporated submissions made to the committee and created a new text. Canada 
had developed a new Article 12 omitting all references to guardianship and 
substituted decision-making. It had the support of the USA, Australia, Lichtenstein 
and Costa Rica. This became the final text of Article 12, following a vote of the 
Eighth Ad Hoc Committee Meeting.165  
However, some nations, including Russia, China and the Arab Member States, 
thought Article 12 was too contentious and it should have left the issue of capacity to 
the Member States.166 Following the Seventh Ad Hoc Session those states inserted 
a footnote to Article 12, stating the meaning for those states was that legal capacity 
meant the capacity to have rights, but not necessarily to exercise those rights. The 
footnote was dropped upon the insistence of the president of the European Union 
(EU) – capacity should mean the same thing in all countries and a Member State 
could place a reservation upon ratification. Gombos indicated the passage of the 
CRPD would have taken a further five to six years without the resolution of Article 12 
in favour of its current meaning, rather than a restricted meaning for different 
member States.167 
Therefore, the present text version of Article 12 of the CRPD does not make any 
reference to guardianship or substituted decision-making. One view of this is 
because every instance of substitution removes legal capacity. Dhanda argues that 
there are a few difficult situations, such as a person in a coma or advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease, but to include substitution in Article 12 would be to open the 
floodgates for only marginal or questionable gain.168 I do not agree. In a few extreme 
cases, such as advanced Alzheimer’s disease, a person can only be assisted by 
guardianship. 
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Critics have raised a number of arguments for the position that any substitution, 
surrogacy or guardianship is not allowed by the CRPD.169 
First, substituted decision-making was in the original draft of the CRPD, but was 
clearly removed in the final draft. Supported decision-making is the only paradigm 
that is consistent with the general principles of the CRPD including autonomy, self-
determination and dignity, found in Article 3 and sub paragraph (n) of the preamble 
to the CRPD.170 Such an interpretation may be confirmed by the CRPD Committee’s 
recent reports on CRPD compliance by the governments of Spain, Tunisia, China, 
Peru, Argentina, El Salvador, Australia and Hungary171 where directions were given 
to replace guardianship with supported decision-making.172 It appears that significant 
reliance has been placed upon submissions from the International Disability Alliance 
(IDA) in rejecting the continuation of guardianship regimes.173 The CRPD Committee 
has provided its final report to Australia’s initial CRPD compliance. They recommend 
supported decision-making as a mechanism to protect the autonomy, will and 
preferences of an individual over the continuation of guardianship.174 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its final report Equality, Capacity 
and Disability in Commonwealth Laws has recommended the inclusion of full or 
universal legal capacity and the provision of supports to exercise legal capacity in its 
first recommendation.175 This includes revision of Commonwealth laws including the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), Social Security and Aged care 
legislation. 176  Carney has outlined and criticised the difficulties that accompany 
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compliance with universal or full legal capacity in Article 12 of the CRPD.177 There 
will be a need to change terminology, an increased need for services and a greater 
or lesser need for adult guardianship with Commonwealth compliance to Article 12 of 
the CRPD.178 Although these Commonwealth issues are of great importance, they 
will not be examined by this thesis, which is concerned with Australian State and 
Territory guardianship cases and legislation. However, individual funding available 
with the NDIS may lead to greater acceptance of the principles of supported 
decision-making contained in Article 12 of the CRPD. This issue will be further 
discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
Second, the critics argue that support may range from zero to 100 per cent, and that 
even in the difficult cases of profound intellectual impairment, coma, loss of 
consciousness, and advanced Alzheimer’s disease or Huntington’s disease, it is 
possible to support a person to make his/her own decision. All that is required is the 
ascertainment of a will or preference that might be attained by providing a support 
network to a person who is institutionalised or isolated.179 Quinn postulates that the 
ascertainment of a will may be gained by an analysis of neurological transmissions in 
the brain.180  
Bach and Kerzner have suggested three status situations for decision-making.181 
The first is autonomous, where the person is able and without assistance, to 
understand the nature and effect of a decision for a particular matter and needs little 
or no assistance. The second is the supported model, where the paramount 
requirement is to elucidate an intention. In this case, there must be at least one 
person who is able to identify a will and preference for the supported individual. The 
final situation is the facilitated one: there is no person able to identify a will and 
preference of the individual. In the facilitated state another person makes the 
decision (facilitator). This is not substitution because the individual retains legal 
capacity and supports, and accommodations are provided to raise the status level to 
supported or autonomous. The facilitated status is, according to Bach and Kerzner, a 
temporary fluctuating status that can be supported.   
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This concept of a facilitated status has been adopted in Ireland in legislation.182 A 
facilitator is appointed by a court or tribunal, if it is not possible to ascertain the will or 
intention of a person. The facilitator will exercise substituted judgement by 
interviewing the person, and all persons close to him/her, to ascertain the person’s 
will and preferences. Minkowitz and others argue that all disability situations are 
capable of being handled through the supported model. However, Minkowitz does 
not identify how the difficult cases can be supported.183 
I do not agree entirely with the facilitated approach to the most difficult disability 
situations. I agree more with Gordon’s opinion that different disability situations call 
for different responses for guardianship and support.184 I am of the opinion that in 
some respects the ‘facilitated’ status is merely a ‘term of art’, when it is actually a 
substituted decision with a consequent loss of legal capacity. This concept maintains 
the notion that all persons above majority maintain full legal capacity within the 
meaning of Article 12 of the CRPD (capacity for rights and capacity to exercise these 
rights), irrespective of the level of disability. The facilitated status may work for a 
person with an intellectual impairment, isolated without a support group, but may not 
work for a person in the late stages of Alzheimer’s disease or in a permanent 
vegetative state. There are some instances where a condition has no prospects of 
improvement and any decision is simply a decision of the substitute. This issue will 
be explored further in section 1.7. 
The third argument put by those who argue that the CRPD does not permit 
guardianship, is that all the safeguards expressed in Article 12(4) of the CRPD can 
be expressed as safeguards for a supported decision-making regime.185 Identifying 
the rights will and preferences of a person or substituted judgement is not substituted 
decision-making or guardianship, but a specific support measure.186 It is my opinion 
that the safeguards provided in Article 12(4) can be applied to both substituted and 
supported decision-making. The measures that are to apply for the shortest time 
possible and subject to regualar review could be applicable to both guardianship and 
supported decision-making. 
On the other hand, the arguments for the preservation of guardianship, following the 
ratification of the CRPD with Article 12, are as follows. 
First, the competing nature of the fundamental human rights which the convention is 
designed to protect. The right to be protected from abuse, neglect and exploitation is 
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set out in Article 16.187 Guardianship is necessary as a last resort, with safeguards to 
protect the most vulnerable persons from harm and abuse; to eliminate risk and 
cases of extreme disability.188 It is also argued that all human rights are of equal 
value so there can be no trade-off of autonomy for reduced protection of abuse.189 
While this is a valid argument, the same protection may be obtained via a supported 
model.   
Second, there is no adequate explanation for the most difficult cases that inevitably 
require substitution. These cases include profound intellectual disability with no 
communication, advanced Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s disease, and extreme mental 
illness such as catatonic depression or coma.190 Sundram speaks of the benefits of 
guardianship in these instances, specifically of protection against financial abuse and 
avoiding unwanted contracts. It is my opinion that some of the most difficult 
situations may have answers in the supported model, but not all, as previously 
noted. Other writers, such as Minkowitz,191 take a different view. 
Third, the language of Article 12(4) of the CRPD is congruent with the preservation 
of guardianship. Wording, such as applying for the shortest time possible, 
proportionality and review by a court or other judicial body, appear to reflect a 
substituted rather than a supported decision-making model.192 Bach has indicated 
that substitution continues with Article 12, due to the wording of Article 12(4), and 
persons without a support network may require substitution until their network is 
developed. 193  However, Bach later argued that facilitated decision-making is 
supported decision-making.194 This is a new conceptualisation of supported decision-
making, developed by Bach and Kerzner to explain why all conditions and disabilities 
can be explained through the supported model. This enables all persons to retain 
legal capacity and still maintain full compliance with Article 12. 
When Australia ratified the CRPD on 17 July 2008, it placed a declaration about its 
understanding of Article 12. A declaration explains how a Member State understands 
a portion of a treaty or convention. Australia declared it would apply the least 
restrictive alternative, and apply supported and substituted decision-making as a last 
resort. However, a Member State has an alternative means of excluding or modifying 
its obligations under a treaty, rather than stating its understanding by declaration. 
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This is done by placing a reservation on an Article at the point of ratification. A 
reservation is a unilateral statement whose effect is to exclude or modify the legal 
effect of that particular provision of the treaty in that Member State.195 It is not 
possible to object to the purpose and objects of the CRPD.196 Under the treaty 
system, a Member State is bound to accept and comply with the general principles 
and objects of a treaty that it assents to or ratifies. If the reservation is in conflict or 
incompatible with those principles or objectives the Member State may not make the 
reservation, 197  or should withdraw its objection. 198  Other State Parties to a 
convention can criticise a reservation and this may be investigated by the CRPD 
Committee.199  The difficulty is to determine if Australia’s declaration is in fact a 
reservation.200  
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its Final Report on the 
incorporation of Article 12 of the CRPD into Commonwealth laws has recommended 
the withdrawal of Australian’s declaration on Article 12 of the CRPD.201 The retention 
of this declaration was viewed as a backstop or hindrance to future changes in this 
area by the ALRC. 
Quinn is of the opinion that if a Member State places a reservation on the general 
principles of Articles 3 or 12, it would be denying the entire convention and it should 
not be allowed to become a compliant party.202 Quinn was not specifically referring to 
Australia’s declaration, but making a specific reference to a Member State that 
places a reservation on the operation of Article 12 of the CRPD. Such a Member 
State may potentially be construed as Canada.  
Canada ratified the CRPD in April 2010, but placed a declaration and a reservation 
on Article 12. It declared that supported decision-making and guardianship were 
allowed by Article 12, but if guardianship was excluded then the effect of the 
reservation means that Canada continues to maintain its legislation, which includes 
guardianship. Kerzner was highly critical of the Canadian position and recommended 
Canada resile from its reservation, 203  because a reservation that allows the 
continued existence of guardianship legislation may be in conflict with the general 
principles and objects of the CRPD.204 
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For the Australian context, the present meaning is that both guardianship and 
supported decision-making coexist under Article 12 of the CRPD, following 
Australia’s declaration upon ratification.  
It is only if Australia’s declaration is found to be a reservation, and Australia 
withdraws the declaration, that this issue becomes enlivened. Currently, 
guardianship and supported decision-making can, as a matter of domestic law, 
coexist in Australia. 
Gaps in the Literature 
The discussion so far in relation to Article 12 raises a number of major questions: 
(a) Can substituted decision-making continue to exist after a country has ratified 
the convention? 
(b) What are the roles of government in providing supports? 
(c) What should a supported model look like?205 
Other more minor issues include: how would the right to be protected be best 
achieved in a supported decision-making model? (section 1.4, above); and, given the 
Australian guardianship model offers protection to certain human rights of autonomy, 
dignity and equality, is this better achieved with a supported model or a combination 
of the two models?   
This thesis will not deal in depth with arguments for and against the continuation of 
guardianship with Article 12, but will focus on compliance and use of Article 12 in 
decided guardianship cases involving accommodation. The CRPD Committee has 
rejected the continuation of guardianship legislation in its 2014 general comment.206 
Guardianship legislation continues in all Australian jurisdictions and in all overseas 
jurisdictions that contain elements of supported decision-making.207 
1.7 How does the Concept of ‘Legal Capacity’ Contained in Article 
12 of the CRPD Compare with Concepts of ‘Capacity’ in the 
general law of Australia? 
This section first considers the meaning of the concept of ‘legal capacity’ in Article 
12(2) of the CRPD and the meaning of ‘mental capacity’ in Australian guardianship 
legislation. It concludes with an examination of a Canadian legislative model which 
incorporates supported decision-making without the imposition of a functional 
capacity test of mental capacity. 
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A distinction can be made for short-hand comparative purposes between the concept 
of ‘legal capacity’ under the CRPD and ‘mental capacity’ under the general law of 
Australia and Canada. 208  Various authors such as Bach, Kerzner, Carney, 
Richardson, Gooding and the ALRC Report use the term ‘mental capacity’ based 
upon functional tests of understanding to be distinguished from ‘legal capacity’ in 
Article 12 which may not be restricted in this way.209 
The Literature Review reveals that legal capacity in Articles 12(2) and 12(3) may 
have a specific meaning, different to the usual or ordinary concepts of capacity, 
based upon tests of understanding found in general law or guardianship law in 
Australia for mental capacity. This has implications for guardianship. It would seem 
that legal capacity in Article 12 includes a capacity to hold rights and a capacity to 
exercise these rights. 210  This amounts to universal legal capacity without 
restriction. 211  This is contrasted with a concept of mental capacity based upon 
disability or cognitive functioning applied to the individual that may result in findings 
of incapacity.212 
In Article 12, the intention expressed by the Ad Hoc Committee (responsible for 
drafting the CRPD) was that legal capacity to act or exercise rights meant the ability 
to undertake and be bound by all forms of legal obligations and duties such as 
opening a bank account, entering into contractual relations, suing in tort, going to 
court, making a will or other enduring documents, or marrying. This implied right 
derives from the Ad Hoc Committee’s analysis of the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This convention 
is the only other UN instrument to contain a provision about legal capacity to 
exercise rights.213 
Article 15 of CEDAW provides: 
…15(1) States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law; and 
15(2) States Parties shall accord to women in civil matters a legal capacity identical 
to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity, in particular they 
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shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and 
shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.214  
However, the words of this provision alone were insufficient to conclude that CEDAW 
not only granted women a capacity to have rights, but also a capacity to act on those 
rights. The point was clarified by the travaux préparatoires to Article 15 of CEDAW, 
which offered the analogy: if a woman was unable to open a bank account, equal to 
that of a man being able to open a bank account, she did not have the capacity to 
exercise her rights.215 The argument that persuaded the Ad Hoc Committee to adopt 
the position that legal capacity should include capacity to exercise rights in the 
CRPD was: why should a woman with disabilities have fewer rights regarding legal 
capacity than a woman without disabilities?216 This equality argument convinced the 
CRPD Ad Hoc Committee that legal capacity should include more than the capacity 
for rights (such as that of a child), but also the capacity to exercise those rights 
(immediately act on those rights). 
It has been argued that legal capacity under Article 12 of the CRPD is a legal and 
social construct. According to Webb and Minkowitz, it has no functional element and 
is a constant that cannot be derogated from by applying functional tests or cognitive 
overloads to the individual.217 ‘No functional element’ means it is not reliant upon 
satisfying a test of cognition or understanding to exercise the capacity to act.218 
Legal capacity is thus seen as applying to the process the question: have sufficient 
supports been supplied to exercise legal capacity?219 Legal capacity is thus attached 
to the process and not the person. There is no sliding scale of legal capacity based 
on individual cognitive elements, only a sliding scale of supports. Under this view of 
universal legal capacity, every person over the age of majority has the capacity to 
exercise all legal rights (buy and sell property, make a will, marry, enter a contract, 
sue in court, etc.), irrespective of the severity of any particular disability. For 
example, people taking a narrow view of legal capacity would argue that a person 
with profound intellectual impairments or advanced Alzheimer’s disease continues to 
have the legal capacity to exercise these rights. It then becomes a question of the 
degree of supports needed to exercise these rights. 
Mental capacity in the general law of Australia, and other nations such as Canada, 
has an entirely different meaning in this area of law. It is contextual and relates to 
functional cognition and understanding with concepts derived from Kant and 
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Rousseau and supported by Rawls, being autonomy based upon reasoning and 
understanding.220   
A few examples from Queensland can illustrate the contextual and functional basis 
of ‘mental capacity’. Capacity is defined in the fourth schedule of the Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) as being able to understand the nature and effect 
of a decision for a particular matter; being able to make the decision freely and 
voluntarily; and finally, being able to communicate the decision in some way.221 For 
example, capacity to make an enduring power of attorney pursuant to the Powers of 
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) requires various understandings, including understanding 
the document: the donor is relinquishing his/her power to make decisions at some 
point in the future; the document can be revoked at any time before the donor loses 
functional capacity, but after the donor loses functional capacity the document 
cannot be revoked by the donor.222 
Testamentary capacity, or the capacity to make a will, continues to be governed in 
Queensland by the principles in Banks v Goodfellow,223 which recognised that this 
mental capacity is at a higher level of cognition than the mental capacity to marry.224 
To demonstrate testamentary capacity the will-maker must be able to understand the 
nature of making a will (it can be changed at any time before death); understand the 
property to be disposed of by a will; and finally, understand the persons whom one 
should consider as beneficiaries.225   
In the law of Australia (without consideration of the CRPD) there are three tests for 
determining capacity/incapacity that may result in the appointment of a guardian. 
First, the status approach where the mere presence of a disability triggers access 
into the guardianship system. Second, the outcome approach, where an objectively 
bad decision may lead to guardianship if there is a need. The outcome approach is a 
test of incapacity as opposed to the third approach, which is a test of mental 
capacity. In this functional approach the tribunal assessing mental capacity in 
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Australia looks at the ability to understand the nature and effect of a decision and to 
communicate the decision, before entry into the guardianship system.226   
The Australian guardianship jurisdictions generally apply a mixed status and 
functional approach. First, the person must have a disability (status approach), then 
by reason of the disability they are held to be unable to make decisions or manage 
their affairs (functional approach). This is the same in all Australian guardianship 
jurisdictions except for Western Australia, Queensland and the lapsed Victorian 
Guardianship and Administration Bill where a sole functional test will be applied.227 
The use of a status element for capacity may be contrary to Article 5 of the CRPD, 
as it could be considered discrimination based upon disability.228 This is because a 
reference to a physical disability may be totally unrelated to the ability to make 
decisions for a particular matter. In New South Wales and Victoria, there are 
recommendations to amend existing guardianship legislation to take only a functional 
approach, eliminating the status element.229  
In Queensland and jurisdictions, such as Canadian provinces and territories that 
apply a functional test for guardianship capacity, the question is whether the 
individual has sufficient cognition to have capacity. Under Article 12 of the CRPD, 
the question may be changed to: have sufficient supports been provided to enable 
the person to exercise his/her legal capacity?230   
The analysis then becomes one of looking at the process of providing supports and 
not looking at any aspects of the individual who has his/her support as a legal 
constant. This capacity cannot be affected by any test of understanding. 231  The 
process is one of providing supports. Under the view that legal capacity is a legal 
constant and all persons of majority age have it, then you do not look at the 
individual person’s reasoning but at the process of provision of supports. Have 
sufficient supports been provided to exercise legal capacity?232 
Dhanda has suggested one of the major themes of the CRPD is the 
interdependence between autonomy, legal capacity and support. That is, it is no 
longer necessary to have incapacity to gain support. Support can be given (or 
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required) to enable a person with full decision-making capacity to exercise his/her 
legal capacity and maintain autonomy.233 
To fit within the changed notion of capacity, from the paradigm of understanding to a 
supported model of unassailable capacity, Bach has suggested a new definition of 
capacity (unspecified but probably legal): 
… the ability to express one’s intention and communicate one’s personhood (wishes, 
vision for the future, needs, strengths, personal attachments) to a trusted group of 
others chosen by the individual, who in a fiduciary relationship of trust, confidence 
and responsibility recognises the individual as a full person and commits to 
representing that person’s agency in accordance with that person’s personhood.234   
This formulation has been quoted with approval by a number of authors, as a new 
conception for considering capacity without a function test in a supported decision-
making model.235 This is in contrast with traditional views of mental capacity, as the 
ability to understand the nature and consequences of a decision and to communicate 
the decision in some way.236 This view of capacity is consistent with the narrow 
approach to the concept of legal capacity in Article 12 of the CRPD, where the only 
restriction to the exercise of legal capacity is an age requirement. 
In summary, it appears there are two approaches to the meaning of legal capacity in 
Article 12(2) of the CRPD – a narrow and broad interpretation. The narrow 
interpretation means there is no restriction to the exercise of legal capacity, other 
than attaining a majority age.237 The clear words of Article 12(3) support this line of 
reasoning, where support is to be provided to exercise legal capacity. There is no 
mention of a functional condition precedent to the exercise of this capacity. 
The second approach is the wider one: legal capacity is comprised of static and 
dynamic elements. The static element is the capacity to have rights that rest with 
everyone from birth. The dynamic element is to exercise rights, subject to attaining 
majority and possibly to a functional test of understanding the nature and effect of a 
decision.238 During the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, China wanted to modify this 
wider view by arguing that a newborn baby may have the capacity for rights but 
cannot exercise them, and legal capacity should only consist of the capacity to have 
rights.239 China proposed inserting a footnote to Article 12 stating legal capacity was 
the capacity to have rights and not the capacity to act,240 and that the capacity to 
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exercise those rights should be subject to a condition precedent such as majority 
and cognition. This was rejected by the Eighth Ad Hoc Committee.241   
If the narrow approach is taken of legal capacity in Article 12(2), it may be 
inconsistent with the continued existence of guardianship legislation. 242  This is 
because guardianship is underpinned by a partial or total loss of legal capacity 
(based on functional understanding) for its operation. If no person, irrespective of the 
level of disability, loses legal capacity the concept of guardianship legislation 
becomes otiose.  
The view of shared capacity formulated by Browning, Bigby and Douglas represents 
a wider approach than universal legal capacity. 243  The person’s capacity is not 
viewed in isolation but with supports. It is only when supports are inadequate to 
ascertain the individual’s will and preferences that substitution becomes appropriate. 
This is in my view a test of mental capacity with support. 
In my view, the wider interpretation of legal capacity for Article 12 of the CRPD will 
be applied by Member States in the immediate and foreseeable future. In this 
Literature Review I have found no country that abandons all forms of guardianship 
legislation; this would be necessary to be consistent with a narrow approach of legal 
capacity in Article 12 of the CRPD. The adoption of the wide approach would be 
preferable until supported decision-making is the accepted norm in the community, 
government and policy. 
The Commonwealth’s approach to State and Territory Guardianship law in the 
ALRC Report 
The Commonwealth recommends that Australian States and Territories should 
review their guardianship law to comply with the national decision-making 
principles.244 These principles include an equal right to make decisions (universal 
legal capacity), provision of support, follow the will and preferences of the person 
and the provision of safeguards to prevent abuse and undue influence.245 The report 
requires the States to comply with Article 12 of the CRPD as well as the 
Commonwealth according to the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties 
(Article 27).246 Compliance should be with supported decision-making. A problem 
arises because compliance with the first of the national decision-making principles 
denotes an equal right to make decisions for all adults or universal legal capacity.  
Compliance with this principle as interpreted by the CRPD Committee requires an 
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elimination of guardianship legislation. The appointment of a guardian will, to the 
extent of the appointment, remove legal capacity. 
The ALRC report considers the retention of guardianship legislation necessary for 
certain persons who are unable to be supported, such as those with advanced 
dementia. The report recognises isolation and the demographics of an aging 
population.247  The last three national decision-making principles are the focus of the 
reecommendations for State guardianship review. They should have legislative 
recognition of supported decision-making, restrict appointments in time and scope, 
and represent the will and preferences of the person, with appointments a last resort. 
It is my opinion that the approach of the Commonwealth will increase compliance 
with Article 12 of the CRPD. This is however by accepting non-compliance with 
universal legal capacity in principle 1 to retain guardianship legislation. 
Legislative Example from Canada  
This subsection looks at an example of a hybrid statute from Canada. It involves a 
supported element without a functional capacity test. It is discussed here in relation 
to the concept of functional mental capacity versus legal capacity but will also be 
referred to later (e.g. in the following subsection about models of supported decision-
making). 
The concept of supported decision-making to maintain autonomy and self-
determination is not a new one; it has been an established philosophical norm for 
over 20 years.248 There are more than 400 organisations and 40 000 individual 
members in the Canadian Association for Community Living that ascribe to this 
philosophy.249 However to date, even in Canada, there has been no one piece of 
legislation that totally embraces this philosophy. All Canadian jurisdictions have 
supported decision-making provisions that maintain guardianship and retain a 
traditional functional capacity test. However, the Representation Agreement Act, 
RSBC 1996, of British Columbia, has components that would satisfy both the 
restricted and the wider view of legal capacity for Article 12 of the CRPD. This Act 
allows the appointment of supporters based upon will and trust, principally without a 
functional capacity test for simple financial and personal/health matters. This would 
correspond to the narrow interpretation of legal capacity in Article 12. This Act 
became operational on 28 February 2000. This Act has been lauded by the UN as 
model legislation. 250  However, a traditional functional test of mental capacity is 
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incorporated for more complex decisions.251 It may be that for major decisions British 
Columbia was unwilling to ‘risk’ supported decision-making. 
The need to protect vulnerable persons from the risk of abuse, neglect and 
exploitation may underpin a reluctance to accept supported decision-making without 
a functional capacity test.252 The risk may be that the supporter does not follow the 
wishes of the individual,253 or, more seriously, the person faces risk of exploitation, 
harm and physical and financial abuse from supporters. 254  There is also the 
perceived risk of a dangerous personal or financial decision causing great harm to 
the individual.255 
However, the Representation Agreement Act has been criticised on a number of 
grounds. It does not provide resources where a person is isolated and has an 
informal support network, consisting of a trusted group of others, selected by the 
individual. The Act also does not deal with the buying and selling of real property.256 
Further, section 11 provides that the Act is overridden by the British Columbia mental 
health legislation.257 
A review of the literature suggests that the abandonment of a cognitive, functional 
test for mental capacity is a very difficult issue for governments to grapple with. It 
currently remains unresolved. Quinn gave this issue six to eight years to resolve 
itself from the adoption of the Convention by the UN General Assembly on 13 
December 2006.258 This time limit has elapsed and there is no complete adoption of 
Article 12 of the CRPD by the Member States regarding supported decision-making 
in preference to guardianship. Advocacy for Inclusion Inc has set a goal of 2100 for 
when persons with decision-making difficulties, due to a disability, will be supported 
in the community without the need of guardianship legislation.259 My examination of 
the literature and discussion canvassed at the commencement of Chapter 8 
suggests that the solution rests in the future, somewhere in-between these time 
estimations.   
Michael Bach has indicated there is reluctance from the community to accept the 
notion that a person with an intellectual or psychosocial impairment can be 
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supported by others to make their own decisions.260 This is particularly true of health 
professionals and financial institutions (probably with regard to potential negligence 
claims when dealing with persons with ‘impaired’ decision-making capacity).261 Bach 
equates the CRPD with the USA Declaration of Independence, which abolitionists 
thought would mean an immediate end to slavery with statements such as ‘all men 
are created equal’. I share some of Michael Bach’s apprehensions: realisation of 
some of the entitlements in the CRPD will require community education and 
acceptance.  
A search of the literature has uncovered the difficult and vexed issue of whether 
functional tests of mental capacity are allowed to continue within the concept of legal 
capacity in Article 12 of the CRPD. While this will change over time, as supported 
decision-making changes from a new paradigm (especially in Australia) to the 
standard basis of decision-making for a person with cognitive difficulties, it is my 
view that supported decision-making models, which include both a system of 
supported decision-making and functional capacity testing, will be developed and 
applicable in Australia. The starting point may be in Victoria because of the initial 
attempt of including supported decision-making in the lapsed Guardianship and 
Administration Bill 2014 (VIC).262 This issue will be further developed in chapter 8 
dealing with future directions. 
1.8 Models of Supported Decision-Making: Risks and Safeguards 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of a number of existing 
supported decision-making models in order to test them against the convention by 
identifying risk factors associated with supported decision-making, and safeguards 
that have been devised to ameliorate these risks. This examination is relevant to 
Article 12(4) of the CRPD. This is because Article 12(4) contains safeguards from 
the anticipated risks that are associated with supported decision-making models. 
The section commences with a general discussion on forms of decision-making, 
such as those identified by Bach, Brayley, and Salzman, including mentors and 
planning documents (e.g. powers of attorney). 263  It then provides several 
classifications of support models proposed by Gordon, 264  illustrating who may 
appoint a supporter, the role of governments in providing support, and the degrees of 
restrictiveness in providing supported models.  
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Bach has postulated there are five main forms of decision-making.265  
1. Autonomous decision-making. The person fits within traditional functional 
capacity models of being able to understand the nature and effect of a 
decision, and communicating the decision in some way. Little or no assistance 
is required, other than possible communication aids and the use of 
interpreters. 
2. Guardianship or substituted decision-making. The person loses capacity and 
autonomy by having his or her right to make decisions transferred to a 
substitute or surrogate. The guardian generally makes decisions on a best 
interest model for the protection of the individual and is not bound to follow the 
person’s wishes.266 This regime has been described by various authors as 
patronising, paternalistic, isolating and discriminatory.267 Bach goes further 
and describes substituted decision-making as a ‘legally authorised removal of 
personhood from an individual and a vesting of their “person” in another 
authority for the purposes of making a decision about that individual...’.268 
3. Planning documents. These would include powers of attorney or advance 
health directives. Bach describes these as an individual electing or 
volunteering to relinquish legal capacity and personhood upon the occurrence 
of a specified event.269 If the individual does not have traditional functional 
decision-making capacity at the time of making the planning tool, it would be 
invalid. The one exception is the Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996, 
and only then to a limited effect, as previously explained. A person with 
advanced Alzheimer’s disease, or a profound intellectual disability, would be 
unable to create such a planning tool. 
4. Mentorship. This is a popular concept, particularly in northern Europe. It may 
be compared to a form of limited guardianship. A mentor is appointed by a 
court, generally for a specific decision. The mentor is paid a fee and may 
need the agreement of the individual to take effect. These arrangements have 
been in place for a number of years in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany 
and Quebec (Canada). The individual retains legal capacity, but may lose 
legal capacity for the specific decision of the appointment.270 Bach criticises 
this system because there is a loss of capacity or autonomy for the specific 
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appointment. In addition, the appointment is made by a court with the 
approbation of the individual. The mentor model is similar to a limited 
appointment of guardianship in Australia, with variations. The mentor is often 
paid a fee by the state. The individual can object to the appointment. Legal 
capacity is retained for everything except the matter concerning the 
appointment. 
5. Supported decision-making. This is based upon the principles that all 
individuals have a will that can be expressed by the individual, or through a 
network of trusted supporters chosen by the individual. It argues that people 
are not inherently incapacitated. Other persons’ interests and concerns do not 
justify removing a person’s autonomy and decision-making rights. 271  A 
person’s will and preferences form the basis of decision-making.   
All of the above categories may contain elements of supported decision-making. The 
following classifications are specific supported decision-making models listed for the 
previously described purposes. 
The following three groupings of supported decision-making models demonstrate a 
divergence of opinion both in classification and important features of a supported 
decision-making regime. The first grouping, the stepped approach, looks at various 
types of support mechanisms, from the least restriction on autonomy to the greatest 
(guardianship). It encompasses formal and informal support mechanisms; within or 
outside legislation; with documentation or without documentation; appointed by a 
court or appointed by an individual. Following the first stepped approach is an earlier 
model that looks at supported decision-making as being expressed within legislation 
or implied by legislation. 
The second grouping focuses on whether the support system is in legislation, implied 
by legislation, or appointed by a court. It was devised by Gordon in 2000 to take 
account of the emergence of supported decision-making in the Canadian 
provinces.272 This may be the case with Australian guardianship legislation, where 
no need for an appointment may mean existing informal support mechanisms are 
adequate.273 
The third classification looks only at court and non-court-made appointments of a 
supporter. This draws attention to the northern European model, where supporters 
and mentors have for some time been appointed by courts with significant success. 
A fourth model classifies whether the supports have been provided or funded by the 
government. This classification is mentioned as Article 12 of the CRPD requires 
                                            
271
 Bach, above n 10. 
272
 Gordon, above n 264. 
273
 See, eg. Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 12. Requirement of ‘need’ before an 
appointment. 
62 
 
supports to be provided by the Member States; a failure to do so is seen as a major 
fault in current supported decision-making models.274  
a) A stepped approach   
This is the method of classification that looks at functional decision-making capacity 
as well as supports on a continuum: autonomous decision-making at one end, with 
no supports, and substitution at the other end, with loss of decision-making capacity 
and substitution. In between is a range of support options. This is the model 
suggested by the Office of Public Advocate, South Australia. 275  This has been 
approved in the VLRC’s Final Report, which recommended changes to the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC).276   
The following is a brief summary of these stepped supports, from no assistance 
through to maximum assistance to make the decision. At the top end of the scale is 
guardianship, where a person is no longer assisted to make his/her own decisions, 
but another person or entity is appointed to make the decision. 
1. Autonomous decision-making. The individual satisfies a functional capacity 
test and can understand the nature and effect of a specific decision and 
communicate this decision in some way. 277  This is the traditional test of 
functional capacity. 
2. Assisted decision-making. The person understands the nature and effect of a 
decision but has communication barriers. These are overcome by supplying 
interpreters, communication aids and facilitated communication sign-language 
interpreters.278 
3. Informal supports through a network of supports. This may be an organised 
circle of friends or supports,279 where a group of trusted others chosen by the 
individual meets voluntarily, with or without a formal written agreement, to 
support decisions affecting the focus of the person’s life. Where there is a 
severe psychosocial disability, it might include a personal ombudsman or 
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agent who confidentially represents the person’s wishes. 280  The support 
network might be contemplated by legislation and resourced by the 
government.281  This model might include legislation that recommends the 
involvement of the individual’s existing support network in the decision-making 
process. 282  Queensland legislation attempts to promote autonomy as its 
purpose283 by ensuring a right to adequate and appropriate supports,284 but 
goes no further. It provides neither resources nor any regime of supported 
decision-making. The support network may be with or without an agreement, 
similar to the South Australian supported decision-making pilot project.285  
4. Supported decision-making agreements. An individual selects the support 
persons or network and can remove the person(s) at his/her will. This model 
could be for personal, financial or health decisions and is recognised by 
legislation in Alberta286 and the Yukon Territories, Canada.287  
5. Court appointed supporters. This is the support mechanism in the 
Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC).288 It occurs in some civil law 
jurisdictions such as Norway and Quebec (Canada). 289   Where a court 
appoints a supporter he/she can only be removed by the court, and the 
individual may not be able to choose a supporter. This has been criticised by 
the CACL Task Force for not meeting their support principles,290 which include 
that the individual should be able to choose and remove his/her supporters at 
will.291 
6. Representation agreements. This has already been discussed with the 
example of the Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996. It is a planning 
tool that can be extended to a more liberalised capacity test for wider use than 
current enduring powers of attorney in Australia, which requires a traditional 
functional capacity test for their use.292 The planning tool can be enlarged to 
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allow the appointment of supporters as well as substitutes. It could be 
registered to allow certainty for banks and third parties.293 
7. Co-decision-making can be used where a person has significant decision-
making difficulties and would otherwise have met criteria for guardianship. 
However, the person has some mental capacity and can exercise his/her legal 
capacity by making a decision with another person. There are two examples 
of this in Saskatchewan and Alberta, Canada.294 It has been recommended 
for use in the changes to the Victorian (Australia) guardianship legislation.295 
The VLRC recommends the use of a co-decision-maker who is a close and 
trusted person, such as a spouse where for example the individual has early 
Alzheimer’s disease. The tribunal can monitor the situation and the certificate 
of the tribunal can give credence to third parties dealing with this new 
situation.296 This form of support was not included in the lapsed Victorian 
Bill.297 This has been criticised for not satisfying the principles of supported 
decision-making by the CACL, because the court selects the co-decision-
maker and not the individual, and the individual does not make his/her own 
decision, but a joint decision.298 
8. Private guardians appointed by a court or tribunal. This model was discussed 
earlier in subsection (2) in the classification by Michael Bach, as well as in 1.1 
and 1.2 of this Literature Review. 
9. Statutory guardians. This may be the OPA in South Australia or Victoria, or 
the Public Guardian in Queensland. One criticism of the United Kingdom’s 
Mental Capacity Act regime was absence of statutory guardians. There, a 
service provider frequently acted as the substitute decision-maker.  This 
potentially causes a conflict of interest with every decision.299 For example, if 
a psychiatrist is the service provider assessing capacity, he/she may seek a 
particular treatment for the patient. The patient may reject this form of 
treatment. It may be in the psychiatrist’s interest to find incapacity to obtain 
that treatment.  
b) Gordon’s taxonomy300   
1. Supporter ordered by the court. This could be the mentorship and assistance 
of the Betreuung in Germany, ‘Godman’ (custodian) in Sweden, and assistors 
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in Norway and Quebec (Canada).301 It now extends to the co-decision-making 
orders in Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada.302 It could also correspond with 
the supportive guardians who were to be appointed by the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) under the lapsed 2014 Victorian Bill.303 
2. Where legislation identifies supporters to render the use of guardianship 
unnecessary. This could be seen in Manitoba, Canada, 304  where the 
legislation mentions the provision of support networks to support a person 
with an intellectual disability to make his/her own decisions. It would now 
extend to the representation agreements, support authorisations and support 
agreements in British Columbia, Alberta and the Yukon Territories, 
respectively. 
3. Indirect or other means to avoid the use of guardianship. This might include 
‘encourages involvement in decision-making of the members of the adult’s 
existing support network’.305 Alternatively, it may mean the avoidance of a 
guardianship appointment if a support network exists as a least restrictive 
option.306 It is possible to consider the UK’s Mental Capacity Act as potentially 
fitting within this taxonomy, as the individual must be supported when 
assessing functional decision-making capacity on a decision-specific basis.307  
c) Classification of support models, as appointed by the court or the 
individual 
This is a nomenclature devised by Salzman.308 There are only two divisions. First, 
supporters are appointed by a court. This would be similar to Gordon’s first method 
of classification.309 The second is all forms of support selected by the individual. This 
would include representation agreements, support agreements, as well as informal 
support networks, which may or may not be registered or have a form of facilitator 
and an agreement.310 
d) Public and Private Models of Support 
Another way of considering this taxonomy is by the use of the terms public and 
private. If the support model is present in legislation it is public; if it occurs outside 
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legislation it is private.311 The public models of support are generally to be found 
within guardianship legislation.312 
The private sphere of supported decision-making includes those categorised by Tina 
Minkowitz.313 There may be some overlap with this categorisation as there may be a 
requirement to provide support or the recognition of informal support networks within 
guardianship legislation.314 
e) Funded or unfunded by government 
Many of the support models in northern Europe have funding for the supporters.This 
includes support models in Germany, Norway, Denmark and Sweden.315 
The only funded model of support in Canada by government resources was the 
limited program in Manitoba. This has been criticised by Bach and Kerzner for only 
including persons with an intellectual disability and not the myriad of other 
disabilities.316 It only applies to support networks and not to other forms of support.  
The support networks are not recognised by legislation. Gordon states that the 
limited coverage may be due to the influence of the ‘independent living movement’ at 
that time.317 
No other support system in Canada is provided with government resources. This 
appears to be a major deficiency in their system. If a person is isolated and has no 
network of trusted others, the legislation allowing for supporters may be denuded of 
meaning.318 
Kerzner indicated the two requirements for a supported decision-making system 
were: firstly, it must be found in legislation and secondly, it must have the provision 
of government resources.319 Kerzner notes that a lack of education and community 
awareness of the variety of support models in Canada may be a major reason for 
their infrequent usage.320 
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None of the support models discussed in this subsection meets all the requirements 
of a support model discussed by Kerzner.321A combination of Manitoba’s resources, 
British Columbia’s relaxed capacity test and the Yukon Territories’ broad range of 
support systems, embodied in their legislation, may satisfy the combination 
suggested by Kerzner. 
f) Risk factors associated with supported decision-making 
The following is a brief consideration of a few identified risk factors raised by a 
survey of the literature. It is necessary to mention these as they lead to a discussion 
of the safeguards necessary to eliminate these risks.  
There are a number of risk factors that are perceived to exist with supported 
decision-making models. The more the supports are restrictive, the more the risk to 
the person intensifies. 
Some of the identified risks are: 
a) The supporter does not listen to the supported person and imposes his/her 
own will to make a decision, rather than support the individual to make his/her 
own decision. If this is the case, then it resembles substitution and borders on 
conflict and undue influence, contrary to Article 12(4) of the CRPD.322  
b) By being involved with a particular supporter or network, the individual loses 
contact with other important relationships such as family and friends.323 
c) The individual is exposed to great harm through financial exploitation, physical 
abuse or other forms of neglect or harm. 324  It is the risk of harm to an 
individual or to the community that places governments in a position where 
they prefer to maintain guardianship and restrictive mental health 
legislation.325 The associated community backlash and government criticism 
against supported decision-making, may, if it represents a majority opinion, 
have political support. Community opinion may represent stereotypes that 
persons with an intellectual impairment are like children who need protection 
and cannot make their own decisions; or that persons with a psychosocial 
disability require supervision as they are a menace or danger to society. 
d) Net-Widening. A limited appointment of a particular person as supporter in a 
specified area such as communication may lead the public to assume 
incapacity in other areas and an inability for other persons to be available to 
                                            
321
 Kerzner, above n 78. 
322
 Burningham, above n 90. 
323
 Ibid. 
324
 NSW Parliament Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, above n 41; NSW 
Trustee and Guardian, above n  41. 
325
 Bernadette McSherry, 'Internationa Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction' (2008) 26(2) Law 
in Context 9; Neil Rees, 'The Fusion Proposal: A Next Step?' in Bernadette McSherry and Penelope 
weller (ed), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health laws (Hart Publishing, 2010) 72. 
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provide support.326The individual is assumed erroneously to need support in 
other areas of life such as financial decisions.  Outsiders may assume that the 
appointed supporter is needed for all aspects of the individual’s decision-
making. 
g) Safeguards for supported decision-making 
Some of the methods raised to safeguard a supported decision-making model are as 
follows: 
1. Accountability. Bach envisages a system of registration of support 
agreements, supporters and actual decisions, as well as registering 
representation agreements. There should be a central body funded by the 
government.327 
2. Monitoring. By having a monitor who is either part of or independent of the 
network, instances of undue influence and abuse may be avoided or 
lessened. Under the Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996, a monitor is 
required for financial decisions.328 
3. Education and training for supporters. It has been suggested this will be an 
important role for the Office of the Public Advocate (similar to the Office of 
Public Guardian in Queensland and New South Wales). The Victorian office 
will not provide supporters, but will take an important role in training and 
monitoring of supporters and support networks when supported decision-
making is introduced to Victoria, Australia.329 
4. Multiple supporters or a support network. This may prevent abuse and assist 
in avoiding substitution.330 
5. Appeal to a court or judicial body. This is important if a particularly difficult 
situation of conflict or abuse occurs, but should be used rarely and with 
caution.331 
1.9 Conclusion 
The literature review has identified that Article 12 of the CRPD may necessitate a 
paradigm shift away from guardianship in favour of supported decision-making. 
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 Nick O'Neill and Carmelle Peisah, 'Beware the New Paternalisms: Capacity as a means of 
achieving the goals of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (AGAC, 2012) 
<http://www.agac.org.au/>; Gooding, above n 209. 
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 Bach, above n 75. 
328
 Nidus, 'Representation Agreements' (Nidus, 2009) <http://www/nidus.ca>. 
329
 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 188; Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 
‘Supported Decision-Making Options for Legislative Recognition’ (2010) OPA Victoria. 
330
 Bach, above n 85. 
331
 Minkowitz, above n 75. 
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Further, it has attempted to define what supported decision-making is and the 
accepted principles that differentiate supported decision-making from guardianship.   
It emerges from the review that legal capacity includes the capacity for rights and the 
capacity to act on or exercise these rights. This highlights a distinction between 
functional mental capacity, based upon concepts of reasoning, and the possibility 
that no functional test of reasoning or understanding may be required for the 
exercise of legal capacity under Article 12. A number of support models from 
overseas jurisdictions suggest that support can be provided in order to exercise legal 
capacity for the purposes of Article 12 of the CRPD. 
The following research questions remain unanswered by this Literature Review: 
a) Can guardianship still exist or is it totally incompatible with the support 
paradigm created by Article 12 of the CRPD? 
b) Can a functional capacity test exist to limit the exercise of legal capacity in 
Article 12(2) of the CRPD? This question is related to question (a) above, as 
the absence of a functional capacity test may render obsolete any form of 
guardianship legislation. 
c) Do Australia’s current guardianship tribunals and courts preserve autonomy in 
accordance with the principles of Article 12 of the CRPD when deciding 
guardianship cases involving accommodation? 
d) Do Australia’s current guardianship tribunals and courts apply the principles of 
autonomy contained in Article 12 of the CRPD when hearing guardianship 
cases involving accommodation?   
e) How can compliance with the principles of self-determination in Article 12 of 
the CRPD be increased while retaining guardianship legislation in Australia to 
protect the welfare and interests of the person?  
The first two questions, (a) and (b) above, concerning the continued existence of 
guardianship and whether a functional test of mental capacity is allowable under 
Article 12 of the CRPD, have been identified as issues by a considerable number of 
authors. They have been answered in the negative by the CRPD committee. They 
do however remain issues for state governments drafting guardianship legislation.   
The last three questions, (c) to (e) above, are related to this research and gaps in the 
literature. The research and analysis will focus on providing answers to these 
questions. It will first develop criteria for the examination of supported decision 
making principles in the Australian guardianship regime. 
To sum up, Australia has ratified the CRPD but indications are that adult 
guardianship is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.  In the following chapter I 
will develop criteria to assess the application of supported decision-making in the 
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CRPD in decided guardianship cases from three Australian guardianship 
jurisdictions. The case analysis will consider post-CRPD ratification guardianship 
cases involving accommodation. It is important to understand the current compliance 
with supported decision making and universal legal capacity as expressed in decided 
guardianship cases as a basis to increase compliance with Article 12. 
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Chapter 2 
Development of Benchmark Criteria and important features 
for assessing Compliance with Supported Decision-Making in 
the CRPD for Australian Guardianship Cases  
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify criteria or features of supported decision-
making that can be used as a benchmark in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
They will measure Australia’s compliance with the CRPD in its guardianship regime 
in relation to the incorporation of supported decision-making. Australia, by ratifying 
the CRPD and its Optional Protocol has decided to bind itself to the Articles of the 
Convention. This includes the obligation to provide supports in the exercise of legal 
capacity as contained in the words of Article 12(3) of the CRPD.   
The discussion will first examine the question of where to find the evaluation criteria. 
Are they to be found in the documents that laid the framework for supported 
decision-making in Canada over 20 years ago?1 Formulations of supported decision-
making by the Canadian Association for Community Living may have influenced the 
formulation of Article 12,2 as it was the Canadian delegation to the CRPD Ad Hoc 
Committee that was responsible for the final draft of Article 12. Alternatively, are 
these criteria to be found from a consideration of the principles that underpin the 
CRPD such as dignity and autonomy?3 The principle of dignity is in the 1945 Charter 
of the United Nations and the first paragraph in the Preamble of the CRPD.4 Or 
finally, should the evaluation criteria be derived directly from the words of Article 12 
itself?   
                                            
1
 Canadian Association for Community Living Task Force, 'Alternatives to Guardianship' (CACL, 
August 1992) <http://www.worldenable.net/rights/adhoc3meet_guardianship.htm>. 
2
 United Nations, 'Fifth Session of the Ad hoc Committee Report' (2005) 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rightsahc5reporte.htm>; see also United Nations, 'Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral Internaitonal Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities on its sixth session' (UN, 2006) 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc6documents>; see also United Nations, 'Comments, 
proposals and amendments submitted electronically to the 7th Ad Hoc Committee' (UN, 2006) 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata12sevscomments.htm>. 
3
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008). See especially Preamble [a] ‘...recognizing the inherent dignity 
and worth ... of all members of the human family...’ Preamble [n] ‘Recognizing the importance for 
persons with disabilities of their individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to 
make their own choices,’ and article 3(a) ‘Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including 
freedom to make one’s own choices and independence of persons.’ 
4
 Ibid. Preamble [a] ‘recognizing inherent dignity… and the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ 
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It will be argued that the source of the evaluation criteria and important features that 
increase or decrease compliance with the evaluation criteria should be derived 
directly from the language of Article 12 of the CRPD, and that the legitimate basis for 
the evaluation criteria is its wording. It will be argued that there are problems in 
utilising the principle of inherent dignity to analyse compliance with supported 
decision-making in the CRPD, as this principle has been used to justify many 
concepts including substituted decision-making as well as autonomy.5 Additionally, 
various authors, as well as the United Nations itself, have used this concept in 
support of guardianship.6 The use of dignity to justify supported decision-making 
would be using this principle as justification for opposing concepts. 
It will be further argued that the use of autonomy as an evaluating criterion does not 
have the force of Article 12 of the CRPD itself.  Autonomy has been used to 
demonstrate one’s ability to reason and understand as the basis for ascertaining the 
moral good. 7  The absence of reasoning and understanding forms the basis for 
findings of “incapacity” leading to guardianship or substituted decision-making. 8 
While autonomy or self-governance may be the end result of Article 12 of the CRPD, 
Article 12 itself provides the constituent elements to achieve the end result of self-
governance and freedom of choice. 
After it is established that Article 12 of the CRPD provides the source of the 
evaluation criteria for assessing compliance with supported decision-making, the 
content of Article 12 will be examined. What portions of Article 12 deal with 
supported decision-making? This section of the chapter will analyse the meaning of 
Article 12 of the CRPD especially in relation to supported decision-making.   
The final section of the chapter will distill two criteria and two important facilitating or 
detracting features from Article 12 that will be used to ascertain current compliance 
                                            
5
 United Nations, 'Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons' (UN General Assembly, 
1971) <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f04e5c.gtml>. See Article 5 endorsing guardianship 
under the inherent dignity as a guiding principle; see also United Nations, 'Declaration on the Rights 
of Disabled Persons' (United Nations, 1975) <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/r3drdp.htm>; Cf 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) where in Article 3(a) dignity is used to support autonomy. 
6
 Barbara Carter, 'The Case for Dignity as the Governing Principle in Adult Guardianship' (2010) 19 
(1) Res Publica 6; see also Barbara Carter, 'Seeking the Essence of Guardianship: Beyond the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2012) 
<http://www.agac.org.au/>; see also Martha Nussbaum, 'The Capabilities of People with Cognitive 
Disabilities' in Eva Feder Kittaly and Licia Carlson (ed), Cognitive Disability and the Challenge for 
Moral Philopsophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 75; see also Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 
'Principles and values in Victorian guardianship legislation' (OPA Victoria, 2009) 
<http://www.publicadvcate.vic.gov.au>. 
7
 Immanuel Kant, Grounwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Arnulf E. 
Zweig trans, Oxford University Press, 2003); see also Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice, The Complete Text of the Metaphysics of Morals Part 1 (John Ladd trans, Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2nd ed, 1999). 
8
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Supported decision-making Background and discussion 
paper' (OPA Victoria, November 2009) <http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>. 
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with Australia’s guardianship regime to provide supported decision-making as 
required by the CRPD.  
These criteria and features will be utilised in the subsequent chapters to evaluate the 
compliance with the CRPD requirements of Australian guardianship cases in the 
area of accommodation. The cases will be those decided subsequent to the 
application of the CRPD in Australia, 16 August 2008.9 This is the date from which 
guardianship tribunals in Australia could have had regard to Article 12 of the CRPD.  
2.2   Possible Sources of the Evaluation Criteria 
There are a number of possible sources for the derivation of evaluation criteria to 
assess Australia’s compliance with CRPD requirements to embrace supported 
decision-making as opposed to substituted decision-making (guardianship). These 
come from the Canadian Association for Community Living (CACL), human rights 
principles found within the CRPD and Article 12 itself of the CRPD. 
2.2.1 The Canadian Association for Community Living (CACL) 1992 
Task Force Report.10   
This report was prophetic of a change in decision-making as the first detailed 
consideration of supported decision-making. The Canadian Association for 
Community Living (CACL) is a significant organisation in Canada with over 400 
organisational members and over 40,000 individual members.11 Michael Bach has 
been the Executive Director of the CACL for a number of years and one of the 
leaders in the supported decision-making movement worldwide.12 The following is a 
                                            
9
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008). Ratified by Australia 17 July 2008 and Article 45(2) effective 
on the 30
th
 day following ratification. 
10
 Canadian Association for Community Living Task Force, above n 1. 
11
 Canadian Association for Community Living, 'National Report Card 2010 Inclusion of Canadians 
with Intellectual Disabilities' (CACL, 2010) <http://www.cacl.ca/contact-us>; see also Council of 
Canadians with Disabilities, 'UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Making 
Domestic Implementation Real and Meaningful' (CCD Working paper, March 2011) 
<http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/international/un/canada/making-domestic-law-real-and-meaningful>; see 
also Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 'Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Overview and next steps for an accessible and inclusive society' (Council of Canadians with 
Disabilities, 2012) <http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/international/un/canada/vangelis-nikias>; see also 
Michael Bach, 'Advancing Self-Determination of Persons with Intellectual disabilities: Overview of the 
Supported Dexision-Making Model and Legal Provision in Canada' (Inclusion Europe, 2007) 
<http://www.inclusion-europe.org/documents/INCL1_WEB_mini.pdf>. 
12
 Michael Bach, 'Securing Self-Determination: Building the Agenda in Canada' (TASH Newslettter, 
1998) 
<http://www.members.shaw.ca/bsalisbur/Securing%20the%20Agenda%20for%20SelfDeterminaton%
20-%20Michael%20Bach.doc>; see also Michael Bach, 'What Does Article 12 of the CRPD Require?: 
Theoretical Starting Points and Questions' (July 2009) 
<http://www.inclusionireland.ie/CapacityRoundtableAug2009.asp>; see also Nandini Devi, Jerome 
Bickenbach and Gerold Stucki, 'Moving Towards Substituted or Supported Decision-Making? Article 
12 of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2011) 5 ALTER, European Journal of 
Disability Research 16. 
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summary of the concept of supported decision-making as it appeared in the CACL 
Task Force Report of 1992:13  
Every adult is entitled to be supported or assisted to make their own decisions. The 
basis for decision making for the CACL Task Force was a will or intention that was 
capable of making choices. Support could be in many forms from assisting with 
communication or understanding of information to communicating a person’s will and 
intention. Persons with full understanding use support to make many decisions.  A 
person is entitled to refuse support. The essence of supported decision-making is a 
long-standing relationship of trust in another person or persons. If a person is 
isolated then the government has a duty to provide a support network. This would 
enable isolated persons who can be supported to make their own decisions to 
exercise self- determination. The CACL formulation is consistent with a right of full 
legal capacity and a right to receive support for this purpose. There should be 
safeguards to prevent a conflict of interest between supporter and supported person 
or the supporter unduly influencing the supported person. A court review system 
should be available, not to monitor the decisions made by the supported person as 
they are entitled to make improvident decisions, but to guard against conflict of 
interest and undue influence by the supporter.   
Therefore evaluation criteria for supported decision-making that could be distilled 
from the CACL Task Force Report of 1992 are: 
a) Following the will and preferences of the individual. 
b) The presence of a trusted individual or group of persons to provide assistance 
or support in decision-making. 
c) The facilitation and provision of a support network by the State where an 
individual is isolated without a group of trusted others. 
d) The presence of safeguards and an appeal to a court to prevent conflict of 
interest or undue influence between the supporter and the individual. 
The CACL formulation of supported decision-making may resemble certain aspects 
of Article 12 of the CRPD. However it does not contain all of the elements of Article 
12 including safeguards adopting the least restrictive alternative for the provision of 
supports. 14  Further, it does not bind or significantly influence an Australian 
Guardianship Tribunal or Court to follow its application. There is no legal obligation 
to apply the CACL Task Force formulation of supported decision-making in Australia. 
It is important to base normative criteria upon a document to which Australia has 
become bound through ratification. The CRPD itself is the most authoritative and 
endorsed statement of supported decision-making through its ratification by 
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 Canadian Association for Community Living Task Force, above n 1. 
14
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(4). 
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Australia. However the CACL formulation will be useful in understanding the content 
of Article 12 of the CRPD as the Canadian delegation to the Ad Hoc CRPD drafting 
committee was responsible for Article 12.15 However this delegation consisted of 
governmental and non-governmental members, much wider than the CACL.  
2.2.2 Human Rights Principles in the CRPD 
Should general human rights principles such as dignity and autonomy be the 
yardstick to measure compliance with supported decision-making requirements in 
the CRPD?   
The normative principles of dignity and autonomy are found in the general principles 
of the CRPD in Article 3.16 The general principles in Article 3 are said to form the 
moral basis or moral fabric of the CRPD.17 These principles are important guidelines 
that underpin supported decision-making and express values that underpin the 
CRPD itself but will not be used as the basis of evaluative criteria for the reasons 
discussed below. 
(a) Dignity 
Dignity has been defined as self-worth and self-respect common to all members of 
the human family from birth. It is not related to productivity, economic status or the 
extent of a person’s disability.18 
Inherent dignity has been said to be the source of all human rights.19 The words 
“dignity” and “self-worth” have appeared prominently in the Preamble in every major 
United Nations Declaration and Treaty since the 1945 United Nations Charter.20 
Recognition of the right to dignity was included in the Preambles of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)21 and the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966).22 
                                            
15
 United Nations, above n 2; see also United Nations, 'Daily Summary of discussion at the seventh 
session 3 February 2006 UN Convention on the Human Rights of People with Disabilities Ad Hoc 
Committee Daily summaries' (UN, 2006) <www.un.org/disabilitiescountries.asp?id=166>; see also 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 'Human Rights Principles' (UNFPA, 2005) 
<http://www.unfpa.org/rights/principles.htm>. 
16
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 3(a). 
17
 Rosemary Kayess and Ben Fogarty, 'The Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities' (2007) 
32(1) Alternative Law Journal 22. 
18
 Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497 (53); see also (UNFPA), above n 15. 
19
 People with Disabilities, 'Everyone, Everywhere: Recogniton of Persons with Disabilities as 
Persons before the Law' (PWD, 2009) 
<http:www.pwd.org.au/documents/pubs/EveryoneEverywhere2009.pdf>; see also Carter, above n 6. 
20
 United Nations, 'Charter of the United Nations (Preamble)' (United Nations, 1945) 
<http://www.un.org/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>. 
21
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 January 1976). Effective in Australia 1990. 
22
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 November 1976). Effective in Australia 1986. 
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Inherent dignity and self-worth have featured in the United Nations instruments on 
disability leading up to and including the CRPD. These include the Declaration on 
the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971);23 the Declaration on the Rights of 
Disabled Persons (1975); 24  the Worldwide Programme of Action Concerning 
Disabled Persons (1983)25 and the Standard Rules On Equalization of Opportunities 
for Persons with Disabilities (1993).26 
The difficulty with using the human rights principle of dignity as a source for an 
evaluation criterion is that although dignity has a generally accepted meaning of self-
worth and self-respect, it has been used as a justification for many different things: 
not only for supported decision-making in the CRPD itself but also as the basis for a 
substituted or surrogate decision-maker (guardian); 27  for Personhood (all of the 
ideas wishes and values of the individual that make them human);28 for a right to 
body integrity;29 for a theory of capabilities stressing real opportunities to have a 
valued life30 and for a theory of moral philosophy based upon autonomy and a priori 
reasoning.31 
A problem that exists when using “dignity” as a basis for the normative evaluative 
framework is that it has been used as a justification for both protection and 
autonomy; with supported decision-making as a means to achieving autonomy. The 
problem exists when the normative values of protection and self-determination are in 
conflict. Previous United Nations instruments concerning persons with disabilities 
took a social welfare and protectionist approach embracing guardianship. 32  The 
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 United Nations, above n 5. 
24
 United Nations, above n 5. 
25
 United Nations Enable, 'World Programme of Action Concerning disabled Persons' (United Nations, 
2013) <http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=23>. 
26
 United Nations General Assembly, 'Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for 
Persons with disabilities' (UN, 1993) <www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/dpil1647e.htm>.  
27
 United Nations, above n 4; see also Barbara Carter, 'Adult Guardianship: Human Rights or Social 
Justice' (2010) 18 JLM 143. 
28
 Michael Bach, 'Legal Capacity, Personhood and Supported Decision Making' (Canadian 
Association for Community Living, January 2006) 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7docs/ahc7ii3.ppt>. 
29
 Department of Health & Community Services v JWB & SMB ("Marion's Case")  (1992) 175 CLR 218 
per Brennan J para 6 and 7 especially, but see whole of the judgment. 
30
 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice Disability, Nationality Species Membership (Harvard 
University Press, 1st ed, 2006); see also Amartya Kumar Sen, Development As Freedom (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 1999). 
31
 Immanuel Kant, 'Synthetic a priori Judgements' (2012) 
<http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5f.htm#intro>; see also Kant, above n 7. 
32
 United Nations, above n 5. 
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CRPD represents a paradigm shift moving towards the proposition that all persons 
with disabilities are no longer objects of charity but persons with enforceable rights.33 
The CRPD is the first United Nations instrument applying to persons with disabilities 
that recognises autonomy as a human right.34 Former notions of guardianship rest 
upon protection, first, of the individual’s property; then of the individual’s safety.35 
The move away from protection to rights and away from guardianship to self-
determination is one of the major features of the CRPD that sets it apart from other 
United Nations instruments.   
Inherent dignity has been seen as the justification for both autonomy and 
guardianship. To the extent that guardianship deals with care and protection the 
uses of dignity may be in conflict; it cannot readily be used as an evaluation criterion 
for supported decision-making in guardianship.  There is arguably dignity in both 
guardianship and supported decision-making depending on how it is defined. 36 
Accordingly, if dignity exists for supported decision-making it may also exist for 
substituted decision-making.   
(b) Autonomy 
The apparent breadth of autonomy is qualified by the short-hand common English 
phrase in the CRPD as the freedom to make one’s own choices.37 
Autonomy is viewed so much as an integral part of Article 12 of the CRPD that the 
CRPD Committee has stated that one’s autonomy, will and preferences are best 
preserved by supported decision-making.38 The CRPD Committee altered the words 
in Article 12(4) of protecting the “rights will and preferences” in their initial Committee 
reports and the concluding observations to Australia’s initial report39 to protecting 
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 Marianne Schulze, 'Understanding The UN Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities' 
(2010) 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/unconventionhradisabilities.pdf>; 
see also Ambassador Don Mackay, 'The convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: a 
benchmark for action' (2007) 56(1) International Rehabilitation Review 48; see also Don MacKay, 
'Chair's Closing Remarks seventh session Ad Hoc Committee' (2006) 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7chairclose>; see also Gerard Quinn, 'Added value of the 
UN CRPD on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (12 September 2008) 
<http://www.nuigalway.ie/cdlp/documents/publications/GQ-120908.pdf>. 
34
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) Preamble [n], art 3(a). 
35
 Sarah Burningham, 'Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co Decision-Making Law' 
(2009) 18 Dalhousie Journal of Legal studies 119. 
36
 Barbara Carter, 'Supported Decision-making background and discussion paper' (OPA Office of the 
Public Advocate, 2009); see also Nussbaum, above n 30. 
37
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) Preamble [n] and General Principles Article 3(a). 
38
 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 'Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Sixth Session 19-23 September' (2011) 
<http://www.ohcr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Session6.aspx>. 
39
 United Nations, 'Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Concluding observations on 
the initial report of Australia, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session (2-13 September)' (2013) 
<http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG> [25]. 
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“autonomy, will and preferences”. 40  It is apparent by the CRPD Committee’s 
interpretation that the right safeguarded and referred to in Article 12(4) of the CRPD 
is the right of autonomy.41   
Therefore, in my view, autonomy is an end-point rather than a criterion by which to 
measure compliance with supported decision-making. Supported decision-making 
may be classified as the means promoted by Article 12 of the CRPD to achieve the 
end result of autonomy.42  There may be other means that are not addressed in the 
CRPD. One possibility might be to change the individual through medical 
advancement so they are able to make decisions without support. Conditions such 
as dementia, psychosocial disabilities and intellectual disabilities may be treatable in 
the future. This is an extension from the notion of using advanced medical means to 
ascertain intention to determine a will and preference.43 Though this may be another 
means to the end of autonomy but it is one that adopts the medical model of 
disability: treat the disability. On the other hand, the CRPD adopts the social model 
of disability: the community disables - do not change the individual, change the 
environment.44 The adaptation of a medical model does not conform to the CRPD 
consideration of disability as a product of environmental and societal barriers. 
Therefore autonomy is the end result or goal of supported decision-making and will 
not be used as an assessment criterion of supported decision-making. From a 
normative basis it is akin to using the end (autonomy) to assess the means to 
achieving the end (supported decision-making).  
2.2.3 Article 12 of the CRPD  
This is the most authoritative, current and directly relevant source of assessment 
criteria for supported decision-making. The other articles of the CRPD, though 
important, do not provide the source of the benchmark criteria for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
There are several reasons for using Article 12 of the CRPD as the source of the 
evaluating criteria for guardianship case law in Australia. For example, Article 12(3) 
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 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(4). 
41
 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 'General Comment on Article 12: Equal 
recognition before the law' (United Nations, 14 April 2014) 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBpdies/CRPD/GC/DGCAricle12.doc> 
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 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(3). 
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 Gerard Quinn, 'Concept Paper "Personhood and Legal Capacity" Perspectives on the Paradigm 
shift of Article 12 of the CRPD' (Harvard Law School, 2010) 
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incorporates the notion of supported decision-making by providing ‘States Parties 
shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the 
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity’.45 Article 12(4) of the 
CRPD in providing safeguards, then goes to some extent to unpack supported 
decision-making into some of its constituent parts. 46  The wording of Article 12 
provides a number of cogent reasons for its use as criteria:  
1. The Articles of the CRPD offer the source of a communication (complaint) to 
the CRPD committee. Although Australia’s adherence to United Nations 
treaties has been less than perfect in recent times,47 assent to an international 
convention offers at the very least a strong  argument that supported decision-
making as it appears in Article 12 of the CRPD should be complied with.48 
Although the Preamble and General Principles will be used to understand the 
meaning of the Articles of the CRPD, it is the Articles themselves which are of 
particular significance in this context.49 
2. Unlike various countries such as the United States of America, where 
ratification of a United Nations treaty means immediate application within the 
Member State, this is not the case for Australia. Here it is not legally 
enforceable until it has been adopted into Australia with specific domestic 
legislation. 50  There is however, an implied rights argument for observing 
Article 12 of the CRPD. This jurisprudential basis is that as Australia has 
ratified a United Nations Convention a person has a right in administrative law 
to expect observance of the Convention’s Articles rather than their flagrant 
disregard.51 This argument has been applied federally for other conventions 
and a single judge of the Victoria Supreme Court has applied the CRPD to its 
guardianship legislation.52 Australia has thus far not implemented domestic 
legislation incorporating the whole or part of the CRPD, but the implied rights 
argument remains valid. 
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3. Queensland and Victorian Guardianship Tribunals and Courts may have a 
legal obligation to apply Article 12 of the CRPD.53 In Queensland, General 
Principle 2 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) provides 
an express obligation to observe human rights of a person with a disability in 
its guardianship legislation. 54  Further, Victorian courts have specifically 
considered Article 12 when overturning guardianship tribunal decisions and a 
succession matter.55This consideration has been in addition to and separate 
from legal rights conferred by the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (VIC).56 
4. Although the exact format of supported measures or the role of the 
government is not clearly identified by Article 12 of the CRPD, some meaning 
has been provided by the United Nations High Commission for Human 
Rights 57  to identify certain components of what is meant by supported 
decision-making.58 This offers the possibility of identifying constituent parts 
going into the means (supported decision-making) to achieve the end 
(autonomy). 
5. The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has recommended changes 
to State and Territory guardianship legislation, Social Security legislation, the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), aged care legislation and other 
Federal laws to take account of Australia’s obligations under Article 12 of the 
CRPD.59 
Accordingly, the legal, legislative, implied rights and UNHCR arguments provide 
justification for Article 12 of the CRPD to serve as the source for obtaining the 
evaluation criteria to assess Australia’s compliance to supported decision-making 
found in Article 12 of the CRPD. 
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2.3 Content of the Evaluation Criteria 
Article 12 of the CRPD is entitled “Equal recognition before the law”. It is however 
concerned with much more than this concept. It deals with legal capacity, provision 
of supports to exercise legal capacity, safeguards in the provision of those supports, 
and the ability of persons with disabilities to hold an interest in property. 
The sources of the evaluation criteria and important features are found in Articles 
12(2), 12(3) and 12(4) of the CRPD.  Article 12(1) and Article 12(5) are nonetheless 
important sections of Article 12 which affect the choice of the criteria and will be 
discussed below. 
2.3.1 Article 12(1) provides: ‘States Parties reaffirm that persons with 
disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the 
law’.60 
The language of Article 12(1) in recognising persons with disabilities as persons 
before the law is said to be consistent with the human rights approach to 
disabilities. 61  Persons with disabilities are to be recognised as persons with 
potentially legally enforceable rights rather than as objects to receive charity only 
when governments and non-government organisations are of the opinion they have 
the ability to provide assistance.62 
The United Nations had used the concept of ‘recognition as a person before the law’ 
previously in other instruments, so the word ‘reaffirm’ was used in Article 12(1). This 
phrase appears in Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)63 
and in Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).64 
It also appears in Article 5(1) of the CRPD which deals with equality and non-
discrimination. This relationship is explained as follows: 
Article 5 gives a general duty to provide accommodations or adjustments, whereas 
Article 12(3) is a specific accommodation or adjustment, being the provision of 
supports.65 Bach and Kerzner argue that the general duty to provide adjustments in 
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Article 5(3) of the CRPD can be used for the provision of the specific adjustment of 
providing supports in the exercise of legal capacity in Article 12.66 
The concept of recognition as a person before the law is a necessary precursor to 
the holding of further rights under Article 12 and indeed, to the holding of any rights 
under the CRPD.67 In order to assert a right to life or a right to move freely it is 
necessary to be recognised as a person before the law. This is to distinguish a 
person from a legal non-person, such as a slave who had no rights.68 A slave was 
treated as property in law.69  The right conferred by Article 12(1) appears to be 
eligibility as a legal person to hold rights. 
There are no specific criteria that can be derived from Article 12(1) of the CRPD that 
can be used for application of supported decision-making to Australian guardianship 
cases involving accommodation. However Article 12(1) is important in providing legal 
personhood to a person with a disability; it forms the framework for other rights in 
Article 12, such as a right to legal capacity or a right to support. 
2.3.2 Article 12(2) provides: ‘States Parties shall recognise that persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life’.  
The concept of “legal capacity” in Article 12(2) of the CRPD is a much wider concept 
than being a person before the law in Article 12(1).70 It includes the capacity to have 
rights and to act upon or exercise these rights. Article 12(1) only provides the ability 
to have rights.71 
This concept is also different to traditional Australian notions of legal capacity based 
upon understanding, appreciation, communication and values.72 This comes from a 
concept of human beings as rational entities, and able to have full cognition, able to 
make all decisions understanding the nature and effect of the decision. The exercise 
of legal capacity is in all aspects of life for all persons in Article 12(2). 
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The meaning of legal capacity for Article 12(2) is complete ability to make decisions 
independent of tests of understanding (mental capacity).73 Any evaluative criterion 
obtained from Article 12(2) needs to reflect this concept of universality. 
McSherry has termed the two limbs of Article 12(2) as legal standing and legal 
agency. 74  Another way of interpreting the distinction is that the first limb is the 
platform for decision-making rights while the second limb is the actual legal ability to 
exercise those rights.  
The United Nations has taken the position that all persons with disabilities enjoy the 
right to exercise legal capacity without restrictions or qualifications. It has become a 
full human right of universal application. Amita Dhanda has argued that the Ad Hoc 
Committee drafting the CRPD was confronted with two choices for the consideration 
of “legal capacity”.75 The first choice was to make it a “right”. This means that as a 
human right it has universal application for all persons without limitations. 76 The 
second possibility was to make the ability to exercise legal capacity something less 
than a human right. ‘Universal’ legal capacity was accepted as placing limitations 
that would remove the capacity to act from a ‘human right” to something less than a 
human right, was for a limited benefit.77 There were arguments by delegates to the 
Ad Hoc Committee drafting the CRPD that certain adults do not have the capacity to 
act on or exercise rights. Some of these persons included those in a coma or with 
advanced Alzheimer’s disease.78 However by catering for a few exceptional cases 
legal capacity would have been removed from the status of a human right. Instead, 
legal capacity was afforded human rights status to be provided to everyone 
irrespective of the level of cognition or disability. 
The United Nations concept of universal legal capacity is contrasted with the current 
traditional approach that places limitations upon ‘legal capacity’. All of the current 
approaches are inconsistent with the Article 12 concept of unrestricted legal 
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capacity.79 Three limitations to the concept of mental capacity are used currently, 
based upon status, outcome and function as discussed earlier in Chapter 1.80  
The ‘functional approach’ continues to place a limitation upon legal capacity, 
reducing it to less than a ‘human right’. Wikler postulates that persons of average 
intelligence and cognitive ability do not have their legal capacity removed in favour of 
persons with superior cognitive ability or intelligence.81 It has been argued that there 
is no magic line that can be identified for intelligence that above the line functional 
mental capacity exists and it is lost below this line. 82  The natural progressive 
argument from those who deny a functional limitation to legal capacity is that all 
persons can be supported to make their own decisions and retain their own legal 
capacity.83 
The advocates of universal legal capacity for all adults indicate that “legal capacity” 
is both a social and legal construct, not an attribute of the functional abilities of the 
individual.84 The “legal construct” is that the law grants “legal capacity” to everyone 
irrespective of the level of disability of the individual. The social construct is the 
notion that it is society which disables and therefore society should remove any 
barriers to the recognition of legal capacity.85 Such a legal construct endows all 
adults with legally enforceable rights and responsibilities. All persons with disabilities 
not only have the rights but the ability to act on or exercise those rights. Tina 
Minkowitz, 86  Amita Dhanda, 87  Gabor Gombos, 88  Michael Bach, 89  David Webb, 90 
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Lana Kerzner91 and Gerard Quinn92 argue that the construction of “legal capacity” is 
independent of any cognitive, physical, perceptual or communication test of 
capability.93   
If universal legal capacity can exist within a guardianship framework then it may be 
possible to adhere to the principles of supported decision-making in Article 12 of the 
CRPD without abandoning current Australian guardianship legislation. 
Can guardianship co-exist with legal capacity as formulated by Article 12?94  A view 
held by organisations and individuals is that guardianship legislation can co-exist 
with a right to exercise legal capacity under Article 12 of the CRPD.95 A co-existence 
of guardianship and a right to exercise legal capacity corresponds not only to the 
degree of disability of the individual but the risk of abuse from the individual’s support 
network. 96  If the individual’s support network is abusive to the individual, 
guardianship may be necessary.97 
The view of ‘shared capacity’ by Browning, Bigby and Douglas 98 supports the 
retention of adult guardianship legislation. Mental capacity is assessed with supports 
to be provided to the individual. Mental capacity is retained but with supports 
provided when an assessment is undertaken.  It is between concepts of universal 
legal capacity in the CRPD and the present tests of mental capacity, assessed 
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without the provision of supports. It resembles the stepped model of support by the 
Office of Public Advocate of South Australia in Chapter 1.8 of this thesis.99  
Australia’s Declaration 
At the time of ratification of the CRPD on 17 July 2008 the Australian government 
provided its interpretive, non-binding declaration of its understanding of the meaning 
of Article 12 of the CRPD: 
Australia recognises that persons with disability enjoy legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life. Australia declares its understanding that the 
Convention allows for fully supported or substituted decision-making arrangements, 
which provide for decisions to be made on behalf of a person, only when such 
arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and subject to safeguards.
100
 
This view is that a person’s legal capacity can be retained and protected while 
retaining a guardianship regime. There may be a sliding scale of autonomy, whereby 
a temporary restriction in one area for protection preserves autonomy in all other 
areas.101 This is to be contrasted with the notion of a sliding scale of supports to 
exercise legal capacity based upon the severity of a disability.102 The approach taken 
by the Australian government is that restriction as a last resort may take the place of 
legal capacity thus ensuring a continuation of the guardianship regime in Australia.103 
The CRPD Committee is concerned with Australia’s retention of its interpretive 
declaration on Article 12 of the CRPD.104 This suggests the retention of guardianship 
at the expense of full legal capacity to exercise their rights.105   
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its inquiry into the implementation of 
Article 12 of the CRPD into Federal legislation has proposed a review of Australia’s 
interpretive declaration.106 In my view and the view of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission107 this declaration may continue to operate as a barrier, preventing the 
recognition of persons with disabilities as having full legal capacity. 
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The opinion regarding the concept of ‘legal capacity’ by the United Nations differs to 
some extent from the declaration upon ratification by the Australian government. The 
CRPD Committee has provided final reports on initial CRPD compliance for Spain, 
Tunisia, Peru, China, Argentina, Hungary, Austria, Australia and El Salvador at the 
time of writing.   
On September 13, 2013 the CRPD Committee delivered its final report on Australia’s 
initial compliance to the CRPD. The CRPD Committee has been uniform in its 
condemnation of guardianship and remains steadfast in its recommendation to 
replace guardianship with supported decision-making. By implication, it would 
appear that the CRPD Committee envisages no restriction or limitation to ‘legal 
capacity’. The CRPD Committee in paragraph 25 of their report on Australia’s CRPD 
compliance provides:  
The Committee recommends that the State party effectively use the current inquiry to 
take immediate steps to replace substitute decision-making with supported decision-
making and that it provide a wide range of measures which respect a person’s 
autonomy, will and preferences and are in full conformity with Article 12 of the 
Convention, including with respect to a person’s right in his or her own capacity, to 
give and withdraw informed consent for medical treatment, to access justice, to vote, 
to marry and to work.
108
  
This demonstrates a move away from substituted decision-making towards 
supported decision-making. Steps are required to embrace supported decision-
making to respect the person’s ‘autonomy, will and preferences’. 109  The CRPD 
committee envisages these steps to replace guardianship with supported decision-
making should be ‘immediate’.110 
2.3.2.1 Least Restrictive Alternative Representing Universal Legal Capacity 
as an evaluation criterion 
The United Nations interpretation of the concept of ‘legal capacity’ for Article 12(2) of 
the CRPD is apparently universal and unrestricted. This view has recently been 
confirmed by the first principle in recommendation 1 of the ALRC Report on Equality, 
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws.111 
It may at first glance appear that no assessment criteria could be derived from this 
interpretation to assess compliance with supported decision-making as required by 
the CRPD. It may however be possible to consider two potential criteria that are 
related to the concept of full legal capacity.   
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The first is a presumption of legal capacity. 112  This means that an individual is 
presumed to have full decision-making legal capacity unless and until there is some 
evidence to rebut this presumption.  Such an approach would still enable limitations 
or restrictions to exist to deny full legal capacity and therefore would be inconsistent 
with the United Nations’ views on the meaning of Article 12(2). The problem with 
using a presumption of capacity as an evaluative criterion is that it can be rebutted or 
removed. This is inconsistent with the United Nations concept of universal ‘legal 
capacity’ which cannot be restricted or removed. It reflects a concept of ‘all or 
nothing’ mental capacity that can lead to findings of incapacity.113 
The second possibility for an evaluation criterion is the application of the concept of 
‘least restriction’. This generally occurs when the appointment of a guardian is 
avoided. Generally, no guardianship order is made where there is a positive support 
network or where there is no guardianship decision to be made. A guardianship 
tribunal may be adopting a least restrictive approach by the recognition of the 
satisfactory functioning of an individual’s support network. Alternatively, a 
guardianship tribunal may take a ‘least restrictive’ approach where there is no 
support network but there are no decisions to be made. It would appear that not 
making a guardianship appointment can be consistent with the exercise of the 
person’s ‘legal capacity’ within the CRPD Committee’s interpretation of Article 12(2) 
of the CRPD.  
Very rarely, the appointment of a particular person who expressly fulfills the 
individual’s accommodation wishes will also meet this requirement. Because the 
appointment is more in the nature of an appointed supporter, it could be seen as one 
of substitution. I acknowledge the contradiction that a guardianship appointment can 
function as the least restrictive alternative. An example of this very infrequent 
situation may arise where an individual expresses a desire for a change of 
accommodation but is unable to achieve this due to a conflict situation. A particular 
person has stated a willingness to conform to the individual’s will and preferences. 
As there are presently no supportive guardians available legislatively (to be 
discussed further in chapter 8), the appointment of the particular person is the least 
restrictive to obey the individual’s will and preferences. Although a contradiction, it 
appears to maintain the individual’s decision-making autonomy for accommodation.  
The United Nations concept of legal capacity is full decision-making ability for all 
persons with disabilities irrespective of the level of disability. An evaluation criterion 
that preserves and is consistent with the notion of full legal capacity is needed for 
evaluative purposes. Applying the least restrictive alternative is consistent with the 
notion of full legal capacity. Where no guardianship order is made because there are 
no decisions to be made or no need for a guardian or recognition of the positive 
effects of the individual’s support network, then the least restrictive approach is 
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taken. This places no restrictions upon the present and future ability of the individual 
to make decisions either with or without support. Full legal capacity within the United 
Nations concept of Article 12(2) is maintained. 
Therefore following the ‘least restrictive alternative’ to maintain self-determination will 
be used as an evaluation criterion for evaluating supported decision-making in the 
following chapters. 
2.3.3 Article 12(3) of the CRPD 
The purpose of this subsection is to derive an evaluation criterion or important 
feature from Article 12(3).  
Article 12(3) provides: ‘States Parties shall take appropriate measures to 
provide  access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.’ 
Article 12(3) of the CRPD will be used to develop an important facilitating feature that 
may affect a tribunal’s application of supported decision-making contained in Article 
12 of the CRPD. This feature will be based upon the private support models that 
presently exist in Australia because legislative models of support do not exist in 
Australia at the time of writing. Victoria’s lapsed Guardianship and Administration Bill 
did enable VCAT to appoint a supportive guardian (supporter) but this bill was not 
enacted.114  
Article 12(3) of the CRPD introduces the notion of supports being provided to 
exercise legal capacity. Article 12(3) is silent as to the types of supports, models of 
support and the role of government in providing supports to exercise legal capacity. 
It is important to consider support models together with their potential risks because 
of the lack of specificity surrounding this issue in Article 12. A description will be 
provided as to the meaning of support to exercise legal capacity, support models, 
public or private demarcation of support models and their associated risks.  Finally, 
an important facilitating feature will be developed to apply to the Australian 
guardianship jurisdiction. 
To obtain an evaluation criterion for Article 12(3) it is necessary to consider the 
meaning of support to exercise legal capacity, the various types of support models 
and how they arise. A distinction is drawn between support models within and 
outside legislation. It will be established that it is possible to derive a facilitating 
feature from the non-legislative (private) support models currently in existence in 
Australia. 
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2.3.3.1 What is meant by ‘supports to exercise legal capacity’? 
There is general agreement from the United Nations, 115  from government 
organisations,116 from non-government and community organisations,117 and from 
individual authors118 relating to the meaning of providing supports to exercise legal 
capacity. This is assistance or support provided by another individual (supporter) or 
group of persons (support network) to enable the individual to make his or her own 
decisions. This support may be communication assistance, language interpretation 
or facilitated communication for a person without any cognitive impairment. For 
people with cognitive difficulties the support may range from gathering information, 
explaining information and options, communicating a response to third parties, 
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understanding a person’s intention, will and preferences and communicating these to 
third parties. 
Support may be formal or informal. It is important to note that nearly all persons 
without disabilities rely upon the assistance of others when making decisions from 
time to time.119 For example the purchase of a house or automobile will generally 
involve consultation with other persons.120 
2.3.3.2 Support models 
The literature review in Chapter 1 has detailed several taxonomies of supported 
decision-making. They included those from Michael Bach121 who classified decision-
making into autonomous, substituted, supported, mentorship and advance planning 
documentation; the South Australian Office of Public Advocate which formulated a 9-
stage stepped model of support;122 Robert M. Gordon’s classification of supported 
decision-making in Canada as ordered by a court, in legislation or contemplated by 
legislation;123 and Salzman, who categorised supports as either within or outside 
legislation (public and private models of support).124 
It is interesting to note that the final Report of the Victorian Law Reform Commission 
(April 2012) recommended legislative reform to their Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1986 (VIC), that included support agreements, representation 
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agreements and co-decision making.125 The only form of support addressed by the 
lapsed Victorian Bill is tribunal appointed supportive guardians. Support agreements 
and co-decision makers are absent from this Bill.126 This Bill will be discussed in 
Chapter 8 with a consideration of recommendations for legislative reform.  
2.3.3.3 Risks associated with Private and Public Models of Supported 
Decision-Making 
As noted in Chapter 1127 the public support models run the risk of isolation of the 
individual from family and friends not appointed as supporters.128 There is also a risk 
that the decision reached will be that of the supporter and not the individual.129 The 
supporter may use their position to unduly influence the individual to make a decision 
to the advantage of the supporter.130 
The identification of these risks is important in developing evaluation criteria that 
identify and take account of these risks. The situation where the supporter influences 
the individual to make decisions that either benefit the supporter or follow the 
supporter’s views and wishes has been of prime concern and features in the 
safeguards contained in Article 12 of the CRPD. 131  Because of these risks, 
evaluation criteria or features will be developed to ascertain compliance with 
supported decision-making in the next subsection. 
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The private sphere of supported decision-making may afford greater control and 
flexibility for the individual but it may have even greater risks than the statute-based 
forms of supported decision-making.132 These risks are similar to the public sphere 
risks of isolation, substitution and undue influence; however these risks may be 
amplified by the informality and lack of external supervision and monitoring.133 
There are criticisms by Kohn, Blumenthal and Campbell,134 Carney and Beaupert,135 
Kohn and Blumenthal,136 Then137 and O’Neill and Peisah138 of supported decision-
making and reluctance to embark upon these programs until significant positive 
empirical data underscores the benefits of supported decision-making. There is an 
absence of such empirical data particularly with public support regimes.139 
Surtees, in 2010 found that in Saskatchewan only approximately 6% of the 
applications for a guardian or co-decision-maker were for a co-decision-maker. Only 
a handful of co-decision making appointments were made by the Court (District 
Court) during the 8 years of the Surtees study.140 
In South Australia, there has been a successful pilot project with 26 participants (23 
completing the two-year project). It was for private support for persons with an 
intellectual impairment in the areas of accommodation and lifestyle decisions.141 The 
project demonstrated that these persons could be supported to make their own 
decisions. Those persons with guardianship orders were able to have their orders 
revoked.142 A small, 6 person, trial was undertaken and completed in 2013 in the 
Australian Capital Territory. The ACT study highlighted the difficulty and importance 
of obtaining a trained supporter/support network because of the reluctance of family 
members to act as supporters and the isolation of persons with cognitive 
disabilities.143 New South Wales has recently completed a similar sized pilot to South 
Australia that included financial decisions. It was conducted jointly by the NSW 
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Guardian and Public Trustee, the NSW Public Guardian and the NSW Department of 
Disability Services. 144  The NSW pilot demonstrated the difficulties in obtaining 
subjects and supporters and in their training for a small (26 person) project.145 
Victoria has recently completed an 18-person project to provide support for isolated 
persons in rural Victoria with an intellectual disability. 146  This Victorian project 
demonstrated that considerable time was necessary to train and educate a person 
about the role of a supporter and of the paradigm shift to a support model away from 
substitution.147 The South Australian, Victorian, NSW and ACT projects demonstrate 
that an educated, trained and monitored informal support network can support an 
individual with an intellectual disability to make their own decisions and avoid the 
appointment of a guardian. However, limited inferences can be drawn based upon 
the small number of participants in these projects. 
2.3.3.4 The use of Article 12(3) to derive a support-based important 
facilitating feature   
The examination of various support models demonstrate that evaluation criteria or 
facilitating features cannot be used in Australia for the public model of support. There 
is no Australian guardianship enactment that contains a legislative or public model of 
support. The situation is different when one considers the private or informal models 
of support. Informal support networks such as family and friends exist as the primary 
means of providing support, particularly for a person with an intellectual 
impairment.148  
An informal support network constituted by a trusted group of others (often family 
and friends) chosen by the individual to express and communicate the individual’s 
will and preferences is at the cornerstone of supported decision-making.149  The 
trusted group of others (support network) is an essential component of supported 
decision-making. It is the other half of the concept is that every person has a will or 
can form an intention that is the basis of decision-making. The support network is 
essential to ascertain the will of an individual and communicate this will to others.150 
The support model of decision-making is achieved, according to Bach and 
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Kerzner,151 when at least one person is able to ascertain the will and preferences of 
an individual. This ascertainment is provided by the support network.  
Without a support network the supported decision-making model is incomplete 
according to some proponents of supported decision-making. 152  The ability to 
express one’s intentions and communicate one’s wishes is according to the CACL 
model, made to a trusted group of others, selected by the individual, in a relationship 
of trust to the individual.153  
A tribunal has no ability to create a positively functioning support network where 
none exists. This is distinguished from a tribunal’s ability to adopt the least restrictive 
alternative, which can be directly applied and used as a criterion. It would appear 
that the use of a private support model can be used as the basis of an important 
facilitating feature that enables compliance with the evaluation criteria. Further, the 
presence of the informal or private supporter or support network may be seen as a 
basis for avoiding guardianship. 
Although there may or may not be government resources that have gone into the 
development of the particular support network, the private support network is likely to 
be one still contemplated by the CRPD.154 Accordingly, Article 12(3) of the CRPD will 
be important as the source of a facilitating feature of private support networks. 
The appointment of a guardian for accommodation involves a two stage process.  
First, a disability that affects decision-making or a decision-making inability is found.  
Then a tribunal ascertains a need for the appointment of a guardian. Where a 
positive informal support network protects the health welfare and safety of the 
individual, there may be no need for a guardianship order. A tribunal can adopt the 
least restrictive alternative by avoiding an order. This maintains autonomy in 
compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD. This will become evident from the case 
analysis in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Therefore the presence and recognition of a positively functioning informal support 
network derived from Article 12(3) of the CRPD will be used as an important feature 
which facilitates compliance with Article 12 in the following chapters. To sum up, the 
CRPD requires support to be provided to enable the individual to exercise their legal 
capacity. The support network is a cornerstone to ascertain and communicate one’s 
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intention to exercise legal capacity. The CRPD does not provide any explanation 
regarding the meaning of support. Support models include both public and private 
models. There are no public support models currently in any Australian guardianship 
jurisdiction. Private models do exist and it has been demonstrated that they are 
essential for some individuals to ascertain and communicate their will and 
preferences. A positively functioning informal support network that is acknowledged 
and recognised by a guardianship tribunal is seen as demonstrating compliance with 
supported decision-making as contained in Article 12 of the CRPD. 
2.3.4 Article 12(4) of the CRPD  
The purpose of this subsection is to use the safeguards provided in Article 12(4) to 
derive criteria and important features that will be used to benchmark the application 
of supported decision-making in Australian guardianship cases. Article 12(4) 
provides:  
States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal 
capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in 
accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that 
measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights will and 
preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are 
proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time 
possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which 
such measures affect the person’s rights and interests. 
Article 12(4) of the CRPD mentions safeguards to prevent abuse in the provision of 
measures to exercise legal capacity. The prevention of abuse is a major message. It 
has a number of features that can provide a useful basis for analysing the 
incorporation of supported decision-making in Australian guardianship cases and 
legislation. These safeguards are the rights, will and preferences of the individual; 
freedom from conflict of interest and undue influence, and following least restrictive 
measures by combining  the concepts of  proportionality, tailored to the individual’s 
circumstances and applying for the shortest time possible. 
Protection from abuse 
It is important to note the relationship between the benchmark criteria and important 
features in the prevention of abuse with the individual’s exercise of their legal 
capacity. By the elimination of conflict of interest and undue influence between the 
individual and their support network a major potential source of abuse can be 
reduced or eliminated. Guardianship attempts to control abuse by the appointment of 
substitute decision-makers. Article 12(4) describes features that need resolution by a 
State Party to facilitate the exercise of decision-making ability. The extent of the 
need to provide safeguards to prevent abuse will become evident from the 
examination of guardianship cases involving accommodation examined in the 
subsequent chapters. 
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2.3.4.1 Respect the rights, will and preferences 
Following the individual’s will and preferences is the major component to supported 
decision-making and decision-making autonomy.  It will be a very important 
evaluation criterion to assess compliance with Article 12. 
The concept of will and preferences is a key to supported decision-making. The 
principle that every person has a will and is capable of making choices and exhibiting 
preferences, and therefore is entitled to make their own decisions is the hallmark and 
foundation of supported decision-making.155 
The proponents of supported decision-making believe that every person has a will 
that is capable of providing choices or preferences that may become decisions. 
According to Quinn, the role of a supporter is to ascertain and ‘spark’ the will of a 
person.156 Quinn postulates that even a person who has been institutionalised for 
many years may be supported in formulating a will and exhibiting preferences by 
living in the community and developing a support network.157 
Supported decision-making can be seen as the mechanism to elicit preferences and 
choices that become the building blocks of decisions. A developmental line can be 
drawn as follows for supported decision-making. Nearly all human beings 
communicate.158 The communication includes preferences. It may take support to 
build up preferences. The preferences may then with support be built up into 
choices. These choices become formal decisions.159 With support the response to an 
experience can elicit a preference. All persons can with varying degrees of support 
exhibit preferences to make their own decisions.160 
Authors have gone to considerable length to ascertain the will and preferences of an 
individual as the key to autonomous decision-making. Based upon the concept of 
will, intention and preferences, Bach and Kerzner 161  have developed three 
categories of decision-making.162 These are: autonomous, supported and facilitated 
and were discussed in Chapter 1.163 
Quinn has expanded upon these three categories of decision-making capacity.164 It 
is important to mention this here because will and preferences are crucial at every 
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stage; he describes how to determine a will and preference in difficult situations.165 
The discussion is important as a clarification of the meaning provided by Bach and 
Kerzner.166 
Quinn167 expresses three levels of support. They are first, autonomous, where little 
support is required, similar to the autonomous state of Bach and Kerzner.168 Second 
the supported state. Here one or more trusted others are able to ascertain the ‘will 
and preferences’ of an individual. The third state is the facilitated decision-making 
state. This arises only when the will and preferences are not known at the time. 
Quinn seeks a person (facilitator) to be appointed by a court to ascertain the 
individual’s will and preferences. The facilitator makes a decision the way the 
individual would have based upon knowledge gained of the individual’s preferences. 
This is achieved by spending time with the individual to attempt communication; 
speaking to those who know the individual and have an opinion as to the individual’s 
will.169 The court appointed facilitator is a last resort. 
From the analysis of Quinn, Bach, Kerzner and Flynn it is apparent that great lengths 
may be taken to ascertain the will and preferences of an individual in the support 
paradigm of decision-making.170 It would appear that even persons in a coma or 
advanced Alzheimer’s disease through the expansive notion of facilitated decision-
making are in a position to have their will and preferences determined.171   
Following the will and preferences of an individual is an important evaluation 
criterion. The more a guardianship tribunal in Australia recognises the will and 
preferences of the individual, the more it adheres to supported decision-making 
principles as contained in Article 12.172 This will be more evident in the subsequent 
chapters 4, 5 and 6 dealing with the application of the evaluation criteria and features 
in Victoria, NSW and Queensland.   
Recall that the CRPD Committee has substituted the word “autonomy” for the word 
“rights” when it has stated that countries should change their legislation from 
substituted decision-making to supported decision-making, as that best upholds the 
autonomy, will and preferences of the individual.173 The CRPD Committee considers 
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the ‘right’ of autonomy together with ‘will and preferences’ to be best ensured 
through a supported decision-making model and not guardianship.174 
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its final report, although retaining 
guardianship as a last resort, has given great importance to following an individual’s 
will and preferences. 175  Recommendation 3-3 creates a hierarchy for decision-
making. The individual’s express will and preferences are to be followed. If not 
express they may be ascertained by family and friends. If this is not possible then a 
substitute decision-maker should follow human rights. It is only when there is likely 
harm to the individual that a best interests approach is used. 176  This approach 
demonstrates the ALRC’s views as to the importance of will and preferences in 
making decisions on an equal basis with others in compliance with Article 12(2) of 
the CRPD. 
It has been demonstrated in this subsection that the protection of the will and 
preferences of the individual will form the basis of a very important evaluation 
criterion for case analysis of Australian guardianship cases in compliance with 
supported decision-making as found in the CRPD. How this may be undertaken will 
be discussed in the subsequent section dealing with the individual evaluation criteria 
and features. 
2.3.4.2 Conflict of interest and undue influence 
These concepts are considered because of the risks associated with supported 
decision-making. Burningham notes that supported decision-making could transform 
into substitution because of the potential for the views and values of the supporter to 
impose themselves.177 The presence of conflict of interest or undue influence may 
convince a tribunal to make a protective order against supported decision-making 
principles. Article 12(4) of the CRPD requires State Parties to provide effective 
safeguards in the measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity to be free of 
conflict of interest and undue influence. The meanings of these terms are not defined 
in the CRPD or in other United Nations instruments.  
The concepts of ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘undue influence’ are based upon two 
separate and distinct equitable doctrines. A ‘conflict of interest’ is based upon the 
concept of fiduciary duties. A person in a fiduciary relationship owes a duty to act 
only in the interests of the beneficiary and not in the fiduciary’s personal interest. An 
accepted category of fiduciary relationship is one of guardian and the person subject 
to a guardianship order.178 The fiduciary duty is one of the utmost trust and good 
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faith.179  Bach has extended this fiduciary relationship to include the relationship 
between an individual and their support network.180 The supporter holds any property 
or gains made by the relationship with the individual as a constructive trustee and 
must account to the individual as an instance of equitable fraud.181 
‘Undue influence’ is a separate but related equitable doctrine that also involves 
‘unconscionability’. This doctrine arises when a transaction occurs through the 
influence of a benefiting party. The inequality between the parties raises the 
presumption of influence. The category of guardian/individual or supporter/individual 
raises the presumption that a transaction from the individual to the supporter that 
benefits the supporter was gained by ‘undue influence’, where the ‘will’ of the 
individual was ‘overborne’.182 The supported individual’s vulnerability, often from a 
cognitive disability, raises the presumption of influence unless this can be disproved 
by the supporter.183 
The concept of undue influence is contrasted and distinguished from the concept of 
conflict of interest. Undue influence involves a transaction with the supported 
individual while conflict of interest does not require a transaction with the supported 
individual.184 Situations where a supporter acquires financial assets through direct 
dealings with the individual will be treated in this thesis as instances of potential or 
actual undue influence as this is the categorisation used by guardianship tribunals 
and courts applying guardianship legislation.185   
The concepts of conflict of interest and undue influence will be applied separately 
when used in later chapters as they are separate doctrines of equity and are refered 
to separately in Article 12(4) of the CRPD.  
The terms ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘undue influence’ will refer to conflict of interest or 
undue influence as between supporter and the individual. This is the use of these 
concepts in Article 12 of the CRPD by commentators, the United Nations and non-
government organisations. They will be given this usage for later chapters. 
Bach in 2008 on behalf of Inclusion Europe developed the 8 key elements for a legal 
system to implement Article 12 of the CRPD. Element 7 refers to the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts between supported person and supporters.186 He argues there 
will be cases when the supporter thinks the decision of the individual is not in that 
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person’s best interest, such as the giving away of money or the purchase of goods 
not needed by the individual. He suggests a process is needed for Element 7 to 
record how a supporter assists the individual with the individual’s decision.187  
The avoidance of conflict between supporter and supported is also a basic 
component of supported decision-making suggested by the CACL Task Force.188 
There should be safeguards and a review or appeal structure to prevent the 
supporter influencing the individual to make the supporter’s decision.  
Burningham has indicated that one of the problems with co-decision-making is that it 
may transpose into substitution if there are no checks to guard against the influence 
of the supporter.189 There is often a cognitive imbalance between the supporter and 
the individual. The United Nations CRPD Committee has recognised the importance 
of providing safeguards to ensure the decision remains that of the individual and not 
that of the supporter.190 In the list of issues provided by the CRPD Committee to 
Spain for its initial report, paragraph 10 sought explanation how undue influence and 
conflict of interest between the ward and the guardian can be prevented from 
occurring. 191  No satisfactory explanation has been forthcoming, highlighting 
difficulties of compliance in this area. The prevention of conflict of interest and undue 
influence is a major element in the prevention of abuse for the individual. This issue 
will be further discussed in Chapter 8 dealing with future directions. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its review of Commonwealth 
laws to implement Article 12 of the CRPD recommended 4 national decision-making 
principles. The last principle was the provision of safeguards to prevent abuse and 
undue influence. 192  The recommendation from the ALRC to prevent abuse and 
undue influence was that an appeal structure with monitoring and review will be 
necessary.193 This is similar to the recommendations by the CACL for supported 
decision-making in their 1992 report.194 I am uncertain whether or not this will lead to 
any better control of abuse and undue influence then the present guardianship 
system which already contains these three controls. The criticism of existing 
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supported decision-making systems is a lack of empirical evidence to indicate which 
support regimes control abuse and undue influence and do this better than 
guardianship.195 
The nature of the conflict between supporter and supported so the decision may no 
longer be that of the individual is different to the more commonly occurring situation 
of disagreements between different family members which often leads a tribunal to 
appoint a guardian.196 For example, a dispute may arise when three children of an 
adult with a cognitive disability each want their parent to reside near them but each 
lives in a different city. By contrast, a conflict between the individual and supporter 
may arise when the supporter wants the individual to reside in a nursing home while 
the individual wants to live at home. In the former situation there are multiple 
potential supporters with disagreement between the supporters. In the latter situation 
the disagreement is between the individual being supported and the supporter. 
A conflict of interest or undue influence by a supporter sometimes may be discerned 
in a review hearing or where there has been an appointment of an enduring guardian 
or power of attorney or problems with an informal support network.197  
Conflict of interest and undue influence between supporter and the individual will be 
a major detracting feature that may affect a tribunal’s compliance with the evaluation 
criteria. This will be applied in subsequent chapters. This important feature often 
derails a tribunal from following the criteria to make a protective appointment in the 
best interest or welfare of the individual.   
2.3.4.3 Least Restriction 
Recall the discussion of ‘least restrictive alternative’ earlier in this chapter set out at 
2.3.2 above. The result is also achieved from Article 12(4). It is a composite criterion 
derived from several ‘safeguards’ in Article 12(4) of the CRPD. These are that the  
measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity … are proportional and tailored to 
meet the person’s circumstances apply for the shortest time possible,…subject to 
regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. 
The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the 
person’s rights and interests.
198  
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This corresponds to the concept of a sliding scale of supports or a continuum of 
supports necessary for the exercise of legal capacity.199 Supports should only be 
provided to the degree to which they are needed by an individual. The last portion of 
Article 12(4) appears, according to French200 as a corollary to this statement, as the 
greater the disabilities the greater or more extensive and restrictive are the supports 
that will be needed to exercise legal capacity.201 
The concept of supports being proportional, tailored to meet the individual 
circumstances and applying for the shortest time possible also is consistent with the 
fluctuating, transitory three stages of decision-making by Bach and Kerzner.202 If a 
person is in a facilitated decision-making state, this may be due to being isolated and 
residing for many years in institutional care. After support is provided to form a 
support network the person may be able to articulate a will and preference, moving 
from facilitated decision-making to supported decision-making to potentially 
autonomous decision-making. 203  The statement that ‘measures to exercise legal 
capacity should apply for the shortest time possible’ is reflective of a person’s 
changing support needs. Note the difficulties in obtaining and training supporters in 
the South Australia, NSW and ACT supported decision-making projects.204 
The key element in this analysis of the Convention is the application of the least 
restrictive alternative; it can result in no guardianship appointment made, preserving 
the individual’s decision-making autonomy. The presence of a satisfactory informal 
support network may remove the need for a restrictive guardianship appointment. It 
may be possible to utilise the concept that is present in every general principle 
section of Australian guardianship legislation, namely, ‘least restriction’.205 According 
to the Victorian Office of Public Advocate, the principle means that guardianship is to 
be used as an absolute last resort206 and be avoided wherever possible. It should 
also be limited in time and only to those matters where there is an urgent need for a 
decision. However, the failure to make a guardianship order where conflict of interest 
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or undue influence has removed individual autonomy may mask persistent 
uncontrolled abuse from the individual’s family and friends. 
The safeguards contained in Article 12(4) of the CRPD have the cumulative effect of 
implying a ‘least restrictive alternative’. This is the least restriction on an individual’s 
decision-making rights. It appears to be a link between Article 12 of the CRPD and 
current Australian guardianship legislation. It will therefore be utilised as an 
assessment criterion to ascertain the level of compliance of Australian guardianship 
cases to supported decision-making in Article 12 of the CRPD. 
The review by a ‘competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body’,207 
as the final words of Article 12(4) are a further justification for implying a criterion of 
adopting the least restrictive alternative. This implies a system of monitoring and 
control to prevent abuse and undue influence which may limit or remove autonomy.  
By controlling abuse and undue influence through an independent review process 
autonomy may be able to be restored.  
2.3.5 Article 12(5) Provides:  
Subject to the provisions of this Article, States Parties shall take all appropriate and 
effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or 
inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank 
loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit, and shall ensure that persons 
with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.  
Article 12(5) is concerned entirely with financial property considerations, namely, 
establishing and maintaining financial decision-making for persons with disabilities.  
The decisions made by a guardian are distinguished from those made by a financial 
administrator in Australia. The guardian decides where the individual is to reside. A 
financial administrator pays for the accommodation. This thesis examines 
guardianship cases dealing with accommodation decisions. There are 
interrelationships between accommodation decisions and administration. The 
accommodation decision is often dependent upon finances.  For example in the PJB 
decision, 208  the appointment of an administrator to sell PJB’s house directly 
determined that PJB would live in residential care. Any interplay between 
guardianship and financial decisions will be considered and analysed without using 
Article 12(5) for the derivation of any specific evaluation criterion. For example, a 
case reviewing the appointment of an administrator without any residential 
accommodation issues will not be relevant for this thesis. 
However, Article 12(5) of the CRPD will be important to future research considering 
supported decision-making in relation to financial decisions. The supported decision-
making project in New South Wales considered personal, health and financial 
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decisions.209 An evaluative criterion based upon an individual’s right to manage and 
control their own property could guide future research into a person with disabilities 
right to financial management. 
Accordingly, both Article 12(1) and Article 12(5) of the CRPD will not be utilised for 
its content to provide evaluation criteria or features for guardianship cases and 
legislation. 
2.4 Identification of the Benchmark of two Evaluation Criteria 
and two important features 
It has been shown in this chapter that the source of analytical criteria for judging 
compliance with supported decision-making will be Article 12 of the CRPD. It has 
further been demonstrated that the content of Article 12 of the CRPD in subsections 
(2), (3) and (4) provides the evaluation criteria and important facilitating or detracting 
features to be used for assessing compliance with supported decision-making in 
guardianship cases.  
This section considers the benchmark, consisting of two evaluation criteria and two 
important features. It discusses the meaning and interrelationship of the benchmark 
criteria and features. 
2.4.1 Tribunal’s Implementation of the Evaluation Criteria 
The criteria of following the will and preferences and applying the least restrictive 
alternative are able to be applied directly by a guardianship tribunal. Their adherence 
by a guardianship tribunal will constitute compliance with the evaluation criteria. The 
last two features of the presence of a positive informal support network and conflict 
of interest and undue influence between the individual and the support network 
cannot be directly applied by a guardianship tribunal. They may be viewed as 
facilitators or detractors operating with the evaluation criteria. They are important 
features to prevent abuse in the exercise of legal capacity by the individual. 
The presence of a positive informal support network may enhance compliance with 
the evaluation criteria. This may be seen by a tribunal dismissing the application for 
an accommodation guardian because the individual is supported and assisted by 
their own support network. However, a tribunal has no power to create an informal 
support network or change a dysfunctional network clouded by conflict of interest 
into a functioning support network. The tribunal can only make decisions on the 
individual’s circumstances that apply at the time of the hearing.   
However, the presence of conflict of interest or of undue influence between the 
individual and their support network may detract from compliance with the evaluation 
                                            
209
 Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee of NSW, 'Submission 79 on the report on the Victorian 
review of their 1986 Guardianship and Administration Act' (30 June 2011). 
106 
 
criteria. A tribunal has no control over whether conflict of interest or undue influence 
exists. Where it exists, it is likely that a tribunal will make an appointment in 
contravention of the evaluation criteria to protect the individual’s best interests. For 
example, where a support network has financially abused the individual or prevented 
contact with family members then a statutory appointment is likely. Therefore, the 
distinction between the criteria and the important features is that a tribunal has the 
ability to directly follow and apply the first but cannot change or create the second.   
While the features remain important as facilitators or detractors, they are also critical 
concepts in supported decision-making derived from Article 12 of the CRPD; and 
initial formulations of supported decision-making.210 The lessons learned from the 
Canadian legislative supported decision-making experiences, 211  demonstrate that 
the ascertainment and communication of will and preferences is by the informal 
support network; and that prevention of conflict of interest and of undue influence 
between supporter and individual is required for supported decision-making to 
operate.212 
It is important to retain these two features as elements of supported decision-
making.  They affect a tribunal’s compliance or non-compliance with the evaluation 
criteria and prevent abuse for the individual. If a direct linkage can be established 
between compliance with the criteria and the presence of a positive informal support 
network then methods to develop, monitor and educate an informal support network 
can be shown to be necessary for compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD. Similarly, 
if a positive connection can be shown between the presence of conflict of interest or 
of undue influence between the network and the individual leading to a restrictive 
guardianship appointment, then prevention of this becomes necessary to comply 
with Article 12. 
2.4.2 Use and Application of the Benchmark to Guardianship Cases 
Involving Accommodation for the Following Chapters 
The benchmark derived in this chapter is designed to evaluate how current 
Australian guardianship tribunal decisions recognise and enable a person to make 
their own decisions in the area of accommodation. Article 12 of the CRPD contains 
two important concepts regarding decision-making ability for persons with 
disabilities. First, all persons, irrespective of the level of disability, have full legal 
capacity and second, to the extent that assistance is needed, they should be 
provided with support to exercise their capacity.213 The benchmark consisting of two 
criteria and two features is designed for this evaluative purpose. The evaluation 
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criteria and features were derived from a combination of the direct words of Article 
12 and by necessary implication. Following the individual’s will and preferences and 
safeguards to prevent conflict of interest and undue influence were derived directly 
from the language of Article 12(4) of the CRPD. The least restrictive alternative was 
derived by a requirement to recognise full decision-making capacity in Article 12(2) 
and from Article 12(4) where safeguards are proportional, tailored to meet the 
individual’s circumstances and apply for the shortest time period. The feature of a 
positive informal support network was derived by implication from Article 12(3). A 
support network constituted by a trusted group of others is often the mechanism for 
the recognition of a person’s will and preferences. It is a support measure consistent 
with Article 12(3) that presently exists under the current Australian guardianship 
system by networks of the individual’s family and friends. 
The benchmark will be applied as follows: 
(a) Will and preferences 
The summation of this concept is to obey the will of the individual regarding present 
and future accommodation decisions and not make a guardianship appointment 
contrary to the individual’s wishes. This criterion is met when the tribunal recognises 
the accommodation choice of the individual. This could be achieved by allowing the 
individual to reside in their accommodation of choice; by dismissing a guardianship 
order and thus enabling the individual to make future accommodation decisions; or 
by enabling an individual to be supported or assisted by their person(s) of choice 
with accommodation decisions. This is the first criterion of application of the 
benchmark to accommodation cases. It may be not followed due to considerations of 
the best interest or welfare of the individual.  
(b) Applying the least restrictive alternative 
My definition of applying the least restrictive alternative is generally placing no 
restrictions upon an individual to choose their place of residence by a tribunal. This 
ensures that an individual can make their own accommodation decisions, with or 
without support. The criterion will be met when a tribunal avoids the appointment of a 
guardian for accommodation. It is also met when a tribunal dismisses a guardian for 
accommodation. I acknowledge the contradiction that the appointment of a person 
who obeys the express wishes of an individual, although strictly substitution, may be 
fulfilling the role of supporter. It would be a tiered form of least restriction. See the 
example provided in 2.3.2 above.  
A guardianship tribunal may dismiss an appointment or application on the basis of a 
finding of no decision to be made or by a finding a positive informal support network. 
The former may be an example of congruency with supported decision-making in 
Article 12, while the later may be a direct application of Article 12(3).   
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The following two features of conflict of interest and undue influence and the 
presence of a positive informal support network cannot be prevented from occurring 
or created by a tribunal. They differ from the evaluation criteria which can be directly 
applied by a tribunal to observe the individual’s will and leave the individual free to 
make their own accommodation choices. The role of the features is subsidiary to the 
criteria. They may enable, assist or facilitate compliance to occur with a positive 
informal support network present. Alternatively, they may have a role of reducing 
compliance with the criteria where conflict of interest or undue influence is present. 
(c) Conflict of interest or undue influence between the individual and their 
support network 
This is seen as an important detracting feature that cannot be directly applied by a 
tribunal but may detract from a tribunal’s compliance with the criteria. There is a 
potential power imbalance between a person with a cognitive disability and persons 
forming a support network without such disabilities. Such persons may be seen as 
vulnerable to financial, physical and personal abuse and exploitation from members 
of their own support network. The existence of conflict of interest between the 
individual and their support network is more likely to convince a tribunal to appoint a 
guardian to prevent further undue influence or conflict of interest.   
(d) The presence of a positive informal support network 
This facilitating feature will be applied to guardianship cases involving 
accommodation following the application of the evaluation criteria. A support network 
may have a positive or negative effect upon compliance with the evaluation criteria. 
A support network that is trusted by the individual and has only the interests of the 
individual at heart and not those of the support network may enhance a tribunal’s 
compliance with the evaluation criteria. Guardianship tribunals in Australia observe, 
generally, a two-step process prior to the appointment of a guardian. First, a tribunal 
finds either a disability or a decision-making inability and second, a tribunal 
subsequently finds the need for a guardianship appointment. The presence of a 
positive informal support network may affect a tribunal’s need to make an 
appointment. A positive support network which addresses the health, welfare and 
best interests of the individual makes an intrusive guardianship appointment for 
accommodation unnecessary. This may be characterised as a guardianship tribunal 
finding no need for an order as the individual is well supported to make their own 
accommodation decisions. This is an example of the least restrictive alternative in 
application. 
Alternatively, if the support network is dysfunctional because it is characterised by 
internal conflict with the individual or is concerned with the interests of the network 
and not the interests of the individual, then, despite the individual’s will and 
preferences, a guardianship tribunal may make an appointment.  This appointment 
of a guardian for accommodation would be contrary to Article 12 of the CRPD. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has obtained two evaluative criteria and two important facilitating and/or 
detracting features that will then be used to assess and measure compliance with 
supported decision-making as it is contained within the CRPD. This will be achieved 
by applying the criteria and features to guardianship cases in Victoria, NSW and 
Queensland involving accommodation. 
The source of the evaluation criteria and features has been obtained from Article 12 
of the CRPD. The CRPD provides the greatest normative justification for the 
incorporation of supported decision-making in Australia.  
The criteria and important features derived from Article 12 of the CRPD were 
obtained both from direct wording of Article 12 (will and preferences and freedom 
from conflict of interest and undue influence) as well as by implication and analysis. 
Obtaining the facilitating feature of the presence of positive informal support 
networks from Article 12(3) was based upon deductive reasoning. Support measures 
to exercise legal capacity were not defined in Article 12(3). However the wording of 
Article 12(3) is sufficiently wide to cater for the support measure to include informal 
support networks. The presence of a positive informal support network is the 
corollary to following an individual’s will and preferences. It is often the means of 
elucidating the individual’s will and preferences. Similarly, obtaining the least 
restrictive alternative was obtained by interpretive reasoning of Article 12(2) and 
Article 12(4).  
As an entry point to the following chapters, the last subsection has provided some 
examples about how the derived evaluative criteria and important facilitating and/or 
detracting features may be useful in analysing the impact and compliance of 
supported decision-making in the current Australian guardianship regime. 
  
110 
 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology used in the case analysis for the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. It commences by discussing why Victoria, New 
South Wales and Queensland have been selected as the three jurisdictions in which 
to apply the evaluation criteria and important features derived from Article 12 of the 
CRPD in chapter 2. It is followed by a discussion of how the cases were obtained, 
the databases and search terms used to obtain relevant cases and how and why 
irrelevant cases were eliminated. Further, I include a description of how the cases 
were analysed and how the benchmark criteria and important features were applied. 
Finally I identify limitations to the research, scarcity of relevant cases – most notably 
in Victoria – due to privacy concerns as well as other limitations, such as government 
funding for the tribunals. 
3.2 Selection of the Jurisdictions 
The jurisdictions of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland were selected for 
the important considerations of case availability, that they represent nearly 80% of 
Australia’s population, and that useful comparisons can be drawn from the 
similarities and differences in their guardianship legislation. The analysis requires 
sufficient numbers of available cases in order to extrapolate trends and draw 
conclusions from the application of the benchmark criteria. The chosen jurisdictions 
were able to yield over 300 relevant cases in the period from 16 August 2008 to 1 
July 2015. There were also restrictions in both the timeframe – it was only in the 
three largest guardianship jurisdictions that sufficient cases were obtained dealing 
with accommodation following the commencement of the CRPD – and guardianship 
case content (accommodation).   
The jurisdictions provide useful comparisons as the guardianship legislation each 
contain general principles that respect the wishes of the individual, apply the least 
restrictive alternative and observe the best interests, welfare or care and protection 
of the individual. The principles of following the wishes of the person and applying 
the least restrictive alternative correspond with the evaluation criteria. However the 
best interest principle focuses upon the protective nature of the jurisdiction which 
may conflict with the principle of following the wishes of the person. Where a 
jurisdiction places its primary focus upon the protective ‘best interests’ of the person, 
this may override the autonomy principles of following the wishes of the person or 
adopting the least restrictive alternative. 
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Useful differences are noted for comparison by the differing importance placed on 
individual general principles in New South Wales, the presence of a separate 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities in Victoria, and additional human 
rights principles in the guardianship legislation in Queensland. These differences 
may or may not affect compliance with the evaluation criteria. 
3.2.1 Victoria 
This was the first jurisdiction in Australia to adopt modern guardianship reform 
including a tribunal system that maintains a distinction between guardianship and 
administration; an Office of Public Advocate; and general principles underpinning the 
legislation. 1  These general principles include an express requirement that when 
performing a function power or duty under the Act the Tribunal is required to apply 
the least restrictive means of limiting a person’s freedom of decision-making. The 
objective best interests of the individual and the wishes of the person are to be 
followed wherever possible.2 The Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) 
has been both the vanguard for Australian guardianship reform and the model of 
primary adoption for the other seven Australian guardianship jurisdictions.3  Victoria 
based its guardianship reform on the ‘Cocks Report’ of 1982 which proposed a draft 
of legislation to protect autonomy and promote safeguards, primarily for persons with 
cognitive disabilities following de-institutionalisation.4 
Victoria is also important because of the recommendations of the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission’s (VLRC) 2012 Final Report on the review of Victoria’s 
guardianship legislation which advocated the inclusion of supported decision-
making.5 Victoria is likely to be the first Australian jurisdiction to introduce legislative 
supported decision-making reforms.6 Its Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 
(VIC), which has since lapsed, would have empowered the guardianship list of VCAT 
to appoint a ‘supportive guardian’. This was a tribunal-appointed supporter for an 
                                            
1
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC); see also Nick O'Neill and Carmelle Peisah, 
'Chapter 6 "Guardianship"' in Sydney University Press Law Books (ed), Capacity and the Law (SydUP 
Law, 1st ed, 2011) 107; see also Minister's Committee on Rights and Protective Legislation for 
Intellectually Handicapped Persons, 'Report of the Minister's Committee on Rights & Protective 
Legislation for Intellectually Handicapped Persons' (1982) 
<http://u.b5z.net/i/u/10196230/f/LISA_Cocks_Report_on_Guardianship_1982.pdf> referred to as the 
‘Cocks’ report chaired by Errol Cocks that led to the Victorian legislation. 
2
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) ss 4(2)(a)-(c). 
3
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Principles and values in Victorian guardianship legislation' 
(OPA Victoria, 2009) <http://www.publicadvcate.vic.gov.au>; see also Office of the Public Advocate of 
Victoria, 'Supported decision-making Background and discussion paper' (OPA Victoria, November 
2009) <http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>. 
4
 Minister's Committee on Rights and Protective Legislation for Intellectually Handicapped Persons, 
above n 1; see also Colleen Pearce, 'Strengths and Tensions in the Current Guardianship System' 
(Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 2011) <http:www.publicadvocate.vic.gove.au/>. 
5
 Victorian Law Reform Commission, 'Guardianship Final Report Number 24' (VLRC, 2012) 
<http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/Guardianship_FinalReport_Full%20text.pdf>. 
6
 Pearce, above n 4; John Chesterman, 'The Victorian law Reform Agenda: The Review of the 
Victorian Guardianship, Mental Health and Powers of Attorney Laws' (Manager, Policy and Education 
OPA Victoria, 2011). 
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individual.7 The individual must have a disability, not oppose the order and meet a 
functional capacity test. The supportive guardian was required to support the 
individual’s personal and social well-being. 8  The appointment of a ‘supportive 
guardian’ must be a more appropriate appointment than the appointment of a 
guardian.9 Supportive guardians could gather information,10 communicate with the 
supported person and others about a decision 11  and take action to effect the 
decision except in the case of a significant financial transaction involving the buying 
and selling of land or shares.12 This Bill has lapsed at the time of writing and its 
implications are discussed further in Chapter 8 dealing with ‘future directions’. 
Victoria was the first Australian State to adopt a Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities. 13 This followed the Australian Capital Territory’s (ACT) earlier 
Human Rights Act covering similar grounds. 14  There are several commonalities 
between the CRPD and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 
(VIC). These commonalities will be discussed in Chapter 4 before applying the 
evaluation criteria and important features to the Victorian cases. VCAT’s application 
of the Charter when hearing guardianship cases may affect how the supported 
decision-making principles are applied. 15  In particular, section 5 of the Charter 
(maintaining International Law) and section 7(2) of the Charter (maintaining the 
principles of dignity, freedom and equality) may lead VCAT to apply supported 
decision-making in Article 12 of the CRPD in order to meet Victorian Charter 
obligations.16  
Victoria has recently completed an 18-person supported decision-making trial for 
isolated Victorians with an intellectual impairment who reside in rural Victoria.17 The 
project demonstrated that it took considerable time to develop a relationship of trust 
with the individual and to assist in a new paradigm of decision-making. Victoria has 
just received funding for a new 60-person supported decision-making project 
involving NDIS clients.18  
                                            
7
 Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC). See especially cl 94-95. 
8
 Ibid cl 95.  
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid cl 100. 
11
 Ibid cl 101. 
12
 Ibid cl 102. 
13
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC). 
14
 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). A general enactment of the ACT Parliament listing civil and political 
rights and the right to education to be considered when drafting legislation, to be applied by public 
and administrative bodies and to enable the Territory Supreme Court to give a declaration of non-
compliance with existing legislation.  See the discussion of the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (VIC) in Chapter 4. 
15
 PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria [2011] VSC 327. 
16
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) ss 5, 7(2). 
17
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report  2012-2013' (OPA Victoria, 2013) 
<www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>; see also Office of th Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Office of the 
Public Advocate of Victoria Annual Report 2014-2015' (OPA, 2015) 
<www.opa.vic.gov.au/opaAnnualReport_2014-_2015_Online_LR-1pdf> 42. 
18
 Victoria, above n 17, 42. The ‘OVAL’ project. 
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Victoria’s initial guardianship legislation, law reform leading to proposed new 
legislation that incorporates one aspect of supported decision-making, a Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities, and a current supported decision-making trial as 
well as a completed trial; make Victoria an ideal subject for case analysis. 
3.2.2 New South Wales 
One of the reasons for including NSW in the jurisdictional analysis was the 
prospective case availability. It was a requirement of the former NSW Guardianship 
Tribunal to provide written reasons for every decision.19 In addition, NSW has the 
largest population of any of the eight Australian guardianship jurisdictions. This 
means that applying supported decision-making principles is likely to affect the 
greatest number of persons in the three jurisdictions, enhancing case availability and 
analysis. 
New South Wales in 1989 was the second Australian jurisdiction to adopt a tribunal 
system for adult guardianship.20 It later became possible to challenge not only the 
appointment of a guardian but also individual decisions made by a guardian to the 
NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal.21 By reviewing an individual accommodation 
decision it is postulated that additional information may be available to apply the 
evaluation criteria and important features to the NSW guardianship cases. The 
commencement of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) in 2014 
removed this avenue of appeal in the course of aligning NSW with the super tribunal 
systems of Victoria (VCAT) and Queensland (QCAT). These tribunals amalgamate 
over 20 state civil, commercial, health and human rights tribunals in a single 
enactment, reducing administration costs. NSW retains its three person panels; 
consisting of a legal, professional and community member.22 This is in contrast to 
VCAT and QCAT which have primarily single member panels.23 The previous ability 
to review individual decisions through an administrative appeal structure may be one 
explanation for the greater number of relevant cases in NSW than in Victoria. There 
were 27 relevant cases found subject to administrative review of an accommodation 
decision in NSW. 
The 2009 NSW parliamentary inquiry into substituted decision-making for adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity recommended significant changes to the NSW 
guardianship regime.24 It had received a number of submissions that advocated the 
                                            
19
 See, eg, Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 68(1). Repealed by Civil and Administration Tribunal Act 
2013 (NSW) s 61(2) where written reasons are provided following a request for reasons. 
20
 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW). Came into force August 1989. 
21
 Ibid s 67(A). 
22
 New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 'NCAT Annual Report 2014-2015' (NSW Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal, 2015) <www.ncat.new.gov.au/.../ncat_annual_report_2014_2015.pdf> 
39-44. 
23
 All of the 21 Victorian cases had one member panels, The vast majority of the 173 Queensland 
cases had one member panels with occasional two member panels. 
24
 NSW Parliament Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, 'Substitute decision-
making for people lacking capacity' (Report No. 43, 25 February 2010). 
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implementation of supported decision-making.25 Submissions also argued that the 
present guardianship regime in NSW offered only a binary solution of either 
autonomy or guardianship (substitution). Kayess among others proposed that 
including supported decision-making would fill the gap in the current legislation.26 
Although supported decision-making did not form part of the final recommendations 
of this parliamentary inquiry, it was clearly an important issue. 
The large population, the ability to review an individual accommodation decision, the 
submissions to the NSW parliamentary inquiry and the importance placed upon 
supported decision-making trials place NSW as an important jurisdiction in which to 
evaluate supported decision-making compliance. 
3.2.3 Queensland 
Queensland’s guardianship legislation came into force on 1 July 2000 and is an 
example of more modern guardianship legislation in Australia.27 The 12 detailed 
general principles in its guardianship legislation are the most comprehensive of any 
Australian jurisdiction.28 Queensland’s adoption of these human rights principles is 
an important reason for including Queensland as a jurisdiction for case analysis.29 
Guardianship principle 2 of the Queensland enactment recognises all adults as 
having the same human rights irrespective of the adult’s decision-making capacity.30 
However these rights are not specified in that general principle. Article 12 of the 
CRPD provides a right to full legal capacity and a right to support to exercise legal 
capacity. I argue that the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT), 
charged with the obligation of administering the guardianship legislation, may be 
required to apply CRPD rights including the Article 12 rights.31 
                                            
25
 PWD Australia and NSW Mental Health Coordinating Council, 'Substitute Decision Making: Time for 
Reform' (2009) <http://www.pwd.org.au/documents/pubs/SB09-substituteDecision>; see also PWD 
and NSW Mental Health Coordinating Council, 'Submission to the NSW Legislative Councils inquiry 
into substituted decision making for people lacking capacity' (2009) 
<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/e00602d3c8f39ca5ca2576d5001
84231/$FILE/100225%20SDM%20Final%20Report.pdf>. 
26
 NSW Parliament Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, above n 24. See 
particularly submission 62 from Rosemary Kayess former delegate to the CRPD drafting committee; 
see also Rosemary Kayess and Ben Fogarty, 'The Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities' 
(2007) 32(1) Alternative Law Journal 22. 
27
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD). 
28
 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1999, 6079-6083 
(Matt J Foley Attorney General); see also Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 11 April 2000, 712-720 (Lawrennce Springborg, Shadow Attorney General); see 
also Queensland Parliament Hansard, 'Guardianship and Administration Bill Second Reading Speech' 
(Queensland Parliament, 12 April 2000). 
29
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) sch 1. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Amita Dhanda, 'Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the past or 
lodestone for the future?' (2007) 34(2) Syracuse International Journal of Law and Commerce 429; see 
also Amita Dhanda, 'Consturcting a New Human Rights Lexicon; Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities' (2008)  SUR International Journal on Human Rights 8. 
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Queensland’s Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) acknowledges the 
importance of supports and support networks to assist an adult to make their own 
decisions. 32  This arose from extensive community consultation prior to the 
formulation of the legislation.33 This places Queensland in a stronger position to 
uphold the evaluation criteria in comparison with Victoria and NSW as these 
jurisdictions do not acknowledge the importance of supports and support networks. 
It was hypothesised that an examination of Queensland’s promotion of human rights, 
informal support networks and informally made decisions in its guardianship 
legislation may reveal a greater compliance with the evaluation criteria and 
supported decision-making in Article 12 than in Victoria or NSW.  
In summary, the three jurisdictions of Victoria, NSW and Queensland have been 
selected as they represent approximately 80% of Australia’s population giving the 
best opportunity to obtain adequate numbers of reported cases. There are 
commonalities in the general principles that closely resemble the evaluation criteria. 
There are also differences for comparison: the relative importance placed on each 
principle (NSW), a separate Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (Victoria), 
and elaborate general principles providing at least some recognition of supported 
decision-making  (Queensland). 
3.3 How the cases were obtained 
The cases were obtained from publicly available internet database searches. The 
Australian Legal Information Institute (Austlii) http://www.austlii.edu.au/ was utilised 
for case retrieval. Other databases such as CaseBase Lexisnexis Australia and 
Firstpoint Legal Online were searched but no additional cases were obtained.  
Victoria’s (VCAT) website referred specifically to Austlii for reported decisions and 
itself provided no reported decisions.34 The NSW Civil and Administration website 
(NCAT) also referred to Austlii for reported cases. It reported a few current cases but 
only industrial and not guardianship matters.35 The Queensland (QCAT) website 
made no express references to decided cases.36 Queensland cases were obtained 
from Austlii when they were formerly obtainable from the Queensland Supreme 
Court website. A search of the Queensland Supreme Court website (on 2 July 2015) 
did not contain any guardianship cases.   
 
This thesis is about accommodation decision-making for adults with impaired 
capacity. This includes all types of facilities that house an individual, for example a 
                                            
32
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) ss 5, 6. 
33
 Queensland Law Reform Commission, 'Assisted and Substituted Decisions Decision-making by 
and for people with a decision-making disability' (Report Number 49, Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, June 1996). 
34
 Last search conducted 12 July 2015. 
35
 Last search conducted 2 July 2015. 
36
 Last search conducted 12 July 2015. 
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residential care facility, a private or public home, a unit, townhouse, caravan or other 
forms of abode. The term used in guardianship legislation (Queensland and Victoria) 
for the limited personal guardianship appointment dealing with accommodation is 
‘where the person lives’.37 However, in all of the available reported guardianship 
cases perused, ‘accommodation’ is the term used to describe the appointment of a 
guardian for where the person lives. The areas of limited guardianship appointments 
are not enumerated or defined in the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW). Plenary 
appointments (of all personal, health and lifestyle matters) are extremely rare. 
‘Accommodation’ was thus included in the eventual search terms for this study. It 
yielded more relevant cases than including ‘housing’ or ‘where the person lives’ as 
part of the search terms. However these last two search terms were also utilised for 
completeness. 
(a) Conducting the Austlii search 
The three combinations of search terms were used sequentially for each relevant 
Austlii case database to obtain an exhaustive list of relevant cases for each 
jurisdiction. The search terms were: 
i. guardianship and accommodation 
ii. guardianship and (hous* not accommodation) 
iii. guardianship and “where the person lives” 
The search term “guardianship and accommodation” produced the vast majority of 
relevant case entries. The search terms of ‘guardianship and (hous* not 
accommodation)’ was used to attempt to retrieve other potential accommodation 
wording such as ‘house, housing, housed or houses’. This produced a few relevant 
entries of plenary appointments of a guardian that included accommodation without 
specifically mentioning the word “accommodation” in the decision. These plenary 
appointments are included in the case data for analysis. Truncated versions of 
guardian* and accommodate* were not used in the search terms. Guardian* was not 
used as it is guardianship legislation and the reference to guardian could bring 
unwanted child guardian and family law entries. Accommodat* was not used as a 
search term because the legislation refers to the word ‘accommodation’, which is 
both singular and plural. A truncated version of accommodate* may refer to 
adjustments used to provide equality of opportunity in discrimination law and not 
residential accommodation. The final search term was used to reflect the statutory 
wording of the appointment in Queensland and Victoria. However the exact phrase 
                                            
37
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) s 24; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(QLD) sch 2; Cf Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 16(2)(a) which requires the functions of a limited 
guardian to be specified but the personal matters are not enumerated in the Act unlike Queensland 
and Victoria; see also Nick O'Neill and Carmelle Peisah, 'Chapter 7 "The function and powers of 
guardians"' in Sydney University Press (ed), Capacity and the Law (Sydney Universty Press, 1st ed, 
2011) 42 where the functions of a guardian were left open to correspond with the common law 
unrestricted personal functions of a committee. 
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of “where the person lives” was not found in any of the searched databases. All three 
search terms were used for Victoria, NSW and Queensland. 
To obtain the desired state case databases it was necessary to activate ‘advanced 
search’ on the Austlii home page. This generated a list of state databases that could 
be searched using the selected search terms. The following databases were 
searched in each jurisdiction: 
Guardianship cases dealing with accommodation decided prior to 16 August 2008 
were disgarded. They were decided prior to the application of the CRPD in Australia. 
(b) New South Wales 
i. NSW Guardianship Tribunal (for cases between 16 August 2008 and 31 
December 2013 after which time the guardianship division of the NSW Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal replaced this body38 
ii. NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal Guardianship Division for guardianship 
cases decided after 1 January 2014 
iii. NSWADT (Administrative Decisions Tribunal) for reviews of accommodation 
decisions made prior to 2014 
iv. NSWADTAP this is the Appeals panel of the NSWADT for appeals prior to 1 
January 2014, when this function was subsumed into NCAT 
v. NCATA, this is the appeals function of the NSW Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal 
vi. NSW Supreme Court 
vii. NSW Court of Appeal 
 
(c) Victoria 
i. VCAT 
ii. Victoria Supreme Court 
iii. Victoria Supreme Court: Court of Appeal  
 
(d) Queensland 
i. Queensland Guardianship and Administration Tribunal (QGAAT) (for cases 
prior to 1 December 2009 after which time QGAAT became subsumed within 
QCAT) 
                                            
38
 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW). 
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ii. QCAT (Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal) 
iii. QCAT appeals (for internal QCAT appeals) 
iv. Supreme Court of Queensland 
v. Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal 
Database searches were concluded on 1 July 2015. Irrelevant material was 
eliminated to obtain relevant guardianship cases after the commencement date of 
the CRPD in Australia. Cases prior to the commencement date for the analysis could 
also be eliminated directly by activating the ‘date’ icon on the Austlii home page. This 
sorted the cases into descending order from the most recent. 
The cases were then scrutinised to eliminate irrelevant material. Cases from the 
guardianship jurisdictions of Queensland, Victoria and NSW that related to children, 
restrictive practices, procedure and administration only were discarded. When 
dealing with Supreme Court case databases the cases involving succession, equity, 
criminal and procedural matters were also eliminated. This left only those 
guardianship cases involving accommodation. Cases that dealt with both 
guardianship and administration matters (financial) were used for the thesis. It was 
frequently difficult to separate a case with some accommodation aspect from a 
purely administrative matter.   
The following is the list of relevant cases retrieved through the search method. The 
relevant cases found for each jurisdiction and each court/tribunal database is listed 
in the table below. The total relevant cases obtained were 110 (NSW), 173 
(Queensland) and 21 for Victoria. 
Table of relevant cases obtained for each Court/tribunal data base in the three 
Jurisdictions 
Tribunal and or 
Court 
New South 
Wales 
Queensland Victoria 
NSW 
Guardianship 
Tribunal 
57 cases   
NSW 
Administrative 
Decisions 
Tribunal 
15 cases   
NSW ADT 
(Appeals Panel) 
12 cases   
NCAT 15 cases   
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NCATA (NCAT 
appeals) 
1 case   
NSW Supreme 
Court 
9 cases   
NSWSC (Court of 
Appeals) 
1 case   
QGAAT  42 cases  
QCAT  129 cases  
QCATA (QCAT 
Appeals) 
 2 cases  
    
VCAT   19 cases 
Victoria Supreme 
Court 
  2 cases 
Case totals  110 cases 173 cases 21 cases 
 
Victoria had the fewest relevant cases due to privacy considerations.39 The privacy 
consideration was a reluctance to make written reasons available to the public 
despite providing limited anonymity by replacing names with letters in the written 
reasons for the decision. Persons may still be able to be identified in sensitive 
matters relating to persons with a variety of disabilities. These cases were believed 
to have limited precedent value as they relied upon specific fact situations. 40 
Queensland had more relevant guardianship cases involving accommodation than 
NSW. However, all of the Queensland cases were either tribunal decisions or the 
internal appeals hearings from the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(QCAT). There were a large number of tribunal cases in Queensland (173) but 
without higher court pronouncements. NSW had 110 cases with a number of higher 
court decisions. The absence of Queensland higher court decisions in my opinion 
does not markedly affect the findings of this thesis as the findings of fact and law of 
the NSW Guardianship Tribunal have been generally accepted by the NSW superior 
courts.41 
                                            
39
 RB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 532 (12 May 2010). 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 ReF [2013] NSWSC 54 (31 January 2013); ReH [2013] NSWSC 1384 (13 September 2013); Re F 
[2013] NSWCA 239 (26 July 2013); ReC (no2) [2012] NSWSC 1351 (2 November 2012); Re C [2012] 
NSWSC 1097 (14 September 2012); Re B (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 1075 (15 September 2011); Re B 
(No.2) [2011] NSWSC 1264 (11 October 2011). 
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3.4 How the cases were analysed 
The research was entirely doctrinal. No empirical work was undertaken. The 
benchmark consisting of two criteria and two important features was applied to each 
case by asking and answering the following questions: 
(a) Will and preferences  
I. What was the individual’s will regarding choice of accommodation?   
II. How was this expressed and to whom?   
III. If the individual did not express an intention for support or a place of 
residence during the hearing, could inferences be drawn by a previous course 
of action?  
IV. Was it expressed during a guardianship hearing?  
V. Could the will and preferences be implied from past conduct of the individual?   
VI. Is the individual currently residing in their chosen place of accommodation? 
(b) Least restrictive alternative  
I. Has the tribunal or court mentioned the application of the least restrictive 
alternative?   
II. What is the least restrictive alternative in the case?   
III. Where there has been an appointment of a guardian for accommodation 
against the will and preference of the individual it will not be the least 
restrictive alternative. What was the reason for not applying the least 
restrictive alternative?   
IV. Was it the situation where the individual’s informal support network 
demonstrated no need for a protective guardianship order?   
V. Was it the case that the individual was well settled in accommodation and 
there was no likelihood of a future accommodation decision to be made?   
VI. Was it the situation that a guardianship order for accommodation was unable 
to be successfully implemented so the order has been discontinued? 
(c) Informal support network  
I. Is there a support network or is the individual isolated? 
II. If there is an informal support network is it positive or negative (eg clouded by 
undue influence and personal interests)?   
III. How has the presence of the network affected compliance with the criteria?  
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IV. Has the network increased criteria compliance by assisting the individual to 
make their own accommodation decisions thereby enabling a court or tribunal 
to adopt the least restrictive alternative and avoid a guardianship order? 
(d) Conflict of interest and undue influence  
I. Was there conflict of interest or undue influence between the individual and 
their support network? 
II. If so, how has this affected compliance with the evaluation criteria?  
III. If there was conflict of interest or undue influence in the past how has the 
tribunal attempted to prevent this from occurring in the future?   
IV. Has the control of conflict of interest or of undue influence with finances 
allowed criteria compliance of guardianship accommodation matters? 
Compliance 
A conclusion was reached for each case regarding whether or not the evaluation 
criteria were met. The dismissal of an application for a guardian because there was 
no need for an order or there was no decision to be made would comply with the 
evaluation criteria. This enabled the person to make their own accommodation 
decisions in the future with or without support. The appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation against the wishes of the person would generally contravene the 
evaluation criteria because the ability to make accommodation decisions has been 
transferred to a substitute decision-maker.  
Partial compliance 
Partial compliance is a term that serves two purposes for this thesis. First, there is 
criteria compliance for accommodation. Second, there is non-compliance with Article 
12 in other areas of decision-making. Occasionally there was partial compliance with 
the criteria when there was no order for accommodation but a restrictive order had 
been made for administration to prevent future conflict of interest or undue influence 
from arising.42 Partial compliance also occurred when the individual was well-settled 
in accommodation but contact issues arose within the individual’s support network 
that needed resolution.43 A person may have experienced physical or financial harm 
in the past from a particular individual. The guardianship tribunal, by limiting the 
ability to contact an unwanted person, is seen by a tribunal as a necessary form of 
protection for the individual’s welfare and interests. A statutory guardian may be 
appointed to prevent contact while allowing the individual to make their own 
accommodation decisions. 
                                            
42
 FAJ [2013] QCAT 703 (22 November 2013); LMB (Guardianship) [2012] VCAT 1443 (24 August 
2012). 
43
 MLB [2015] QCAT 22 (19 January 2015); DJ [2014] QCAT 619 (11 November 2014); AJ [2014] 
QCAT 683 (22 October 2014); BMD [2013] QCAT 479 (9 September 2013). 
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The issues that I categorise as ‘partial compliance’ could have been dealt with as full 
compliance for accommodation. Partial compliance is a useful categorisation for this 
thesis as it denotes full compliance for accommodation and non-compliance with 
Article 12 in one or more other guardianship or administration areas of decision-
making.  
3.4.1 How is compliance with the evaluation criteria to be measured? 
A tribunal or court meets the evaluation criteria by obeying the will and preferences 
of the individual and not restricting the individual’s decision-making ability to enable 
the individual to make accommodation decisions in the future. The facilitating feature 
of the presence of a positive informal support network and the detracting feature of a 
conflict of interest or undue influence between the person and their support network 
are not within the control of the tribunal or court. Their presence or absence may 
enhance or detract from compliance with the evaluation criteria of obeying the 
individual’s will and preferences, and applying the least restrictive alternative. 
The compliance indicator that was selected for the analysis was ‘significant’ 
compliance. This means that a meaningful or noteworthy number of reported cases 
adhered to the will and preferences of the individual and applied the least restrictive 
alternative. To qualify as ‘significant’ the compliance level did not have to exceed half 
of the reported cases. It was ‘significant’ if at least one-quarter to one-third of the 
reported cases met the criteria. If less than one-quarter of the reported case 
examples followed the evaluation criteria then this would not qualify as significant 
compliance. However, all three jurisdictions had criteria compliance levels over one 
quarter to nearly one half of the reported available cases dealing with 
accommodation. 
This thesis only considers evaluation criteria compliance relating to guardianship 
decisions involving accommodation. There may be different compliance levels seen 
if financial administration was included in this research. This is because the 
preservation of finances and real property for future generations was historically the 
most important reason for invoking this protective jurisdiction.44 
Subsidiary Research Questions common to Victoria, New South Wales and 
Queensland 
It is useful to list questions that will be answered in the upcoming three chapters of 
the thesis by applying the benchmark criteria and important features to Victoria, 
NSW and Queensland guardianship cases dealing with accommodation. These 
questions are raised here to set the context for the next three chapters. They are: 
(i) Is there significant compliance with the evaluation criteria in the three 
jurisdictions? 
                                            
44
 Sarah Burningham, 'Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co Decision-Making Law' 
(2009) 18 Dalhousie Journal of Legal studies 119. 
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(ii) If there are variations in the compliance levels what could account for the 
differences? 
(iii) Does the presence of a positive informal support network increase 
compliance with the evaluation criteria? 
(iv) What is the effect of a dysfunctional support network upon criteria 
compliance? 
(v) Does the presence of conflict of interest and/ or undue influence between 
the individual and their support network affect compliance with the 
evaluation criteria? 
3.5   Methodological research limitations 
The major research limitation is the small number of available guardianship cases 
involving accommodation following the commencement date of the CRPD. This is 
most notable in Victoria but is also apparent in the other two jurisdictions. The 
scarcity of written decisions available to the public may be attributable to two 
considerations. First in Queensland (QCAT), Victoria (VCAT) and now in NSW 
(NCAT); written reasons are normally provided only following a request for written 
reasons.45  Reasons may be provided orally unless there is a timely request for 
written reasons to be provided. The second reason, in all 3 jurisdictions, is a 
perceived need to maintain confidentiality. This is despite an attempt to maintain 
privacy by the use of initials for names.46 This privacy consideration appears to be 
only relevant in Victoria. In NSW and Queensland a large number of relevant cases 
were made available on Austlii. It may mean that all or nearly all guardianship 
decisions reduced to writing in Queensland are available to the public. Many of the 
NSW cases are also available to the public. However, Victoria, with similar numbers 
of guardianship appointments to Queensland and NSW, releases very few of its 
guardianship cases involving accommodation due to privacy considerations.47 
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 Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (VIC) ss 45, 46. Request in writing within 28 
days of the hearing and written reasons to be provided within 28 days of the request; Civil and 
Administration Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ss 61(2), (3). The same time limits as for VCAT; Queensland 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QLD) ss 122(2), (3). A written request for reasons within 
14 days of the hearing and there is a 45 day time limit following the request to furnish written reasons. 
46
 RB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 532 (12 May 2010), [263]-[264] per Harbison J. 
47
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, above n 17; Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 
'Annual Report 2011-12' (OPA Victoria, 2012) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/file/OPA_AReport20111-12>. 
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3.5.1 Other factors not covered in this thesis that may affect tribunal 
compliance with the evaluation criteria 
(a) The level of government funding for tribunals 
Australia’s guardianship tribunal structure is either free or at very low financial cost to 
the user.48 This means that the financial burden of operating the tribunal system falls 
upon the State or Territory. The Productivity Commission in its Access to Justice 
Arrangements final report recommended the increased use of super-tribunals over 
many specialised tribunals to lower the cost burden upon the jurisdictions.49 The 
amalgamation of tribunals has taken place in Victoria, Queensland and NSW 
between 1998 and 2014 with the creation of VCAT, QCAT and NCAT. There is 
expected to be a flow-on savings in at least shared administration and capital 
works. 50  Restrictions in government funding to tribunals may however have an 
adverse affect upon compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD by:- 
(i) Limiting the funding available for training of members on the application of 
Article 12 of the CRPD.51 Training has been mentioned recently for NCAT 
members but has not been mentioned in the Annual Reports recently of 
VCAT and QCAT. 
(ii) The constitution of the panel hearing the guardianship matter. All of the 
perused Victorian cases were constituted by a single member panel. All of 
the NSW tribunal cases were constituted by a three-member panel 
comprising a legal, community and professional member. 52  The QCAT 
cases were constituted primarily by a single member with some 2 member 
panels.53 It may be the case that the greater the number of members the 
greater the prospects of a consideration of Article 12 of the CRPD.  
However, there is no empirical data to support this hypothesis. 
(iii) The time provided for the hearing. It is postulated that the greater the time 
allocated for a hearing the greater the chance of consideration of Article 12 
of the CRPD. Again, it is not within the scope of this research to evaluate 
the hypothesis. 
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 Nick O'Neill and Carmelle Peisah, Chapter 5 The Development of Modern Guardianship and 
Administration, Capacity and the Law (Sydney University Press, 1st ed, 2011) 
49
 Productivity Commission Commonwealth of Australia, 'Access to Justice Arrangements Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report' (Productivity Commission, 3 December 2014) 
<www.pc.gov.au/inquiriescompleted> 370-82. 
50
 Ibid 364-82. 
51
 New South Wales Public Guardian, 'Annual Report 2014' (Public Guardian of NSW Department of 
Justice, 2014) <www.publicguardian.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/advocacyrpt2014final>; see also 
Tribunal, above n 22, 43-44. NCAT and the Public Guardian conduct training sessions for members 
about the use and operation of Article 12 of the CRPD. 
52
 Tribunal, above n 22, 42-4. 
53
 173 cases, all interim orders determined by a single member, all appeals by two members, 
including a Presidential member, some of the complicated matters had a two-member panel. 
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(iv) The remuneration paid to the tribunal member. It is postulated that the 
greater the daily or sessional fee paid per member the more time that will 
be taken into consideration of Article 12 in the decision.  It is 
acknowledged that tribunal members take care and consideration with 
every decision. 
(v) Education and Training of tribunal members. It is postulated that the 
greater the education and training of tribunal members upon the meaning, 
use and application of Article 12 of the CRPD, the greater compliance will 
be.observed. 
(b) Time for providing a written decision 
The decisions of VCAT, QCAT and NCAT in their respective guardianship lists or 
guardianship divisions are nearly always provided orally on the day of the hearing. 
This is contrasted with Federal tribunals such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT) and the Social Securities Appeal Tribunal (SSAT) that nearly always provide 
their decision with written reasons subsequent to the hearing.  For QCAT, VCAT and 
NCAT it may be that the limited time in which the members must reach a decision on 
the day, may affect their opportunity to consider and apply Article 12 of the CRPD. 
The extent that these factors affect compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD are 
unknown and do not form part of this thesis. The thesis considers issues mentioned 
in the written available reasons for the decisions that may or may not comply with 
Article 12. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has indicated how the research was conducted. It has provided reasons 
why Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland were selected as the three 
jurisdictions for the application of the benchmark of two criteria and two important 
features. It discusses how the cases were selected and retrieved, including the 
databases and search terms used. Once the cases were obtained, they were 
analysed according to the benchmark. The limitation of small case numbers due to 
confidentiality was overcome to a considerable extent (except for Victoria) by the 
choice of the three largest jurisdictions for examination and comparison.54 
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 David Gordon Evans, How to Write a Better Thesis or Report (University Press, 1st ed, 1995); 
Queensland Public Advocate, 'Annual Report of Queensland Public Advocate of Queensland 2010-
2011' (2011) <http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/130294/office-of-the-public-
advocate-report-1011.pdf>; NSW Trustee and Guardian, 'Annual Report 2010-2011' (2011) 
<http://www.tag.nsw.gov.au/verve/_resources/10973_NSWTG_Annual_Report_2011_V15_WEB.pdf>
; Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report OPA 2008-2009' (OPA Victoria, 2009) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gove.au>. 
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Chapter 4 
Application of the Benchmark Criteria and important features 
to Guardianship Cases involving accommodation in Victoria 
4.1   Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the evaluation criteria and important features 
developed in Chapter 2 to guardianship cases dealing with accommodation. It deals 
with the recognition and application of the criteria to Victoria. It is proposed that 
obeying the will and preferences of the individual, applying the least restrictive 
alternative and the two important features of conflict of interest and undue influence 
between the individual and their support network, and the presence of a positive 
informal support network can be used to ascertain the present incorporation of the 
principles of supported decision-making. This criteria and features were derived from 
Article 12 of the CRPD and applied to tribunal and court decisions in guardianship 
cases involving accommodation. 
4.2   Issues Specific to Victoria 
4.2.1 Availability of Relevant Cases 
The limited number of available written reasons from decided Victorian guardianship 
decisions means that limited inferences can be drawn from the specific examples 
which apply the evaluation criteria and important facilitating or detracting features.  
This is due to privacy considerations mentioned in Chapter 3.  However, there are a 
number of important relevant cases discussed in this chapter. 
There are only two Victorian Supreme Court cases available at the time of writing 
that discuss and apply Article 12 of the CRPD. The first is the important 2011 
Supreme Court case of PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria.1 
This case involves accommodation and will be discussed in detail below.  
The second case of Nicholson & Ors v Knaggs & Ors2 concerned testamentary 
capacity and will only be discussed for its application of Article 12 of the CRPD.3 
Vickery J explained and applied Article 12 to the process of will making and 
testamentary capacity. He said all persons with disabilities have the right to make a 
will on an equal basis with all other persons.4 All persons have the right to support to 
                                            
1
 PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria [2011] VSC 327. 
2
 [2009] VSC 64 (27 February 2009). 
3
 Nicholson and Ors. v Knaggs and Ors. [2009] VSC 64 (27 February 2009), [58]-[64] per Vickery J.  
4
 Ibid [19]. 
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make a will in accord with Article 12 (3) of the CRPD.  This is contrary to the notion 
of testamentary capacity as an instance of mental capacity in Banks v Goodfellow 
discussed in Chapter 1.7.5 By an examination of the objects, preparatory material 
and the 2005 background paper to legal capacity, Vickery J indicated that the CRPD 
meaning of capacity in Article 12 included the ability to have rights and to exercise 
these rights.6 The right to exercise legal capacity must be free from undue influence 
as a safeguard to abuse contained in Article 12(4).7 
Before it is possible to apply the evaluation criteria to Victorian guardianship cases 
involving accommodation, it is necessary to briefly explain the possibility of an 
overlap between Article 12 of the CRPD and some portions of the Charter on Human 
Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (VIC) which came into force in 2007 and 2008 at a 
similar time to the CRPD.8  
The following two subsections will consider the Victorian Charter and any 
interrelationship with the CRPD. This will be followed by an application of the 
evaluation criteria to the available Victorian guardianship cases. These guardianship 
cases all deal with accommodation, although not exclusively, as there may be some 
overlap with financial administration. It is the accommodation issues that will form the 
basis of the analysis. 
4.2.2 The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (VIC) 
The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities is a modest attempt to 
enumerate 20 important civil and political rights shared by all members of society 
and to hold these rights paramount when drafting legislation and government policy. 
Their breach does not lead to any award of damages and its intended consequences 
are primarily non-legal. There are no criminal or civil consequences imposed for a 
purported breach of an enumerated charter right. Unlike a constitutionally 
entrenched Bill of Rights the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty remains 
unaffected.9 Breaches of the Charter may be raised in equal opportunity bodies, 
courts and tribunals but without conferring new rights. International law and existing 
human rights law remain unchanged. The primary effect requires public authorities10 
                                            
5
 Banks v Goodfellow (1970) LR 5 QB 549. 
6
 Nicholson and Ors. v Knaggs and Ors. [2009] VSC 64 (27 February 2009) [58]-[60]. 
7
 Ibid [75]-[76]. 
8
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) s 2. Commencement is 1 January 
2007 except for pt 3 div 3, 4 and s 2(2). Part 3 div 4 includes obligations of Public Authorities which 
may include VCAT; see PJB v Melbourne Health and State Trustees of Victoria [2011] VSC 327, [105] 
per Bell J where public authorities and the Supreme Court were provided with an additional 12 
months to assimilate the legislation. 
9
 George Williams, 'The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Origins and Scope' 
(2006) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 24; see also Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human 
Rights Commission, 'Victoria's Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities' (Equal Opportunity and 
Human Rights Commission, 2012) <http://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/index.php/the-
charter>. 
10
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) s 4 (definition of ‘Public Authority’). 
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to provide services consistent with the enumerated Charter rights and government to 
draft legislation and policy in accordance with these rights.11 
The Charter is an ordinary enactment of the Victorian Parliament. It can be modified 
or overridden by another Victorian statute. 12  It does not require any special 
amendment procedure to amend the Charter. 
The purpose of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities is set out 
in section 1 of the Charter and is threefold: 
a) To ensure that new statutory provisions in Victorian enactments are 
compatible with the enumerated human rights.13 Statements of compatibility 
are required in respect of all bills introduced into Victorian Parliament.14 
b) It imposes an obligation on all public authorities to act in such a way that is 
compatible with the twenty enumerated civil and political rights contained in 
the Charter.15 Public authority can include a VCAT guardianship Tribunal.16 
c) To provide jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Victoria to declare that a 
statutory provision in a Victorian enactment cannot be interpreted consistently 
with a human right and requires the relevant minister to respond.17 However, 
the validity of an enactment is not affected by a pronouncement of the 
Supreme Court.18 
The current human rights enumerated in the Charter are civil and political rights. 
They do not include economic, social and cultural rights.19 In chapter 1, civil and 
political rights were described as negative, justiciable and immediately realisable. 
This is contrasted with economic, social and cultural rights that are positive, non-
justiciable and progressively realised.20 Article 12 of the CRPD confers civil and 
political rights in paragraphs 1 to 3, and economic, social and cultural rights in 
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 Williams, above n 9. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) s 1(2)(b). 
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 Ibid s 1(2)(d). 
15
 Ibid s 1(2)(c). 
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 Ibid s 4 (definition of ‘Public Authority’); see also PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of 
Victoria [2011] VSC 327, [105] where Bell J rejects the assertion that VCAT as a quasi-judicial body is 
not a public authority. He states VCAT is an administrative body giving an administrative decision and 
is bound to apply the Charter as a Public Authority. 
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 Ibid s 1(2)(e). 
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 Ibid s 39(5)(e). 
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 Ibid ss 8-26; see also Barbara Carter, 'Adult Guardianship: Human Rights or Social Justice' (2010) 
18 JLM 143. 
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 Amita Dhanda, 'Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the past or 
lodestone for the future?' (2007) 34(2) Syracuse International Journal of Law and Commerce 429; see 
also Penelope Weller, 'Human Rights and Social Justice: the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and the Quiet Revolution in International Law' (2009) 4 Public Space: The Journal of 
Law and Social Justice 74. 
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paragraphs 4 and 5.21 This may blur the distinction for CRPD purposes by having 
both civil and political as well as economic rights in Article 12, requiring more rights 
to be immediately realisable. This may mean that the whole of Article 12 may be 
immediately realisable. 
All natural persons are deemed to have the human rights as set out in Part 2 of the 
Charter; corporations do not have any human rights.22 Those human rights can only 
be limited by what is justifiable in a free and democratic society based upon human 
dignity, equality and freedom.23 Any limitations to these human rights must consider 
the nature of the right, the purpose of the limitation, the relationship between the 
limitation of the right and its purpose, and any less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.24 
Bell J in Kracke v Mental Health Review Board25 has provided a four-step approach 
to the interpretation of the Charter for administrative bodies and courts. 26  This 
incorporates the application procedures in section 7(2) of the Charter.27 These steps 
are as follows: 
1. Engagement. Identify the human rights in general terms that may be 
affected by the legislation; then refine this task to identify the specific human 
rights in the Charter and any other rights that may be affected. 
2. Justification. This process involves two considerations. First, the concept of 
legality. This means that legislation should not infringe basic human rights.  
Second, the concept of proportionality. Human rights should only be 
affected to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose of the legislation.28 
3. Re-interpretation. Has the least restrictive path been taken in the 
interpretation of the statute for the least possible intrusion upon human 
rights? 
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 Penelope Weller, 'The Convention  on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Social Model 
of Health: New Perspectives' (2011) 21 Journal of Mental Health Law 10 : see also Marianne Schulze, 
'Understanding The UN Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities' (2010) 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/unconventionhradisabilities.pdf>. 
22
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) s 6. 
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 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board & Ors (General) [2009] VCAT 646 (revised 21 May 2009). 
See especially Bell J at [60]-[70]. 
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 Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, 'Supported Decision Making an Alternative to Guardianship' 
(Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, 2009) 
<www.globalmentalhealth.org/sites/default/filesdocs/MDAC>. 
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 Bernadette McSherry and Ian Freckelton, Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy, Biomedical Law 
and Ethics Library (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1st ed, 2013). See especially Chapter 5 by 
Annegret Kampf (76-91) discussing the PJB v Melbourne Health and State Trustees of Victoria 
decision. 
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 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) s 7(2); see also Mental Disability 
Advocacy Centre, above n 26; see also McSherry and Freckelton, above n 27, 83-90. 
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4. Declaration. Only the Supreme Court of Victoria can declare an existing 
statutory provision to be inconsistent with human rights as contained in the 
Charter. 
This four-stage approach has relevantly been applied where secured 
accommodation was needed for the protection of a violent person with multiple 
impairments.29 In AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 186 a variety of civil and political 
rights were identified, including the right to enjoy human rights without discrimination 
s 8(2) of the Charter, the right to move freely within Victoria and choose where to live 
(s 12), the right to privacy (s 13), the right not to be subject to arrest or unlawful 
detention (s 16) and the right to obtain medical treatment with consent (s 24).30 It 
was held that it was justified and proportional to restrict the individual’s 
accommodation against his will for the protection of the individual and the public. 
This is a major justification for the preference of protection over self-determination in 
guardianship cases. It is in contravention of the benchmark criteria. A number of 
examples of this are seen in 6.3 (Queensland cases) considering ‘will and 
preferences’. 
4.2.3 Interrelationship between the Victorian Charter and the CRPD 
There are certain provisions within the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
2006 (VIC) that are not only consistent with the CRPD but may assist VCAT and 
Courts in the application of Article 12 of the CRPD. These are: 
a) Section 5 of the Charter is entitled ‘Human rights in the Charter in addition to 
other rights and freedoms’. It maintains other rights and freedoms not found 
within the Charter. This section protects human rights which arise in other 
places such as the common law, international law and the Australian 
Constitution. It is an implicit recognition that human rights such as those 
contained in Article 12 of the CRPD exist even though they are not specifically 
mentioned and protected by the Charter. It is postulated that as public 
authorities in the Charter are required to consider enumerated Charter rights, 
they may also begin to consider other human rights such as those contained 
in Article 12 of the CRPD. Capacity to exercise rights and the ability to be 
supported to exercise legal capacity may be considered more frequently 
where there is an obligation to consider civil and political Charter rights.31 
This section would appear to validate the provisions of Article 12 of the CRPD 
as International Law not to be abrogated by the Charter. Anti-Discrimination 
statutes have as their basis, International Law, although once enacted their 
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 AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 186 (18 July 2009). Phillips M identified the right of where to live in 
s 12 of the Charter and approved the restrictions to prevent harm to the individual and public. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(2), (3); see also Dhanda, above n 20; see also Annegret 
Kampf, 'The Disabilities Convention and its Consequences for Mental Health Laws in Australia' in 
Bernadett McSherry (ed), Law in Context (The Federation Press, 2008) . 
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application becomes part of domestic law.32 Bell J applied both Charter rights 
and CRPD rights in the PJB v Melbourne Health and State Trustees of 
Victoria VSC [2011] 327 judgement.33 Bell J, as discussed below, applied 
Articles 5, 12, 19 and 23 of the CRPD to this case with detailed analysis and 
comparison to similar Charter rights without highlighting any difficulties with an 
Australian State jurisdiction applying international law.34 In summary, section 
5 protects international law; Article 12 of the CRPD is part of international law; 
Article 12 of the CRPD can be directly applied by a Victorian Court or tribunal 
even though the rights contained in Article 12 of the CRPD are not specifically 
mentioned in the Charter.  
b) The basis for human rights in section 7(2) of the Charter is ‘dignity, equality 
and freedom’.35 This appears consistent with the General Principles of the 
CRPD contained in Article 3, particularly ‘(a) respect for the inherent dignity, 
individual autonomy, including the freedom to make one’s own choices and 
independence of persons; and (e) Equality of Opportunity’.36 The references 
to equality in section 7 of the Victorian Charter may be seen as congruent with 
the notion of treating persons with a disability on an ‘equal basis with all other 
persons in the community’. This notion of ‘an equal basis with others’ is one of 
the key concepts of the CRPD and of Article 12 itself.37 However ‘equality’ is a 
difficult concept with a number of different meanings. They include concepts 
of formal equality (equal treatment without the recognition of the need for 
different treatment created by the disability) as well as substantive equality 
(different treatment required by the disability), with substantive equality being 
categorised by the removal of barriers to enable more equal participation.38 
The CRPD utilises the concept of substantive equality in its definition of 
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 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (CTH). See, eg, ss 12, 14. 
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 PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria [2011] VSC 327, [130]-[160], [260]-[285] 
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‘disability’. 39  For example the provision of formal equality by allowing all 
persons to enter a building with stairs may not provide substantive equality 
until an elevator is available for persons with physical disabilities to enter the 
building.40 Similarly, substantive equality for a person with a severe cognitive 
disability may not be achieved until supports are provided for the exercise of 
their decision-making rights. Substantive equality is related to equality of 
opportunity, with the removal of barriers to enable more equal participation. 
The Victorian Charter refers to equality of opportunity in its definition section.41 
There appears, therefore, to be a commonality of the underlying basis for both 
the CRPD and the Victorian Charter. The comparison for the CRPD is equality 
for all persons with a disability with all other persons in the community. The 
comparison for the Victorian Charter is the more general equality for all 
residents of Victoria.42 It is my argument that the specific equality of Article 12 
of the CRPD between persons with a disability and others in the community 
can be subsumed within the more general equality protection of the Victorian 
Charter. 
c) Section 8 of the Charter is headed ‘Recognition and Equality before the Law’. 
Section 8(1) provides ‘Every person has the right to recognition as a person 
before the law’.43 This form of wording is indistinguishable from that of Article 
12(1) of the CRPD providing legal personality and the platform for rights to all 
persons.44 
d) Section 12 of the Charter is titled ‘Freedom of Movement’. It provides ‘Every 
person lawfully within Victoria has the right to move freely within Victoria… 
and has the freedom to choose where to live.’45 This appears to be on all 
fours with Article 19 of the CRPD ‘living independently and being included in 
the Community’. Both Article 19 of the CRPD and section 12 of the Victorian 
Charter provide for freedom of choice as to where to live. Article 19 of the 
CRPD recognises the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the 
community with choices equal to others, with the State Party facilitating these 
measures.46 Section 12 of the Victorian Charter provides a right of complete 
freedom of choice of residence but is silent as to any obligation upon Victoria 
to facilitate the provision of services and facilities so that this choice of 
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 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
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residence can be exercised for all persons. The CRPD provides that the State 
Party should facilitate support to assist the individual with the accommodation 
decision. This assistance is absent in the Victorian Charter. Article 19 of the 
CRPD goes further, however, by recognising that some persons with 
disabilities require support services provided by the State Party to enable 
them to exercise their choice of residence in the community.47 
Quinn draws a connection between Articles 12 and 19 of the CRPD. Choice of 
place of residence and choice of with whom and where one lives (Article 19 of 
the CRPD) can be read with Article 12. Legal capacity cannot be exercised 
without freedom of choice of accommodation.48 The argument by Quinn is that 
it is essential to provide supports to enable persons with disabilities to reside 
in the community. If a person is institutionalised, they cannot fully exercise 
their legal capacity, and their choices are significantly restricted.  
Though commonalities exist between the CRPD and the Victorian Charter, there is 
no equivalent in the Charter to Article 12(2), (3) and (4) which discuss legal capacity, 
supports to exercise legal capacity, or safeguards in the exercise of legal capacity.  
Having reviewed the Charter my starting hypothesis was that the requirement to 
apply the Victorian Charter by VCAT in its guardianship jurisdiction will lead to a 
more frequent application of Article 12 supported decision-making principles than in 
jurisdictions without a similar Charter or Act. This is because VCAT as an 
administrative body is exercising jurisdiction as a public authority and is bound to 
apply the Victorian Charter.49 A person must have a disability to come within the 
ambit of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC). 50  The Victorian 
Charter preserves and does not abrogate human rights contained in International 
Law.51 The CRPD is specific International Law of application to all persons with 
disabilities. There are similar underlying principles in section 7(2) of the Charter as 
compared with the general principles contained in Article 3 of the CRPD.52  Article 
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12(1) of the CRPD closely resembles section 8 of the Victorian Charter with the right 
to be recognised as a person before the law.53   
Unfortunately, this hypothesis has not been demonstrated to be the case. The trend 
was to simply apply the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) without any 
reference to the Victorian Charter or the CRPD.54 Occasionally, there is a mention of 
human rights contained in the Victorian Charter, but without a comprehensive 
analysis or any mention of analogous Article 12 CRPD rights. 55  One VCAT 
guardianship accommodation case went into a full analysis of Victorian Charter 
rights.56 However, only one Supreme Court guardianship and administration case 
gave full consideration to Victorian Charter and CRPD rights. 57  Possible 
explanations for the failure of VCAT to apply the Victorian Charter or Article 12 of the 
CRPD will be discussed in the conclusion to this chapter and in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis.  
4.2.4 Victorian Guardianship Cases 
The only Victorian guardianship decision considering rights under the CRPD, 
including Article 12, has been the appeal to the Supreme Court in PJB v Melbourne 
Health and State Trustees of Victoria (and this case is discussed below).58 The 
succession case discussing and applying Article 12 of the CRPD, Nicholson and Ors 
v Knaggs and Ors59 has previously been discussed in this chapter at 4.2 (above). 
Apart from those decisions, the Victorian Charter has occasionally been mentioned 
and applied but it was only analysed in full detail by Bell J in the Kracke decision, 
which is not a guardianship case.60 The Charter was also considered in detail by 
Phillips M in the AC decision, without reference to Article 12 of the CRPD. 61 
Generally, the guardianship legislation is applied without reference to issues extrinsic 
to it. However, there are instances where the wishes of the individual are taken into 
account and no order for guardianship follows. There are also instances of 
considerable informal supports where guardianship has been refused. It is in these 
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circumstances that the fulfilment of the evaluation criteria demonstrates compliance 
with supported decision-making as contained in Article 12(3) of the CRPD. 
4.3   Will and Preferences 
The overall objective of the first evaluation criterion is to support the will and 
preferences of the individual. To fulfil this criterion an appointment should not be 
made which restricts the individual’s ability to make their own decisions in the future 
with or without supports. Compliance with this criterion will be met when the tribunal 
or court makes a decision in accord with the individual’s will and preferences.62 
The Victorian guardianship legislation requires a consideration of the ‘wishes’ of the 
person when considering the need for a guardian;63 however, any appointment made 
must be in the best interests of the person.64  
There is a tension between adhering to the ‘will and preferences’ of an individual and 
making a decision in the ‘best interests’ of the person. Where the decision is made in 
favour of the will of the individual this will comply with the evaluation criterion and be 
in compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD.65 The Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1986 (VIC) places the principles of ‘will and preferences’ (wishes of the person) 
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and ‘best interests’ on an even footing in the objects of the Act.66 However, these 
principles are frequently in conflict where the application of one over the other can 
lead to differing outcomes.67   
The PJB decisions provide a good illustration of the tension between will and 
preferences and perceived best interests.68 
4.3.1 Patrick’s Case 
PJB (Patrick) was a fifty-eight-year-old man in 2010. He had been diagnosed with a 
psychosocial disability. For 18 years prior to the VCAT hearing, Patrick had 106 
admissions to hospital for a mental illness. His pattern of behaviour was to take anti-
psychotic medication while in hospital but refuse to take this medication upon 
discharge as he did not believe he had a mental illness. This led to Patrick becoming 
unwell and continuing with his cycle of hospital admissions. Patrick wished to retain 
part ownership and residence of his council home in which he had resided for many 
years. Melbourne Health wished Patrick to relocate to a hostel form of supported 
accommodation where he would receive supervised medication. Patrick would be 
unable to afford both repayments on his council house and the hostel 
accommodation, so to move meant that Patrick would have to sell his house.69  
Melbourne Health made an application for the State Trustees of Victoria to be 
appointed as Patrick’s administrator for the sole purpose of selling Patrick’s house to 
force the move to hostel accommodation. A guardian was not sought as Patrick 
could be subject to an involuntary in-patient treatment order pursuant to overriding 
mental health legislation. It was Patrick’s wish to retain his public housing and 
continue to make his own decisions. It was also his wish that if an administrator was 
needed his brother should be appointed as his brother would not force Patrick to sell 
his home.   
Deputy President Billings of VCAT made the order to appoint State Trustees of 
Victoria to manage Patrick’s finances on the basis that this order would be in the 
‘best interests’ of Patrick.70 This was made with the full knowledge that it would result 
in the sale of Patrick’s home and his relocation to supported accommodation. In 
VCAT’s view, supervised medication was in Patrick’s medical ‘best interests’ to 
prevent the cycle of hospital admissions. In this thesis ‘medical best interests’ means 
what is objectively best for the individual’s health, safety and welfare.  
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Billings DP referred to both the Charter and the Convention but failed to identify with 
specificity the Victorian Charter or Convention rights involved. Appointing State 
Trustees of Victoria as Patrick’s administrator the following comments are made on 
the appointment of the State Trustees: 
(a) Engagement. Billings DP did not identify with specificity either the Charter 
human rights involved such as section 12 (right to move freely) or section 20 
(right of property), or Article 12 of the CRPD. 
(b)  Justification. Billings DP quoted section 7(2) of the Charter and said a 
proportionality test was required to show the means chosen to restrict 
autonomy were reasonable and justified.71 The possible future rejection of 
medication by Patrick was sufficient to conclude that it was a proportional 
justification to sever Patrick from his home.72 
(c) Best interests. Billings DP said the medical best interests of Patrick in 
stopping the cycle of hospital admissions was proportional to justify any 
infringement upon Patrick’s unspecified Charter rights.73 
(d) Article 12. Billings DP cited Article 12 of the CRPD but said it was not 
contravened when the case is considered as a whole, and a decision is made 
on behalf of a person with a cognitive impairment to sell his home in his best 
interests. He said this was congruent with proportionality as contained in 
Article 12 of the CRPD.74  
It is respectfully submitted that Billings DP has misconstrued the CRPD in general 
and Article 12 in particular. The design of Article 12 of the CRPD is the recognition of 
legal capacity and the provision of supports where needed to exercise legal capacity. 
It does not envisage the removal of decision-making capacity in the best interests of 
a person. Further, the proportionality mentioned in Article 12(4) of the CRPD may be 
that the supports provided must be only those required to enable decision-making to 
occur.75  For example, if a person had a communication difficulty, then supports 
should only be provided in that area if requested by the individual and only for the 
time necessary. Billings DP in my opinion may have confused the proportionality test 
in the Victorian Charter that relates to a restriction of an enumerated Charter human 
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right76 with safeguards in the provision of support measures in the exercise of legal 
capacity in Article 12.77   
This case was successfully appealed in the Supreme Court of Victoria, with Bell J 
dismissing the administration order.78 A different emphasis was placed upon the 
legislation in the Supreme Court than in VCAT. According to Bell J, the core 
principles of the Guardianship Act were the wishes of the person and the least 
restrictive alternative to maintain personal autonomy.79 This corresponds with my 
evaluation criteria. Bell J used his four-step analysis from the Kracke decision as 
stated in 4.2.2 (above). He identified the relevant Victorian Charter rights to include 
section 8 (recognition and equality before the law) having the status of a legal person 
with the ability to have rights.80 To require an administrator is discrimination based 
upon a disability. Other sections were section 12 (freedom of movement) as Patrick 
through the administrator appointment loses the freedom to choose where to live; 
section 13 (privacy and reputation) privacy is lost with the removal of Patrick’s home 
ownership; and section 20 (Property) the appointment constitutes the loss of an 
interest in real property.   
The equivalent CRPD rights were also discussed. These were Article 5 (equality and 
non-discrimination), Article 12(5) interest in real property and Article 19 (the right to 
live in the community with supports).81 Bell J discussed each of the Charter rights as 
well as the CRPD rights that were involved in the decision to sever Patrick’s 
relationship with his home. Article 5 (Equality and non-discrimination) was relevant 
for the same reason that section 8 of the Charter rights was implicated. This was 
because there was discrimination by appointing an administrator for a person with a 
disability. A person without a disability would not lose their right to exercise their 
legal capacity. Article 12(5) of the CRPD was involved as Patrick loses his interest in 
his council home. Article 19 was involved as Patrick loses the ability to choose his 
place of residence.82  
The justification process was implemented by Bell J finding that there was a 
disproportionate restriction upon autonomy through the appointment of the 
administrator.83 There needed to be a very important reason to separate a person 
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from their home (legality). The restriction upon choice of residence for Patrick was 
not proportional to the possible improvement in his medical best interests. A 
distinction was drawn between financial decision-making ability and the mental 
health status of Patrick. Patrick was always able to make repayments despite 
frequent hospital admissions. Bell J found that there was no evidence that the cycle 
of hospital admissions would be severed by the sale of Patrick’s house.84 It could not 
be shown that Patrick would comply with medical treatment while in the hostel. 
Bell J’s approach did not place an emphasis upon the medical best interests of 
Patrick but emphasised Patrick’s will and preferences in allowing Patrick to make his 
own accommodation decisions. The evaluation criterion of will and preferences was 
met by Bell J but not by Billings DP. Bell J placed great emphasis on human rights 
contained both in the Victorian Charter and the CRPD. The principle of following the 
wishes of the person was given great importance when he applied a justification test 
to overturn the restrictive appointment of an administrator.  
The approach of Bell J accords with my own views of the weight given to the general 
principles in the Victorian guardianship enactment. Priority should be given to the will 
and preferences of the individual to maintain their self-determination. I agree with 
Bell J that the potential effect upon Patrick’s medical best interest was insufficient to 
outweigh Patrick’s wishes. There was no evidence that the change of 
accommodation would have any effect upon the cycle of hospitalisations. Bell J did 
not discuss the concept of proportionality in Article 12(4) of the CRPD and the overall 
interpretation of Article 12 expressed in my criticism of Billings DP’s decision. I do 
agree with Bell J’s comments that Billings DP’s decision was the most restrictive 
decision. This will be discussed later in this chapter when considering the second 
evaluation criterion. 
4.3.2 Cases illustrating the tension between best interests and will and 
preferences 
Bell J did not focus upon the ‘best interests’ of Patrick in the way Billings DP did. A 
focus upon ‘best interests’ can lead in my opinion to misapplications of will and 
preferences. The individual’s best interests can be misinterpreted to support a 
paternalistic approach contrary to the actual preferences of an individual. 85  For 
example, Billings DP in the MC decision in my opinion misinterpreted the individual’s 
will to reside in his own home closer to his mother and the cinema as a will to reside 
in a different residential care facility chosen by the OPA (Victoria).86 It was unsafe for 
MC to continue to reside in the current residential care facility due to assaults on 
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him. MC’s stated preferences at the hearing were to reside first in his own 
accommodation closer to his mother or, second, to reside with his brother in private 
accommodation. If neither option was possible, he would prefer to stay in the current 
facility despite the assaults. These choices did not include a willingness to move to 
another residential care facility closer to MC’s mother (Office of Public Advocate 
Victoria solution). This was against MC’s will and preferences. In my view it was 
Billings DP’s decision in MC’s best interests to continue with the OPA as guardian for 
accommodation and to conflate MC’s will and preference to coincide with this 
decision.  
In another VCAT decision, the failure of VCAT to ascertain an express ‘will or 
preference’ would lead to the non-compliance with this evaluative criterion in a 
situation where the person’s will was not express but could, in my opinion, be implied 
from a course of action over a number of years.87 Billings DP in the DM decision, by 
appointing the OPA as guardian for accommodation, said he could not determine the 
will of DM;88 this was despite DM’s choice to reside with her son PD and have PD 
care for her over the past 10 years. The one person who was in the best position to 
ascertain the will and preferences of the individual appeared to have his assertions 
over-ridden as it did not appear to be in the best interests of the individual.89 This 
issue of finding an implied will and preference has not arisen in other cases 
examined by this thesis. Although there was no mention by Billings DP in this case, it 
is possible that the refusal of PD to work with siblings and service providers meant 
that Billings DP was unwilling to infer DM’s will from past conduct. Generally, the will 
and preference as in the DM case is required to be made expressly by the individual.  
4.3.3 Medical Best Interests Affected by Knowledge and Understanding 
of Accommodation Needs 
People, whose will and preferences are to return home but are unable to do so 
because of a lack of insight regarding their care needs and the inability to have these 
needs met at home, have had their will and preferences overridden on the basis of 
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medical best interests.90 In the SNE decision, the individual had high care needs due 
to her frailties and physical disabilities. She lacked insight that she was unable to 
return home without assistance.  
In the RB decision, discussed later in this chapter, a young man with autism and 
behavioural issues was not permitted to return home, by the Victorian Department of 
Disability Services, according to his wishes. RB lacked the insight into his care 
needs. He could not be cared for without high-level assistance. This level of 
assistance was unavailable at RB’s home.91 
4.3.4 Compliance with will and preferences  
The will and preferences of an individual may be followed by VCAT in compliance 
with this evaluation criterion even in a situation of significant financial abuse by a 
supporter. 
This situation arose in the case of LMB (Guardianship).92 LMB, aged 89, resided with 
her son JLMB in her former home. LMB had severe cognitive deficits due to 
Alzheimer’s disease. LMB had two other sons, RLMB and KLMB, both of whom 
sought guardianship and wanted their mother to reside in a residential care facility. 
Two years prior to the VCAT hearing, JLMB, unemployed, with marital and financial 
problems, returned to live with his mother in the family home. JLMB influenced LMB 
to transfer her home of the past 50 years to him. JLMB also reduced LMB’s financial 
assets. At the time of the hearing LMB was entirely beholden for her financial 
existence to JLMB.   
It was the express will and preference of LMB to continue to reside with JLMB in her 
former home. This will was expressed verbally by LMB at the hearing. H Lambrick 
DP found LMB well cared for and happy.   
The application for guardianship was dismissed on the basis that it did not follow the 
will and preferences of LMB and was not in her best interests.93 An appointment of 
the other two sons would have resulted in a nursing home placement. The actual 
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undue influence between JLMB and LMB was controlled by the appointment of the 
State Trustees of Victoria as administrator. In this case refusal to appoint a guardian 
followed the will and preferences of LMB consistent with the evaluative criterion and 
Article 12 supported decision-making. The support measures taken by JLMB 
supported the ‘will and preferences’ of LMB with the safeguard of the State Trustees 
of Victoria as administrator.94 
The LMB decision involves important aspects of both evaluation criteria and the 
important facilitating and detracting features. It will be further discussed in the body 
of this chapter when discussing least restrictive alternative and the important 
facilitating and detracting features. 
4.3.5 Disagreements involving support networks may override a 
person’s will and preferences 
Disagreements may be between the individual’s support network and service 
providers or a disagreement within the support network. This can lead to the 
appointment of the statutory guardian against the will of the individual. 
The first situation arose in the DM decision,95 where the individual’s son who had 
been the live-in principal carer for the individual would not work with the service 
provider. It also arose in the RB decision,96 where the mother of a son residing in 
community housing due to his autism and behavioural issues had disagreements 
with the service providers. It was the will and preference of RB to reside at home. 
This was not possible due to RB’s behaviour. 
Examples of the second type of disagreement arose within the support networks in 
the DM and MC cases.97 In both of these cases the disagreement was where the 
individual should reside. In each case the statutory guardian (OPA) was appointed. 
4.3.6 A lack of accommodation options can override the person’s will 
and preferences in their medical best interests 
An absence of alternate accommodation, and an absence of informal supports to 
prevent harm to both the individual and to others, has overridden an individual’s 
choice of accommodation.98 The individual’s will and preferences were overridden by 
VCAT where it was neither feasible nor practicable to comply in the AC and RB 
                                            
94
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(4). 
95
 DM (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 1705 (25 August 2009). 
96
 RB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 532 (12 May 2010). 
97
 DM (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 1705 (25 August 2009).  
98
 RB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 532 (12 May 2010); AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 186 (18 July 
2009). 
143 
 
cases.99 In the AC decision Phillips M decided against following the individual’s will 
and preferences to live in his own accommodation as he repeatedly harmed himself 
and others in supported, restrictive accommodation. This decision was considered to 
be in AC’s best interests as it protected AC from potential self-harm and protected 
the community. Phillips M applied the Victorian Charter using the 4 step approach in 
the Kracke decision to show that restrictions upon movement were justified and 
proportional in AC’s best interests and in the public’s interests. Not only was AC a 
moderate risk of harm to himself and the public from past actions due to his 
disabilities, there was also a lack of alternative accommodation providing this level of 
protection outside of Sandhurst (AC’s present accommodation). 
Where it is neither feasible nor practicable for a young adult with autism, obsessive 
compulsive disorder and behavioural issues to reside at home according to his will 
then will and preferences may be overridden in favour of maintaining supported 
residential care on the grounds of medical best interests.100 
4.3.7 Medical Best Interests 
While following the medical best interests (health, welfare and safety) can coincide 
with obeying the will and preferences of a person,101 it was also held by Billings DP 
in the PJB decision of VCAT that obeying the medical best interests of Patrick could 
override his will and preferences. 102  Both of these decisions appear as 
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manifestations of the best interests of the person. It appears that the application of 
medical best interests of a person can lead to inconsistent results with compliance 
with the evaluation criteria. The difference mey be explained by the presence of a 
positive informal support network in the AC decision which may operate as 
protection to safeguard the individual’s medical best interests. This enables the will 
and preferences of the individual to be honoured. The argument that a positive 
informal support network functions as protection, enabling a tribunal to focus upon 
the individual’s will and preferences will be developed in the conclusion to Chapter 7 
and applied in Chapter 8 when providing recommendations to improve criteria 
compliance by strengthening the positive informal support network. 
4.3.8 Summary of Will and Preferences 
Obeying the will and preferences of the individual is at the apex of the evaluation 
criteria. Compliance with this criterion demonstrates congruence with supported 
decision-making expressed in Article 12. Even though there was only one 
guardianship case (and its appeal) applying Article 12 of the CRPD, a number of 
cases observed the will and preferences of the individual. This may be due to the 
fact that it corresponds with observance of one of the three general principles of the 
Victorian guardianship legislation. 
This section has shown the tension between compliance with the ‘will and 
preferences’ of the individual and following the individual’s best interests.103 There is 
a tendency to interpret will and preferences to coincide with best interests as in 
MC.104 A decision in accordance with the perceived view of the individual’s best 
interests may be contrary to the individual’s will and preferences and contrary to 
supported decision-making in the CRPD. This was demonstrated in the PJB, MC, AC 
and RB cases. Maintenance of the individual’s health may be a factor in 
consideration of the individual’s best interests (as noted in PJB, LMB, AC, MC and 
RB). Where the individual’s health may not be improved through a change of 
accommodation then there is good reason to prefer will and preferences over best 
interests.105 Note the PJB and LMB decisions where the individual’s health was not 
affected by a guardianship order for accommodation. There is also one example of 
finding no express or implied will and preference when it may be in conflict with the 
tribunal’s application of best interest principles.106 Where there are no appropriate 
and practicable accommodation options in accordance with the individual’s will and 
preferences available then a tribunal is likely to make an appointment contrary to the 
individual’s will following the principle of best interests.107 If feasible and practicable 
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alternatives exist in accordance with the individual’s will and preferences then will 
and preferences may be followed.108 
4.4   Least Restrictive Alternative 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The decision made should be the least restrictive one that is in compliance with the 
will of the individual and generally preserves the individual’s decision-making ability. 
Success here is generally measured by not making a guardianship appointment so 
that the individual is able to make their own accommodation decisions with or without 
supports in the future.  
4.4.2 Patrick’s case 
The concept of the least restrictive alternative is not to promote the ‘best interests’ of 
the individual.109 It is the least restrictive alternative to maintain decision-making 
autonomy. In the PJB decision, ‘least restrictive alternative’ was dealt with in two 
different ways. At first instance, Billings DP found the appointment of the State 
Trustees of Victoria as plenary administrator was in the medical best interests of 
Patrick.110 This is inconsistent with the use of ‘least restrictive alternative’ in the 
evaluation criterion for supported decision-making in Article 12. Legal capacity, 
autonomy and support to exercise legal capacity must not be overridden by concepts 
of protection. Compare this interpretation of ‘least restriction’ to that of Bell J in the 
successful appeal.111 There, ‘least restriction’ meant the least possible intrusion to 
maintain decision-making autonomy. It was not meant as ‘least restriction’ to 
maintain a protective ‘best interests’ position. There was a criticism by the Supreme 
Court112 that the VCAT decision was not the least restrictive but the most restrictive 
by removing decision-making ability where there was no proof that it would improve 
Patrick’s health. Compare the PJB decision with the LMB case. 
4.4.3 The LMB Case 
In LMB, Lambrick DP held that the appointment of the other two sons as guardians 
for accommodation would have led to a residential care facility placement. This was 
not the least restrictive alternative.113 LMB was adamant that she did not wish to 
reside in an aged-care facility and wished to continue to reside in her former home 
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with her son JLMB. This coincides with the evaluative criterion use of ‘least 
restrictive’ alternative to follow the will of the individual and maintain her ability to 
make her own decisions (with or without support). Because an administrator was 
appointed for financial decisions, the decision was only the least restrictive regarding 
the avoidance of the appointment of a guardian for accommodation. The 
administrator could be regarded as a financial manager, not a supporter, to protect 
LMB from future actions of JLMB. The administrator does not determine LMB’s 
accommodation. This choice has been retained by LMB through the avoidance of a 
guardian appointment. If LMB’s other sons were appointed guardian for 
accommodation it would have meant a residential care placement which was 
expressed by the tribunal as not the least restrictive alternative.114 The PJB and LMB 
decisions demonstrate how the criterion of applying the least restrictive alternative 
and obeying the individual’s will and preferences operate synergistically to facilitate 
decision-making autonomy. 
4.4.4 Least restriction where there is no need for a decision or no 
decision to be made 
A least restrictive alternative may also be reached where no guardianship 
appointment is made because there are no decisions to be made and therefore no 
need for an appointment. This is in compliance with the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1986 (VIC).115 This position complies with the evaluation criterion 
as the individual is potentially available in the future to be supported to make their 
own decisions without limitations.116 An illustration of this point may be seen in the 
case of MM (Guardianship).117 
MM was an eighty-four-year-old woman with advanced dementia. She was placed in 
an aged-care facility with no dispute regarding the facility or medical care.  MM had 
two children BM and NM. Each had obtained powers of attorney from MM that the 
tribunal revoked due to a lack of capacity to give the power. The siblings were in 
conflict regarding MM’s finances. An independent financial administrator was 
appointed by Duggan M, but the guardianship application was dismissed as there 
was no need for any decision in this area to be made.118 
An example of where there was no need an appointment was in the KSP decision. 
Holloway M appointed KSP’s daughter as plenary guardian and administrator. KSP 
was elderly and isolated, residing in rural Victoria, but without any diagnosed 
cognitive disability. The appointment was not the least restrictive as KSP wished to 
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make his own accommodation decisions with or without support. The daughter’s 
appointment prevented KSP from exercising future decision-making.119  
4.4.5 The exceptional case; where an appointment can be the ‘least 
restrictive alternative’ 
An appointment of a guardian or an administrator may comply with the evaluation 
criteria and supported decision-making principles of Article 12 if it complies with the 
wishes of the individual. Recall the PJB decision. If Patrick’s brother was appointed 
as administrator he would not have sold his house. This would satisfy the criteria of 
will and preferences and least restrictive alternative. 120  An express reference of 
wishing to be with the individual’s people may enable the appointment of a particular 
person to fulfil this wish in accordance with the least restrictive alternative, as in 
WD.121 In the WD case, an elderly man expressed a wish to be with ‘his people’. 
Morrish J appointed WD’s daughter as guardian for accommodation as she would 
uphold WD’s accommodation will and preferences. WD’s daughter was akin to an 
appointed supporter even though it was theoretically substitution. Accordingly, WD’s 
will and preferences were observed and the appointment was the least restrictive as 
the present accommodation (residential care) was contrary to WD’s will and 
preferences. There was a conflict between WD’s former partner and WD’s family 
regarding WD’s accommodation. Without an appointment, WD would have continued 
to reside in a residential facility away from his family and against his will and 
preferences. 
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Disagreements between family members may lead to a restrictive appointment 
contrary to the least restrictive alternative. 122  It was discussed in 4.3.5 that 
disagreements within support netwoks is an important factor in potential non-
compliance with the evaluation criteria and supported decision-making as contained 
in Article 12. Some form of mechanism to reduce disputes may have the effect of 
greater adherence to the evaluative criteria and supported decision-making 
principles. This will be discussed in chapter 8.   
4.4.6 Summary of applying the least restrictive alternative 
The avoidance of the appointment of a guardian for accommodation maintains a 
least restrictive alternative by enabling the individual to be supported in the future to 
make their own accommodation decisions. This may be due to no need for a 
decision because of adequate support or no reason for a decision to be made. This 
criterion operates synergistically with the first criterion by generally not placing 
limitations on an individual’s decision-making abilities to enable their will and 
preferences to be observed in the future. Even when the appointment of an 
administrator is made to resolve family issues or where there has been previous 
financial abuse, compliance with this criterion has been observed where a 
guardianship appointment for accommodation has been avoided.123 This would be 
an instance of partial compliance with the evaluation criteria. Partial compliance 
indicates adherence to the criteria for accommodation but non-compliance with 
Article 12 in one or more other areas of decision-making. 
There are a number of examples from Victoria where the individual’s will and 
preferences were followed and the least restrictive alternative applied.124 This was 
despite only one case expressly applying Article 12 of the CRPD and only a few 
references to the Victorian Charter.125 A number of cases made specific references 
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to following the wishes of the individual and applying the least restrictive 
alternative.126 
4.5   The Presence of a Positive Informal Support Network 
4.5.1 The LMB Case 
Recall the LMB decision.127 Irrespective of any actual financial undue influence by 
son JLMB, LMB was well cared for. JLMB gave 24-hour care. There was a call 
button. His mother was happy and very positive despite her frailty. LMB looked to 
JLMB for complete support and assistance.128 The benefit of an informal support 
network in leading to compliance with the evaluative criteria can be demonstrated 
from Victorian cases.129 Billings DP in the AC decision130 dismissed the application 
for a guardian made by the State of Victoria’s Corrective Services for 
accommodation for a man formerly in jail but had agreed to supported 
accommodation. The positive informal support network consisting of informal support 
from the OPA (Victoria), PWD (Australia) professionals and the assistance in the 
supported accommodation led to no appointment, thus complying with the evaluation 
criteria. AC’s doctor noted the positive therapeutic effect of AC being free to make 
his own accommodation decisions.131 
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4.5.2 The VTH case 
In another case example of VTH,132 an elderly man with a cognitive disability was 
able to continue to reside in his own home with the positive informal support of a 
network consisting of 3 of his 6 children. The round the clock home care enabled the 
application for an accommodation guardian to be dismissed in compliance with the 
evaluation criteria.133 
Where there is no informal support network or difficulties in the functioning of a 
support network then VCAT may be inclined to make a guardianship order for 
accommodation in contravention of the evaluation criteria.134   
Where no informal support network exists it is postulated that the creation of such a 
network may lead to avoidance of an appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation. 135  This would be consistent with the evaluation criteria and 
consistent with supported decision-making. 
4.5.3 Summary 
The presence of a positive informal support network has played an important role in 
VCAT decisions made in full or partial compliance with the evaluative criteria.136 It 
may mean that the welfare or best interest’s principle is obeyed so that there is no 
need for a guardianship order. The other principles of wishes of the person and least 
restriction may be more readily followed. 
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4.6   Conflict of Interest and Undue Influence  
Conflict of interest and undue influence is between the supporter and the 
individual. 137  These are two distinct equitable concepts that were previously 
discussed in Chapter 2.138 
4.6.1 The LMB case 
Recall the LMB decision,139  where son JLMB had used his position to strip his 
mother LMB of all her financial assets.140 VCAT dealt with this matter in a way 
partially consistent with the evaluative criteria by dismissing the guardianship 
application.141 VCAT did, however, appoint the State Trustees of Victoria as the 
administrator.142 This may be an example of partial compliance with the evaluation 
criteria because it was met for guardianship, by not appointing a guardian, but not for 
financial administration. Unlike the models discussed in Chapter 1, it is not possible 
for VCAT to make an appointment creating an informal support network, or 
approving a support agreement or appointing a supporter. 143  Virtually the only 
available control mechanism at present for VCAT to assist an informal supporter is to 
make a formal appointment. This observation is replicated in the other jurisdictions 
discussed in the next two chapters. VCAT does not create conflict of interest or 
undue influence, and is not responsible for the lack of a positive informal support 
network. These three factors affect VCAT’s compliance with the evaluation criteria. 
The appointment of an administrator could, in this instance, be seen as the 
appointment of a monitor for JLMB, consistent with supported decision-making 
principles, and similar to the monitor used in the South Australian and ACT 
supported decision-making projects. 144  The monitor ensures the supporter is 
providing assistance and not substitution for the decision. The administrator for LMB 
is a substitute for finances and a control in place to enable assistance for 
accommodation decisions for LMB. The administrator serves as a financial control 
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overseeing the actions of JLMB. This frees JLMB to function as LMB’s support 
network for lifestyle and accommodation decisions.  
Just as the presence of a functioning informal support network may be a key marker 
towards compliance with the evaluation criteria, the presence of conflict of interest 
may be a key indicator that the evaluation criteria will not be followed.145 The conflict 
of interest may be associated with the removal of the individual’s autonomy, being 
substituted to the will of the supporter.   
In some cases conflict may be seen as an opportunity to inventively reach a solution 
in accordance with the evaluative criteria and supported decision-making 
principles.146 In LMB by only protecting finances to leave guardianship untouched; in 
VTH by resolving family disagreements by following the individual’s wishes to remain 
at home with supports; in WD by the appointment of WD’s daughter to enable WD’s 
accommodation wishes to be met; and in PJB by dismissing the appointment of the 
State Trustee of Victoria to enable Patrick to retain his desired public housing.  
Alternatively, and possibly more frequently, conflict may be seen as justification for 
making a restrictive appointment. 147  The absence of mandatory legislative 
counselling will be discussed further in chapter 8. This may be of benefit for the 
resolution of some conflict situations. Chapter 8 will also make recommendations 
regarding the need to create, educate and monitor a support network as a basis to 
control and reduce conflict of interest and undue influence. This may reduce the 
individual’s exposure to abuse and neglect. 
4.6.2 Summary 
Conflict of interest and undue influence as between the individual and their support 
network only arose in one instance from the available cases.148 The appointment of 
an administrator in that case enabled the avoidance of a guardianship order 
facilitating partial compliance with the evaluation criteria.  
4.7   Discussion 
The findings of this chapter must be placed in perspective. There were only 21 
reported available cases as compared with 110 in NSW and 173 in Queensland. It 
was only in the LMB decision that conflict of interest or undue influence between 
supporter and the individual was observed.  This is in contrast to 46 examples in the 
NSW and Queensland cases. 
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An observation from Victoria that will be underscored by the NSW and Queensland 
cases is the weighting placed by VCAT on its guardianship principles. The 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) places an equal weighting upon the 
principles of following the wishes of the person, applying the least restrictive 
alternative and maintaining the welfare and best interests of the person.149 Only Bell 
J in the PJB decision gave an equal weight to these three principles. In the other 
cases VCAT first applied the principle of protecting the welfare and interests of the 
person before applying the autonomy principles of following the wishes of the 
individual and making the least restrictive decision. This was only done where it was 
safe to do so. This was when the health, welfare and safety of the individual were 
adequately protected. 
4.8   Conclusion 
This chapter identifies an important trend in that approximately half of the available 
cases demonstrated compliance with the evaluation criteria.150 This is despite a near 
absence of references to supported decision-making and to Article 12 of the CRPD.  
However, the guardianship principles consistent with the evaluation criteria were 
generally applied after the protective guardianship principle of maintaining the 
welfare and best interests of the person.151 
4.8.1 Significant compliance 
There was compliance with the evaluation criteria in nearly half the reported 
available cases in the Victorian jurisdiction in the relevant area and time frame.152 
The significant compliance level with the evaluation criteria is likely due to the 
application of the general principles in the Victorian guardianship legislation. There is 
almost no express reference to Article 12 and very little application of the Victorian 
Charter. VCAT as an administrative body is required to apply the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (VIC) in its decisions. This occurred on an 
infrequent basis.  Only the PJB decision refered to and applied Article 12 of the 
CRPD. Section 5 of the Victorian Charter was not used to refer to and apply Article 
12 of the CRPD.  
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 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) ss 4(2)(a),(b) and (c).  
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 9 out of 21 cases. 
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 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) s 4(2)(b). 
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 VTH (Guardianship) [2012] VCAT 1649 (8 October 2012); LMB (Guardianship) [2012] VCAT 1443 
(24 August 2012); WD (Guardianship) [2011] VCAT 2442 (20 September 2011); MM (Guardianship) 
[2011] VCAT 2269 (6 December 2011); PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria 
[2011] VSC 327; CM (Guardianship)  [2010] VCAT 1313 (10 August 2010); AC (Guardianship) [2009] 
VCAT 753 (8 May 2009). 
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There is a tension between autonomy and protection in the application of the 
principles that underpin the Act. 153  Following the wishes of the individual and 
adopting the least restrictive alternative are two of the three general principles in the 
Victorian Act corresponding with the evaluation criteria. In applying the least 
restrictive alternative and obeying the will and preferences of the individual, VCAT 
appears to balance this by the need to make the decision in the ‘best interests’ of the 
individual.154 As mentioned in the Discussion, the principle of protecting the best 
interests of the person is applied first and given de facto primacy. When the decision 
follows the individual’s will and preferences and enables the individual to make their 
own accommodation decisions, it will comply with the evaluation criteria.  
The Supreme Court in the PJB decision155 and VCAT in the AC, LMB, MC and VTH 
decisions156 expressed their reasons as following the wishes of the individual and 
applying the least restrictive alternative. When this occurs, it complies with the 
evaluation criteria. 
4.8.2 Co-incidental compliance 
Compliance with the evaluation criteria may be termed co-incidental. By applying the 
guardianship principles contained in Victoria’s guardianship legislation, VCAT is 
providing tacit or incidental compliance with the evaluation criteria.  These principles 
are congruent with the evaluation criteria of applying least restrictive alternative and 
obeying the will and preferences of the person.157 
The influence of the Victorian Charter and Article 12 of the CRPD appears to have 
had a minimal effect upon the compliance level with the evaluation criteria. There is 
only one reported case in this jurisdiction dealing with accommodation that discusses 
and relies upon rights contained in the CRPD as a determinative factor in the 
decision.158 Civil and political rights protected by the Victorian Charter have also 
been of limited application in the available cases. Only one VCAT guardianship 
decision thoroughly considered and applied Bell J’s 4-step approach in the Kracke 
decision.159 Three other VCAT decisions made references to the Victorian Charter 
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 Sarah Burningham, 'Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co Decision-Making Law' 
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without applying the 4-step approach in Kracke.160 The remainder of the available 
relevant cases did not make any reference to human rights contained within the 
Victorian Charter or to the CRPD rights such as the right to exercise legal capacity in 
Article 12. The cases simply applied the guardianship legislation. 
There are two possible explanations for this expression, first, when VCAT exercises 
its functions, it is seen to be quasi-judicial. It is providing a legally enforceable 
decision. Courts are not bound to apply the Victorian Charter as they have been 
specifically excluded from the definition of ‘public authority’ in the Charter. 161 
However, the quasi-judicial argument of not being bound to apply the Victoria 
Charter was rejected by Bell J in the PJB Supreme Court appeal as Bell J 
considered VCAT to be an administrative body providing an administrative decision, 
thus bound to apply the Victorian Charter.162  
Second, VCAT’s guardianship jurisdiction, unlike the Supreme Court, is entirely 
statute-based. 163  The function of VCAT is seen as complete when there is 
compliance with the relevant legislation.164 There is no inherent jurisdiction of VCAT 
analogous to the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or 
superior courts with inherent jurisdiction.  
4.8.3 The hierarchy of the evaluation criteria and important features 
Following the individual’s will and preferences is at the apex of the evaluation 
criteria. Adopting the least restrictive alternative by not making an order enables the 
individual’s will and preferences to be unrestricted so they can be supported in the 
future to make their own accommodation decisions. 
It has been argued by Burningham 165  and Salzman166  that the tension between 
autonomy and protection (reflected in Australian guardianship legislation as the 
tension between will and preferences and best interests) is always irreconcilable. I 
disagree, it has already been demonstrated in the LMB, VTH and AC decisions of 
VCAT that will and preferences and best interests of the person may sometimes be 
congruent or consistent with each other.167 When this situation arises the evaluation 
criteria appear to be satisfied. In the VTH, LMB and AC cases, the individual’s 
interests were sufficiently protected by a positive informal support network and VCAT 
was able to take this into account and reach decisions in compliance with the 
evaluation criteria. 
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 RB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 532 (12 May 2010); WD (Guardianship) [2011] VCAT 2442 (20 
September 2011); PJB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 643 (17 May 2010). 
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 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) s 4. 
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 PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria [2011] VSC 327, [105]. 
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 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC). 
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 Burningham, above n 153. 
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 Salzman, above n 153. 
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 LMB (Guardianship) [2012] VCAT 1443 (24 August 2012); VTH (Guardianship) [2012] VCAT 1649 
(8 October 2012); AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 753 (8 May 2009). 
156 
 
It has been noted that where the will and preferences of the individual are followed 
and the decision is the least restrictive to enable the individual to be supported to 
make their own decisions, then the evaluation criteria will be met. The PJB cases 
serve as good examples. In VCAT, Billings DP did not follow PJB’s will and 
preferences and applied least restriction to maintain PJB’s medical best interests. 
Bell J in the Supreme Court obeyed PJB’s will and preferences to retain his council 
home and applied the least restrictive alternative to maintain decision-making 
autonomy and not to apply PJB’s medical best interests. It was observed that 
medical best interests are one aspect of the protective nature of the objective best 
interests of the person. In the AC decision,168 the individual’s medical best interests 
were served by making no order for guardianship. This allowed the individual to 
make their own decisions in accordance with the criteria. This was contrasted with 
the VCAT PJB decision where the medical best interests appeared to be contrary to 
the individuals will and preferences leading to a decision against the criteria.169 
Where the medical best interests are consistent with the individual’s will and 
preferences then the criteria can be met. This will be demonstrated more frequently 
in Chapter 5 dealing with NSW where the best interests’ principle has a paramount 
status above the wishes of the individual. 
The last two features appear to be either enhancing or limiting factors that materially 
affect whether or not the evaluation criteria will be met. The presence of an informal 
support network enhances the likelihood that the evaluation criteria will be observed 
is illustrated in the LMB, VTH and AC cases.170 This may be due to the wishes of the 
person being able to be maintained with little risk of harm to the individual or others 
through the positive influences of the support network.171 It may also serve as a 
protective function to convince VCAT that the health and circumstances are being 
adequately met so there is no need to make a restrictive appointment in the ‘best 
interests’ of the person.172 Conversely, the absence of an informal support network 
or poorly functioning support network may militate against compliance with the 
evaluation criteria.173 The development and training of a positive support network will 
be further discussed in chapter 8. Such a network would constitute a support model 
as contemplated by Article 12(3) of the CRPD. It may also increase the overall 
compliance level with the evaluation criteria. 
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The presence of a conflict of interest or undue influence may operate as a detracting 
feature to compliance with the evaluation criteria. There is insufficient case data from 
the Victorian jurisdiction to draw conclusive findings. However, where conflict of 
interest or undue influence exists, it appears that VCAT may be more likely to make 
an appointment contrary to supported decision-making and the evaluative criteria.174   
The imposition of a guardian is currently virtually the only protective measure 
available to VCAT to control abuse and conflict of interest. Potential changes to 
guardianship legislation and in the interpretation of existing guardianship legislation 
will be discussed and developed in Chapter 8, dealing with future directions in this 
area. This will include a discussion of supportive guardians and its potential impact 
from the lapsed Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC). 175
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Chapter 5 
Application of the Benchmark Criteria and Important Features 
to Guardianship Cases involving Accommodation in New 
South Wales 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess compliance with the evaluation criteria and 
apply the important features developed in Chapter 2 to decided guardianship cases 
in the NSW jurisdiction involving accommodation from the application date of the 
CRPD in Australia.1    
The chapter is divided into 3 subsections. The first of these discuss factors in NSW 
that may affect the compliance rate with the evaluation criteria. The next subsection 
considers the evaluation criteria and important features through a case analysis. 
Finally, the discussion and conclusion evaluates trends that arise from the case 
analysis. 
This chapter will further consider the trends in the application of the evaluation 
criteria and important features in NSW. The main finding from the application of the 
evaluation criteria to NSW cases was a compliance level approximating one-third of 
the available cases. This was similar to Victoria, even though NSW lacks a Charter 
of Rights and places the welfare and interests of the individual paramount in its 
general principles of its guardianship legislation.2 Compliance was coincidental as 
there were no references to supported decision-making or Article 12 of the CRPD in 
any of the decided cases. However compliance with the general principles in the 
legislation enabled coincidental compliance with the evaluation criteria. 
5.2 Issues Specific to NSW  
There are three considerations that may affect the level of compliance with the 
evaluation criteria in NSW. These factors are first, placing the best interests of the 
person in the guardianship principles at a higher level than the wishes of the person.  
Second, the absence of a charter of human rights; third, like Victoria, the NSW 
guardianship legislation preceded the CRPD by over 20 years and was concerned 
primarily with protection rather than the preservation of autonomy. These 
considerations will be discussed in this subsection.   
                                            
1
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 45. Convention comes into force on the thirtieth day 
following ratification or 16 August 2008 as Australia ratified CRPD on 17 July 2008. 
2
 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4. 
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5.2.1 The status of the principle promoting protection, welfare and best 
interests of the person in the NSW general principles 
Although guardianship legislation in Victoria and NSW has similar general principles 
underpinning their enactments, they vary in the relative importance given to each 
principle. In NSW the welfare and interests of persons under guardianship should be 
given paramount consideration.3 This paramount consideration places best interests 
or welfare of the person at a higher level statutorily than the other principles of ‘least 
restrictive alternative’ and wishes of the person which also appear in the general 
principles of the enactment.4 It appears that the tension between the protection of 
the welfare of the individual and the preservation of the individual’s decision-making 
autonomy has been resolved in NSW in favour of protection. This primacy appears 
to be in contravention of the evaluation criteria.5  
 A different weighting is placed upon these general principles in Victoria, where each 
of these three principles is given an equal weighting.6 In NSW, in an otherwise 
evenly balanced contest, the will and preferences of the individual may be over-
ridden in favour of an appointment in the individual’s welfare and interests.7 This may 
occur in Victoria as well; however, express paramount status of the individual’s 
welfare and interests arises in NSW and not Victoria.   
Guardianship legislation in Australia has been said to maintain only partial or limited 
autonomy.8 To the extent that NSW guardianship legislation requires protection of 
the welfare of the individual as a paramount consideration above the individual’s 
wishes this may be a factor reducing the compliance rate with the evaluation criteria 
in NSW as compared to Victoria. 
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 Ibid s 4(a). 
4
 Ibid ss 4(b), (d). ‘The freedom of decision and freedom of action of such persons should be 
restricted as little as possible’ and ‘the views of such persons in relation to the exercise of those 
functions should be taken into consideration’. 
5
 Attorney-General of NSW, 'Are the Rights of people whose capacity is in question being adequately 
promoted and protected?' (2006) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/diversityservices>; see also Barbara 
Carter, 'Seeking the Essence of Guardianship: Beyond the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities' (2012) <http://www.agac.org.au/>; see also John Chesterman, ‘The 
Future of Adult Guardianship in Australia’ (2013) 66(1) Australian Social Work 26. 
6
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) s 4. Objects of the Act 4(2)(a) the means which is 
the least restrictive of a person’s freedom of decision and action as is possible in the circumstances is 
adopted, and (b) the best interests of a person with a disability are promoted, and (c) the wishes of a 
person with a disability are wherever possible given effect to. 
7
 ABJ v Public Guardian [2011] NSWADT 172 (18 July 2011); WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 
2012); RFM [2012] NSWGT 20 (8 August 2012); FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011); SAB v 
SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013); LHH [2013] NSWGT 14 (1 February 2013). 
8
 Shih-Ning Then, 'Evolution and Innovation in Guardianship Laws' (2013) 35(1) Sydney Law Review 
34. 
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5.2.2 The absence of a charter protecting the human rights of a person 
with disabilities 
There is no Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities in NSW such as in 
Victoria.9 This factor may militate against compliance with the evaluation criteria to 
the same extent as in Victoria because addressing charter rights would possibly lead 
a tribunal or court to consider rights under international treaties.10 
5.2.3 The formulation of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) 
As with Victoria, guardianship legislation developed out of the findings of the ‘Cocks 
Report’. 11  It was not developed out of human rights principles found in United 
Nations instruments and Canadian guardianship legislation as was the Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (QLD). 12  This may account for fewer principles to 
ground the incorporation of Article 12 of the CRPD into NSW and Victorian 
guardianship legislation than in Queensland. The driver for both the Victorian and 
NSW guardianship enactments was to provide both protection and the preservation 
of autonomy for persons with cognitive disabilities to reside in the community 
following deinstitutionalisation.13 Protection was effected by the appointment of a 
guardian, while autonomy was preserved by a limited order or finding alternatives to 
guardianship.14  The Cocks Report predates the CRPD by nearly a quarter of a 
century. Although there have been recommendations to incorporate supported 
decision making as contained within the CRPD in both Victoria15 and from a NSW 
Parliamentary inquiry,16 such recommendations have not been enacted. This may 
mean that compliance with the evaluation criteria as developed from Article 12 may 
be coincidental as the NSW general principles were based upon the dual concepts of 
protective guardianship and preservation of autonomy wherever possible as a least 
restrictive alternative.17   
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 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC). 
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 PJB v Melbourne Health and the State Trustees of Victoria [2011] VSC 327. 
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 Minister's Committee on Rights and Protective Legislation for Intellectually Handicapped Persons, 
'Report of the Minister's Committee on Rights & Protective Legislation  for Intellectually Handicapped 
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 Queensland Law Reform Commission, 'Assisted and Substituted Decisions Decision-making by 
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 Colleen Pearce, 'Strengths and Tensions in the Current Guardianship System' (Office of the Public 
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15
 Victorian Law Reform Commission, 'Guardianship Final Report Number 24' (VLRC, 2012) 
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 NSW Parliament Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, 'Substitute decision-
making for people lacking capacity' (Report No. 43, 25 February 2010). 
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 Minister's Committee on Rights and Protective Legislation for Intellectually Handicapped Persons, 
above n 11; see also United Nations, 'Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons' (UN 
General Assembly, 1971) <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f04e5c.gtml> s 5 which gives a 
right to a guardian. 
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The anticipated effect of the NSW considerations upon the positive adherence to the 
supported decision-making evaluation criteria is for a lower rate of compliance than 
with that of Victoria. This is because of the paramount importance placed on the 
welfare and interests of the person.18 The Victorian guardianship legislation places 
welfare or best interests of the person on an equal basis to the wishes of the person 
as two of the three general principles of the enactment.19 This difference in the 
status of the general principles (protection over autonomy) plus the absence of a 
Charter of Human Rights was hypothesised to lead to lower compliance with the 
evaluation criteria than Victoria.  
5.3 NSW case analysis applying the evaluation criterion of 
following the individual’s will and preferences 
Success is measured with this criterion by the tribunal following the wishes of the 
individual. This could be manifested by allowing the accommodation decision in 
accordance with the wishes of the individual or by not making an appointment so the 
individual may be supported in future to make their own accommodation decisions. 
The presence of an enduring document may be evidence of the will and preferences 
of an individual’s choice for assistance with a future accommodation decision.20 This 
criterion is at the apex of the evaluation criteria as the essence of supported 
decision-making is that every person has a will that is capable of being ascertained 
and forming the basis for decision-making.21  
The individual’s welfare and interests are the paramount consideration when 
determining a guardianship matter in NSW.22 This protective principle may clash with 
the autonomy principle of following the will and preferences of the individual. Where 
there is a clash then protection must be given precedence over autonomy. It is 
however possible for will and preferences to coincide with welfare and interests. 
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 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4(a). 
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 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) ss 4(2)(b)-(c). 
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 GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008); KAT [2009] 
NSWGT 12 (10 July 2009); WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); KCE [2010] NSWGT 1 (6 
January 2010); SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013). 
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 Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, 'A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal 
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Scope, 'Supporting people who communicate informally and use behaviours of concern to live lives 
they prefer through partnerships' (2009) <http://www.leishman.associates.com.au/44assid2009>; see 
also Canadian Association for Community Living Task Force, 'Alternatives to Guardianship' (CACL, 
August 1992) <http://www.worldenable.net/rights/adhoc3meet_guardianship.htm>; see also Gerard 
Quinn and Suzanne Doyle, 'Taking the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Seriously: The Past and Future of the EU Structural Funds  as a Tool to Achieve Community Living' 
(2012) 9 The Equal Rights Review 69; see also National University of Ireland Galway, 'Essential 
Principles: Irish Legal Capacity Law' (NUGalway, 2012) 
<http://www.nuigalway.ie/cdlp/documents/principles_web.pdf>; see also Eilionoir Flynn and Anna 
Arstein-Kerslake, 'Legislating Personhood: Realising the Right to Support in Exercising Legal 
Capacity' (AGAC, 2012) <http://www.agac.org.au/>. 
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 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4(a). 
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When this occurs, the evaluation criterion of obeying the individual’s will and 
preferences can be met despite paramountcy given to the protective principle. 
There are a number of militating factors that have been distilled from the NSW 
guardianship cases dealing with accommodation. These factors may adversely affect 
the individual’s welfare and interests. They may in turn affect compliance with the 
evaluation criterion of will and preferences particularly where compliance with the 
factor is inconsistent with the will and preferences of the individual. These factors are 
not the important facilitating or detracting features derived from Article 12 of the 
CRPD in Chapter 2. They are factors derived from an analysis of the NSW cases. 
The factors are various aspects of the welfare and medical best interests of the 
individual together with disputes within the individual’s support network or the 
support network and service providers. These factors are: maintaining the medical 
best interests of the individual; disagreements and maintaining family contact of the 
individual; financial considerations affecting welfare and best interests; the 
supporter’s knowledge and understanding of the individual’s medical best interests. 
These factors were present in the limited Victorian cases to the extent discussed in 
the previous chapter. The presence of enduring documentation may indicate the will 
and preference of the individual but is not a factor adversely affecting the individual’s 
welfare and interests. 
5.3.1 Medical Best Interests 
Maintaining the individual’s health, welfare and safety comprises the medical best 
interests for this thesis. It has been shown to be an important factor in following the 
paramount consideration of protecting the welfare and interests of the individual. 
When the individual’s health can be protected and is consistent with the wishes of 
the individual then this evaluation criterion has a likelihood of compliance. This would 
be where the will and preferences coincide with the welfare and interests of the 
person as evidenced through the advancement of the individual’s medical care. A 
few case examples will be provided in the body of this chapter with further 
illustrations in the footnotes to illustrate the points raised. 
The case of OM v Public Guardian [2010] NSWADT 137 is an example where the 
will and preferences of the individual were upheld as welfare considerations through 
maintaining the individual’s health which was consistent with her wishes. QI was an 
80 year old woman with moderately advanced Alzheimer’s disease. At the time of 
the hearing she had been in a Sydney nursing home for 3 years. QI had a support 
network in Queensland and north of Sydney. QI’s doctors said it was inadvisable to 
move her. A decision by the NSW Public Guardian to move QI to Queensland was 
appealed by OM (QI’s cousin) to enable her to remain in the Sydney residential care 
facility. QI was settled at the current facility, any move would add to her confusion. 
QI wished to remain in the present care facilityas she was ‘a Sydney girl’. Here QI’s 
health and welfare were congruent with her expressed wishes to allow compliance 
with this assessment criterion.   
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Further examples where the will and preferences of the individual and medical best 
interests coincide include:23 a father residing with his daughter in a rural setting;24 an 
individual continuing to reside in chosen residential care;25 an individual residing with 
his indigenous partner;26 and an individual residing with one child while ignoring 
contact with other children.27 These cases resulted in this evaluation criterion being 
met by the legislative paramount consideration in NSW of the welfare and interests 
of the person. The individual’s choice of accommodation corresponded with the 
tribunal’s opinion of their welfare and medical best interests. 
Where the will and preferences of the individual do not correspond with the 
individual’s medical best interests, then this evaluation criterion will not be met. A 
clear example is FGE.28 FGE was an 86 year old woman with vascular dementia and 
for the past 12 months she resided in a nursing home in western Sydney. Prior to 
this she resided with her son BAE in public housing. FGE had two pins in her hips 
and one in her spine; she used a wheelchair for mobility and required two attendants 
for mobility. It was FGE’s will and preference to return to her public housing now 
occupied only by BAE to be cared for by BAE. Against the instructions of the nursing 
home and doctors BAE took his mother out of the nursing home by bus to withdraw 
money from FGE’s bank account. BAE also took FGE by train and bus to the 
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 PZ v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2010] NSWADTAP 14 (15 March 2010). The individual CO 
wished to reside with his daughter NQ in rural NSW. CO was settled, enjoyed the rural environment, 
and engaged in respite activities with good health. CO opposed his son PZ’s application to reside with 
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[2011] NSWSC 1264 (11 October 2011). B, a 94 year old woman wished to be assisted by her son 
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v Public Guardian and anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71  (11 November 2008). The individual’s wishes to 
reside with her daughter and have no contact with her two sons GN and GO was upheld; see also HH 
v HI and Protective Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009). No appointment for 
accommodation guardian continued for a woman who was a Jehovah’s W itness as accommodation 
was settled and any health decisions could be assisted by her friend HH; see also WTA [2012] 
NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012). Mother resided with daughter to whom she granted an enduring 
guardian. This was upheld even though daughter denied access to other siblings of mother as her 
health was met by the daughter. 
24
 PZ v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2010] NSWADTAP 14 (15 March 2010). 
25
 FX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 184 (5 September 2012); HH v HI and 
Protective Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009). 
26
 JKA [2012] NSWGT 21 (9 August 2012). 
27
 GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008). 
28
 FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011); see also Re F [2013] NSWCA 239 (26 July 2013) 
where BAE was unsuccessful in his application for leave to appeal the GT decision and was 
dismissed by White J. BAE further appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal before Leeming JA and 
Young AJA which was also dismissed for lack of actual or perceived bias. 
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guardianship tribunal hearing. BAE was not appointed guardian and FGE was not 
allowed to relocate to her home of 20 years as this was contrary to her health needs.  
There are further examples of where the health requirements of the individual do not 
correspond with the will and preferences of the individual. These include where the 
health and safety of the individual may appear compromised to a guardianship 
tribunal or court,29 and where there may be health risks present for the individual 
associated with their accommodation.30 In these cases the evaluation criterion is not 
met and is overridden by the paramount interest of the welfare of the person.31  
                                            
29
 OHB [2009] NSWGT 14 (16 April 2009); WBN [2009] NSWGT 9 (2 November 2009); BGI [2010] 
NSWGT 2 (13 January 2010); QAI [2010] NSWGT 7 (25 January 2010); TAM [2010] NSWGT 21 (5 
March 2010); ODEU [2010] NSWGT 16 (19 March 2010); NAC [2010] NSWGT 22 (23 June 2010); 
OTR [2012] NSWGT 26 (1 May 2012); YLS [2012] NSWGT 13 (9 May 2012); ICQ [2012] NSWGT 15 
(5 June 2012); CDW [2012] NSWGT 16 (13 June 2012); ReH [2013] NSWSC 1384 (13 September 
2013); SDF [2013] NSWGT 1 (17 January 2013); ABY [2013] NSWGT 31 (25 March 2013); DLH 
[2013] NSWGT 4 (17 April 2013); WSU [2013] NSWGT 37 (4 December 2013); NBX [2013] NSWGT 
19 (14 May 2013); EAJ [2013] NSWGT 29 (14 October 2013). 
30
 ReF [2013] NSWSC 54 (31 January 2013); FBN [2010] NSWGT 18 (22 April 2010); KAN [2013] 
NSWGT 8 (9 May 2013); DTN [2012] NSWGT 24 (3 December 2012); KAN [2013] NSWGT 8 (9 May 
2013); CAA [2013] NSWGT 32 (26 July 2013); BTA [2013] NSWGT 23 (12 August 2013); YYN [2013] 
NSWGT 36 (29 October 2013). 
31
 ABJ v Public Guardian [2011] NSWADT 172 (18 July 2011). MMD was a frail, elderly man of Arabic 
ethnicity who was depressed and had dementia. His son, ABJ, who was a medical doctor appealed 
unsuccessfully to have his father return to his home. The public guardian placed MMD with MMD’s 
daughter ACU as ACU provided thickened fluids, more nutrition and support services for MMD. It was 
MMD written choice to reside with ABJ but this was rejected  as MMD’s welfare (health) was best met 
by the daughter’s care; see also AYZ [2013] NSWGT 33 (2 August 2013). AYZ was a 56 year old man 
of Chinese ethnicity. AYZ had chronic paranoid schizophrenia with persecution delusions. In addition, 
he sustained acquired brain injury while alone in New Zealand. AYZ’s support network consisted of 
his son UBZ with whom he resided and other family members. AYZ, while insightless to his illness, 
wished to make all of his own decisions and return to New Zealand where he would be isolated from 
his support network. UBZ was appointed guardian and given coercive powers and control of AYZ’s 
passport. UBZ was aware of AYZ’s health needs and his appointment was culturally appropriate; see 
also IZ v JC, JB, JA [2009] NSWADTAP4 (23 January 2009). IZ was an 89 year old woman with 
physical disabilities. She was residing with her daughter JA in JA’s home until sons JB and JC 
became accommodation guardians and placed IZ in residential care due to squalid conditions at JA’s 
home and refusal of services. It was IZ’s will to leave the nursing home and reside with JA. This was 
overridden on the basis of health considerations; see also LHH [2013] NSWGT 14 (1 February 2013) 
where LHH an 83 year old woman admitted to hospital from her own home with Alzheimer’s disease. 
LHH wished to return home but was isolated from her family support network of nephew SSD. LHH’s 
present support network of real estate agent MMB disagreed with medical opinion of LHH’s ability to 
return home; see also QDI [2013] NSWGT 26 (26 August 2013) where QDI was a 23 year old Maori 
female with an intellectual disability and schizo-affective disability. Her present support network 
consisted of her aunt UAH. QDI did not wish to be assisted by UAH as there was a significant 
breakdown in their relationship. QDI claimed she had been beaten and physically restrained by UAH. 
UAH mistrusted the health professionals and restrained QDI to protect her from potential sexual and 
physical danger. The Public Guardian was appointed for accommodation upon the basis of welfare 
needs and the dysfunction of QDI present support network; see also  SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] 
NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013). Mother BM had three daughters. SAB resided with her mother, was 
the power of attorney and received a transfer of the mother’s house. SAB objected to her other two 
siblings being appointed guardians. It was the mother’s wishes that SAB provide assistance with her 
decisions. SAB had made a number of inappropriate health decisions for her mother. For health 
considerations White J in the NSW Supreme Court upheld the appointment in contravention of the 
wishes of the individual. 
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The Supreme Court of NSW has recently-2015-required the release of a person 
voluntarily placed in a mental health facility by the NSW Public Guardian.32 The 
person had the NSW Public Guardian appointed for accommodation because of 
alcoholism, suicide attempts and a borderline personality disorder. The NSW mental 
health legislation allows both voluntary and involuntary placements in a mental 
health facility. The individual’s placement was reviewed by the NSW Mental Health 
Review Tribunal, finding the individual did not have a mental illness and revoked the 
placement. The Public Guardian and the mental health facility continued to house 
the individual against her will and preferences. The decision of the Supreme Court 
was to affirm the decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, revoking the 
placement, enabling the individual to leave according to her wishes. The case 
demonstrates that an accommodation decision of the Public Guardian can be 
overridden by the MHRT in accordance with the will and preferences of the 
individual. 
Summary 
The maintenance of the individual’s medical best interests is an important factor in 
determining compliance with the NSW general principle of meeting the welfare and 
interests of the person. It is not a separate evaluation criterion. It is a sub-factor that 
demonstrates whether the welfare and interests of the person are met. The OM, 
WTA, PZ, FX and JKA cases have shown that an individual’s will and preferences 
can coincide with medical professional opinion regarding maintenance of the 
individual’s health. It may be because the individual’s choice coincided with the most 
appropriate accommodation because of the individual’s specific condition of 
dementia (OM, FX). It may be that the health and care provided by the individual’s 
support network adequately meet the welfare and interests of the individual (WTA, 
PZ). It may be that the indigenous partner of an indigenous person is in the best 
position to assist with appropriate accommodation (JKA). In these cases there is a 
strong likelihood that this prime evaluative criterion is met. Where there is 
inconsistency between the individual’s will and preferences and medical opinion as 
to the individual’s health requirements then a NSW guardianship tribunal  is likely to 
reach a decision inconsistent with supported decision-making under Article 12. The 
FGE, ABJ, AYZ, IZ and SAB cases were examples of an inconsistency between 
medical opinion and the individual’s will and preferences. The individual’s lack of 
knowledge of their own health needs in FGE, ABJ, AYZ and IZ cases have been 
important in a tribunal determining that the individual’s choice of residence was not in 
accord with their medical best interests. 
5.3.2 Resolution of Disagreements  
The individual’s support network is of prime importance in protecting the person’s 
welfare and interests. It may be the mechanism for communicating and observing 
the will and preferences of the individual. If there are problems within the individual’s 
                                            
32
 Sarah White v The Local Health Authority & Anor [2015] NSWSC 417 (13 April 2015). 
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support network then a guardianship tribunal may decide that the individual’s welfare 
and interests are compromised and appoint the Public Guardian for accommodation. 
 Disagreements may arise between members of the individual’s family which 
generally constitute their informal support network. There may be communication 
issues between family members.  There may also be disputes concerning the place 
of residence or the level of cognitive functioning of the individual by members of the 
support network. Where there is an impasse in a network disagreement, the frequent 
outcome is an appointment of the Public Guardian. This is frequently against the will 
and preferences of the individual. 33  Network disagreements may arise more 
frequently in the following chapter dealing with Queensland guardianship cases. It 
will be considered again in Chapter 8 when discussing recommendations to improve 
criteria compliance through the resolution of disagreements. 
 
                                            
33
 Lo v Public Guardian [2009] NSWADT 138 (12 June 2009). There was a disagreement between Lo 
(son of the individual) and his sister, who comprise the support network. The will of the individual 
mother is to reside at home or be assisted by the family. The public guardian was appointed against 
the will of the individual; IAT [2010] NSWGT 27 (25 August 2010). Mrs IAT resided in a nursing home 
and wished to reside at home. There was a dispute as to the appropriate place of residence by the 
individual’s son and daughter, who comprised the support network. The Public Guardian was 
appointed for accommodation and selected a nursing home; ACV v Public Guardian and ACX [2011] 
NSWADT 167 (12 July 2011). The individual was elderly and resided in residential care. The 
individual’s will was to reside closer to her daughter in a rural NSW town. There was a dispute 
between the individual’s children and the Public Guardian chose residential care in Sydney against 
the individual’s and preferences; PXC [2011] NSWGT 1 (13 January 2011). Mr PXC is a 30 year old 
man with acquired brain injury. He resided with his father but his will and preference is to reside with 
his mother who lives overseas. The Public Guardian was appointed and sought private NSW rural 
accommodation with PXC’s funds against his will; XNP [2011] NSWGT 24 (10 February 2011); TAT 
[2011] NSWGT 8 (7 April 2011). Mrs TAT was elderly with dementia. She wished to continue to reside 
with her daughter NAT, who removed TAT 3 times from the residential care facility to reside with her 
at home. TAT’s other children agreed with the Public Guardian’s nursing home placement. The Public 
Guardian was re-appointed and given coercive powers against TAT’s will; Re C [2012] NSWSC 1097 
(14 September 2012); ReC (no2) [2012] NSWSC 1351 (2 November 2012). There was a dispute 
between siblings regarding the father’s (individual) residence. The son wishes father to reside with 
him in Sydney, the daughter seeks funds to purchase a rural property. The Public Guardian was 
appointed against the individual’s wishes and the NSW Supreme Court would not over-rule the 
NSWGT; AHB v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWADT 76 (27 April 2012). The individual was 
an elderly woman with a cognitive disability and health problems. Her will was to remain at home. 
There was a dispute between the individual’s children regarding residential care. The Public Guardian 
was appointed and the NSW Trustee and Guardian appointed to sell the individual’s house to pay for 
a nursing home bond; ALE v Public Guardian [2012] NSWADT 250 (29 November 2012). The 
individual resided in a nursing home in NSW according to her wishes. Two of the individual’s children 
agree with this residence. The third daughter seeks to remove the individual to South Australia 
against her wishes leading to the appointment of the Public Guardian; DTN [2012] NSWGT 24 (3 
December 2012). DTN was an elderly woman who resided at home with one of her two sons. This 
was according to her will and preferences. Due to disputes between the two sons the Public Guardian 
was appointed against DTN’s wishes; Re F [2013] NSWCA 239 (26 July 2013). This was the appeal 
of the FGE case where FGE wished to reside at home in her council house with son BAE. BAE was in 
disagreement with his sister MGS and the Public Guardian was appointed against FGE’s will; HLT 
[2014] NSWCATGD 5 (7 February 2014); Su v Public Guardian [2014] NSWCATAP 32 (10 July 
2014). The individual had an intellectual disability and cerebral palsy. He had been cared for a 
number of years by his brother according to his wishes. A family dispute led to the appointment of the 
Public guardian for accommodation; SNC (No1) [2014] NSWCATGD 17 (27 February 2014). 
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Family contact 
Obstruction of family contact by other members of the individual’s support network is 
another aspect of support network disagreements. It is a welfare consideration that 
may override the will and preferences of the individual. These are disagreements 
within the individual’s support network. The isolation of an individual may be seen as 
against the paramount consideration of the individual’s welfare and interests. This 
point is illustrated by ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian.34 AFK was an elderly 
woman with Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia. AFK resided in Coffs 
Harbour in her own townhouse and was cared for by her daughter ABE who resided 
with her. AFK had two other daughters who both resided in or near Coffs Harbour. 
AFK wished to sell her townhouse and purchase a relocatable home in Tweed 
Heads and reside there with ABE. This sale was refused. One of the reasons for the 
refusal was that it would isolate her from family contact with her other two daughters.  
There are other examples to support this proposition.35 In the FGE case,36 FGE’s 
daughter MGS was not appointed accommodation guardian as she would relocate 
FGE to a nursing home in Cairns close to her employment. This would result in FGE 
losing contact with her two sons. It was FGE’s express wish to return to her former 
public housing with son BAE. Where there is already a situation of strained family 
relationships then this may not preclude the individual’s will and preferences being 
observed to the detriment of contact with some members of the individual’s family.37 
However, where there is no communication between parents of an individual who 
have separated an appointment has been made of the Public Guardian for 
accommodation contrary to the will of an adult son with an intellectual disability who 
                                            
34
 ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 208. 
35
 RHH [2012] NSWGT 25 (3 December 2012). Mr RHH was 84 years old with dementia. In 2011 
RHH’s daughter PPP and son in law moved in with RHH and obtained an enduring guardianship that 
was overridden by the GT. Mrs PPP did not allow contact with RHH’s other two sons for 18 months. 
RHH wished to be supported in all decisions by his daughter, this was not allowed by the GT; see 
also KCN [2013] NSWGT 28 (26 September 2013). KCN was an 88 year old woman residing in a 
dementia specific care facility. KCN’s support network consisted of family members. The sons and 
grandchildren did not communicate with daughter EMM. The Public Guardian was appointed to 
resolve accommodation issues because of lack of agreement and a failure to communicate between 
members of the support network; see also SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013) 
where the individual had three daughters and had physical and cognitive disabilities, the tribunal 
appointed the two non-custodial siblings as they had medical experience and would not have been 
contacted by the daughter who resided with the individual regarding the mother’s care; DGD [2014] 
NSWCATGD 48 (13 November 2014). Individual’s daughter refused contact with the person’s second 
husband. 
36
 FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011); FGE(2) [2012] NSWGT 3 (16 March 2012). 
37
 GN and anor v Public Guardian and anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71  (11 November 2008). An 
accommodation and access guardian order was not made even though the individual GP refused to 
have contact with her sons GN and GO following the sale of the family home; see also AHX v NSW 
Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012) where a return to home 
accommodation from a nursing home staying with one son AIV as carer would continue to alienate 
the other son AHX from his mother; see also WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012) where an 
accommodation guardian was not ordered and the individual continued to reside with her daughter of 
choice even though family contact was strained with the other siblings. 
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wished to reside with and be supported by his mother. 38  The impasse in 
communication between ex-partners influenced the tribunal to appoint the Public 
Guardian. 
Therefore, the results are mixed, with some instances resulting in observing the will 
and preferences of the individual and other examples not following the will and 
preferences of the individual.39 It may be the case that if the welfare of the individual 
is maintained through a satisfactory health regime then strained family contact 
issues may not preclude observance of the will and preferences of the individual.40 
In summary, network disagreements are a factor going to the welfare and interests of 
the person. Disagreements within an individual’s support network can affect the 
individual’s welfare and interests, leading to an appointment of the Public Guardian 
for accommodation. This could also be classified as a dysfunctional support network 
leading to the statutory appointment. 
Isolation from family members where it is in conflict with the individual’s will and 
preferences may lead to an appointment by a tribunal in contravention of the 
individual’s will and preferences. 41  However, if a person chooses isolation from 
various family members but welfare and interests through health are maintained, 
then a tribunal may decide in favour of this evaluation criterion.42  
5.3.3 Financial Considerations that affect Welfare and Interests 
Financial accommodation considerations may play a part in overriding an individual’s 
will and preferences as it may relate to future accommodation choices. This occurred 
in the ABE decision.43 The NSW Trustee and Guardian refused the sale of AFK’s 
townhouse. One of the reasons given was the lesser title of the relocatable home 
which was 22 years old, had been on the market for 22 months, and the purchaser 
                                            
38
 QNE [2014] NSWCATGD 10 (3 April 2014). QNE was an 18 year old man at the time of the 
hearing. He had an intellectual disability and resided mainly with his mother TAS. There was no 
communication between TAS and her former spouse NCE. The Public Guardian was appointed 
against the will of QNE. The tribunal indicated the least restrictive approach would have been no 
appointment with the parties acting informally. 
39
 ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 208; FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 
2011); FGE(2) [2012] NSWGT 3 (16 March 2012); see also RHH [2012] NSWGT 25 (3 December 
2012) where the individual’s will and preferences were not met with family contact issues but compare 
AHX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012); WTA [2012] 
NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); see also GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] NSWADTAP 
71 (11 November 2008) where despite family contact issues the will and preferences of the individual 
were observed and maintained. 
40
 AHX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012); Re B (No.2) 
[2011] NSWSC 1264 (11 October 2011); WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); PZ v NSW 
Trustee and Guardian [2010] NSWADTAP 14 (15 March 2010); GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor 
[2008] NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008). 
41
 FGE(2) [2012] NSWGT 3 (16 March 2012); ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 
208; IZ v JC, JB, JA [2009] NSWADTAP4 (23 January 2009). 
42
 GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008); WTA [2012] 
NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012). 
43
 ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 208. 
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would not acquire title to the land. The respondent argued that if AFK needed to sell 
her home and pay a bond to enter residential care there may be insufficient funds to 
meet the bond if the relocatable home was purchased. Other cases also consider 
finances as a welfare issue.44 
When the financial considerations have been seen to play an important part in 
maintaining the welfare and interests of the individual it has generally resulted in a 
decision or appointment contrary to the evaluation criterion of following the will and 
preferences of the individual, for example the LHH decision where there was 
financial abuse by a supporter45 and with finances that are connected to the welfare 
and interests of the individual in certain instances. In such a case financial issues 
become a factor of welfare and interests. The LHH case in relation to conflict of 
interest and undue influence is discussed later in this chapter.  
Where an individual’s partner has sold the individual’s home to repay gambling 
debts, leaving the individual homeless, an appointment against the individual’s will 
occurred in the EAD decision.46 
Summary 
Financial considerations may play a role in determining the welfare and best 
interests of a person.47  Where finances are limited and the individual’s will and 
preferences are inconsistent with prudent financial management then a tribunal 
                                            
44
 AHX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012). AIW (mother and 
individual) had property worth $3.9 Million and she could afford son AIV to reside rent free caring for 
her in her home and pay him a fee for so doing while the other son AHX wanted the house rented and 
AIW in a nursing home; see also LHH [2013] NSWGT 14 (1 February 2013) where LHH who owned a 
home in Sydney was persuaded by her support network of real estate agent MMB to raise 
$343,000.00 by obtaining two reverse mortgages on her home. LHH was unaware how these funds 
were spent but much went to pay off debts accrued by MMB and for a new car valued at $70,000.00 
which MMB used for his own purposes; see also NP v NQ and ors [2009] NSWADTAP 65 (18 
September 2009). It was not seen as a proper use of the individuals funds to return to the individual’s 
native country of Greece; see also PV v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 89 (4 May 
2011) where the individual’s home was required to be sold to meet nursing home expenses. It had not 
been sold or leased and there was a $15,000.00 a year shortfall between nursing home expenses 
and the individual’s part age pension; see also ZGH [2013] NSWGT 3 (15 January 2013) where the 
financial considerations of an increase in family payments and a reduction of the quantum of a 
property settlement of a marriage dissolution affected both parents ability to become guardians of 
their adult son ZGH who had an intellectual disability (Downs syndrome and autism); GN & anor v 
Public Guardian & anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008) where Mother GP refused 
contact with sons GN and GO following the sale of her house that she attributed to her sons. 
45
 ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 208; NP v NQ and ors [2009] NSWADTAP 65 
(18 September 2009) where finances were a significant issue but not in AHX v NSW Trustee and 
Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012) where sufficient funds existed to pay for in-
home care services. 
46
 EAD [2014] NSWCATGD 13 (2 July 2014) where EAD was a 70 year old man with dementia. EAD 
resided in a monastery, followed by residential care after his partner KCN rendered him homeless 
selling his home and other assets to repay KCN’s gambling debts. The NSW Public Guardian was 
appointed for accommodation against EAD’s will. 
47
 YYN [2013] NSWGT 36 (29 October 2013); see also HLT [2014] NSWCATGD 5 (7 February 2014) 
where the individual’s large property assets increased the risk of financial abuse from the support 
network. 
170 
 
decision may be made against this evaluation criterion.48 However, where finances 
are abundant, as in the AHX case, potential misuse of finances may not preclude the 
individual’s will and preferences from being followed.49 Without sufficient finances it 
may be difficult to maintain the individual’s welfare and future interests. 
5.3.4 Medical Best interests Affected by Knowledge and understanding 
of the individual’s Needs 
Where the person chosen by the individual to provide support and assistance lacks 
the knowledge and ability to provide this assistance then the tribunal may be 
unwilling to follow the will and preferences of the individual. This may be related to a 
further aspect of medical best interests which was not evident in the Victorian cases. 
In the FGE decision,50 son BAE was FGE’s choice for providing care, assistance and 
accommodation support. However he lacked understanding that dementia was a 
progressive illness, and that his mother would need two attendants at all times. She 
was at significant risk of further fracture. It was unwise for BAE to take his mother by 
bus to the bank and guardianship tribunal hearing. 51  There are other examples 
where the person selected by the individual was not capable or appropriate to assist 
or support the individual as they lacked knowledge and understanding of the adult’s 
condition.  
This of course is closely related to maintenance of the individual’s health needs or 
medical best interests. Where the individual is oblivious to the health needs of the 
adult either through an inability to take the time to understand the individual’s health 
care requirements,52 or a perceived incapability to understand these requirements53 
or for some other reason such as personal gain, 54  a tribunal may make an 
appointment contrary to the individual’s will and preferences.   
In summary, the knowledge and ability of a person selected by the individual to 
provide support is a factor going towards their welfare and interests. Where the 
individual selects a prospective supporter with an intellectual disability a tribunal may 
appoint against the will and preferences of the individual.55  
5.3.5 The Presence of Enduring documents 
The presence of an enduring document such as an enduring power of attorney or 
enduring guardianship may, if not overridden, evince the will and preferences of the 
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 ABE v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 208; NP v NQ and ors [2009] NSWADTAP 65 
(18 September 2009). 
49
 AHX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012). 
50
 FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011). 
51
 FGE(2) [2012] NSWGT 3 (16 March 2012); see also FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011). 
52
 ABJ v Public Guardian [2011] NSWADT 172 (18 July 2011). 
53
 RFM [2012] NSWGT 20 (8 August 2012). 
54
 FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011). 
55
 RFM [2012] NSWGT 20 (8 August 2012). 
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individual.56 This issue did not arise from the limited available cases in Victoria. 
Although these are documents of delegation they may demonstrate an individual’s 
preference for support or assistance by particular persons rather than from an 
independent statutory body such as the NSW Public Guardian.57 It may be easier for 
a tribunal to rely or validate such an enduring document if the welfare and interests 
appear to be well maintained for the individual.58 Where the health of the individual 
may be compromised or family contact completely blocked, or where the individual 
may not have understood the ramifications of the enduring document it may also be 
seen as a situation where such a document may be invalidated by a guardianship 
tribunal or court.59 
It appears that the inter-relationship between the welfare of the individual by 
supporting the health and well-being of the individual is an important factor in the 
recognition and validation of an enduring document by the tribunal.60 Where the 
health of the individual may be compromised by following a recent enduring 
document where the individual had questionable understanding of such a document, 
this document is likely to be overridden or invalidated.61 
Where an individual makes an enduring document during periods of advanced 
dementia it is questionable whether this document represents the will and 
preferences of the individual. A court or tribunal is more willing to invalidate this 
document under these circumstances.62 
Summary 
An enduring document such as an enduring guardianship or enduring power of 
attorney is not of itself a factor involved in the welfare and interests of an individual. It 
is a factor potentially indicating an individual’s preferences for having support and 
                                            
56
 WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012). WTA resided with one daughter FPL in FPL’s home. 
There was an enduring guardianship in favour of FPL. The document was upheld and a guardian was 
only appointed for access to WTA’s other two children TFN and XFE as this access was being denied 
or restrained by FPL; see also GN and anor v Public Guardian and anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71  (11 
November 2008) where an enduring guardian document was upheld with no need for an order in 
favour of the individual’s daughter despite contact issues from the individual’s sons GN and GO; AWR 
[2014] NSWCATGD 42 (27 November 2014). Epoa and enduring guardian documents upheld 
evincing the intention of a long-standing supportive relationship. 
57
 WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] 
NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008); NP v NQ and ors [2009] NSWADTAP 65 (18 September 2009). 
58
 WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] 
NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008). 
59
 SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013). The individual’s daughter SAB had an 
enduring document invalidated during a period of questionable understanding by the individual. SAB 
had not treated excessive bleeding from a vaginal polyp, inappropriate use of patches and wheelchair 
and had kept this information away from the individual’s two other daughters with medical training; 
see also RHH [2012] NSWGT 25 (3 December 2012) where RHH’s Daughter Mrs PPP had kept all 
knowledge of RHH away from RHH’s sons. 
60
 WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012). 
61
 SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013); RHH [2012] NSWGT 25 (3 December 
2012); KCE [2010] NSWGT 1 (6 January 2010); KAT [2009] NSWGT 12 (10 July 2009). 
62
 SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 March 2013). 
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assistance with decision-making. Where a guardianship tribunal or court invalidates 
or overrides an enduring document it may contravene the will and preferences of the 
individual. In NSW a tribunal or court does so to maintain the welfare and interests of 
the individual.   
5.3.6 Summary of Will and Preferences 
The welfare and interests of an individual are the paramount considerations for a 
guardianship tribunal in NSW. Where these are consistent with the individual’s will 
and preferences then it is possible to meet this criterion. It has been demonstrated in 
this section that a number of factors impinge upon whether the will and preferences 
of the individual can be observed. If the factors adversely affect welfare and interests 
then a protective appointment of a guardian for accommodation is likely against the 
will and preferences of the individual. It appears as if the maintenance of the 
individual’s welfare and interests is a feature that connects all of these factors.63 The 
paramount consideration for a body applying the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) is 
the welfare and interests of the person.64 If the welfare and interests of a person are 
inconsistent with the person’s will and preferences then the person’s welfare and 
interests will trump their will and preferences. To this extent such a determination by 
a guardianship tribunal will be inconsistent with this evaluation criterion. Where the 
individual’s will and preferences are congruent with the individual’s welfare and 
interests then a decision can be reached in compliance with this criterion. The 
factors identified in this section can ultimately lead to compliance or non-compliance 
with the paramount consideration of the welfare and interests of the person. This is 
because the cases show that when the identified factors are met the welfare and 
interests aremaintained.   
Observation 
Despite the identification of a number of factors relating to the individual’s welfare, a 
significant number of cases upheld the individual’s will and preferences. This 
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 GN and anor v Public Guardian and anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71  (11 November 2008); IZ v JC, JB, 
JA [2009] NSWADTAP4 (23 January 2009); KAT [2009] NSWGT 12 (10 July 2009); XJ v 
Guardianship Tribunal  [2010] NSWADTAP 63 (20 September 2010); KCE [2010] NSWGT 1 (6 
January 2010); OM v Public Guardian [2010] NSWADT 137 (8 June 2010); PZ v NSW Trustee and 
Guardian [2010] NSWADTAP 14 (15 March 2010); ABJ v Public Guardian [2011] NSWADT 172 (18 
July 2011)7; PV v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 89 (4 May 2011); ABE v NSW 
Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 208; FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011); EB & Ors v 
Guardianship Tribunal & Ors [2011] NSWSC 767 (2 August 2011); AHX v NSW Trustee and Guardian 
and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012); RHH [2012] NSWGT 25 (3 December 2012); RFM 
[2012] NSWGT 20 (8 August 2012); FGE(2) [2012] NSWGT 3 (16 March 2012); JKA [2012] NSWGT 
21 (9 August 2012); WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); FX v NSW Trustee and Guardian 
and anor [2012] NSWADT 184 (5 September 2012); SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 (21 
March 2013); ZGH [2013] NSWGT 3 (15 January 2013). 
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approximates one-third of the available examined cases. 65  This may reflect a 
willingness of NSW tribunals and courts to abide by the principle of respecting the 
wishes of the person when they can be observed along with the individual’s welfare 
and interests. However there were no references to supported decision-making or to 
the principles contained in Article 12 of the CRPD in any of the cases examined. 
5.4 The evaluation criterion of applying the least restrictive 
alternative 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of following the ‘least restrictive alternative’ is to maintain decision 
making autonomy. This is generally achieved by not making an order. This enables 
the individual to be supported to make their own future accommodation decisions. 
This principle of least restrictive alternative appears in every Australian guardianship 
jurisdiction. When an individual is well settled in accommodation and there is unlikely 
to be a decision to be made in the future then no appointment will be made. A 
common illustration of this occurs when an individual is well-settled in residential 
care without the need for future accommodation decisions.66 
5.4.2 Criterion met where there is no need for a decision or no decision 
to be made 
The individual may have significant disabilities but be well supported,67 or where the 
individual is not facing an immediate accommodation decision;68 then a tribunal may 
find that there is no need for an accommodation guardian. This applies the least 
restrictive alternative. 
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 JKA [2012] NSWGT 21 (9 August 2012); XAD [2013] NSWGT 10 (12 July 2013); NQ [2014] 
NSWCATGD 28 (29 September 2014); WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); AHX v NSW 
Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012); Re B (No.2) [2011] NSWSC 
1264 (11 October 2011); PV v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 89 (4 May 2011); OM v 
Public Guardian [2010] NSWADT 137 (8 June 2010); XJ v Guardianship Tribunal  [2010] NSWADTAP 
63 (20 September 2010); GN and anor v Public Guardian and anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71  (11 
November 2008); HH v HI and Protective Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009). 
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 JQE [2009] NSWGT 13 (19 January 2009); TKX [2009] NSWGT 6 (2 September 2009); QBZ [2010] 
NSWGT 8 (28 January 2010); LAD [2010] NSWGT 24 (10 March 2010); TBT [2013] NSWGT 17 (20 
February 2013); KMC [2014] NSWCATGD 43 (4 December 2014). 
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 JKA [2012] NSWGT 21 (9 August 2012); QBZ [2010] NSWGT 8 (28 January 2010); LAD [2010] 
NSWGT 24 (10 March 2010); CVP [2011] NSWGT 19 (28 July 2011); JND [2011] NSWGT 18 (8 
September 2011); TBT [2013] NSWGT 17 (20 February 2013); UUU [2013] NSWGT 24 (22 August 
2013); KTT [2014] NSWCATGD 6 (19 February 2014); NFS [2014] NSWCATGD 35 (28 October 
2014); KMC [2014] NSWCATGD 43 (4 December 2014). 
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 HH v HI and Protective Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009); see also BDN [2014] 
NSWCATGD 15; (27 May 2014) where BDN was a 96 year old woman residing in her own home. The 
tribunal did not appoint a guardian for accommodation as she could make her own accommodation 
decisions, the house was satisfactory and there was no present need for a decision. 
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There are examples of the ‘least restrictive’ alternative being adopted in NSW to 
maintain the autonomy of the individual. In the OM decision 69  it was the least 
restrictive alternative not to move the individual, QI, as she was well settled and 
wished to remain in the current residential care facility. Her wishes were to remain 
where she was as she was a ‘Sydney girl’. 
There are a significant number of other examples where the least restrictive 
alternative has been followed in NSW by a tribunal or court as in HI v HH and the 
Protective Commissioner, JKA, XJ v the Public Guardian, Re B (no 2), FX v the 
NSW Trustee and Guardian and GN v the Public Guardian.70 The individual may be 
supported by a culturally appropriate informal support network;71  the individual’s 
welfare, interests and accommodation needs may be maintained by a selected 
portion of the individual’s family or support network;72 or the individual may be well-
settled in accommodation without the need for decisions to be made presently or in 
the near future.73 
This criterion complements the first evaluative criterion of observing the will and 
preferences of the individual. Autonomy is preserved when no appointment is made 
even when the will and preferences of the individual cannot be identified. This may 
be congruent with the facilitated state of disability described by Bach and Kerzner in 
chapters 1 and 2 where the will and intention of the individual cannot be ascertained 
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 OM v Public Guardian [2010] NSWADT 137 (8 June 2010). 
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 HH v HI and Protective Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009). HH and HI were 
close friends and were both Jehovah’s Witnesses. HH sought an appointment of guardian for 
accommodation, health and religion. This was dismissed as HI was well settled and no 
accommodation decision was necessary. It was not possible to appoint a religious guardian and HH 
could assist with individual health decisions as statutory attorney for HI; see also JKA [2012] NSWGT 
21 (9 August 2012) where JKA as an indigenous man with acquired brain injury could be assisted with 
accommodation decisions by his indigenous partner according to his wishes so the appointment of 
the Public Guardian was dismissed as there was no need for a continuing appointment of 
accommodation guardian; see also XJ v Guardianship Tribunal  [2010] NSWADTAP 63 (20 
September 2010). The applicant sought to be the accommodation guardian for the individual. He was 
the brother of the individual’s ex-partner. The individual had returned to reside with her family and 
there was no need for a guardian despite the applicant’s allegations of physical abuse by family 
members; see also Re B (No.2) [2011] NSWSC 1264 (11 October 2011) where son WA was 
appointed accommodation guardian for his mother, B. This was in accordance with the former wishes 
of B and less restrictive than the former Public Guardian.  Allegations of physical and sexual abuse by 
WA’s siblings were dismissed by White J; see also WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); see 
also FX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 184 (5 September 2012) where the 
individual expressed a wish to remain at her current residential care facility and not with son FX who 
would remove the individual from NSW to thwart a guardianship order. The Public Guardian observed 
the will and preferences of the individual; see also GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] 
NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008) where there was no need for an accommodation guardian as it 
was the will and intention of the individual to continue to reside with her daughter and to refrain from 
contact with her two sons GN and GO. 
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 JKA [2012] NSWGT 21 (9 August 2012). 
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 AHX v NSW Trustee and Guardian and anor [2012] NSWADT 35 (5 March 2012); WTA [2012] 
NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] NSWADTAP 71 (11 
November 2008). 
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 HH v HI and Protective Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009). 
175 
 
by at least one person.74 By finding no need for an accommodation guardian even 
where there are significant cognitive disabilities, then the individual retains decision-
making ability. The individual is free in the future to either make his or her own 
accommodation decisions alone or with the assistance of a support network.75 The 
application of this criterion by not making an appointment could assist a person with 
a significant psycho-social disability who may be able to express their wishes at a 
later date or be able to be assisted by a chosen network of trusted others at a later 
time.76 
5.4.3 Least restriction where an accommodation decision cannot be 
implemented against the individual 
An example of this is when an individual with a significant psycho-social disability 
who had not followed the accommodation decisions of an appointed guardian had 
his guardianship appointment dismissed by the tribunal.77 This decision followed the 
‘least restrictive alternative’ as the appointment had no effect upon the individual, 
who chose his own accommodation against the decision of the appointed Public 
Guardian.78 If an individual will not abide by the accommodation decisions of an 
appointed guardian then the ‘least restrictive’ alternative is to have no order as any 
order is ineffectual to support the individual’s welfare and interests. This rationale 
was confirmed where a guardianship order for accommodation was lapsed where an 
18 year old woman, pregnant, exercised independence by making her own 
accommodation decisions. 79  The tribunal indicated that it was preserving the 
independence and dignity of risk of the young woman by not re-appointing a 
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 Bach and Kerzner, above n 21; see also Centre for Disability Law & Policy National University of 
Ireland Galway, 'Submission on Legal Capacity the Oirreachtas Committee on Justice Defence and 
Equality' (NUI, 2011) <http://www.nuigalway.ie/cdlp/documents/cdlp_submission_on)ie>. 
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 JKA [2012] NSWGT 21 (9 August 2012); WTA [2012] NSWGT 23 (27 November 2012); XJ v 
Guardianship Tribunal  [2010] NSWADTAP 63 (20 September 2010); HH v HI and Protective 
Commissioner [2009] NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009); GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] 
NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008). 
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 EB & Ors v Guardianship Tribunal & Ors [2011] NSWSC 767 (2 August 2011). The individual was a 
70 year old woman who probably had schizophrenia. She had been in hospital for over 12 months an 
appointment of the Public Guardian was made as her Bondi home was covered in refuse. Hallen AJ 
allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court on the basis that the Public Guardian may not have been the 
least restrictive and the daughters who reside with the individual required notice and time to prepare 
for the GT hearing.   
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 XAD [2013] NSWGT 10 (12 July 2013). 
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 Ibid. XAD was a 49 year old man with a mental illness drug and alcohol abuse, assaults and 
behavioural issues. Schyvens  DP, lapsed an existing GT order for accommodation and services for 
the Public Guardian because XAD would only obey a compulsory involuntary treatment order, he 
would vote with his feet and not follow an accommodation decision of the NSW Public Guardian. 
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 NQ [2014] NSWCATGD 28 (29 September 2014). A guardianship order was lapsed upon review. 
The order would not be followed without coercive powers. There was no justification for this as NQ 
had made her own decisions with appropriate medical and ante natal care and had changed 
accommodation 3 times. Intervention by the Public Guardian was futile as NQ voted with her feet.   
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guardian.80 Dismissing the order for a guardian for accommodation has been held in 
these cases to be both the least restrictive alternative and promoting the welfare and 
interests of the individual as it was a meaningless restriction upon autonomy.81 The 
actions of the individual by disobeying the appointed guardian’s chosen 
accommodation, had the effect of ‘re-claiming’ autonomy for the individual.  
5.4.4 Summary 
The criterion of observing the ‘least restrictive alternative’ is an important evaluative 
criterion to maintain the individual’s autonomy. It functions synergistically with 
observing the will and preferences of the individual. By generally having no 
appointment, the individual’s will and preferences can be supported in the future. 
This is particularly in the case of a finding of ‘no need’ for a guardianship order. 
Decision-making autonomy is preserved with the individual free to be supported in 
the future. There is compliance with this criterion in NSW when it is consistent with 
the welfare and best interests of the individual. When it does not appear in the best 
interests of the individual then the least restrictive alternative is likely not to be 
followed. The exception appears to be where the individual disobeys the decision of 
an appointed guardian for accommodation that was made in his or her best interests. 
In that case the tribunal has been willing to discontinue a guardianship order upon 
review where it has been demonstrated to have no effect upon the individuals’ 
accommodation.82  
5.5 The presence of a positive informal support network 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Although unable to create it, the NSW guardianship tribunal has power to 
acknowledge a positively functioning informal support network.83 Where the NSW 
guardianship tribunal refuses to recognise a positively functioning support network of 
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 Ibid; see also NTL [2013] NSWGT 6 (23 April 2013) where NTL was a 28 year old indigenous 
woman incarcerated with a psycho-social disability and drug abuse. She was not engaging with 
services and the guardianship order for accommodation was discontinued as it could not be 
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an individual and prefers the appointment of the NSW Public Guardian there is a 
possible contravention of the evaluation criteria.84 
It is not possible for the NSW guardianship tribunal to create a support network 
where one does not exist. Nor is it possible for a tribunal to change a dysfunctional 
support network into a positively functioning one. For this reason, the presence of a 
positively functioning informal support network is a facilitating feature and not a 
criterion. Its presence may significantly enhance compliance with the evaluation 
criteria by a finding that there is no need for the restrictive appointment of a guardian 
for accommodation.85 
5.5.2 Lack of a support network creating a need for a decision/ NDIS 
cases 
On the other hand, where there is a need for an accommodation decision and the 
individual lacks a support network then a restrictive appointment is often made.86 
This has recently occurred to facilitate accommodation decisions under the pilot 
NSW project of the National Disability Insurance Scheme, where an accommodation 
plan is required to facilitate changes in residential accommdation.87 In the NZO and 
KCG cases residents of accommodation under the NSW NDIS trial, lacked a support 
network. The NSW Public Guardian was appointed for accommodation decisions to 
facilitate KCG and NZO’s change of residence. The individual’s supporter may 
become the NDIS nominee to avoid the appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation.88  The NSW Public Guardian may be appointed accommodation 
decision-maker when an individual becomes isolated by the death of his informal 
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 Re B (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 1075 (15 September 2011). White J found the son of a 94 year old 
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support network.89 At the time of writing there were no Victorian cases linked to 
NDIS trials and Queensland did not have any NDIS trials. 
5.5.3 Positive and negative support networks 
The existence of a support network could have positive or negative implications for 
the individual. Positive implications would be that the support network facilitates or 
assists the individual to make their own decisions. 90  A positive support network 
would not influence the individual to make a decision that benefits the supporter.91 
Therefore no conflict of interest arises between the supporter and the individual 
because the support network is interested in the individual. A positive support 
network understands the individual’s needs and is able to provide assistance so the 
individual can make their own decisions by providing information in an 
understandable format.92 
The presence of a positive informal support network may enhance compliance with 
the evaluation criteria for example the positive support network may consist of an 
indigenous partner providing assistance to another indigenous person,93 a daughter 
of the individual with whom the individual resides,94 a son of the individual who is 
concerned that medical treatment may be unavailable in present residential care,95 
or a daughter of the individual, who was chosen by the individual to reside in a rural 
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 PNQ [2013] NSWGT 39 (12 December 2013). PNQ was a 32 year old Aboriginal male. He had a 
cognitive disability. There was a need to change accommodation as PNQ was taken advantage by 
young males who had stolen his medication. MNQ’s support network of his mother and sister had 
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(9 August 2012); XJ v Guardianship Tribunal  [2010] NSWADTAP 63 (20 September 2010). 
91
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 JKA [2012] NSWGT 21 (9 August 2012). 
94
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setting.96 There are additional examples from NSW where the existence of a positive 
informal support network is congruent with the evaluative criteria.97  
By contrast, the absence of a positive support network may see the tribunal make 
decisions that contravene the evaluation criteria. This may occur where there is no 
support network for the individual or there is evidence that the support network 
provided has negative influences.98 For example, in the FGE case99 a decision was 
made in favour of the Public Guardian against the will and preferences of FGE. The 
case of FGE is also an example of a dysfunctional support network oblivious to the 
needs of the individual. It will be discussed in the following sub-section dealing with 
conflict of interest and undue influence.  
Another example of an inappropriate support network arose in the decision of ABE100 
where the proposed move to Tweed Heads from Coffs Harbour would isolate the 
individual AFK from her support network of two daughters. 
There are other examples where the absence of a positive support network has 
resulted in a tribunal appointment in contravention of the evaluation criteria. For 
example, there may be disagreements between members of the individual’s support 
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 PZ v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2010] NSWADTAP 14 (15 March 2010). 
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preferences; see also XJ v Guardianship Tribunal  [2010] NSWADTAP 63 (20 September 2010) the 
individual’s family provided an adequate support network so there was no need for an 
accommodation guardian despite continued allegations of violence and sexual abuse from XJ the 
brother of the individual’s ex-partner; see also GN & anor v Public Guardian & anor [2008] 
NSWADTAP 71 (11 November 2008); see also HH v HI and Protective Commissioner [2009] 
NSWADTAP 41 (30 June 2009) where HI had dementia and resided in a nursing home. HI’s close 
friend HH could provide support regarding health and accommodation decisions so that no 
guardianship order was needed. 
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 LHH [2013] NSWGT 14 (1 February 2013). LHH was isolated from her family support network of 
SSD and IDM as LHH’s nephew SSD and wife IDM resided in rural NSW and only rarely had contact 
with LHH, whose husband died a number of years earlier to the hearing; see also QDI [2013] NSWGT 
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 FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011); FGE(2) [2012] NSWGT 3 (16 March 2012). 
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network adversely affecting criteria compliance. 101  A number of these instances 
demonstrate an absence of understanding and concern for the health and welfare of 
the individual by the support network.102 The supporter may be unable to provide 
support for the individual because of the supporter’s own health considerations.103 In 
other examples the supporter may isolate the individual from their family;104 there 
may be physical or sexual abuse by the support network;105 or may be concerned 
with the supporter’s own personal interests.106 Other cases that involve financial 
abuse and exploitation will be examined in the next section dealing with conflict of 
interest and undue influence. 
5.5.4 Summary 
The examination of the NSW case law has demonstrated that by and large the 
recognition of a positive functioning support network is associated with compliance 
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2013). The lack of communication between daughter EMM and other members of KCN’s family 
constituting her support network created a dysfunctional network; BCA [2014] NSWCATGD 47 (16 
December 2014). 
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with the evaluation criteria.107 That is, the will and preferences of the individual will 
be observed and the least restrictive alternative is followed where there is evidence 
of a positive support network. Where this is evident it results in no guardianship 
order being made.108 However, where the informal support network is negative and 
does not maintain the welfare and interest of the individual, or is clouded by the 
personal interests of the supporter then the tribunal  is more likely than not to make 
an order contravening the evaluation criteria.109 
5.6 Conflict of interest or undue influence  
5.6.1 Introduction 
This feature was derived from the safeguards to protect individuals from abuse in the 
provision of support measures to exercise legal capacity in Article 12(4) of the 
CRPD.110 It refers to conflict of interest or undue influence between supporter and 
the individual.111 
The reported guardianship decisions from NSW do not define the equitable terms 
‘conflict of interest’ and ‘undue influence’ but refer to both concepts as potentially or 
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actually occurring,112  There are multiple examples of both of these situations in 
NSW.113 
5.6.2 Financial exploitation by the support network 
This situation does not constitute a positive informal support network. Note again the 
FGE decision.114 The informal supporter FGE’s son BAE personally had a financial 
interest in FGE returning to reside with him in FGE’s former public housing. BAE had 
control of FGE’s bank account and age pension funds through her bankcard and not 
as a Centrelink payment nominee. This ceased when FGE went to the nursing home 
and FGE’s daughter MGS was appointed administrator and cancelled BAE’s access 
to FGE’s bankcard. It is noted that BAE had personal interests in having FGE reside 
with him. Other examples where the supporter receives large financial advantages 
from having the individual reside with them includes the purchase of a new motor 
vehicle and accessing the finances of the individual,115 or where the supporter is 
interested in retaining the individual’s house for the personal benefit of the 
supporter.116 
There are other examples of an informal support network with personal pecuniary 
interests instead of having only the interests of the individual.117 This could result in 
financial abuse and exploitation through undue influence by the supporter. These 
interests may arise by reducing financial obligations to a non-custodial ex-spouse by 
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supporting the individual to reside with a particular parent, 118  or by the support 
network residing rent-free in the individual’s private residence.119 
5.6.3 Conflict of Interest 
Conflict of interest arose in the LHH decision120 between the individual, LHH and her 
supporter and real estate agent MMB.  LHH was elderly and isolated from her only 
other living relative. LHH obtained two reverse mortgages over her home totalling 
$343,000. MMB used most of this money for his own purposes, to purchase a motor 
vehicle and to pay off his own debts.  
Another example is where ex-partners in a disputed property action seek custody of 
their adult son with a disability to reduce their financial obligations to each other.121  
5.6.4 Undue influence 
In FGE 122  after MGS (BAE’s sister) was appointed administrator she cancelled 
FGE’s bankcard. This prevented BAE from making ATM withdrawals. BAE took FGE 
to her bank and had FGE strip her account of all but $30.00. This is an instance of 
undue influence as this money was not used to pay nursing home fees; it was used 
by BAE for his own purposes. Undue influence can also arise where the supporter 
influences the individual to take out reverse mortgages on their home to advance 
large sums of money to the supporter.123 
The appointment of an administrator to prevent future financial abuses from 
occurring can obviate the need for a guardian for accommodation. There may be no 
need for a guardian for accommodation; therefore the criterion of applying the least 
restrictive alternative is upheld.124 
Where there are unsupported allegations of undue influence a tribunal or court may 
be prepared to disregard them and make a decision in accordance with the 
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evaluation criteria.125 For example, unsupported allegations of financial abuse may 
be rejected where there is no evidence and where they were made by a sibling 
seeking the individual to reside away from the supporter,126 or where the accuser is 
another sibling seeking the sibling’s dismissal as a potential guardian.127 
5.6.5 Summary 
Where conflict of interest or undue influence are present, appointments in 
contravention of the evaluation criteria are frequently made. 128  The tribunal is 
exercising its jurisdiction for the perceived welfare and interests of the individual. 
Where there is no ability to successfully protect and monitor these interests by a 
positive support network then an accommodation guardian is often appointed as an 
external decision-maker and monitor.129 
This is a feature that may have the effect of an appointment in contravention of the 
evaluation criteria in order to remove the conflict of interest or undue influence to 
protect the welfare and interests of the individual.130 By making an appointment of an 
independent body, the tribunal or court attempts to prevent exposure to further 
abuse. 
5.7 Discussion 
The level of compliance with the evaluation criteria in NSW was 40 cases out of 110 
cases. This compares with an observed compliance level in Victoria of 9 cases out of 
21 cases. I do not find this distinction to be statistically significant due to the 
relatively small number of reported available cases in Victoria. For example, in 
Victoria, only one case demonstrated conflict of interest or undue influence between 
the individual and their support network.131 There were 11 examples of this type of 
conflict or undue influence between the individual and their support network in 
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NSW.132 It was mentioned at the commencement of this chapter that NSW was 
anticipated to have a much lower level of compliance with the evaluation criteria than 
Victoria because of the absence of a charter protecting human rights and an express 
statutory obligation to give paramount consideration to the welfare and interests of 
the individual.133 
It is likely that the presence of a Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 
(VIC) and not placing the principle of maintaining the indivivual’s welfare and 
interests paramount were inconsequential in complying with the criteria. This may be 
due to very few Victorian cases expressly applying their Charter even though VCAT 
is an administrative body. Only the PJB decision relevantly applied the Charter to 
incorporate rights contained in Article 12 of the CRPD.134  
It is also likely that VCAT decisions are providing implied paramount consideration to 
the general principle of maintaining the individual’s welfare and best intersts. This is 
through the two-step process of finding a disability with an associated inability to 
make important decisions and by finding a need for an order to appoint a guardian 
for accommodation. When VCAT or NCAT apply their guardianship legislation they 
look at the need for an order to protect the welfare and interests of the person. The 
autonomy principles of least restriction and the individual’s wishes are applied on a 
secondary basis when it is safe to do so. It was only Bell J in the PJB decision who 
gave the principles of applying the least restrictive alternative and following the 
wishes of the person an equal status with the protective principle of welfare and 
interests.135 
If the weighting of the general principles and the presence or absences of a charter 
of human rights are neutral regarding criteria compliance, then it is still possible to 
comply with the evaluation criteria. This arises where there is a positive informal 
support network; where there is no accommodation decision to be made; or where it 
is not possible to implement a guardianship order for accommodation. 
5.8 Conclusion, trends and findings from the NSW guardianship 
cases   
This chapter has applied the evaluation criteria and important features developed in 
Chapter 2 to the NSW guardianship jurisdiction. The criteria of obeying the 
individual’s will and preferences and applying the least restrictive alternative can be 
                                            
132
 LHH [2013] NSWGT 14 (1 February 2013); HLT [2014] NSWCATGD 5; (7 February 2014); YYN 
[2013] NSWGT 36 (29 October 2013); CAA [2013] NSWGT 32 (26 July 2013); ZGH [2013] NSWGT 3 
(15 January 2013); Re C [2012] NSWSC 1097 (14 September 2012); ReC (no2) [2012] NSWSC 1351 
(2 November 2012); PXC [2011] NSWGT 1 (13 January 2011); TKX [2009] NSWGT 6 (2 September 
2009); NAC [2010] NSWGT 22 (23 June 2010); FGE [2011] NSWGT 16 (18 October 2011). 
133
 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) ss 4(a)-(c). 
134
 PJB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 643 (17 May 2010). 
135
 Ibid. 
186 
 
applied by the tribunal. The last two features enhance or detract from the tribunal’s 
ability to apply the evaluation criteria. The tribunal does not control the existence of 
these features. The following trends can be drawn from the NSW case analysis. 
5.8.1 Significant compliance 
NSW guardianship decisions involving accommodation have demonstrated 
significant compliance with the evaluation criteria. Approximately one-third of the 
available cases demonstrated compliance with the criteria (40 out of 110 cases). 
This was a surprising result. NSW lacks a Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities and places welfare and interests of the individual above the 
principles of following the individual’s wishes and applying the least restrictive 
alternative. A possible reason for the observed compliance level with the evaluation 
criteria in NSW may be a willingness to apply, wherever possible, the general 
principles of following the individual’s wishes and applying the least restrictive 
alternative. 136  This is demonstrated when following these principles leads to a 
decision in accordance with the welfare and interests of the individual.137 
5.8.2 Coincidental compliance 
Compliance with the evaluation criteria in NSW appears to be coincidental. This 
means that NSW guardianship cases involving accommodation comply with the 
evaluation criteria without any reference to supported decision-making principles 
contained within Article 12 of the CRPD. It is coincidental because two of the 
general principles correspond with the evaluation criteria. This is not entirely 
unexpected as the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) was developed from the Cocks 
Report of 1982. 138  This report served the dual functions of protection through 
guardianship and preservation of autonomy through limited orders or by making no 
guardianship order. There were no references in any of the decided cases to the 
CRPD or supported decision-making in Article 12. The Guardianship Act 1987 
(NSW) makes no reference to human rights or the right to be supported to exercise 
legal capacity. The NSW cases make no reference to the individual having full legal 
capacity or the right to be supported to exercise full legal capacity. It appears as if 
the NSW guardianship legislation is being applied in a vacuum without express 
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reference to international human rights obligations. It is true that there is no 
requirement to apply any United Nations human rights convention when reaching a 
guardianship tribunal decision. However, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) has recommended that States and Territories amend their guardianship 
legislation to incorporate the principles of full legal capacity, support to exercise 
legal capacity and following the individual’s will and preferences in decision-
making.139The national decision-making principles derived directly from Article 12 
are intended to lead to greater (if not express) compliance to the evaluation criteria 
and Article 12 of the CRPD. At the time of writing, there has been no indication that 
the ALRC national decision-making principles will be incorporated into NSW 
guardianship legislation. 
5.8.3 Welfare and interests may be compatible with will and preferences 
The will and preferences of the individual can be consistent with the individual’s 
welfare and interests. When the will and preferences can be met while maintaining 
the individual’s welfare and interests the evaluation criteria can be met even though 
the paramount consideration is the individual’s protective welfare and interests. This 
appears to be in contradiction to authors who indicate that self-determination and 
guardianship legislation are irreconcilable.140 Where factors such as the medical best 
interests of the individual can be met by complying with the will and preferences of 
the individual then it is likely that the individual’s will and preferences can be 
followed. Where the medical best interest cannot be met then an appointment 
contrary to the evaluation criterion of obeying the individual’s will and preferences is 
likely.  
5.8.4 Role of the support network 
The presence of a positive informal support network can be associated with 
enhancing compliance with the evaluation criteria.141 Where there is a functioning 
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informal support network a tribunal may find no need for an appointment of a 
guardian for accommodation. It is able to apply the least restrictive alternative. This 
enables the individual to make their own accommodation decisions. The informal 
support network funcitons as protection for the individual by meeting their welfare 
and interest needs.  
In contrast, where the support network is oblivious to the health needs of the 
individual or favours the personal interests of the supporter over those of the 
individual then an appointment in contravention of the evaluation criteria is likely.142 
A dysfunctional support network detracts from compliance with the evaluation 
criteria.   
5.8.5 Conflict of interest and undue influence 
The presence of conflict of interest or of undue influence between supporter and the 
individual have only limited reported available case examples in NSW.143 Where 
there has been evidence of conflict of interest and undue influence the tribunal has 
made an appointment in contravention of the evaluation criteria. This demonstrates 
that the presence of conflict of interest or of undue influence detracts from 
compliance with the criteria because the tribunal has no control over the existence of 
this feature but makes an appointment for the individual’s welfare and interests in 
order to control financial abuse.  
5.8.6 Summary 
In conclusion, the cases examined in this chapter have demonstrated a significant 
coincidental level of compliance with the evaluation criteria. This demonstrates that 
in a significant number of the available cases the paramount consideration of the 
welfare and interests of the individual can be consistent with the individual’s will and 
preferences. This suggests the apparent tension between autonomy and protection 
can be resolved in NSW in favour of autonomy without totally abandoning 
guardianship legislation. 
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Chapter 6 
Application of the Benchmark Criteria and important features 
to Queensland’s Guardianship Regime Involving 
Accommodation  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter applies the benchmark criteria and important features to the 
Queensland guardianship jurisdiction. It is divided into 4 sections; an historical 
background to the human rights focus of the legislation; an explanation of legislative 
provisions in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) that possibly 
require supported decision-making; the application of the evaluation criteria and 
important features to decided guardianship cases involving accommodation; 
discussion of findings and conclusions from the case analysis.  
The Queensland cases total more than the combined number of cases in Victoria 
and New South Wales. Some variation in results may be attributable to the disparity 
between case numbers in the three jurisdictions.  
There has been significant compliance with the evaluation criteria in Queensland. 
The compliance level was slightly less (almost one-third of available cases) than in 
NSW or Victoria. The observed compliance levels were 9 out of 21 cases for 
Victoria; 40 out of 110 cases for NSW; and 57 out of 173 cases for Queensland.  
This result was surprising as a higher level of compliance was anticipated due to the 
recognition of supported decision-making and the detailed general principles 
contained within the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD). This finding 
will be canvassed in the discussion and conclusion to this chapter and in the 
following chapter.  
6.1.1 Brief Historical Background to the Guardianship Regime in 
Queensland 
Queensland was the last of the Australian jurisdictions to develop what O’Neill and 
Peisah have termed a modern guardianship tribunal system. 1  As with other 
Australian jurisdictions (except for the Northern Territory) 2  the tribunal system is 
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efficient and inexpensive.3 It has a state funded Office of Public Guardian (formerly 
Adult Guardian) which functions as an independent potential guardian with 
investigatory powers. Queensland’s guardianship legislative regime is in two parts: 
the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (QLD) which creates enduring powers of attorney 
and establishes the Office of the Public Guardian, and the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (QLD).   
It took nearly 10 years from the former Attorney-General of Queensland Dean Wells’ 
reference to the Queensland Law Reform Commission on 1 September 1990 to the 
commencement of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) on 1 July 
2000.4 Queensland’s guardianship legislation rests on an elaborate set of human 
rights based general principles that must be observed by anyone exercising a power 
or performing a function under the Act.5 These principles were derived from existing 
United Nations instruments, other existing Australian State and Territory 
guardianship legislation’s general principles and from Canadian guardianship 
legislation.6 
The Queensland Law Reform Commission had found through wide consultation that 
human rights protection was lacking from the three existing relevant Acts; the Mental 
Health Act 1974 (QLD), the Intellectually Disabled Citizen’s Act 1985 (QLD) and the 
Public Trustee Act 1978 (QLD).7 
In the Attorney-General’s 1999 second reading speech to the Guardianship and 
Administration Bill Matt Foley heralded its human rights aspects and its support in 
decision-making:   
...people with disabilities share the same human rights as all of us... For the first time in 
this state Queensland will have a legislative system whereby the most vulnerable 
members of our society will be able to be supported in achieving autonomy in their 
decision-making...8 
Thus support for persons with decision-making difficulties had been advocated in 
Queensland for years prior to the commencement of the CRPD. It is also interesting 
to note that the guardianship legislation developed from the Queensland Law Reform 
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Commission Report, ‘Assisted and substituted decisions...’9 (which took 6 years to 
complete), deals exclusively with the appointment of substitute decision-makers in 
the form of guardians and administrators rather than the appointment or facilitation of 
assistants or supporters. This was to be left to occur informally.10 
From a human rights perspective Queensland’s guardianship regime differs from the 
other Australian State and Territory regimes in three important aspects. First, it 
provides an elaborate set of human rights based general principles. Second, there is 
a presumption that all persons with disabilities have decision-making capacity by 
employing a matter specific functional test of mental capacity as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Third, there are a number of provisions within the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (QLD) that acknowledge supported decision-making and 
informal support networks. These provisions will be discussed further in the next 
subsection as they relate to and may be congruent with the provisions of Article 12 of 
the CRPD and the evaluation criteria.  
6.2 Issues Specific to Queensland: Legislative features that may 
or may not promote compliance with the evaluation criteria 
It is useful to consider provisions of the Queensland legislation specific to this 
jurisdiction which may recognise or possibly require supported decision-making. 
These include provisions found within the general principles to the Act as well as 
specific sections of the Act.  
6.2.1 Application of the benchmark criteria and features 
The evaluation criterion of obeying the will and preferences of the adult is generally 
achieved by not making a guardianship order. The least restrictive alternative is 
generally met by refraining from making a guardianship order to enable the adult 
either alone or with support to make future accommodation decisions. The presence 
of a positive informal support network consists of an individual or group of trusted 
others who assist the adult with the adult’s accommodation decisions. Its presence 
or absence may affect compliance with the two evaluation criteria. The absence of 
conflict of interest and of undue influence between the adult and their support 
network ensures it is the adult’s own decision and does not unduly benefit the 
supporter/support network. 
6.2.2 Legislative provisions 
The legislative provisions to be assessed against the criteria include the following: 
                                            
9
 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 4. 
10
 Ibid. 
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(a) Provisions in the guardianship principles acknowledging persons with 
disabilities to have the same human rights as all persons in society and 
protecting their underlying dignity and self-worth.11 
(b) Provisions presuming an adult to have mental capacity and applying a 
‘functional’ test of mental capacity.12 
(c) Provisions in the Act and the Guardianship Principles that recognise the 
existence and importance of the adult’s support network and the adult’s right 
to receive support to make their own decisions.13 
The evaluation criteria and features are now considered in relation to each of these 
legislative provisions of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD). The 
purpose of this discussion is to outline how the legal guardianship framework in 
Queensland may or may not promote compliance by the Tribunal with the evaluation 
criteria.   
6.2.2.1 Same Human Rights and respect for Dignity and Self-Worth 
The guardianship principles 14  inject an underlying human rights focus in the 
Queensland guardianship legislation. Guardianship Principle 2 recognises persons 
with disabilities have the same human rights as all other persons, while Principle 3 
demonstrates respect for dignity and self-worth irrespective of disability.15 This is a 
different focus to guardianship legislation in Victoria and New South Wales, where 
the primary focus was to protect persons with a cognitive disability following 
                                            
11
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) sch 1 Guardianship Principle (GP) 2. Same 
Human Rights ‘(1) the right of all adults to the same basic human rights regardless of a particular 
adult’s capacity must be recognised and taken into account. (2) the importance of empowering an 
adult to exercise the adult’s basic human rights must be recognised and taken into account’. GP 3 
(Dignity and self-worth) ‘an adult’s right to respect for his or her human worth and dignity as an 
individual must be recognised and taken into account’.   
12
 Ibid. GP 1 ‘an adult is presumed to have capacity for a matter’. Repeated in s 7(a) and the definition 
of capacity in sch 4 where the adult must be able to ‘(1) understand the nature and effect of a decision 
for a matter; (2) be able to freely and voluntarily make the decision; and (3) be able to communicate 
the decision in some way’. 
13
 Ibid. s 5(c) states ‘the capacity of an adult with impaired capacity to make decisions may differ 
according to – (iii) the support available from members of the adult’s existing support network’; s 5(e) 
states ‘an adult with impaired capacity has a right to adequate and appropriate support for decision-
making’; s 6 states ‘This Act seeks to achieve an appropriate balance between (a) the right of an adult 
with impaired capacity to the greatest possible degree of autonomy in decision-making and (b) the 
adult’s right to adequate and appropriate support for decision-making’; s 7 states ‘The way the 
purpose is achieved by (a) encouraging involvement in decision-making of the members of the adult’s 
existing support network and GP 7 Maximum participation, minimal limitation and substituted 
judgement’; s 7(2) states ‘...the importance of preserving  to the greatest extent practicable, an adult’s 
right to make his or her own decisions must be taken into account’; s (3)(a) states ‘the adult must be 
given any necessary support, and access to information, to enable the adult to participate in decisions 
affecting the adult’s life’. 
14
 The Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) uses the term “general principles’ in schedule 
2 of the Act but this thesis will use the term ‘guardianship principes. 
15
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) sch 1. GP 2, 3. 
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deinstitutionalisation. 16  The human rights basis of Queensland’s guardianship 
legislation has been lauded by the Office of Public Advocate in Victoria as a model 
for legislative reform.17 
Queensland’s guardianship principles of persons with disabilities having the same 
human rights and respect for dignity and self-worth as all other persons have the 
potential to be in compliance with the evaluative criteria developed from Article 12. 
The CRPD focuses on human rights, treating persons with disabilities as citizens 
with enforceable rights rather than as recipients of charity.18 The CRPD in Article 
3(a) states that dignity is enhanced by an individual’s ability to make their own 
decisions.19 Individual dignity meaning self-worth and self- respect20 has been said 
to be the underlying basis of all human rights declared by United Nations 
instruments.21 
The exact scope and application of General Principle 2 and 3 remain unclear. There 
is no guidance within the Queensland legislation to determine what human rights 
are, or how should they be applied or protected. For example, do human rights 
include those rights specified in United Nations conventions including the CRPD? 
Article 12 of the CRPD confers both a right to legal capacity and a right to be 
supported to exercise legal capacity. Is this protected by General Principle 2?22  
Accordingly, compliance with the evaluative criteria for Guardianship Principle 2 and 
3 is also unclear. If a QCAT decision is made to dismiss an application for an 
accommodation guardian because the tribunal recognises the adult’s rights to 
exercise their own legal capacity and receive support to act upon their own will and 
preferences, then the evaluation criteria would be met. If a decision is reached 
because it is the least restrictive as required by Article 12 of the CRPD then again 
the criteria would be met. The will and preferences of an adult could also be 
                                            
16
 Minister's Committee on Rights and Protective Legislation for Intellectually Handicapped Persons, 
'Report of the Minister's Committee on Rights & Protective Legislation for Intellectually Handicapped 
Persons' (1982) <http://u.b5z.net/i/u/10196230/f/LISA_Cocks_Report_on_Guardianship_1982.pdf>; 
see also Colleen Pearce, 'Strengths and Tensions in the Current Guardianship System' (Office of the 
Public Advocate of Victoria, 2011) <http:www.publicadvocate.vic.gove.au/>. 
17
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Submission to the Victorian Law Reform Commission in 
respect to the Guardianship Consultation Paper' (Office of Public Advocate Victoria, May 2011) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/file/file/Research/Submissions/2011/OPA-Submission-to-
VLRC-May2011.pdf> see also Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Response to the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission's Final Report on Guardianship' (OPA Victoria, May 2012) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>; Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC). 
18
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008). 
19
 Ibid art 3(a). 
20
 Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497 (53). 
21
 People with Disabilities, 'Everyone, Everywhere: Recogniton of Persons with Disabilities as 
Persons before the Law' (PWD, 2009) 
<http:www.pwd.org.au/documents/pubs/EveryoneEverywhere2009.pdf>; see also Barbara Carter, 
'The Case for Dignity as the Governing Principle in Adult Guardianship' (2010) 19 (1) Res Publica 6. 
22
 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 April 2000, 712-720 
(Lawrennce Springborg, Shadow Attorney General). 
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respected if there are positive references to Guardianship Principles 2 and 3 during a 
hearing.   
The conclusion reached is that these human rights based guardianship principles 
have the potential to increase compliance with the evaluative criteria of obeying the 
will and preferences of the adult and following the least restrictive alternative. There 
has been a lack of reference and application of Guardianship Principles 2 and 3 in 
the reported cases considered later in this chapter. This may be due to difficulties in 
applying these principles, which will be considered in the discussion and conclusion 
to this chapter. Without observable express references to these principles they may 
play no role in the compliance of the evaluative criteria. They remain unclear in both 
their scope and application for tribunal members and other users of the Act. This 
same criticism may be raised in Victoria in relation to Charter rights and the failure to 
use section 5 of the Charter to implement CRPD rights. 
6.2.2.2 Presumption of Capacity and Functional test of Capacity 
The presumption of capacity may be anticipated to have the effect of increasing 
compliance with the evaluation criteria by not removing an adult’s decision-making 
ability and placing this in the hands of a substitute decision-maker. Only Queensland 
and Western Australia presently have a presumption of capacity in their guardianship 
legislation; however South Australia and the Northern Territory have the presumption 
of capacity in related legislation. 23  The ‘presumption of capacity’ means that 
evidence is required to displace the presumption. It is a rebuttable presumption of 
fact. Where the presumption of capacity is not rebutted then no accommodation 
guardian can be appointed and the adult is able to make his or her own 
accommodation decisions with or without support. 
The ‘functional’ test of capacity in Queensland does not require a person to have a 
disability. It incorporates a three-part matter specific test of understanding which is 
exercised freely and communicated by the adult in some way.24 Victoria and New 
South Wales use a combination of ‘status’ (must have a disability to come within the 
ambit of their legislation) and function (because of their disability the person cannot 
make reasonable decisions for their care).25 This can lead to the appointment of a 
guardian where the adult does not have a cognitive disability. The ‘functional 
                                            
23
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 7(a), GP 1; Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1990 (WA) s 4(3); see also Advanced Personal Planning Act (NT) s 6(2); see also Advance Care 
Directives Act 2013 (SA) s 10(c).  
24
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) sch 4 (definition of ‘capacity’). 
25
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) ss 22(1)(a), s 3 (definition of ‘disability’); 
Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 3 (definition of ‘disability’). 
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capacity’ test has been criticised as discriminatory because persons who do not 
have an identified disability do not have their decision-making ability questioned.26 
Both the ‘presumption of capacity’ and the ‘functional’ test of capacity in Queensland 
are different to the idea of universal ‘legal capacity’ contained in Article 12.27 The 
CRPD concept gives all persons with disabilities the ability to have rights and to 
exercise those rights without employing a functional test of understanding or being 
able to rebut a right of legal capacity.28 
The evaluative criteria appear to be met specifically when the presumption of 
capacity is not rebutted. In these instances the adult will continue to enjoy full legal 
capacity congruent with Article 12 of the CRPD and can be supported to make 
accommodation decisions. In these cases the ‘will and preferences’ of the adult will 
be met by not placing any restrictions upon the adult’s decision-making ability. 
It is still possible for a guardianship decision to be in compliance with the evaluative 
criteria when the presumption of capacity has been rebutted. This can occur when 
an appointment is made consistent with the wishes of the adult or when an enduring 
power of attorney is upheld that is consistent with the adult’s present wishes for 
assistance. 
The application of the criterion of observing the ‘least restrictive alternative’ can 
occur to meet the evaluation criteria even when the presumption of capacity has 
been rebutted. There may be no need for an order as there may be no decision to be 
made, the adult’s informal support network may be functioning appropriately to meet 
the adult’s needs, or a situation of need for a guardian may no longer exist. In these 
situations the evaluative criteria will be met but this is not due to the presumption of 
capacity or functional capacity test in the Queensland legislation. It is attributable to 
                                            
26
 International Disability Alliance, 'Position paper on functional capacity for Article 12 of the CRPD' 
(IDA, 2010) <http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/en/ida-sositi>; see also International 
Disability Alliance CRPD Forum, 'Principles on the Implementation of Article 12 (IDA Article 12 
Principles)' (2008) 
<www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/documents_working_group/Article_12_Principles_Final.doc>; 
see also International Disability Alliance, 'Legal Opinion on Article 12 of the CRPD' (IDA, 2009) 
<http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/en/ida-position>; see also Tina Minkowitz, 'Abolishing 
Mental Health Laws to Comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' in 
Bernadette McSherry and Penelope Weller (ed), Rethinking Rights' Based Mental Health Laws (Hart 
Publishing, 1st ed, 2010) . 
27
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 12(2). 
28
 United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, 'Legal Capacity' (UN, 2009) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGD21102009.asp>; Amita Dhanda, 'Legal 
Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the past or lodestone for the future?' 
(2007) 34(2) Syracuse International Journal of Law and Commerce 429; see also Clarence J 
Sundram, 'A discussion of Legal Capacity in the draft Convention on Disability' (National Disability 
Authority, 2006) <http://www.mdri.org/mdri-web-2007/pdf/>; see also Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, 
'A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity' (2011) <http://www.lco-
cdo.org/en/disabilities-call-for-papers--bach-kerzner>. 
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following the fundamental principle of taking the least restrictive alternative to 
maintain the adult’s decision-making autonomy.29 
The presence of a positively functioning informal support network may enhance a 
tribunal’s unwillingness to rebut the presumption of capacity for an adult. Conversely, 
the presence of actual undue influence between the adult and the adult’s support 
network may provide an incentive to rebut the presumption of capacity to enable an 
order to be made to prevent further financial abuse. 
In summary, Queensland’s presumption of decision-making capacity is directly 
consistent with the evaluative criteria when its application results in no rebuttal of 
‘capacity’. In other cases the presumption of capacity and the functional capacity test 
may be a neutral feature. The evaluative criteria may still be met through the 
application of the ‘least restrictive alternative’ in refraining from making a 
guardianship appointment. 
6.2.2.3 Provisions in the Act that recognise the importance of the 
adult’s informal support network and require support to be 
provided  
There is recognition of the important role played by the adult’s informal support 
network in assisting the adult in decision-making in several sections of the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD). Recognition of the importance of a 
support network is found in the Acknowledgement (s 5), the purpose (of the Act) to 
achieve balance (s 6), the way the purpose is to be achieved (s 7) and Guardianship 
Principle 7. 30  These provisions do not exist in other Australian guardianship 
enactments. They recognise the existence of an adult’s informal support network in 
supporting the adult to make their own decisions. They go even further in stating that 
the adult has a right to be supported to make their own decisions.31 These provisions 
rely upon the existence of a positively functioning support network of the adult’s 
family, friends and trusted others. 32  However, there are no positive obligations 
arising from the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) to create a support 
network where none exists or to educate, train and monitor an existing support 
network that may be poorly functioning. 
The recognition of the importance of the adult’s support network may increase 
compliance with the evaluative criteria. This occurs by finding that there is ‘no need’ 
for the appointment of a guardian as decisions can be made informally with the 
                                            
29
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 5(d), GP 7(3)(c). ‘A person or other entity in 
performing a function or exercising a power under this Act must do so in a way least restrictive of the 
adult’s rights’. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Ibid ss 5(e), 6(b), 7(3)(a) GP. See footnote 19 supra for the words of these provisions. 
32
 Michael Bach, 'What Does Article 12 of the CRPD Require? Theoretical Starting Points and 
Questions' (July 2009) <http://www.inclusionireland.ie/CapacityRoundtableAug2009.asp>; see also 
Dianne Chartres, 'Implementation of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities' (AGAS, 2012) <http:/www.agac.org.au/>. 
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assistance of the support network. This is consistent with the evaluation criteria by 
the tribunal taking the ‘least restrictive’ approach by not making a guardianship order 
or by dismissing an application for an accommodation guardian. 
What if the adult is isolated and does not have an informal support network? Since 
there is no requirement under the Act to create a support network it is likely that an 
appointment of an accommodation guardian will be made against the evaluation 
criteria.  
If the adult’s support network is dysfunctional due to internal conflict or personal 
interests of the support network favoured over the interests of the adult then an 
appointment is likely in contravention of the evaluation criteria.  
In summary, the provisions recognising supported decision-making and the right to 
be supported serve as an acknowledgement or platform for supported decision-
making. There is no legislative requirement for either QCAT or any other body to 
create a support network. If there is a positively functioning support network then it is 
likely that no decision for an accommodation guardian will be made and these 
provisions enhance compliance with the evaluation criteria. This is accomplished by 
adopting the least restrictive alternative and allowing the will and preferences of the 
adult to be followed. However, where there is no support network or a dysfunctional 
support network then the Queensland provisions will not assist in compliance with 
the evaluation criteria. 
6.2.3 Summary of Queensland’s legislative provisions 
It was anticipated that the legislative features of the Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (QLD) would result in a greater compliance with the evaluation criteria than 
in NSW or Victoria. This however remains uncertain due to the lack of clarity of 
Guardianship Principles 2 and 3, differences between the meaning of ‘legal capacity’ 
in the CRPD and capacity under the Queensland legislation, and recognition of 
informal support networks in Queensland without creating, training or monitoring 
these networks. 
6.3 Application of the evaluation criterion of obeying the adult’s 
will and preferences to Queensland guardianship cases 
involving accommodation 
This criterion is satisfied if the will of the adult is met by obeying the preferences of 
the adult. It could be met by not making a guardianship order therefore allowing the 
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adult to make his or her own accommodation decisions as in RAB and KAF,33 by 
making an appointment in accordance with the adult’s wishes PLC v Adult 
Guardian34 or by upholding an enduring power of attorney that may indicate the 
adult’s wishes. 
The concept of universal will irrespective of the level of cognitive ability underpins the 
concept of ‘legal capacity’ and supported decision making in Article 12 of the 
CRPD.35 Support may be necessary to ascertain an adult’s will and preferences but 
once ascertained these preferences should be followed.36 
Guardianship Principle 7 is congruent in a number of respects with following the ‘will 
and preferences’ of the adult.37 It includes seeking and taking the wishes of the adult 
into account. It also includes the provision of supports in Guardianship Principle 
7(3)(a), but it does not require the wishes of the adult to be exclusively obeyed. It 
qualifies this duty by using the words ‘to the greatest extent practicable’ in 
Guardianship Principle 7(3)(b). There is no interpretation of the meaning of the 
words ‘to the greatest extent practicable’ for following the wishes of the adult in 
Guardianship Principle 7. Guardianship Principle 7 also raises care and protection as 
a requirement for anyone performing a function or exercising a power under the Act. 
This has been shown to override the wishes of the adult in certain cases.38 The 
                                            
33
 Re RAB [2009] QGAAT 72 (28 September 2009) .RAB was a 77 year-old man living in his own 
home. RAB had early Alzheimer’s disease with an MMSE of 20/30. He paid his bills, visited doctors 
on his own, attended to household duties cooking and cleaning and had a positive support network no 
order for guardianship was made; Re KAF [2008] QGAAT 91 (16 December 2008); HE [2013] QCAT 
488 (20 August 2013). 
34
 PLC v Adult Guardian [2013] QCATA (14 January 2013). The adult, PSB, was 52 and had an 
intellectual disability and cerebral palsy. The adult indicated his sister PLC who had been caring for 
him since his mother died 12 months prior to the hearing was not appointed guardian as PSB said he 
wanted the OAG who was appointed. 
35
 Lana Kerzner, 'Paving the way to full realisation of the CRPD's Rights to legal capacity and 
supported decision-making: a Canadian perspective' (April 2011) <http://cic.arts.ubc.ca/research-
knowledge-exchange/supportive-decision-making.html>; Gerard Quinn, 'Rethinking Personhood: New 
directions in Legal Capacity Law and Policy (An Idea Paper) How to Put the 'shift' into Paradigm Shift' 
(University of British Columbia, 29 April 2011) 
<http://www.arts.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/CIC/July_2011/Gerard_Quinn_s_Keynote_April_29_2
011.pdf>; Gerard Quinn, 'An ideas paper' (4 June 2009) 
<http://www.onclusionireland.ie/documents/AnIdeasPaperbyGerardQuinnJune2009pdf>. 
36
 Scope, 'Supporting people who communicate informally and use behaviours of concern to live lives 
they prefer through partnerships' (2009) <http://www.leishman.associates.com.au/44assid2009>. 
37
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 7(2) states ‘Also, the importance of preserving, 
to the greatest extent practicable, an adult’s right  to make his or her own decisions must be taken 
into account.’; (3)(a) states ‘the adult must be given any necessary support, and access to 
information, to enable the adult to participate in decisions affecting the adult’s life, and (b) to the 
greatest extent practicable, for exercising power for a matter for the adult, the adult’s view and wishes 
are to be sought and taken into account.’ 
38
 Ibid sch 1 ss GP 7(3)(b), (5); see Re JD [2003] QGAAT 14 (19 September 2003) where it was held 
that GP 7(5) was sufficient to enable the adult to be held against her wishes for her protection to 
prevent her entering the criminal justice system; see also Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 
2009); see also Re MAN [2008] QGAAT 97 (24 December 2008) where, for protective reasons, a 26 
year old man with an intellectual disability, behavioural issues and potential criminal responsibility was 
denied 6 declarations of capacity to enable him to exercise his will and preferences for protective 
reasons. 
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principles contained in General Principle 7 resemble the general principles in NSW, 
Victoria and the other Australian State and Territory guardianship jurisdictions.39 
Guardianship Principle 7 was discussed here as it promotes observance of the 
adult’s will and preferences. It will be revisited at the end of this chapter when 
considering recommendations from the findings of the Queensland guardianship 
cases. 
Factors that militate against compliance 
There are a number of factors that negatively affect following the ‘will and 
preferences’ of the adult. When these occur Article 12 of the CRPD will not be 
followed and the important criterion of compliance with the adult’s preferences will 
not be met. These situations may be categorised as disagreements between the 
adult’s support network and the provision of services for the adult, medical best 
interests/care and protection issues for a vulnerable adult, and disagreements 
between members of the adult’s support network, where Guardianship Principle 8 
(maintenance of the adult’s existing supportive relationships)40 may be used against 
the adult’s right to be supported to make their own decisions.41 The use of Enduring 
Powers of Attorney to indicate the adult’s will and preferences will be considered as 
there are frequent examples where such documents have been overridden in 
circumstances where there are disagreements  between members of the adult’s 
support network. 
6.3.1 Disagreements between the Adult’s Support Network and the 
Service Provider 
This is a factor that may militate against compliance with this criterion to resolve an 
impasse when necessary services are refused by the adult’s support network. This 
situation might arise when the adult is of younger age and has an intellectual and 
possibly a psycho-social disability and the support network is unhappy with the level 
and degree of services provided as in the cases of JAA, FDN, MB, BBE and DJ.42 
The adult may indicate a desire to make their own decisions or to be assisted or 
supported by a family member in decision-making. Even in situations where the 
intellectual disability is profound and it is very difficult to ascertain the individual’s will 
and preferences, it is highly unlikely that the adult would have elected to be assisted 
by the Queensland Public Guardian in their decision-making as in the cases of CAA, 
                                            
39
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) s 4; Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4; Adult 
Guardianship Act 1988 (NT) s 4; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 4; Guardianship 
and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) s 4; Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 
5; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (TAS) s 6. 
40
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) sch 1 GP 8. Maintenance of existing supportive 
relationships provides ‘The importance of maintaining the adult’s existing supportive relationships 
must be taken into account’. 
41
 Ibid s 6. Purpose of the Act. 
42
 JAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 1 (6 January 2009); FDN [QCAT] 325 (4 July 2011); MB [2013] QCAT 714 
(26 November 2013); BBE [2014] QCAT 80 (25 February 2014); DJ [2014] QCAT 619 (11 November 
2014). 
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MAM, HAB, FPC and RAA.43 The appointment of the State funded independent 
decision-maker may be seen as both a protective mechanism and as a means to 
resolve current and future disputes by QCAT in the cases of MAM, FPC and RAA.44 
If there were other mechanisms to either provide support for the adult in these 
situations or for other forms of dispute resolution then there may be fewer 
appointments of the statutory guardian (public guardian) with a consequent higher 
adherence to the evaluation criteria. These possible solutions will be discussed in 
Chapter 8 dealing with ‘Future Directions’. 
6.3.2 Medical Best Interests 
A restrictive appointment is made for the medical best interests of an adult. This 
would be in support of Guardianship Principle 7(5). The medical best interests 
encompass the health, safety and welfare of the adult. The adult in these instances 
may have an intellectual disability, a psycho-social disability or multiple disabilities. 
The adult may have only paid service providers in their lives as in TS, BF, WWB and 
ST45 or may have an existing support network consisting of trusted family members. 
The appointment of a guardian for accommodation may be made to promote the 
health or medical best interests of the adult as in the cases of HAA, LAA, KAB, SAS 
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 Re HAB [2008] QGAAT 82 (5 November 2008). HAB was a 19 year-old man with a psycho-social 
disability. He resided with his aunt (supporter) in private rented accommodation. Both HAB and his 
aunt did not understand HAB’s disability and disagreed with the treating team. The OAG was 
appointed for accommodation and services; Re CAA [2009] QGAAT 7 (19 February 2009). CAA was 
a 20 year-old man with an intellectual disability and ASD. He had resided for the previous 12 years 
prior to the hearing with foster guardian HB. CS, CAA’s brother removed CAA and placed him in 
residential care without the knowledge of HB. There was a conflict between CS and disability services 
and HB. The OAG was appointed for accommodation; Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009). 
RAA was an adult with Russell-Silver syndrome. This manifested in an intellectual and psycho-social 
disabilities with behavioural issues. He wanted his mother KM to be guardian. There was a dispute 
between KM and disability services in addition to KM residing interstate. OAG was appointed; Re 
MAM [2008] QGAAT 92 (17 December 2008). MAM was a 21 year old woman. She had a profound 
intellectual disability and was non-verbal. MAM received 65 hours per week of funding from disability 
services. The policy required MAM to reside in accommodation with a co-tenant. This was against 
MAM’s mother’s wishes. There was a disagreement between Disability Services and MAM’s mother 
with the OAG appointed; FPC [2012] QCAT 689 (21 December 2012). FPC was a 19 year old woman 
with an intellectual disability. She resided in a three-person Endeavour house. FPC had three siblings, 
all of whom had intellectual disabilities. FPC’s support network (parents) had problems with the 
service provider. The OAG was appointed as future accommodation disputes were likely; PLC v Adult 
Guardian [2013] QCATA (14 January 2013). PSB was a 52 year old man with an intellectual disability 
and cerebral palsy. He had been cared for by his sister PLC for the previous 10 months before the 
hearing following the death of his mother. The OAG was appointed but on appeal it was held that the 
need for guardianship and the appropriateness of PLC as guardian was not properly considered and 
a new hearing should take place even though PSB gave an express preference for the OAG. PSB 
may not have understood the issues. 
44
 FPC [2012] QCAT 689 (21 December 2012); Re MAM [2008] QGAAT 92 (17 December 2008); Re 
RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009). 
45
 TS [2011] QCAT 684 (14 November 2011). TS, a young woman, had a cognitive disability, 
deafness and alcoholism. TS was isolated without a support network. The OAG was appointed for 
accommodation. TS was likely to be evicted and return to live on the streets. 
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and BS.46 Sometimes an appointment is made to prevent involvement or further 
involvement of the criminal justice system in the life of an adult who has intellectual, 
psycho-social and other disabilities as in the cases of MAN, HRJ and AJC.47 
The medical best interests of an adult may also be protected where there is a lack of 
understanding of the medical needs of the adult by their support network, as in BSK, 
JAA, FLP and MGH.48 This often results in an appointment of the statutory guardian 
for the adult’s care and protection. 
The adult’s care and medical best interests may be used to justify a guardianship 
order where the adult is subject to abuse. There may be physical or sexual abuse 
from the adult’s support network as in the cases of DAB, EE and LF.49 The adult may 
also experience abuse in the form of neglect and exploitation from their network. 
This also has resulted in guardianship appointments for the protection, and the 
medical best interests, of the adult.50 
Guardianship orders appointing the OAG/Public Guardian for accommodation and 
other personal and health decisions have been made in situations involving adults 
                                            
46
 HAA,Re [2009] QGAAT 4 (4 February 2009); LAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 13 (11 March 2009); LAC, Re 
[2009] QGAAT 49 (12 June 2009); KAB, Re [2009] QGAAT 74 (3 September 2009); SAG, Re [2009] 
QGAAT 67 (16 September 2009); PC [2009] QCAT 17 (4 December 2009); PK [2010] QCAT 75 (12 
February 2010); BDG [2010] QCAT 112 (2 March 2010); DN [2010] QCAT 398 (17 August 2010); 
WWB [2012] QCAT 175 (2 February 2012); MPS [2012] QCAT 474 (29 August 2012); EWH [2013] 
QCAT 137 (8 February 2013); BSK [2013] QCAT 218 (23 April 2013); MB [2013] QCAT 714 (26 
November 2013); NR [2013] QCAT 662 (16 December 2013); SAS [2014] QCAT 26 (15 January 
20l14); BS [2014] QCAT 281 (13 June 2014); SA [2014] QCAT 635 (7 November 2014); BD [2014] 
QCAT 597 (9 November 2014); SBA [2015] QCAT 28 (20 January 2015); MA [2015] QCAT 82 (13 
March 2015); GAJ [2015] QCAT 98 (2 March 2015); HLD [2015] QCAT 163 (30 April 2015). 
47
 Re MAN [2008] QGAAT 97 (24 December 2008). MAN was a 26 year old man. He had the OAG 
and PTQ as appointed guardians and administrators since 2001. He had made three unsuccessful 
applications for ‘declarations of capacity’ to remove the substitutes. This application was dismissed. 
MAN did not have stable accommodation. He made frequent abusive ‘000’ calls to the police. MAN 
had sexually harassed young males. There were criminal justice issues; HRJ [2010] QCAT 38 (20 
January 2010). HRJ was a 19 year old man with an intellectual disability, autism and behavioural 
problems. He used objects as projectiles and frequently hit his head on solid objects. MAN lacked a 
support network. The possibility of criminal charges was present. OAG was appointed for 
accommodation; AJC [2013] QCAT 51 (21 January 2013). AJC was a 49 year old man with a 
profound intellectual disability. He had resided in the same supported accommodation for the past 22 
years with a service provider supported by his family support network. AJC recently moved to 
emergency housing and did not wish to return to his former accommodation. AJC had current criminal 
charges of allegations of rape, OAG re-appointed for accommodation; Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 
August 2009). RAA’s behaviour towards young males also potentially involves the criminal justice 
system; GAJ [2015] QCAT 98 (2 March 2015). GAJ, an adult with an intellectual disability and ABI, 
had criminally assaulted family members while he resided with family. 
48
 BSK [2013] QCAT 218 (23 April 2013); SAS [2014] QCAT 26 (15 January 20l14); MGH [2014] 
QCAT 250 (6 June 2014); FLA [2014] QCAT 521 ( 22 September 2014); JAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 1 (6 
January 2009); DN [2010] QCAT 398 (17 August 2010). 
49
 DAB, Re [2009] QGAAT 25 (14 April 2009); GS [2012] QCAT 538 (12 October 2012); EE [2013] 
QCAT 539 (10 October 2013); LF [2013] QCAT 733 (21 October 2013). 
50
 LJE [2010] QCAT 21 (15 January 2010); DN [2010] QCAT 43 (5 February 2010); PK [2010] QCAT 
75 (12 February 2010); WT [2010] QCAT 633 (24 November 2010); DM [2012] QCAT 152 (7 March 
2012); BSA [2014] QCAT 206 (16 April 2014). 
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with mental or psychosocial disabilities in the PR, TJR and HAB cases. 51  A 
justification for these orders is protection of the public and protection of the 
individual.52 This may be an example of medical protective best interests as seen in 
chapters 4 and 5.53  
Safety considerations 
There are often safety considerations arising from the adult’s behaviour where QCAT 
deem it necessary for a restrictive order to protect the individual and the public, as in 
the cases of LAB, MAK and RAE.54 Such an appointment may be contrary to the 
express will and preferences of the individual. This would be in contradiction with the 
purpose of the Act and in contravention of the evaluation criterion of observing the 
will and preferences of the individual in the HAB and RAA cases.55 It may also cause 
the adult to leave their accommodation and find alternative accommodation in 
defiance of a decision made by the Public Guardian.56 The appointment of the Public 
Guardian in these circumstances may be a futile attempt of care and protection 
under the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) in the cases of PR and 
HRJ.57 It was observed in Chapter 5 that in four recent NSW cases where the adult 
                                            
51
 PR [2012] QCAT 610 (10 October 2012). PR was a 32 year old indigenous man with a psycho-
social disability. He resided in a community care unit (CCU). He lacked insight to his diagnosed 
condition, had poor medication compliance and frequently abused alcohol. He was subject to an 
involuntary treatment order but the OAG was appointed for accommodation; TJR [2011] QCAT 527 
(20 October 2011). TJR was a 55 year old man residing in his own home with an intellectual and 
psycho-social disability. TJR was in danger of losing his home and had significant outstanding 
criminal charges not before the Mental Health Court. An appointment of the OAG was made for 
accommodation as there was no individual in the adult’s support network willing or able to assist with 
accommodation decisions; Re HAB [2008] QGAAT 82 (5 November 2008). HAB was also subject to 
an involuntary treatment order. 
52
 Phillip Fennell and Urfan Khaliq, 'Conflicting or complementary obligations? The UN Disability 
Rights Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and English law' (2011) 6 European 
Human Rights Law Revew 662; Philip Fennell, 'Institutionalising the Community: The Codification of 
Clinical Authority and the Limits of Rights-Based Approaches' in Bernadette McSherry and Penelope 
Weller (ed), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Hart Publishing, first ed, 2010) 13; Re 
RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009). 
53
 AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 753 (8 May 2009); PJB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 643 (17 May 
2010); OM v Public Guardian [2010] NSWADT 137 (8 June 2010). 
54
 LAB,Re [2008] QGAAT 64 (28 August 2008); MAK, Re [2008] QGAAT 83 (6 Noventber 2008); 
RAE, Re [2008] QGAAT 89 (27 November 2008); PAF, Re [2009] QGAAT 58 (3 July 2009); MJI 
[2010] QCAT 76 (23 February 2010); DD [2010] QCAT 37 (5 January 2010); MGM [2010] QCAT 23 
(14 January 2010); WT [2010] QCAT 633 (24 November 2010); FDN [QCAT] 325 (4 July 2011); CED 
[2012] QCAT 386 (21 June 2012); PVJ [2014] QCAT 205 (14 February 2014); MGH [2014] QCAT 250 
(6 June 2014); TS [2014] QCAT 598 (10 November 2014); HLD [2015] QCAT 163 (30 April 2015). 
55
 Re HAB [2008] QGAAT 82 (5 November 2008); Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009); NAN 
[2008] NSWGT 12 (17 March 2008). 
56
 Karov v Chief Executive, Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation 
[2011] QCAT 11 (10 January 2011). 
57
 PR [2012] QCAT 610 (10 October 2012); HRJ [2010] QCAT 38 (20 January 2010); Re RAA [2009] 
QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009). 
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refused to obey an accommodation decision from an appointed guardian the order 
was dismissed. The result was compliance with this criterion.58 
The lack of specific advocacy and other services to protect and to support individuals 
with intellectual and/or psychosocial disabilities to make their own decisions may 
provide one reason why the statutory guardian is appointed contrary to the will and 
preferences of the individual and contrary to the purpose of the Act.59 It may be but 
that does not appear in the written reasons for a decision that the members of the 
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) or the former Queensland 
Guardianship and Administrative Tribunal (QGAAT) wish to ensure the protection of 
vulnerable adults with various disabilities. They have only limited means at their 
disposal. These means involve the appointment of a substitute decision-maker 
(guardian or administrator). 
Summary 
This section demonstrates that restrictive orders are frequently made contrary to the 
evaluative criterion of ‘will and preferences’ of the adult and contrary to the adult’s 
right to receive support to make their own decisions (SAA, PR, MAN, AJC and 
RAA).60 The perceived vulnerability of an adult because of an intellectual or psycho-
social disability coupled with isolation and potential involvement of the criminal 
justice system has resulted in the making and continuation of these orders. 
6.3.3 Disagreements between members of an adult’s existing support 
network 
Guardianship Principle 8 has been used in a number of situations to make 
appointments of the statutory guardian contrary to the will and preferences of the 
adult. Guardianship Principle 8 provides, ‘the importance of maintaining an adult’s 
                                            
58
 HLA [2014] QCAT 419 (12 August 2014); HI [2013] QCAT 543 (27 September 2013); JSG [2014] 
NSWCATGD 20 (7 April 2014); NTL [2013] NSWGT 6 (23 April 2013). 
59
 Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report 2011-12' (OPA Victoria, 2012) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/file/OPA_AReport20111-12>; Office of the Public Advocate 
South Australia, 'Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Disability care and Support' 
(OPA, 2 August 2010) <http://www.carersaustralia.com.au/storage/Submission-to-PC-Long-term-
Care-and-Support-Scheme%20_NDIS_.pdf>; see also Office of the Public Advocate of the Australian 
Capital Territory, 'Substitute Decision-Making' (OPA - ACT, 2011) 
<http://www.publicadvocate.act.gov.au/guardianship/substitute_decision_maki>; Office of the Public 
Advocate of South Australia, 'Developing a Model of Practice for Supported Decision Making' (Office 
of the Public Advocate of South Australia, 2011) <http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/cgi-
bin/wf.pl?file=/html/document>; see also Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, 'Annual Report  
2012-2013' (OPA Victoria, 2013) <www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au>; see also Office of the Public 
Advocate of South Australia, 'What is Supported Decision Making' (OPA South Australia, 2011) 
<http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/cgi-bin/wf.pl?pid=&hi=&mode=show&fo>. 
60
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) ss 5(e), 6(b), 7(3)(a) GP; SAA [2012] QCAT 707 
(26 November 2012). Will of SAA a 75 year old woman with anxiety and dementia residing at home 
with husband SG was to remain at home and continue to make all decisions. There was violent 
behaviour to husband, neighbours and police led QCAT to the restrictive order of OAG for SAA’s care 
and protection; AJC [2013] QCAT 51 (21 January 2013); Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 
2009); Re MAN [2008] QGAAT 97 (24 December 2008); PR [2012] QCAT 610 (10 October 2012). 
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existing supportive relationships must be taken into account.’ On its face this 
principle through recognising and maintaining an adult’s support network could result 
in greater compliance with the evaluative criteria. However, the cases do not support 
this proposition. It holds more to the contrary. The cases demonstrate that a 
dysfunctional support network often demonstrates a need for an appointment of a 
guardian against the will and preferences of the adult. The adult generally wishes 
either to make their own accommodation decisions or to be assisted by family 
members. I have identified the will and preferences of the adult in most of the cases. 
The network disagreements frequently result in the appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation against the will and preferences of the adult. It is discussed here as 
an important factor militating against compliance with the adults wishes. There is 
some overlap with the first facilitating feature as these situations are classified in this 
thesis as dysfunctional support networks. 
The disagreements generally result in an appointment of the Public Guardian. The 
Public Guardian is required to maintain existing supportive relationships by 
communicating with all members of the adult’s support network, in accordance with 
Guardianship Principle 8. 
Should unresolved family disagreements be the catalyst for a restrictive appointment 
of an accommodation guardian when this is contrary to the readily identified wishes 
of the adult? What if the adult had made a particular decision to receive support or 
assistance from a particular family member with full knowledge of the family 
dynamics? 
This subsection will be divided into a number of hypothetical situations with 
explanatory case examples. 
Example 1: Siblings or other members of the adult’s support network do not 
agree on the place of residence of the adult  
Family members contrive to or actually remove the adult from Queensland. For 
instance sibling ‘A’ resides in Queensland and sibling ‘B’ resides in another state and 
the adult is removed to that state, as in the cases of HAD, SAL, PAP, JAB, WAB, IT, 
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WIV and NAP. 61  The disagreement is resolved through the appointment of the 
independent statutory decision-maker.62 This appointment may be against the known 
wishes of the adult, who may have expressed them to the tribunal or other persons 
                                            
61
 Re HAD [2009] QGAAT 75 (1 October 2009). HAD was a 94 year old woman with Alzheimer’s 
disease. She could no longer recognize pictures of the royal family of great interest to her in the past. 
She had two children a daughter ND and a son CL. ND took HAD to reside with her in Western 
Australia according to her will. When asked by QCAT how ND would apply GP 8 if appointed 
accommodation guardian ND said she would invite the remainder of the family to Christmas lunch in 
Western Australia. The OAG was appointed accommodation guardian. The Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 44A allows for the recognition of interstate guardianship orders 
making it possible for the appointment of the OAG in Queensland (that occurred) to be applicable in 
Western Australia; SAL [2013] QCAT 31 (11 January 2013). SAL was an elderly woman with a 
cognitive disability. She had a son SA residing in Queensland and a daughter PH who resided in 
Victoria. Under the pretext of a holiday PH took SAL to Victoria. It was formerly the adult’s will was to 
reside in Queensland with her son. PH insisted this was to be a permanent, while SA said it was 
temporary. The OAG was appointed for accommodation; Re JAB [2009] QGAAT 42 (27 May 2009). 
JAB was an elderly woman with a cognitive disability. She had two children, GWV (son) who resided 
in South Australia and a daughter WV who resided in Queensland. The OAG was appointed as GWV 
wished to remove JAB from Queensland against the views of WV; Re WAB [2009] QGAAT 48 (12 
June 2009). WAB was a male aged 59 years who had a stroke in 2008. He had a partner RK who 
wanted WAB to reside with her in Queensland. WAB had a brother in Tasmania who wanted WAB to 
reside with him. The guardianship order was dismissed upon review following WAB’s marriage to RK 
and return to Queensland according to his wishes. The reasoning of the tribunal was that a decision 
of a relative in Tasmania could not affect a happily married couple living in Queensland; Re PAP 
[2008] QGAAT 70 (8 October 2008). PAP was a 77 year old woman who had a stroke in 2008. She 
had two daughters SR and RH and a new partner AB. The daughters did not agree with AB. Although 
AB had put $50,000.00 towards the purchase price of PAP’s home AB wanted to remove PAP to Far 
North Queensland against the wishes of SR and RH who wanted PAP to remain at home. The OAG 
was appointed for accommodation decisions; IT [2010] QCAT 258 (15 April 2010). On 17 February 
2010 TS and RL were appointed administrators for their mother IT who resided in a residential care 
facility with dementia. On 11 March 2010 TS and RL without contacting the appointed guardian, the 
OAG or other members of the family (support network) transferred IT to another residential care 
facility. This was outside their appointment for administration with the OAG and PTQ appointed; NAP 
[2012] QCAT 69 (17 February 2012). NAP was an elderly female with dementia residing in a high 
care residential facility. There was a conflict between NAP support network consisting of her 
daughter-in-law KP and her son GP. KP wanted NAP to transfer to a residential facility in central 
Queensland where NAP had a number of relatives. GP would accept the treating team’s advice 
regarding relocation. KP had her daughter PO apply for guardianship and was wedded to the 
relocation. The Office of Adult Guardian was continued as accommodation guardian; WIV [2012] 
QCAT 608 (23 October 2012). WIV was a 94 year old woman with cognitive disabilities. She had a 
husband WTN and a daughter TN comprising her support network. WTN wanted WIV to return home 
from hospital while TN wished to remove WIV to reside in NSW, according to her wishes. The OAG 
was appointed for accommodation. 
62
 AAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 3 (19 January 2009); SAB, Re [2009] QGAAT 16 (18 March 2009); OAA, 
Re [2009] QGAAT 51 (18 June 2009); DG [2010] QCAT 330 (30 June 2010); EEE [2010] QCAT 644 
(8 September 2010); WRG [2010] QCAT 666 (15 December 2010); BMR [2011] QCAT 280 (7 June 
2011); GMB [2012] QCAT 113 (6 February 2012); MRD [2012] QCAT 445 (10 February 2012); BLT 
[2013] QCAT 713 (4 April 2013); HI [2013] QCAT 543 (27 September 2013); EE [2013] QCAT 539 (10 
October 2013); FAB [2014] QCAT 235 (26 March 2014); BSA [2014] QCAT 206 (16 April 2014); MDC 
[2014] QCAT 338 (10 July 2014); SM [2014] QCAT 596 (28 October 2014); BD [2014] QCAT 597 (9 
November 2014); NMR [2015] QCAT 34 (7 January 2015). 
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as in the case of PAP,63 or may have made these wishes known by an enduring 
power of attorney as in JAB.64 
Example 2: Communication issues between members of the adult’s support 
network 
The network may consist of family members of the adult who due to personal 
differences will not act together to assist and support the adult. This often results in 
an appointment of the statutory guardian contrary to the will and preferences of the 
adult with the tribunal using Guardianship Principle 8 as justification for both the 
need for an appointment and the appropriateness of the statutory guardian, as 
illustrated in the cases of TAA, AAE, SAF, CAB, BAA, BP, PAA, HB, PSB and 
                                            
63
 Re PAP [2008] QGAAT 70 (8 October 2008). PAP had expressed utmost confidence in AB to assist 
with decisions and had made enduring powers of attorney in favour of AB in 2005 and 2008. 
64
 Re JAB [2009] QGAAT 42 (27 May 2009). JAB had some years ago provided son GWV with an 
enduring power of attorney for personal and financial decisions and expressed a desire to reside with 
GWV in South Australia. 
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HWR. 65  The cases cited with this example demonstrate dysfunctional support 
networks. There is no mechanism available to QCAT either legislatively or informally 
                                            
65
 Re TAA [2009] QGAAT 39 (19 May 2009). TAA was a 69 year old woman who had a sub-Dural 
haematoma in 2003. TAA’s support network consisted of husband TM and daughter KM. There had 
not been any communication between KM and TM for the past 6 years. OAG appointed for 
accommodation against the adult’s will who wanted assistance from the family; Re AAE [2009] 
QGAAT 29 (29 April 2009). AAE was an 80 year old man with a cognitive disability. His support 
network consisted of a son AP and a daughter TM. AAE was taken by police to his home on several 
occasions wandering and carrying thousands of dollars in a bag. AP sought guardianship but would 
not communicate with TM, GP 8 was used to appoint OAG against the will of the adult who wanted 
assistance from family; Re SAF [2008] QGAAT 73 (24 October 2008). SAF was an 85 year old 
woman with a cognitive disability. SAF had a husband BS who recently died. SAF had 4 daughters 
SS, TA, RB and MB. SS placed SAF in a residential aged care facility without contacting the other 
siblings, OAG appointed for accommodation; Re CAB [2009] QGAAT 20 (27 March 2009). CAB was a 
61 year old woman with early Alzheimer’s disease. Her support network consisted of her husband CO 
and two sons. CO would not communicate with CAB’s sons. In addition, CO used CAB’s financial 
resources to fund his legal actions, pay for a holiday in Europe for himself and threatened to leave 
CAB unless she did everything he demanded. OAG and PTQ were appointed against the will of the 
adult who wanted the sons to assist; Re BAA [2009] QGAAT 2 (15 January 2009). BAA had a support 
network consisting of her 5 daughters. Together with her deceased husband BAA had accumulated 
substantial financial assets. Three of the daughters would not communicate with the other two. At the 
time of the hearing BAA was 82 with moderate Alzheimer’s disease. For 35 years BAA had resided on 
acreage. Three daughters decided to purchase a smaller house to make 24 hour in home care more 
feasible. The OAG and perpetual trustees were appointed against the adult’s will who wanted her 5 
daughters to assist as evidence by the epoa; BP [2012] QCAT 376 (21 August 2012). This was the 
review hearing of the BAA decision. The adult was now 85 years of age and in a residential care 
facility. Communication problems persisted as between the 5 daughters. Some wanted residential 
care and others wanted their mother to be cared at home with private paid carers. The OAG and 
perpetual trustees were continued appointees; Re SAF [2009] QGAAT 62 (27 July 2009). SAF was an 
80 year old woman with cognitive and physical disabilities. Her support network consisted of two 
sons, ST and SG. SAF resided with ST to whom SAF transferred the family home after ST was 
released from jail. ST and SG would not communicate and the OAG was appointed for 
accommodation against the will of the adult who sought assistance from her son ST; Re PAA [2009] 
QGAAT 18 (20 March 2009). PAA was a 94 year old woman with a cognitive disability. Her support 
network consisted of daughter B and second husband PT. B would not communicate with PT. B 
removed PAA from a residential care facility she shared with PT had PAA sell her house and pay half 
the purchase price of B’s new house she resided in with PAA. The OAG was appointed for 
accommodation; HWR [2010] QCAT 349 (18 July 2010) HWR was an 80 year old man with 
Alzheimer’s disease. In 2003 he sold his banana and Papaya farm on the Sunshine Coast of 
Queensland for $30 million dollars. He transferred $17 million to his three children HR, HN and Miss 
H retaining $13 million in a company structure. HWR was residing in a private residence with 24-hour 
care provided by his new support network of a financial advisor WH, WH’s wife and another paid 
carer being paid $180,000.00 per year. HWR’s children were isolated from HWR and had 
communication issues with members of the new support network. It was HWR’s will as evinced by his 
new epoa to be supported by his new support network. OAG and PTQ were appointed; BE v Office of 
the Adult Guardian & Public Trustee of Queensland [2010] QCAT 24 (17 June 2010). BE 
unsuccessfully appealed the QCAT decision to revoke BE as attorney for her sister ML and install the 
OAG and PTQ. ML had a psycho-social disability and had appointed BE as her attorney. BE owned a 
house jointly with ML but had communication issues with her father and ML. Family conflict, distrust of 
BE by ML and a need to investigate finances led to the appointment of the OAG; HB [2012] QCAT 68 
(1 February 2012). HB was a 73 year old woman with advanced Alzheimer’s disease residing in a 
residential care facility. HB’s support network consisted of son HM and daughter ND. HM and ND had 
a falling out in 2008 and had not communicated with each other for the next 4 years. During this time 
ND had HB sell her house move in with ND (for 10 months) and transfer all of HB’s financial assets of 
over $451,000.00 to ND’s personal bank account. It was HB’s intention that her two children assist 
with decisions as evidenced by the epoa. The OAG became involved when HM as co-attorney noticed 
in late 2011 that HB’s financial assets had been dissipated; LRS [2012] QCAT 112 (19 March 2012). 
LRS was an elderly woman with dementia. LRS had a support network consisting of her two sons MS 
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to mend the communication difficulties so the solution reached is often the 
appointment of the statutory guardian. 
Example 3: Members of the adult’s support network cannot agree upon the 
level of cognitive disability or the care needs of the adult 
‘X’ and ‘Y’ are children of the adult with a cognitive disability. ‘X’ believes the adult 
has only a limited disability and can reside at home while ‘Y’ believes the 
impairments are substantial and require residential care. Guardianship Principle 8 is 
again used in these circumstances to justify both the need for an accommodation 
guardian to be appointed and the statutory guardian as the appropriate decision-
                                                                                                                                       
and NS. NS did not communicate with MS when he removed both parents from respite care to live 
with NS in rented accommodation. MS brought the QCAT application alleging NS had withdrawn large 
sums from LRS’s bank account for NS’s use with the OAG appointed for accommodation; PSB [2013] 
QCAT 17 (17 January 2013). PSB was an 85 year old woman with Alzheimer’s disease residing in 
residential care. PSB had three daughters BFJ, CLK and NMR. BFJ and CLK were appointed 
guardians for health only. BFJ and CLK without communicating with NMR transferred PSB to another 
residential care facility. The OAG was appointed for accommodation; see also JAA, Re [2009] 
QGAAT 1 (6 January 2009); GAC, Re [2009] QGAAT 26 (15 April 2009); PAG, Re [2009] QGAAT 59 
(10 July 2009); EEE [2010] QCAT 644 (8 September 2010); NR [2011] QCAT 433 (8 July 2011); BLT 
[2013] QCAT 713 (4 April 2013); BMD [2013] QCAT 479 (9 September 2013); CJP [2013] QCAT 663 
(19 September 2013); LF [2013] QCAT 733 (21 October 2013); BBE [2014] QCAT 80 (25 February 
2014); DRR [2014] QCAT 352 (2 July 2014); FJ [2014] QCAT 394 (26 June 2014); HLA [2014] QCAT 
419 (12 August 2014); WBC [2014] QCAT 502 (8 October 2014); GS [2014] QCAT 657 ( 3 November 
2014); H [2014] QCAT 615 (26 November 2014); LIP [2014] QCAT 659 (16 December 2014); NMR 
[2015] QCAT 34 (7 January 2015). 
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maker, as in the cases of WMJ, CK, HAC, RMR, HE and JMS.66 These and other 
cases demonstrate that Guardianship Principle 8 can be used in contravention of the 
evaluation criterion of following the will and preferences of the adult. It is used where 
disagreements of a variety of types exist, not to resolve the disagreement, but to 
appoint the statutory guardian. 
6.3.4 Enduring Powers of Attorney 
This subsection complements the previous subsection where Guardianship Principle 
8 of the general principles was being used as justification where disharmony exists 
within the adult’s support network to appoint the statutory guardian. This subsection 
describes the situation where an enduring power of attorney is made by the adult 
pursuant to the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (QLD) yet disagreements between the 
members of the adult’s support network may lead to a revocation of the enduring 
power of attorney and the appointment of the statutory guardian. This use of 
Guardianship Principle 8 by the Tribunal overrides the will and preferences of the 
adult demonstrated by the enduring document. 
                                            
66
 WMJ [2012] QCAT 595 (24 October 2012) WMJ was an elderly woman with dementia as well as 
physical disabilities. She was unstable on her feet and needed two attendees to assist with mobility. 
She had falls and could not use a walking frame. Her support network consisted of her three children. 
A daughter with whom WMJ had been residing considered WMJ could return home according to the 
adult’s wishes. The other two siblings said an aged care facility would be required, OAG was 
appointed; WRG [2010] QCAT 666 (15 December 2010). CK was a 93 year old man with a cognitive 
disability. CK had a support network consisting of his son CP and daughter Mrs CP. CP resided with 
his father CK from 2007. In 2009 CK had a fall and spent several months in hospital. CP said CK 
could make all of his own decisions and should go home according to his wishes. Mrs CP followed the 
medical treating team who wanted CK in residential care refuting CK’s cognitive ability. The OAG was 
appointed for accommodation; Re HAC [2009]  QGAAT 55 (7 July 2009). HAC was an 88 year old 
woman with Alzheimer’s disease. She had been residing in her own home with the assistance of 
daughter HH and granddaughter HL accordihng to her wishes. Another daughter K formed the 
support network. Falls had resulted in fractures to HAC’s knee and hip. K believed HAC should 
receive care in a residential care facility while HH believed HAC should remain at home, the OAG was 
appointed; RMR [2011] QCAT 636 (23 November 2011). RMR was an 88 year old woman residing in 
an aged care facility. RMR had recently lost her husband, had an MMSE of 17/30 and was seen 
wandering the facility aimlessly searching for her deceased husband. RMR’s support network 
consisted of daughters SI and JM who were appointed joint guardians for accommodation in an 
earlier QCAT hearing. SI believed RMR had regained decision making ability and could return home 
and be assisted by SI. JM wanted RMR to be accommodated in a different aged care facility, the 
appointment was changed to the OAG for accommodation; HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013). 
HE was a 92 year old woman with a support network consisting of her 4 children. Three children 
considered HE had dementia and required an aged care facility. The fourth child MCDP supported HE 
to reside with her and assisted HE to revoke an enduring power of attorney for the other 3 children in 
favour of MCDP. It was HE’s wishes as expressed to the tribunal and in her epoa to reside with her 
daughter MCDP. QCAT overturned the previous finding of incapacity, finding the new epoa valid as 
the presumption of capacity was not rebutted; see also Re SAF [2009] QGAAT 62 (27 July 2009) 
where the support network of SAF consisted of sons ST and SG. ST resided with SAF and was of the 
opinion that SAF could make her own decisions and reside in ST’s home (formerly the family home) 
with ST. SG said SAF could not do so and required an aged care facility. The OAG was appointed for 
accommodation; see also JMS v Adult Guardian and Anor [2013] QCATA 135 (30 April 2013) where 
JMS’s QCAT appeal was dismissed as the previous QCAT finding was upheld that JMS should not be 
appointed accommodation guardian as there was family conflict and GP 8 would not be followed by 
JMS; see also OAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 51 (18 June 2009); SJWN [2013] QCAT 136 (6 March 2013). 
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An enduring power of attorney has been termed by Bach as ‘self-imposed 
substitution or self-imposed guardianship’. 67  It is neither autonomous decision-
making nor supported decision-making where a supporter or support network assists 
the individual to make their own decisions. The enduring power of attorney can 
however be an indication of the individual’s choice for future assistance and support. 
It may be an indication of the will and preferences of the adult. As with other 
jurisdictions, QCAT has full jurisdiction over enduring powers of attorney. They can 
be upheld as valid, overridden by superimposing a guardianship order so the 
enduring power of attorney lies dormant but activates following the expiration of the 
order, or QCAT can revoke the enduring document. The enduring power of attorney 
could be revoked for failing to comply with Guardianship Principle 8 maintaining the 
adult’s existing supportive relationships as well as for numerous other reasons.68 
This subsection will refer to a number of the cases mentioned already as they also 
involved enduring powers of attorney. The enduring power of attorney was in many 
instances either overridden or revoked due to the attorney’s inability to maintain 
existing supported relationships or resolve disagreements between members of the 
adult’s support network.  
The enduring power of attorney may have been created by the adult with full 
knowledge of the family dynamics as demonstrating the adult’s intentions. If this is 
the case then why should the family dynamics go against the adult’s intentions so 
that an unintended statutory body becomes the adult’s decision-maker, as in the 
                                            
67
 Michael Bach, 'Supported Decision Making under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities' (Canadian Association for Community Living, November 2007) 
<http://.inclusionireland.ie/documents/Bach-SupportedDecision>. 
68
 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (QLD) s 76. The General Principles must be applied by any person 
exercising a power or performing a function under the POA including GP 8, other duties in POA are to 
act honestly (s 66), to avoid a conflict (s 73), to consult with other attorneys (s 79), to act together with 
joint attorneys (s 80) and to keep property separate as between principal and attorney (s 86). 
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cases of PAP, LRS, CK, WIV, MGH, SAF, TAA, AAE, HAD, HAC, BAA, BP and 
HB?69 
                                            
69
 Re PAP [2008] QGAAT 70 (8 October 2008). PAP made epoa’s for her partner AB in 2005 and 
2008 which were invalidated (for process 2005 and capacity 2008). It was the intention of PAP to 
have support from AB and not the OAG, which was appointed; Re SAF [2008] QGAAT 73 (24 
October 2008). SAF had made 2 epoa’s in favour of daughter SS. SAF’s three other daughter’s TA, 
MB and RB were not made co- attorneys, the placement of PAP in residential care without consulting 
the other 3 siblings meant GP 8 was not followed and the OAG appointed for accommodation; Re 
TAA [2009] QGAAT 39 (19 May 2009). Following TAA’s subdural haematoma TAA made an epoa for 
husband TM and daughter KM to act jointly. They did not communicate for 6 years epoa revoked as 
both GP 8 and s 79 of POA not followed (no consultation between attorneys); Re AAE [2009] QGAAT 
29 (29 April 2009). AAE had made an epoa in favour of daughter TM. TM had breached GP 7(5) (care 
and protection) allowing AAE to wander the streets with a bag of money containing thousands of 
dollars and also not followed GP 8 in maintaining the supported relationship with AP. The epoa was 
revoked and AP’s application for guardianship was dismissed as he would not follow GP 8 by not 
communicating with TM; see also BE v Office of the Adult Guardian & Public Trustee of Queensland 
[2010] QCAT 24 (17 June 2010) where ML’s epoa in favour or sister BE was revoked as BE failed to 
keep financial records, lost the trust of ML and was in conflict with their father; Re HAD [2009] 
QGAAT 75 (1 October 2009) where an epoa existed jointly for NB daughter and HAD’s son. This 
epoa was revoked as unmanageable following HAD’s removal by NB to Western Australia, GP 8 was 
not maintained; Re BAA [2009] QGAAT 2 (15 January 2009). There was an epoa made by BAA in 
2003 in favour of all 5 of BAA’s daughters jointly but with 3 allowed to make decisions. There were 3 
month strained family meetings decisions were being made with 3 daughters as a voting impasse 
excluding the other 2 daughters. The epoa was revoked due to a failure to consult s 79 epoa and 
failure to uphold GP 8; Re HAC [2009]  QGAAT 55 (7 July 2009). HAC had an epoa jointly for 
daughters J and HH and wished to continue to reside with HH. The epoa was revoked  for a variety of 
reasons, failure to consult (s 79), failure to act honestly (s 66), failure to keep funds separate as HH 
transferred $125,000.00 of HAC funds to HH’s personal bank account and GP 8; Re PAA [2009] 
QGAAT 18 (20 March 2009) where an epoa in favour of daughter B was revoked for a variety of 
reasons failure to have a conflict transaction (sale of PAA’s house and contributing $264,000.00 to the 
purchase price of B’s new Buderim house), failure to keep funds separate (s 86) and failure to 
maintain existing supported relationship with second husband PT who was isolated; HWR [2010] 
QCAT 349 (18 July 2010). HWR made an epoa in favour of his three children in 2003. After a falling 
out he revoked this epoa and made a new one in 2008 in favour of his financial advisor WH. The 
tribunal found WH had isolated HWR from his family by living in a small country town with poor health 
services away from family surrounding HWR with paid carers. By allowing WH to withdraw as attorney 
this meant the 2008 revocation was valid and no epoa would be in existence so OAG and PTQ 
appointed; HB [2012] QCAT 68 (1 February 2012). HB made an epoa in 1999 for son HM and 
daughter ND to act jointly and severally. When ND acted alone to strip HB of all her finances of 
$451,000.00 place HB in residential care and did not pay the facilities’ fees incurring an $11,000.00 
debt the epoa was revoked for failing to act honestly (s 66), failing to separate finances (s 86), failing 
to consult (s 79); MA [2012] QCAT 685 (13 November 2012). MA had an epoa in favour of his wife. 
MA was admitted to hospital and doctors said he needed a secure dementia aged care facility. The 
attorney would likely take MA home. This would breach GP 7(5) failing to take adequate care and 
protection so epoa overridden by OAG for accommodation: Re JAB [2009] QGAAT 42 (27 May 2009). 
JAB gave son GWV an epoa but not daughter WV. JAB expressed an intention to move to South 
Australia and live with GWV. The epoa was overridden by an order for the OAG as GP 8 could not be 
maintained; LRS [2012] QCAT 112 (19 March 2012). On 25 May 2007 LRS gave a power of attorney 
for personal and financial matters to her two sons MS and NS to act jointly. On 29 October 2011 LRS 
purportedly revoked this joint power of attorney making a new power of attorney for NS alone. QCAT 
revoked the 2011 document for lack of capacity and revoked the 2007 document as unworkable 
finding NS had breached s 79 (POA) by not communicating with joint attorney MS and s 85 POA by 
not keeping records; CK [2010] QCAT 336 (20 May 2010). CK’s son CP moved in with CK in 2007. 
On 15 January 2008 CK gave a power of attorney for personal and health matters to CP and for 
financial matters to CP and Permanent Trustees. This epoa was revoked by QCAT when CP failed to 
transfer CK from Greenslopes Hospital to residential care and when CP mortgaged CK’s home for 
$540,000.00 raising capital for a financial venture involving CP; WMJ [2012] QCAT 595 (24 October 
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There are situations when an adult has made an enduring power of attorney and 
seeks to revoke it in favour of no enduring power of attorney or a different 
appointment. QCAT demonstrates some reluctance to find an enduring power of 
attorney invalid in those circumstances and is prepared to uphold the existing 
enduring power of attorney to promote the care and protection of the adult as 
occurred in BJD, and AF.70 
This subsection has discussed enduring powers of attorney from the aspect of the 
enduring power of attorney being an indication of the will and preferences of the 
individual. A significant number of reported decisions have shown that the enduring 
power of attorney can be overridden or revoked by an appointment of the 
Queensland Public Guardian because of a failure to maintain the adult’s existing 
supported relationships in accordance with Guardianship Principle 8. 
6.3.5 Summary of factors militating against following will and 
preferences 
There are a number of factors that can militate against compliance with the 
evaluation criterion of following the will and preferences of the adult. The support 
network consisting of family members may have disputes with service providers for 
an adult with an intellectual disability. This may result in a restrictive appointment.71 
The medical best interests of the adult as well as the care and protection/safety of 
the public may result in an appointment against the will and preferences of the 
adult.72 The presence of disputes and communication issues between members of 
                                                                                                                                       
2012). WMJ an 81 year old female had made an epoa in favour of her two sons and daughter to act 
jointly. They could not agree upon placement while WMJ was in hospital. The daughter wanted home 
placement while the sons wanted a nursing home placement. The epoa was overridden in favour of 
the OAG for accommodation; WIV [2012] QCAT 608 (23 October 2012) where an epoa in favour of 
husband WTN and daughter TN was held unmanageable as they would not consult (s 79) and would 
not follow GP 8. TN had removed $75,000.00 from HIV’s band account placing these funds in TN’s 
son in law bank account; MJH [2012] QCAT 594 (15 November 2012). MJH was an 80 year old 
female residing in Queensland. She had an epoa in favour of three daughters who resided in NSW. 
MJH could make her own decisions and scored 30/30 in an mmse. The tribunal however appointed 
the OAG for accommodation as they were of the opinion that MJH was influenced by her daughters to 
sell her Queensland house and move to Sydney to please the daughters not her own interests. 
70
 BJD [2011] QCAT 615 (12 August2011) BJD was a 66 year old man residing temporarily in 
hospital. He had falls due to alcoholic dementia. He made an epoa in favour of his 4 children who 
were seeking an alternate residential care placement. BJD scored 29/30 in a mini mental state 
examination but was refused a declaration of capacity upon the basis that he was previously high-
functioning as a psychologist and was familiar with dementia specific tests. The epoa was continued 
against BJD’s will for his care and protection; AF [2011] QCAT 199 (27 April 2011). AF was an 88 
year old man, who, 18 months prior to the hearing made an epoa in favour of his wife and the Office 
of Adult Guardian (OAG) for personal and health decisions and for his wife and PTQ for financial 
decisions. His wife died and the OAG and PTQ remained attorneys. AF sought his grandchildren to 
be appointed as guardians and administrators. This was dismissed holding the epoa’s was valid. The 
presumption of capacity was rebutted during the hearing if was rebutted 18 months earlier the 
grandchildren could have been appointed guardians. 
71
 Re MAM [2008] QGAAT 92 (17 December 2008); FPC [2012] QCAT 689 (21 December 2012). 
72
 Re MAN [2008] QGAAT 97 (24 December 2008); Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009); 
HRJ [2010] QCAT 38 (20 January 2010); PR [2012] QCAT 610 (10 October 2012); AJC [2013] QCAT 
51 (21 January 2013). 
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the adult’s supportive network may lead to a restrictive appointment of the Public 
Guardian against the will and preferences of the adult. Often a justification for this 
appointment is the inability of the support network to comply with Guardianship 
Principle 8 of maintaining the adults existing supported relationships.73 On the other 
hand, a positive support network can enhance compliance with this criterion.74 An 
enduring power of attorney may indicate an adult’s will and preferences. This 
document can be overridden where the attorney(s) fail to uphold Guardianship 
Principle 8 against the will of the adult.75 
There were a significant number of cases that upheld the will and preferences of the 
adult. These occurred when the presumption of capacity was not rebutted leaving 
the adult free to make their own decisions in the cases of HE, DLT, MJL, BWE, TL, 
DM, PP and LOP.76  The adult may be well supported by their informal support 
networks, which provide adequate care and protection to avoid the need for an 
appointment of a guardian for accommodation as in the cases of HAD, JAC, RAB, 
                                            
73
 PSB [2013] QCAT 17 (17 January 2013); Re PAP [2008] QGAAT 70 (8 October 2008); Re AAE 
[2009] QGAAT 29 (29 April 2009); Re TAA [2009] QGAAT 39 (19 May 2009). 
74
 WT [2009] QCAT 27 (22 December 2009); BJR [2010] QCAT 484 (5 October 2010); TWG [2010] 
QCAT 618 (11 November 2010); JS [2013] QCAT 706 (10 November 2013); AJ [2014] QCAT 683 (22 
October 2014); HCD [2014] QCAT 643 (29 November 2014); TP [2015] QCAT 35 (15 January 2015) 
75
 Re JAB [2009] QGAAT 42 (27 May 2009); WMJ [2012] QCAT 595 (24 October 2012); BP [2012] 
QCAT 376 (21 August 2012); Re BAA [2009] QGAAT 2 (15 January 2009). 
76
 HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013). The adult was an elderly widow with early cognitive deficits 
and 5 children. The adult gave an epoa for all matters to 4 of the 5 children who placed the adult in a 
residential care facility. The fifth child removed the adult from the facility and cared for her in the fifth 
child’s home. HE revoked her epoa and made a new epoa in favour of the fifth child. QCAT found 
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity enabling the adult to reside according to 
wishes expressed in the hearing in her daughter’s home; DLT [2010] QCAT 99 (22 January 2010). 
DLT was 41 years old and residing in her own accommodation at the time of the hearing. She had a 
number of psychosocial disabilities. At the time of hearing she was working in a Brisbane hospital and 
could make all of her own decisions; the presumption of capacity was not rebutted; MJL [2011] QCAT 
217 (17 May 2011) MJL lives at home in squalor. He scored 29/30 on an MMSE and the geriatrician 
said he could make all of his decisions. MJL’s children were concerned after the adult’s wife died, 
however the presumption of capacity was not rebutted enabling MJL to remain at home according to 
his wishes; BWE [2011] QCAT 216 (5 May 2011). BWE, the adult was elderly with arthritis and 
diabetes. He lived independently and had little contact with his children for 20 years. BWE managed 
his finances and health care independently with the tribunal finding no evidence to rebut the 
presumption of capacity; TL [2011] QCAT 253 (2 June 2011). TL, the adult sustained a brain injury in 
1998, receiving a large sum of money as compensation. TL makes all of her own decisions, financial 
and no-financial with no evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity; DM [2012] QCAT 638 (4 
October 2012). DM went to live with her eldest son after an abusive relationship from the applicant. 
DM revoked her epoa and made an epoa in favour of her son. DM scored 27/30 on a mini mental 
state examination, presumption of capacity not rebutted enabling DM to reside with her son according 
to her will and preferences; PP [2013] QCAT 247 (28 May 2013). Mrs PP was 86 at the time of the 
hearing. PP had recovered cognitively from opiate medication following a hip replacement.  The 
presumption of capacity was not rebutted for non-financial decisions enabling PP to remain at home 
according to her wishes; LOP [2014] QCAT 249 (21 May 2014). LOP, the adult, resides in her own 
home with her daughter wih a mild intellectual disability. LOP has Parkinson’s disease and mobility 
issues but scored 28/30 in an MMSE. The presumption of capacity was not rebutted enabling LOP to 
remain at home according to her will. 
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KAF, CDM, MLB AJ and JS.77 The informal support network could be the newly 
married spouse of the adult in the cases of WT and WAB.78 The adult may re-claim 
the ability to determine their accommodation by not complying with the order of the 
appointed statutory guardian in the case of Karov v Chief Executive, Department of 
Employment Economic Development and Innovation.79  
However, none of the cases made specific references to Guardianship Principle 2 
(same human rights) or provided specific references to supported decision-making 
as contained in Article 12 of the CRPD. 
                                            
77
 Re HAD [2008] QGAAT 96 (24 December 2008). HAD was an 81 year old man with alcoholic 
dementia at the time of the hearing. He resided with two carers who took him in off the streets 6 years 
prior to the hearing. There was no need for a guardian because of the positive support network 
enabling HAD to continue to reside with RE and JL in their home; JAC, Re [2009] QGAAT 60 (20 July 
2009). JAC was a 77 year old widower with Alzheimer’s disease at the time of the hearing. JAC was 
being maintained in his own home by 3 of his 4 children according to his wishes. There was no need 
for a guardian due to the positive support network; Re RAB [2009] QGAAT 72 (28 September 2009) 
RAB, the adult had cognitive deficits but was well supported by his children. RAB continued to reside 
at home doing his cooking, cleaning paying bills and attending to medical needs. MMSE 20/30 but no 
need for a guardian due to family supports enabling RAB to remain at home according to his will and 
preferences; Re KAF [2008] QGAAT 91 (16 December 2008). KAF resided at home according to his 
wishes and had positive support from his network of children. He spent large sums of money on 
telephone sex calls but was well supported to reside at home with early dementia; CDM [2010] QCAT 
317 (9 July 2010). CDM was an indigenous man who sustained a brain injury following a motor 
vehicle accident in 1991. The support from CDM’s step father in residing at home according to CDM’s 
wishes and by re-introducing CDM to the aboriginal community meant there was no need for a 
guardian despite CDM’s cognitive deficits; AJ [2014] QCAT 683 (22 October 2014). AJ is a 59 year 
old man with an intellectual disability. He resides at home with one sibling and is supported by 
another sibling who lives next door. The positive support network enabled AJ to continue to reside at 
home according to his wishes. There was partial compliance as a contact order was made to protect 
AJ from one person who had threatened AJ in the past; MLB [2015] QCAT 22 (19 January 2015). 
MLB was a 59 year old woman residing alone in her own home according to her wishes. She had a 
stroke but was supported by a friend, forming a positive support network. There was no need for a 
guardian for accommodation; JS [2013] QCAT 706 (10 November 2013). JS was a 92 year old 
Swedish man who migrated to Australia 50 years ago. He had early dementia but was well supported 
to continue to reside at home with a support network consisting of his friend MP. 
78
 WT [2009] QCAT 27 (22 December 2009). WT, the adult, had a cognitive disability and strained 
family relationships. The appointments of guardian and administrator were revoked upon review 
following WT’s marriage. WT’s wife became his entire positive support network avoiding the need for 
a continued guardianhip order; Re WAB [2009] QGAAT 48 (12 June 2009). WAB, the adult, was a 49 
year old man with a cognitive deficit. The guardianship order in favour of WAB’s brother in Tasmania 
was revoked following WAB’s marriage to RK and their return to Queensland. RK, as WAB’s wife, 
became his positive support network with no need for a guardianship order. 
79
 Karov v Chief Executive, Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation 
[2011] QCAT 11 (10 January 2011). HKA, the adult is a 47 year old woman who was a registered 
nurse. HKA has cognitive deficits due to viral encephalitis contracted from her work. HKA resides at 
home in defiance of an accommodation decision made by the appointed statutory guardian. The 
guardianship appointment was dismissed with autonomy reclaimed as the order could not be 
implemented against the adult. 
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6.4 Applying the Least Restrictive Alternative 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The concept of following the ‘least restrictive alternative’ has been one of the most 
important concepts in maintaining the decision-making ability of adults in the 
Queensland guardianship jurisdiction. My general understanding is that this criterion 
can be complied with when the tribunal refrains from making a guardianship order or 
revokes an order upon review. This will enable the adult to be supported or assisted 
to make his or her own accommodation decisions in the future.80 
In Queensland the principle of taking the ‘least restrictive’ option is reflected in the 
Acknowledgment section of the Act. Section 5(d) which provides, ‘the right of an 
adult with impaired capacity to make decisions should be restricted and interfered 
with, to the least possible extent.’81 This concept is repeated in the Guardianship 
Principles. Guardianship Principle 7(3)(c) provides, ‘a person or other entity in 
performing a function or exercising a power under the Act must do so in a way least 
restrictive of the adult’s rights.’ 82  The concept of not making an order so as to 
preserve the adult’s rights of self-determination has been observed by the tribunal 
administering this Act since its inception.83 
There are several categories of cases where the ‘least restrictive alternative’ is 
followed by not making a guardianship order. They are as follows: 
6.4.2 Where there is no need for an order as the adult’s informal support 
network is meeting the needs of the adult 
The adult may or may not have been subject to a guardianship order in the past. The 
tribunal is of the opinion that the informal support network is working well and there 
                                            
80
 Tina Minkowitz, 'Paradigm shift supported decision making under the CRPD' (Law Reform 
Commission, 2005) <www.chrusp.org/home/resources>; see also John Brayley, 'Supported Decision 
Making In Australia' (2009) 
<http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/documents/08_News_%26_Articles/Supported%20Decision%20Making.p
df>. 
81
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 5(d) Acknowledgements. 
82
 Ibid GP 7(3)(c).  
83
 Ibid. Formerly the concept of adopting the ‘least restrictive alternative’ was found in s 4(d) of the 
Act. 
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is no need for a restrictive guardianship order as was the case in HAD, CDM, RAB 
and JAC.84 
6.4.3 Where there were disagreements in the past but these no longer 
exist 
This situation arises when the tribunal may have considered the situation in the past 
and appointed a guardian due to a perceived need because of disagreements 
between members of the adult’s support network that could not be resolved 
informally. After the situation resolves there is no longer the need for a guardianship 
order, as found in the cases of WAB, WAA, and PAP.85 
6.4.4 Where there are no accommodation decisions to be made even 
though disagreements remain within the adult’s support network 
The situation may arise when the adult has been permanently placed in an aged 
care facility. There may be disharmony between the adult’s support network 
                                            
84
 Re HAD [2008] QGAAT 96 (24 December 2008). HAD was an 81 year old man with alcoholic 
dementia. He resided with a couple who allowed him to reside with them for the past 6 years after 
finding HAD living in the street. Once HAD left the accommodation. The couple took HAD back and 
HAD was very happy to be supported to reside with the couple; CDM [2010] QCAT 317 (9 July 2010). 
CDM was an aborigine male who sustained head injuries following a motor vehicle accident. In 2000 
he received $504,000.00 for his personal injuries claim held on trust by the PTQ. CDM had been 
living on the streets and subject to the criminal justice system. He returned to live with his mother and 
step-father TGN who provide a positive support network. CDM is happy, has stable accommodation 
and is being supported to regain inclusion in the aborigine community. There was no need for a 
guardianship order; Re RAB [2009] QGAAT 72 (28 September 2009). RAB was a 77 year old man 
who resided at home with a mild cognitive disability. He accepted services from Veterans Affairs, paid 
his bills, attended to household duties and attended medical visits. There was no need for an 
accommodation guardian as RAB’s family provided an excellent support network; JAC, Re [2009] 
QGAAT 60 (20 July 2009). JAC was a 77 year old man residing in his own home with significant 
dementia from alcohol related causes. He had two sons and two daughters. One son, solicitor JP, had 
stolen $400,000.00 from JAC and was in jail for fraud at the time of the hearing. JAC’s remaining 
three children provided a very positive support network. Son JK spent at least 1 night a week with his 
father caring for him at home. All three siblings worked together to enable JAC to be supported to 
continue to reside at home so there was no need for a guardianship order; see also WT [2010] QCAT 
633 (24 November 2010); TWG [2010] QCAT 618 (11 November 2010); BJR [2010] QCAT 484 (5 
October 2010); JS [2013] QCAT 706 (10 November 2013); AJ [2014] QCAT 683 (22 October 2014); 
HCD [2014] QCAT 643 (29 November 2014); TP [2015] QCAT 35 (15 January 2015); MLB [2015] 
QCAT 22 (19 January 2015); SAM [2015] QCAT 93 (4 March 2015). 
85
 Re WAA [2009] QGAAT 32 (27 April 2009). WAA was a 77 year old woman with Alzheimer’s 
disease that had markedly decline in the previous 12 months. WAA resided in residential care and 
was visited on a daily basis by her daughter WJ. There were numerous guardianship orders in the 
past due to a conflict between WAA’s male friend AD and daughter WJ. The conflict within the support 
network had resolved as AD no longer visited WAA. There was no need for a guardianship order; 
compare WAA with Re PAP [2008] QGAAT 70 (8 October 2008) where the conflict between PAP’s 
new partner AB and PAP’s daughters continued with the need for the guardianship order remaining; 
Re WAB [2009] QGAAT 48 (12 June 2009). There was no further need for a guardianship order as 
the conflict between WAB’s new wife RK and WAB’s brother in Tasmania was meaningless after 
WAB and wife RK returned to Queensland; SM [2014] QCAT 596 (28 October 2014). SM is known by 
a variety of names. He was 84 years of age residing in an aged care facility in Queensland. SM had 
three children they resided in Victoria, Queensland and NSW respectfully. Son BJ recently died 
leaving a substantial estate to SM. The conflict between SM’s remaining children had resolved and 
there was no need for a guardianship order. 
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concerning things such as finances but not about accommodation or health issues, 
as shown by the cases of MAD, HB, PRH, TWG, BMD, BM and KH.86 Therefore, no 
appointment of a guardian is required. 
6.4.5 Where a previous concern of health and safety for the adult no 
longer exists 
This is similar to 6.4.3 above but in this situation there are no disagreements within 
the adult’s support network. It arises when an appointment was deemed necessary 
to prevent an adult leaving an accommodation situation as in the cases of MV and 
MA.87 
6.4.6 Where an informal substituted decision can be made by the adult’s 
positive support network 
Section 9 of the Act is entitled ‘Range of substitute decision-makers’. Section 9(a) of 
the Act provides that substitute decisions can be made ‘on an informal basis by 
members of the adult’s existing support network’.88 The situation may arise when a 
member of the adult’s support network applies for a guardianship order but there is 
                                            
86
 Re MAD [2009] QGAAT 22 (8 April 2009). MAD was an 88 year old woman with Alzheimer’s 
dementia. She was residing in a residential care facility with her husband. MAD had 3 sons MP, MC 
and MG who constituted the support network and were in disagreement regarding finances but not 
residential care. Held, no need for guardianship as there was no decision to be made, MAD was well 
settled in care; HB [2012] QCAT 68 (1 February 2012). HB had end-stage dementia; she could not 
recognise her children ND and HM or her grandchildren. Following the revocation of the epoa for 
failing to act honestly (s 66) POA, failing to consult with HM the other attorney (s 79) and failing to 
keep property separate (s 86) POA and the appointment of the PTQ there were no guardianship 
decisions to be made; see also PRH [2010] QCAT 529 (29 October 2010); TWG [2010] QCAT 618 
(11 November 2010); BMD [2013] QCAT 479 (9 September 2013); BM [2014] QCAT 634 (7 
November 2014); KH [2014] QCAT 585 (19 November 2014). 
87
 MV [2012] QCAT 684 (19 July 2012). MV was an elderly woman with a psycho-social disability. She 
resides in an aged care facility. MV’s support network comprises her two daughters ML and CD who 
were appointed accommodation guardians. There was a fear that MV would abscond from her aged 
care facility and return home where it was not safe to reside due to her frailty, cognition and psycho-
social disability. MV was well settled and included in activities despite her frailty. Guardianship was 
dismissed as there was no longer a need; MA [2012] QCAT 685 (13 November 2012) where the risk 
to MA’s perceived health justified the tribunal overriding the epoa to prevent MA from likely returning 
home with his wife the attorney. Following MA striking a nurse it was deemed by the treating team 
that MA should reside in a dementia specific aged care facility. 
88
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 9(a). Note this is not a supported decision but 
an informal substituted decision. 
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no need as the Act empowers the support network to make an informal substituted 
decision for accommodation in the cases of WJP and SI.89 
6.4.7 Where a positive support network may assist in finding the 
presumption of capacity is not rebutted 
This situation applies when an adult may have been subject to a guardianship order 
in the past but has a positive support network and can make his or her own 
accommodation decisions as in the cases of KAF and HE.90 In other situations, there 
may simply be no evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity thereby enabling a 
continuation of decision-making autonomy in the cases of DLT, MJL, BWE, DM, PP 
and LOP.91 
6.4.8 Where it is futile to continue with a guardianship order as it cannot 
be implemented against the adult 
A guardianship order for accommodation is revoked on review when it has proved to 
be ineffective as the adult has not complied with the statutory guardian’s choice of 
accommodation.92 
6.4.9 Summary 
The cases highlighted in this section have demonstrated the importance of applying 
the least restrictive alternative considerations when addressing a guardianship 
application. The principle has been held by Creyke to be fundamental to maintaining 
                                            
89
 WJP [2012] QCAT 714 (28 November 2012). WJP was an elderly man with a cognitive disability 
who was presently in hospital. WJP’s brother was his attorney but had recently died. WJP’s nephew 
sought an urgent appointment of himself as guardian to gain a place in an aged care facility for WJP. 
The nephew had placed WJP on the waiting list of several nursing homes. It was held there was no 
need for a guardian as this was a positive support network and a residential care placement was 
appropriate and could be made informally; SI [2012] QCAT 577 (17 October 2012). SI was an elderly 
man with dementia. An application was made by SI’s son in law to be appointed guardian to apply for 
an Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) report to facilitate a high care residential care placement. It 
was held there wasn’t a need for an order quoting s 9 of the Act as the ACAT application did not 
require the appointment of a guardian. Note in both WJP and SI there was a positive support network 
consisting of one person. 
90
 Re KAF [2008] QGAAT 91 (16 December 2008). KAF resided in his own home. He had a mild 
cognitive disability that affected his ability to control spending on 1902 sex telephone calls. His very 
positive support network of family members meant there was no need for a guardian and KAF’s 
application for a declaration of his own capacity was upheld for accommodation and other personal 
and health decisions. KAF previously had family members then the OAG as accommodation 
guardians; HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013). The positive support network of HE daughter 
MCDP assisted in the tribunal not rebutting the presumption of capacity to enable the guardianship 
application to be dismissed. 
91
 DLT [2010] QCAT 99 (22 January 2010); MJL [2011] QCAT 217 (17 May 2011); BWE [2011] QCAT 
216 (5 May 2011); DM [2012] QCAT 638 (4 October 2012); PP [2013] QCAT 247 (28 May 2013); LOP 
[2014] QCAT 249 (21 May 2014). 
92
 Karov v Chief Executive, Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation 
[2011] QCAT 11 (10 January 2011). The adult was a 47 year old woman with psycho-social 
conditions of depression, borderline personality disorder and gambling addiction. She refused contact 
with the OAG, continuing to reside in her own unit. The order was dismissed as it could not be 
implemented. 
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the person’s right to autonomous decision-making.93 It is least restrictive when a 
tribunal can refrain from making a guardianship order to protect the decision-making 
ability of the adult. 
In Queensland, the application of this principle has played a significant role in 
compliance with the evaluation criteria as has been shown from the cases.  
6.5 The Presence of a Positive Informal Support Network 
6.5.1 Introduction 
A positive informal support network is argued by the proponents of supported 
decision-making to comprise one or more trusted others – such as family and friends 
– that have a long-standing relationship with the adult and support the adult to 
enable them to make their own decisions.94 
Whereas QCAT can directly apply the two evaluation criteria, like the other 
jurisdictions it is not possible for QCAT to create a support network where none 
exists. It is also not possible for QCAT to educate or train a dysfunctional informal 
support network.  
6.5.2 Presence of a positive informal support network 
It has been demonstrated from the previous subsection that a positive informal 
support network in the adult’s life can play a pivotal role in maintaining the adult’s 
decision-making autonomy. This is accomplished by the tribunal adopting the ‘least 
restrictive alternative’ by finding that there is no need for the appointment of a 
guardian, as shown in the cases of HAD, KAF, WAB, WAA, JAC, CDM, WJP, MV, 
SI, HE and SAM.95 
6.5.3 Lack of a support network 
It has also been demonstrated that where the adult is isolated and either does not 
have an informal support network or is separated from an informal support network, 
                                            
93
 Robin Creyke, Who Can decide? Legal decision-making for others (Department of Human Services 
and Health  Aged and Community Care Division, 1995). 
94
 Nandini Devi, Jerome Bickenbach and Gerold Stucki, 'Moving Towards Substituted or Supported 
Decision-Making? Article 12 of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2011) 5 
ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 16; Michael Bach, 'Legal Capacity, Personhood and 
Supported Decision Making' (Canadian Association for Community Living, January 2006) 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7docs/ahc7ii3.ppt>; Canadian Association for Community 
Living Task Force, 'Alternatives to Guardianship' (CACL, August 1992) 
<http://www.worldenable.net/rights/adhoc3meet_guardianship.htm>. 
95
 Re HAD [2008] QGAAT 96 (24 December 2008); Re KAF [2008] QGAAT 91 (16 December 2008); 
Re WAB [2009] QGAAT 48 (12 June 2009); Re WAA [2009] QGAAT 32 (27 April 2009); JAC, Re 
[2009] QGAAT 60 (20 July 2009); SM [2014] QCAT 596 (28 October 2014); CDM [2010] QCAT 317 
(9 July 2010); WJP [2012] QCAT 714 (28 November 2012); MV [2012] QCAT 684 (19 July 2012); SI 
[2012] QCAT 577 (17 October 2012); HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013); SAM [2015] QCAT 93 
(4 March 2015). 
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or has only paid service providers in the adult’s life, then it is possible and even likely 
that the Queensland Public Guardian will be appointed as accommodation guardian 
for the adult, as in the cases of RAA, MAN, HWR, HRJ, SAA, TS, PR, SAG, KAT, 
HJK, DD, MGM, WSF, BM, SP, ST, WWB and BFI.96 This decision is often made for 
the ‘care and protection’ of the adult applying Guardianship Principle 7(5) to the 
adult’s situation, as in the cases of SAA, RAA, MAN and FPC.97 
6.5.4 Dysfunctional support network 
When the adult’s informal support network is characterised by personal interests of 
the supporter/support network then it may be labelled as dysfunctional and its 
presence may result in an appointment in contravention of the evaluation criteria in 
                                            
96
 Re RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009); Re MAN [2008] QGAAT 97 (24 December 2008); 
HWR [2010] QCAT 349 (18 July 2010). Although HWR had three children his present informal 
support network of WH and paid carers could all be classified as paid service providers and not an 
unpaid support network; HRJ [2010] QCAT 38 (20 January 2010); SAA [2012] QCAT 707 (26 
November 2012); TS [2011] QCAT 684 (14 November 2011). TS was a 35 year old woman who was 
deaf and an alcoholic. TS had only service providers in her life and no support network. She was in 
danger of losing her accommodation after smashing windows to enter her premises after losing her 
keys. She had lived on the streets for 5 years prior to obtaining council housing. TS was at risk 
sexually, physically and financially. She needed both an advocate and accommodation guardian. The 
OAG  was appointed as a protective measure; PR [2012] QCAT 610 (10 October 2012); SAG, Re 
[2009] QGAAT 67 (16 September 2009); PC [2009] QCAT 17 (4 December 2009); HJK [2009] QCAT 
9 (8 December 2009); DD [2010] QCAT 37 (5 January 2010); MGM [2010] QCAT 23 (14 January 
2010); WSF [2010] QCAT 12 (22 January 1010); BM [2010] QCAT 115 (31 March 2010); SP [2010] 
QCAT 361 (29 July 2010); ST [2012] QCAT 12 (23 January 2012); WWB [2012] QCAT 175 (2 
February 2012); BF [2013] QCAT 123 (7 March 2013); TS [2014] QCAT 598 (10 November 2014). 
97
 SAA [2012] QCAT 707 (26 November 2012); Re MAN [2008] QGAAT 97 (24 December 2008); Re 
RAA [2009] QGAAT 66 (31 August 2009); FPC [2012] QCAT 689 (21 December 2012). 
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the cases of GA, WIV, FAJ, SAD, CSY, HWR, HAC and HB.98 Where the support 
network is poorly functioning and has entirely different views regarding the adult’s 
accommodation then an appointment contrary to the evaluation criteria is often 
made. This has been previously demonstrated in this chapter in 6.3 where the 
informal support network is dysfunctional and has either communication issues or 
disagrees with the adult’s level of cognition or accommodation in PAP, SAF, AAE, 
                                            
98
 GA [2013] QCAT 71 (25 January 2013). GA was an elderly female who resides in residential care 
with Alzheimer’s dementia. GA has very substantial financial assets consisting of both realty and 
personality in Australia and overseas. There was an epoa in favour of her 4 children one of whom 
claimed over $300,000.00 for one year’s management of the estate. There were also shared financial 
interests with the other children. The OAG and PTQ were appointed; NG & NC v TR [2010] QCATA 
54 (24 September 2010). NG, NC and TR were the three children of NE who had over $25 Million in 
financial assets. TR had been appointed administrator and the OAG accommodation guardians for 
NE in an earlier QCAT hearing. The support network was dysfunctional with none of the siblings 
trusting each other. NC had obtained $200,000.00 from NE’s bank account and an order of the 
Queensland Supreme Court prevented NC dealing with these funds. The QCAT appeals panel 
approved the earlier QCAT decision upholding OAG for accommodation due to the non-functional 
support network; FAJ [2013] QCAT 703 (22 November 2013). FAJ’s (adult) support network included 
an internet fraudster from the USA PM who received very large sums of money from FAJ which were 
used for PM’s gambling addiction. After protecting, FAJ’s remaining finances with the appointment of 
an administrator there was no need for an accommodation guardian; Re SAD [2009] QGAAT 28 (19 
May 2009). SAD was a 35 year old man who had cognitive disabilities following two motor vehicle 
accidents in NSW. SAD received 3.5 Million in compensation for his injuries. SAD’s support network 
consisted of his partner MP who had personal interests aside from the interests of SAD. SAD 
wandered, missed medical appointments and his residence was unkempt and potentially squalid; 
CSY [2010] QCAT 49 (20 February 2010). CSY had three haemmhoragic strokes in 2006 and 2007. 
He had an expressive dysphasia, physical disabilities and brain injuries as a result of the strokes. His 
wife as supporter, cancelled rehabilitation services, cancelled access to the community, denied 
nutrition and kept him isolated considering her and her son’s financial interests above the needs of 
CSY; HWR [2010] QCAT 349 (18 July 2010). The personal interests for the new support network was 
the 13 Million remaining in HWR estate. This may have led to the isolation from HWR’s family and 
friends moving away to an isolated rural town without health or other contacts with only paid carers in 
HWR’s life. HWR’s children had broken into his new residence looking for documentation and there 
were DVA’s against his former support network; WIV [2012] QCAT 608 (23 October 2012). The 
motivation for daughter TN to wish mother WIV should reside with her may be related to the 
$75,000.00 of WIV’s funds that TN had transferred to TN’s son in law’s bank account; Re HAC [2009]  
QGAAT 55 (7 July 2009). HAC’s daughter HH may have had a personal interest in having her mother 
HAC continue to reside with HH. HH had transferred $125,000.00 of HAC’s funds to HH’s personal 
bank account; HB [2012] QCAT 68 (1 February 2012). It was only the fact that the PTQ was 
appointed for financial decisions and there were no accommodation decisions to be made that 
prevented the appointment of the OAG after ND had acquired $451,000.00 of mother HB’s financial 
assets. 
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TAA, HAD, HAB, CAB, BAA, HAC, PAA, BE,  LRS, IT, BP, MA, WIV, MJH and 
PJB.99 
A support network is also dysfunctional where there is physical and emotional harm 
against the adult emanating from the support network. This situation occurred in the 
case of FJ.100 
6.5.5 Summary  
This section illustrates that a positive informal support network can remove the need 
for the appointment of a guardian for accommodation where the presumption of 
capacity has been rebutted. However, where there is no informal support network or 
where the support network is dysfunctional then an appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation is frequently made to protect the interests and needs of the adult. 
The dysfunction may arise from communication issues within the support network, or 
physical, emotional or financial abuse of the adult by the network.  In those cases the 
interests of the network take precedence over the interests of the adult. 
6.6 Conflict of Interest and Undue Influence between the Adult 
and their Support Network 
6.6.1 Introduction 
Whereas it is possible for QCAT to directly apply the two evaluation criteria, it is not 
possible for QCAT to directly apply this feature.101 The presence of conflict of interest 
or of undue influence may detract from compliance with the evaluation criteria by 
QCAT making a protective appointment in favour of a guardian for accommodation.  
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 Re PAP [2008] QGAAT 70 (8 October 2008); Re SAF [2008] QGAAT 73 (24 October 2008); Re 
AAE [2009] QGAAT 29 (29 April 2009); Re TAA [2009] QGAAT 39 (19 May 2009); Re JAB [2009] 
QGAAT 42 (27 May 2009); Re HAD [2009] QGAAT 75 (1 October 2009); Re CAB [2009] QGAAT 20 
(27 March 2009); Re BAA [2009] QGAAT 2 (15 January 2009); Re HAC [2009]  QGAAT 55 (7 July 
2009); Re SAF [2009] QGAAT 62 (27 July 2009); Re PAA [2009] QGAAT 18 (20 March 2009);BE v 
Office of the Adult Guardian & Public Trustee of Queensland [2010] QCAT 24 (17 June 2010); RMR 
[2011] QCAT 636 (23 November 2011); LRS [2012] QCAT 112 (19 March 2012); IT [2010] QCAT 258 
(15 April 2010); NAP [2012] QCAT 69 (17 February 2012); BP [2012] QCAT 376 (21 August 2012); 
MA [2012] QCAT 685 (13 November 2012); WMJ [2012] QCAT 595 (24 October 2012); WIV [2012] 
QCAT 608 (23 October 2012); MJH [2012] QCAT 594 (15 November 2012); PSB [2013] QCAT 17 (17 
January 2013); SAL [2013] QCAT 31 (11 January 2013); JMS v Adult Guardian and Anor [2013] 
QCATA 135 (30 April 2013); HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013). 
100
 FJ [2014] QCAT 394 (26 June 2014). FJ was 80 years of age and resided with son FG. Sons FG 
and FD were joint attorneys for all matters under a 2010 epoa. FG assaulted FJ and threatened her. 
FG due to the stress of an upcoming QCAT hearing brought by FD telephoned QCAT and threatened 
suicide. It was not considered safe for FJ to continue to reside with FG and the OAG appointed for 
accommodation. 
101
 See the discussion of conflict of interest and undue influence in Chapter 2 at 2.3.4.2. 
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6.6.2 Conflict of interest 
Conflict of interest as between supporter and the adult may arise in situations where 
there are disagreements between members of the individual support network, as 
revealed by HB, HAC, LRS and PAA.102 
A conflict of interest may arise when the adult’s chosen supporter has health issues 
and is unable to provide time to support the adult. This situation arose in the case of 
DRR.103 
A financial conflict of interest can result in abuse, neglect and exploitation of the 
adult in CSY and HWR.104 The situation where an actual or potential conflict of 
interest has arisen is often associated with financial abuse or exploitation of an 
elderly adult in the cases of HAC, PAA, HWR and HB.105 Finances played a key part 
                                            
102
 HB [2012] QCAT 68 (1 February 2012). HB had a support network consisting of ND daughter and 
HM son. They were in conflict and did not communicate with each other for over 3 years. ND’s 
personal interests as attorney and supporter conflicted with HB’s interests (mother) by transferring all 
$451,000.00  to her own bank account  placing HB in a residential care and not paying the fees 
leaving a debt of $11,000.00; Re HAC [2009]  QGAAT 55 (7 July 2009). Daughter and 
supporter/attorney HH’s personal interests potentially conflicted with HAC’s interests in the transfer of 
$125,000.00 of HAC’s funds to HH, while HH was in conflict with her sister and co supporter K; Re 
PAA [2009] QGAAT 18 (20 March 2009). B created a conflict transaction by having mother PAA sell 
her house and contribute $267,000.00 to the purchase of B’s new home, B was also in conflict with 
ST, PAA’s second husband; WIV [2012] QCAT 608 (23 October 2012). TN daughter was in conflict 
with WTN WIV’s husband TN may have a conflict of interest in the transfer of $75,000.00 of WIV’s 
funds to TN’s son in law; LRS [2012] QCAT 112 (19 March 2012). Co-Attorney MS alleged that 
attorney NS had misused large sums from LRS’s bank account of $340.00 per week withdrawals. No 
records were kept to ascertain the purpose of the withdrawals. The OAG and PTQ were appointed 
even though the allegations of conflict of interest between supporter (NS) and the Adult LRS were not 
proved. 
103
 DRR [2014] QCAT 352 (2 July 2014). DRR was a woman with physical and psycho-social 
disabilities. After meeting her carer and supporter RA in hospital she gave RA her epoa and RA 
resided with DRR and received the Carer’s Allowance. Due to RA’s poor health she left DRR in 
hospital on 27 occasions over the previous 2 years prior to the hearing. It was DRR’s will to reside 
with RA and be supported by RA. The OAG was appointed guardian for accommodation, health and 
services as RA’s own health needs were in conflict with her ability to support DRR. 
104
 CSY [2010] QCAT 49 (20 February 2010). CSY’s support network consisted of his wife and 
teenage son. CSY’s wife in stopping rehabilitation services following CSY’s three strokes, isolating 
CSY, leaving him with inadequate nutrition and hydration, could amount to abuse or neglect. This was 
based upon a desire not to contribute for CSY’s services for financial reasons; HWR [2010] QCAT 
349 (18 July 2010). HWR’s financial advisor and supporter WH had isolated HWR from his family, 
friends health services and the community by residing in a house in a rural setting with only paid 
carers present. One of these paid carers was WH’s wife. The personal interests form the huge 
financial estate of HWR led to his isolation. 
105
 Re HAC [2009]  QGAAT 55 (7 July 2009); Re PAA [2009] QGAAT 18 (20 March 2009); HWR 
[2010] QCAT 349 (18 July 2010); HB [2012] QCAT 68 (1 February 2012); WIV [2012] QCAT 608 (23 
October 2012); GA [2013] QCAT 71 (25 January 2013); MAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 9 (29 January 
2009); HAA,Re [2009] QGAAT 4 (4 February 2009); HJK [2009] QCAT 9 (8 December 2009); DJP 
[2009] QCAT 24 (10 December 2009); FLP [2009] QCAT 21 (11 December 2009); PK [2010] QCAT 
75 (12 February 2010); GMB [2012] QCAT 113 (6 February 2012); GS [2012] QCAT 538 (12 October 
2012); EWH [2013] QCAT 137 (8 February 2013); CJP [2013] QCAT 663 (19 September 2013); NR 
[2013] QCAT 662 (16 December 2013); CMR [2014] QCAT 154 (25 February 2014); BBE [2014] 
QCAT 80 (25 February 2014); BS [2014] QCAT 281 (13 June 2014); FJ [2014] QCAT 394 (26 June 
2014); LJW [2014] QCAT 670 (11 December 2014); SGA [2015] QCAT 15 (15 January 2015); SAM 
[2015] QCAT 93 (4 March 2015). 
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in many of the actual or potential cases of conflict of interest as between the adult 
and the adult’s support network in this area. Where the finances are protected 
through the appointment of an administrator and there are no decisions to be made 
regarding an adult’s accommodation, then a tribunal may refrain from making a 
guardianship appointment thus upholding the evaluation criteria in HB. 106  Even 
where there are very substantial financial assets of an adult, there may be no conflict 
of interest as between the adult and the adult’s support network, as in BAA and 
BP.107 
6.6.3 Undue Influence  
There are slightly more case examples of undue influence, as between the adult and 
the supporter than case examples of conflict of interest SAD, PAA, CAB, HAC and 
CK.108 
It is possible for the tribunal to make an appointment of the Public Guardian contrary 
to the evaluation criteria on unproven allegations or the potential for undue influence 
as in the case of SAD.109 However unsupported allegations of undue influence by 
parties to a hearing may be dismissed by a tribunal, thus making a decision in 
conformity with the evaluation criteria.110 
Only one case has attempted to define ‘undue influence’ between supporter and 
adult as a power imbalance between dominant and weaker parties, where the 
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 HB [2012] QCAT 68 (1 February 2012). 
107
 Re BAA [2009] QGAAT 2 (15 January 2009). The conflict amongst BAA’s 5 daughters who 
constituted the support network was in relation to care and accommodation of mother BAA and not 
regarding individual financial interests of the 5 daughters; BP [2012] QCAT 376 (21 August 2012). 
108
 Re SAD [2009] QGAAT 28 (19 May 2009). There was an allegation of possible undue influence by 
SAD’s partner and supporter MP where SAD had $3.5 Million in settlement money following his MVA; 
Re CAB [2009] QGAAT 20 (27 March 2009). CAB’s husband CO was alleged to have unduly 
influenced CAB to pay for his legal expenses, pay for his overseas European holiday and place CAB’s 
house on the real estate market; Re HAC [2009]  QGAAT 55 (7 July 2009); CK [2010] QCAT 336 (20 
May 2010). QCAT raised ‘undue influence’ when supporter son CP had his 93 year old father with 
dementia sign mortgage documents while in Greenslopes hospital. This raised substantial funds 
against CK’s principal asset, his home to enable CP to enter into a questionable financial venture; Re 
SAF [2009] QGAAT 62 (27 July 2009). Son ST was alleged to have unduly influenced SAF to transfer 
her house and other funds to ST; Re PAA [2009] QGAAT 18 (20 March 2009); HWR [2010] QCAT 
349 (18 July 2010); WIV [2012] QCAT 608 (23 October 2012); MJH [2012] QCAT 594 (15 November 
2012); HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013); PAG, Re [2009] QGAAT 59 (10 July 2009); LAD, Re 
[2009] QGAAT 77 (5 October 2009); IAA, Re [2009] QGAAT 44 (28 May 2009); GMB [2012] QCAT 
113 (6 February 2012); DM [2012] QCAT 152 (7 March 2012); EE [2013] QCAT 539 (10 October 
2013); LF [2013] QCAT 733 (21 October 2013); FJ [2014] QCAT 394 (26 June 2014); MDC [2014] 
QCAT 338 (10 July 2014); FLA [2014] QCAT 521 ( 22 September 2014); LJW [2014] QCAT 670 (11 
December 2014); SGA [2015] QCAT 15 (15 January 2015). 
109
 Re SAD [2009] QGAAT 28 (19 May 2009); HWR [2010] QCAT 349 (18 July 2010). 
110
 HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013). The allegation of undue influence on HE by the new 
supporter MCDP upon HE was dismissed. 
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dominant party obtains a benefit from the weaker party in the case of FAJ.111 The 
dominant party may constitute a dysfunctional support network concerned with the 
supporter’s interests and not the interests of the adult.112 In every instance from the 
available cases, it has been raised where there are substantial financial assets of the 
adult. However there were a number of cases where the adult had substantial 
financial assets but no actual undue influence, as was found in KAF, AAE, WAA and 
CDM.113 
6.6.4 Summary 
The presence of conflict of interest or of undue influence as between the adult and 
the adult’s support network may be associated with an appointment of an 
accommodation guardian contrary to the evaluation criteria. 114  The instances of 
conflict of interest or undue influence between supporter and adult appear less 
common than disagreements between individual members of the adult’s support 
network.115 In my opinion this may be because this type of conflict or undue influence 
remains undetected as the adult may be unaware and unable to initiate proceedings. 
The absence of conflict of interest or of undue influence as between supporter and 
the adult may be a factor in compliance with the evaluation criteria.   
6.7 Discussion: Comments and Findings from the Queensland 
Cases 
6.7.1 Findings 
Despite acknowledgement of supported decision-making and the right to be 
supported to make decisions in the Acknowledgement, Purpose and General 
                                            
111
 FAJ [2013] QCAT 703 (22 November 2013). FAJ was a 71 year old female with no apparent 
cognitive disabilities. FAJ’s husband died in 2009. In 2010 FAJ met PM from an internet site and 
developed a romance through e mail and telephone contacts. FAJ had never met PM, who continued 
to reside in the USA. FAJ lent PM a great deal of money through three unsecured loans. At the time 
of the death of FAJ’s husband FAJ owned a house, a unit and had substantial shares and money in 
the bank. At the time of the QCAT hearing, FAJ had transferred all but the proceeds of the sale of her 
unit to PM. FAJ continued to reside in the unit complex living in a different unit paying rent. The FBI, 
police and FAJ’s 4 children who resided interstate in Australia were all of the opinion PM was a 
confidence man and the assertions of future marriage were a scam. PM’s stories included money was 
required for back taxes, 7 operations, paying for his 5 children’s education and he could not visit 
Australia as he laundered money for the Mafia and would be shot upon entering Australia. The 
inability to understand the financial arrangement with unsecured loans in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
backed up by worthless promissory notes enabled QCAT to rebut the presumption of capacity but 
found no need for an accommodation guardian after the PTQ was appointed to protect the remaining 
finances of FAJ. 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 Re KAF [2008] QGAAT 91 (16 December 2008); Re AAE [2009] QGAAT 29 (29 April 2009); Re 
WAA [2009] QGAAT 32 (27 April 2009); CDM [2010] QCAT 317 (9 July 2010); Re BAA [2009] 
QGAAT 2 (15 January 2009); BP [2012] QCAT 376 (21 August 2012); GA [2013] QCAT 71 (25 
January 2013). 
114
 CSY [2010] QCAT 49 (20 February 2010); HWR [2010] QCAT 349 (18 July 2010). 
115
 RMR [2011] QCAT 636 (23 November 2011). 
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Principles of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD),116 the Act does 
not appear to yield any greater compliance for QCAT decisions following the 
evaluation criteria than in either Victoria or NSW. Compliance with the evaluation 
criteria occurred in nearly one-third of the available Queensland cases (57 out of 173 
cases). Could this be a true reflection of the Queensland cases? If it is true, then 
what could be the possible explanations for this result and what studies or changes 
could be implemented because of this result? 
Support for the Findings 
There is support for these findings from external sources. These sources include 
annual reports of tribunals and Public Guardians. The results obtained from this and 
the previous two chapters’ analysis is supported by data obtained from the Office of 
Public Advocate in Queensland, the Office of Public Advocate in Victoria and the 
Public Guardian in NSW. 117  Guardianship appointments in a 10-year study in 
Queensland have increased from 16 in the first year of operation (6 months only) to 
792 new appointments of a guardian in 2010.118 This led to speculation that the 
Queensland Public Guardian would be unable to cope with the number of new 
guardianship appointments by 2020. They represent greater numbers of 
guardianship appointments in Queensland than in Victoria or NSW despite the larger 
populations in NSW and Victoria.119 If this is an accurate reflection of compliance 
with supported decision-making in the three jurisdictions then what are the possible 
explanations for compliance in Queensland being no greater than in NSW and 
Victoria? 
6.7.2 Possible explanations for the findings 
First, in Queensland, there are no individual advocacy services provided by either 
the Public Guardian or the Queensland Public Advocate. This is unlike the Office of 
Public Advocate in Victoria that has provided an individual advocacy function since 
its inception.120 The initial Public Advocate in Victoria, Ben Bodna, had stated that 
every guardianship order is a failure of advocacy.121 As a result of lack of information 
applicants to QCAT in guardianship matters may be unaware that disagreements 
                                            
116
 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) ss 5(e), 6, GP 7(3)(a). 
117
 Queensland Public Advocate, 'Annual Report of Queensland Public Advocate of Queensland 
2010-2011' (2011) <http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/130294/office-of-the-
public-advocate-report-1011.pdf>; Office of the Public Advocate of Victoria, above n 59; NSW Trustee 
and Guardian, 'Annual Report 2010-2011' (2011) 
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between members of the adult’s support network are likely to result in an 
appointment of the Public Guardian for accommodation and other personal matters, 
against the will and preferences of the adult. Applicants have not had the benefit of 
advocacy to inform them that an appointment will totally or partially remove the 
human right of self-determination and place this right within the hands of an 
unfamiliar and unwanted statutory third party. 
Second, the complexity of Guardianship Principle 7 of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (QLD) itself may be very difficult to apply. There were some 
references in the cases in general to not following Guardianship Principle 7, but 
without specifying which part of the principle. 122  Guardianship Principle 7 is a 
complex provision containing the three general principles of wishes of the person, 
least restriction and care and protection (best interests) found in all the other 
Australian guardianship jurisdictions. In addition, it contains the principles of 
participation in decision-making, the right of the adult to make his or her own 
decisions, the right to necessary support to make these decisions, and the right to 
make a decision the way the adult would have if their wishes were known 
(substituted judgement).123 The principles in Guardianship Principle 7 may conflict. 
For example ‘care and protection’ in Guardianship Principle 7(5) may be in conflict 
with the wishes of the adult in Guardianship Principle 7(3)(b) or the adult’s right to be 
supported to make their own decisions in Guardianship Principle 7(3)(a). A clearer 
enunciation of a requirement to follow the wishes of the person in a separate 
principle may have resulted in greater specific reliance and adherence to that 
principle. 
Third, tribunals are faced with resolving complex issues and entrenched family 
disputes. There are limited legislative means for the resolution of these disputes. 
There have been repeated references in some written reasons to following the least 
restrictive alternative and obeying the wishes of the adult in the purposes of the Act.  
However, restrictive appointments are made due to disagreements within the support 
network or with the support network and service provider.124 There is no ability for 
QCAT to refer the adult’s support network to education or training. There is no 
Queensland equivalent, to the NSW Guardianship Tribunal (now NCAT) pre-hearing 
telephone advice to attempt to resolve matters without a guardianship hearing.125 
The Act depends upon the existence of an informal support network that is positively 
functioning. 
Fourth, disagreements between members of the adult’s informal support network 
regarding where the adult resides, their level of cognition or communication issues 
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create an impasse that may impact negatively upon the care and protection of the 
adult. QCAT uses Guardianship Principle 8 to appoint the statutory guardian to 
communicate with all members of the adult’s support network to resolve the 
perceived impasse. 
What are possible solutions? This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 8 
considering ‘Future Directions’.   
6.7.3 Deficiencies with the Queensland Guardianship Regime 
There is no mechanism required by Queensland for the implementation of supported 
decision-making. There is no requirement to provide and train a network where none 
exists. There is also no requirement or facilities to educate, train or monitor an 
existing informal support network of the adult. 
It may be beneficial to conduct a trial or feasibility study that would both educate and 
monitor existing support networks of the adult, and implement a project to create 
support networks for isolated adults. If the project be of sufficient size it may be 
possible to establish if there is a greater compliance with the evaluation criteria or a 
decrease in statutory guardianship appointments.  
The pilot supported decision-making projects in the ACT, NSW and South Australia 
had relatively small numbers of participants. They however did show that, with a 
trained supporter and effective monitor, an adult with a significant intellectual 
disability could be supported to make their own decisions and overcome the need for 
an appointment of a guardian.126 
It was anticipated that due to the legislative framework of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (QLD) there would be a significantly higher rate of 
compliance to the supportive decision-making evaluative criteria than in Victoria or 
NSW. This has not been shown to be the case and may point to the need for 
redress. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have found that Queensland’s compliance level with the evaluation 
criteria derived from Article 12 of the CRPD is significant but only partial. The level of 
compliance with the two evaluation criteria has been no greater than in Victoria or 
NSW. 
Queensland’s guardianship legislation has a number of positive aspects regarding 
autonomy and supported decision-making but also shortcomings in relation to this 
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laudable purpose. The positive aspects of the legislation were the detailed human 
rights based general principles, the presumption of decision-making capacity and the 
recognition of informal support networks along with the adult’s right to be supported 
to make their own decisions. 
The shortcomings arise through what is omitted from the legislation and how the 
legislation is applied in the guardianship cases dealing with accommodation. 
Guardianship Principle 2 recognises that all persons with disabilities have the same 
human rights as all other persons. This principle does not specify how human rights 
are to be applied or if legal capacity and the right to be supported to maintain 
decision-making autonomy are included in these human rights. Guardianship 
Principle 7 does not specify how to resolve the conflict in the application of the 
principles of obeying the wishes of the adult and making a decision for the adult’s 
care and protection. The presumption of capacity and the functional capacity test 
contained in General Principle 1 does not recognise that only adults with disabilities 
are likely to have their capacity put into question and that the rebuttal of mental 
capacity can remove the universal assertion of  legal capacity in Article 12(2) of the 
CRPD. The legislation provides for the recognition of support networks and the right 
to be supported but omits any mechanism for this to be achieved. There is no 
mechanism for the creation of a support network where none exists. Nor is there one 
to train, educate and monitor a poorly functioning support network. 
The Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD)127 and the Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 (QLD) 128  have been observed to have partial compliance with the 
evaluation criteria. The principle of following the adult’s will and preferences are 
given express references in Guardianship Principle 7 but this may be overridden by 
care and protection considerations also found in Guardianship Principle 7(5).129 
Following the ‘least restrictive alternative’ is an important consideration in refraining 
from an appointment of an accommodation guardian where there is no need for an 
appointment, thus preserving the ability to be supported in the future to make an 
accommodation decision.130 The legislation recognises the importance of an informal 
support network to assist the individual but only provides an acknowledgement or 
platform for the support network. The legislation falls down in all three jurisdictions 
when the network does not exist, is poorly functioning or has elements of conflict of 
interest or undue influence. There is no mechanism in all three jurisdictions to 
prevent or control conflict of interest or undue influence as between the adult and the 
adult’s support network except for the appointment of the statutory substitute 
decision-maker.  
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In Queensland, after the presumption of capacity is rebutted, QCAT looks at the 
need for a guardianship order.131 This raises considerations of care and protection 
similar to welfare and best interests in the other guardianship jurisdictions. Care and 
protection is given a first consideration. It is only after the adult’s welfare has been 
established that the autonomy principles of least restriction and following the wishes 
of the adult are observed, when it is ‘safe’ to do so. 
6.8.1 Coincidental compliance 
The consideration of Queensland guardianship cases dealing with accommodation 
has shown that compliance with the evaluation criteria is likely to be coincidental. 
This is because there were no references in the cases, in this area and time frame, 
to supported decision-making and legal capacity as contained in Article 12, nor were 
there any references to Guardianship Principle 2 (same human rights) and nor were 
there any references to the requirements of the CRPD. 
6.8.2 Significant compliance 
The cases have demonstrated that compliance with the evaluation criteria in 
Queensland is significant. Compliance with the assessment criteria occurred in 57 of 
the 173 available reported cases. This appears to be an observed compliance with 
the principle of following the ‘least restrictive alternative’ and not making a 
guardianship appointment, unless in the opinion of QCAT it is absolutely necessary 
to meet the needs of the adult or to protect the adult’s interests.132  
6.8.3 Factors militating against obeying will and preferences 
The Queensland cases have demonstrated a number of considerations that militate 
against compliance with the crucial criterion of observing the ‘will and preferences’ of 
the adult. These factors were medical best interests considerations associated with 
the adult’s health, welfare and safety,133 disagreements between the adult’s support 
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network and the adult’s service providers,134 or disagreements between individual 
members of the adult’s support network.135 
There are limited means for QCAT to resolve disputes amongst the adult’s support 
network. Queensland tribunal members frequently use Guardianship Principle 8 (the 
maintenance of the individual’s supportive relationships) to make an appointment 
against the individual’s will and preferences because of a situation of unresolved 
disagreements between members of the adult’s support network. The adult’s will and 
preferences as demonstrated by their enduring power of attorney have also been 
overridden using Guardianship Principle 8 as a justification for the appointment of 
the Public Guardian for accommodation decisions. 
6.8.4 Least restrictive alternative 
The resistance of a Queensland Guardianship tribunal (QCAT or the former QGAAT) 
against appointing an accommodation guardian where it is not the ‘least restrictive 
alternative’ is the prime example where the evaluation criteria are met in the 
Queensland cases. Where there is no need for a guardian, or where there is no 
decision to be made, there is a strong likelihood that no accommodation guardian 
will be appointed.  
6.8.5 Positive informal support network 
The presence of a positive informal support network demonstrates, through the 
cases, a strong correlation that the tribunal will find no need to appoint an 
accommodation guardian.136 As with NSW and Victoria, the positive informal support 
network protects the adult from abuse enabling QCAT to maintain the adult’s 
autonomy by avoiding a guardianship appointment for accommodation. 
6.8.6 Conflict of interest and undue influence 
The presence of conflict of interest and the presence of undue influence as between 
the adult and the adult’s support network do occur but appear less frequent than 
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disagreements between members of the adult’s support network from the recorded 
available cases.137 
In the next chapter I synthesise the trends of the three jurisdictions of Victoria, NSW 
and Queensland in relation to their compliance with the evaluation criteria. This will 
include a detailed analysis of the tension between protection and autonomy that 
arises within the context of the guardianship regime in the three jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 7 
An analysis of the cumulative trends in applying the 
evaluation criteria and important features to Victoria, NSW 
and Queensland’s guardianship cases involving 
accommodation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the trends in Chapters 4 (Victoria), 5 (NSW), and 6 
(Queensland) found when applying the evaluation criteria and important features 
developed in Chapter 2. I will first discuss how the legislative similarities and 
differences between the jurisdictions affect criteria compliance. This is followed by an 
examination of compliance with the benchmark criteria from which I form a theory 
that though there can be genuine autonomy within the protective framework of 
guardianship, protective principles are generally given priority over autonomy. I 
conclude by drawing together indicative trends derived for the two criteria and two 
features from the three jurisdictions. 
Compliance with the evaluation criteria ranges from nearly one third (Queensland 
and NSW) to one half (Victoria) of the available guardianship accommodation cases 
surveyed from 16 August 2008 to 1 July 2015. This degree of compliance is 
significant because the criteria and important features were developed from Article 
12 of the CRPD, the benchmark for this thesis. There has been only one reported 
guardianship accommodation decision (PJB) that has directly applied Article 12.1 
The level of compliance must be attributable to factors extrinsic to Article 12. This 
issue will be considered in the section which discusses criteria compliance. 
7.2 How the legislative similarities and differences between the 
three jurisdictions affect criteria compliance 
7.2.1 Similarities 
There are a number of similarities between the three jurisdictions, for example, all 
three possess a ‘modern guardianship system’ as defined by O’Neill and Peisah.2 
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Firstly they all have an independent statutory body – the Office of the Public 
Advocate (Victoria), and the Public Guardian in Queensland and NSW. These are 
statutorily created state-funded organisations that can be appointed as a guardian 
for accommodation even though that appointment may be against the will and 
preferences of the individual.3 Each jurisdiction also contains a tribunal structure that 
is accessible, inexpensive, intended to comply with natural justice generally without 
the need for legal representation, and which allows for the delivery of written reasons 
for a decision pursuant to a timely request.4 
More importantly however, the guardianship legislation in the three jurisdictions 
shares three general principles which guide decision-making under the regimes. 
These are: following the wishes of the person, applying the least restrictive 
alternative, and observing the welfare and interests or care and protection of the 
person.5 With regard to the last, the Queensland Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (QLD) does not refer to best interests or welfare and interests of the 
person, however the reference to ‘care and protection’ in Guardianship Principle 7(5) 
of the Queensland Act has been held to have a synonymous meaning.6 
I argued in Chapter 27 that the first two principles, following the individual’s wishes 
and applying the least restrictive alternative, maintain decision-making autonomy in 
accordance with the CRPD.8 These two principles correspond with the evaluation 
criteria derived in this thesis. They demonstrate the tension between autonomy and 
protection discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.9 While the protective principle of welfare 
and best interests appears in direct opposition to applying the least restrictive 
alternative and following the wishes of the person, there are some instances where 
best interests and the wishes of the person coincide, for example where it is the wish 
of the person to be supported informally by their partner. Guardianship tribunals 
have concluded that this informal support is also in the best interests of the person10 
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as it aligns with the person’s wishes.11 The need for a guardianship appointment is 
thus avoided. This could also be classified as a positive informal support network.   
The Victorian and NSW guardianship legislation was derived to a large extent from 
the sample guardianship enactment attached to the 1982 Cocks Report.12 The later 
Queensland legislation was developed from a combination of existing Australian 
state guardianship legislation, Canadian guardianship legislation, and United Nations 
human rights instruments.13 The Cocks Report expressed both a right for persons 
with an intellectual disability to be protected by a guardian, and a competing right for 
self-determination.14 This dichotomy of the right to protection versus the right to 
autonomy may account to some extent for the incorporation of both protection and 
autonomy rights into the general principles of all three guardianship statutes.15  
The similarities of both autonomy and protection in the general principles of each 
jurisdiction enable the general principles to form the basis of the application of 
guardianship legislation and compliance with the evaluation criteria. The similarities 
of the tribunal system and the availability of the appointment of the independent 
statutory guardian (Public Guardian or Office of Public Advocate) for accommodation 
issues enables the guardianship principles to be upheld on an equivalent basis in 
each jurisdiction. All three guardianship jurisdictions are accessible and free to the 
public, and the appointment of the statutory guardian for accommodation is also 
made without charge to the individual. There may be an equivalent weighting for 
each jurisdiction when considering the application of the protective principle of 
welfare and best interests in appointing the independent guardian for the individual’s 
protection. The equivalent weighting may be due to more emphasis being placed 
upon protection in the tension between autonomy and protection discussed in the 
conclusion to this chapter. 
7.2.2 Differences 
The differences may be categorised into two areas: the legislative weighting given to 
protection as opposed to self-determination principles; and the relative importance 
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given to human rights principles, including the right to support to exercise self-
determination.  
7.2.2.1 Legislative weighting of the general principles 
The Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) gives paramount importance to the principle of 
observing the individual’s welfare and interests, ahead of the principle of following 
the wishes of the person, or adopting the least restrictive alternative.16 It differs from 
the legislative weighting of the general principles in the other two jurisdictions where 
both the Queensland and Victorian guardianship legislation place the three general 
principles on an equal level of importance. Victoria’s Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1986 (VIC) lists only three general principles, and gives each an 
equal weighting.17 In contrast, the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) 
lists 12 guardianship principles,18 all of equal weighting. Guardianship Principle 7 
(G.P. 7) includes not only the three general principles, but the additional principles of 
the rights to participate in decision-making (G.P. 7(1)), to self-determination (G.P. 
7(2)),and to support to exercise decision-making (G.P.7(3)(a)), as well as observing 
the views and wishes of the person (G.P. 7(3)(b)), applying the least restrictive 
alternative (G.P. 7(3)(c)), substituted judgement (making a decision the way the 
person would have done) (G.P.7(4)), and care and protection (G.P. 7(5)). As noted 
above, Guardianship Principle 7(5) does not contain the words ‘welfare and best 
interests’ but these have been held to be subsumed within the concept of ‘care and 
protection’. 19  None of the provisions contained in Queensland’s Guardianship 
Principle 7 are given any legislative preference.   
The effect of the same general principles in each jurisdiction is directly relevant to 
compliance with the evaluation criteria. This is due to the principles of following the 
wishes of the person and applying the least restrictive alternative being consistent 
with the evaluation criteria. This relationship will be further discussed in the following 
subsections and in the conclusion to this chapter. It was anticipated that NSW would 
have a lower level of compliance than the other two states because of the paramount 
status of the protective guardianship principle, but this did not occur. 
7.2.2.2 Legislative importance of human rights principles  
Both Victoria and Queensland have substantial legislative protection for human 
rights20 which might be relevant to the area of guardianship; this appears absent in 
New South Wales.   
Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 1986 (VIC), a general 
statute of the Victorian Parliament that confers no new enforceable legal rights, is not 
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replicated in an equivalent Queensland or NSW statute. The Charter lists a number 
of civil and political rights to be considered when drafting legislation, and when 
administrative bodies (such as VCAT) apply legislation. The Charter vests the 
Supreme Court of Victoria with a declaratory power to state incompatibility of current 
legislation with Charter rights. The Charter is important for this thesis because it 
recognises international law not specifically mentioned in the Charter (s 5), this of 
course can include Article 12 of the CRPD. The Charter is based upon the principles 
of equality, dignity and freedom (s 7), similar to principles contained in the CRPD.21 
Section 8 of the Charter gives recognition as a person under the law and provides a 
platform for rights. It is therefore similar to Article 12(1) of the CRPD. Section 12 of 
the Charter also provides Victorians with rights to movement within the State and 
freedom to choose where to live, both relevant in relation to change of 
accommodation. I anticipated that application of these Charter provisions would lead 
to a number of cases where Article 12 of the CRPD was expressly applied by VCAT; 
however this expectation did not eventuate. 
The Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) is distinguishable from the 
Victorian and NSW guardianship legislation in two major respects. First, it offers an 
elaborate set of human rights-based general principles to be applied by all users of 
the Act. They include principles such as all persons share the same human rights, 
and dignity and respect are to be accorded to all persons. 22  These could be 
interpreted to include both the right to full legal capacity and the right to support to 
exercise full legal capacity found in Article 12 of the CRPD.23 Second, there are a 
number of provisions within the Act that provide a right to support for decision-
making, and state the importance of the individual’s support network in assisting the 
individual with decision-making.24 Therefore the Queensland guardianship legislation 
is potentially more closely linked with the evaluation criteria and Article 12 of the 
CRPD than NSW or Victoria’s guardianship legislation.  
7.2.2.3 The explanations for the observed level of criteria compliance in 
Queensland, NSW and Victoria  
It was anticipated that NSW, with its paramount importance on the principle of 
protection of the individual’s welfare and best interests, and with neither a charter of 
rights, nor any provisions in its Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) to protect the Article 
12 CRPD rights of full legal capacity and support to exercise that capacity, would 
have the lowest level of compliance with the evaluation criteria of obeying the will 
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and preferences and applying the least restrictive alternative. However the actual 
compliance level was not as anticipated.  
Queensland was anticipated to have the highest level of compliance with the criteria 
because of the express right to support for decision-making, the importance of 
support networks and the same human rights for all adults expressly contained 
within the legislation. I expected that Victoria would have a level of compliance with 
the criteria higher than NSW but less than Queensland because of the presence of 
the Victorian Charter and the equal treatment of the three general principles without 
stating a right to support or support networks. However no compliance level 
regarding the evaluation criteria was as anticipated.   
New South Wales has neither a Charter of Human rights and Responsibilities, nor an 
elaborate set of human rights in its guardianship legislation which specify a right to 
support to exercise self-determination. These differences however did not result in a 
variation of the anticipated level of compliance with the evaluation criteria. This was 
because the protective guardianship principle was also given paramount status in 
Queensland and Victorian guardianship decisions. The Queensland Guardianship 
Principle which recognises the same human rights for all adults was not explained or 
applied in the reported cases. The provisions in the Queensland guardianship 
legislation which recognise the importance of support networks did not have the 
effect of improving compliance with the evaluation criteria. This was because, like 
the other two jurisdictions, the legislation cannot create a support network where 
none exists, nor can it transform a dysfunctional support network into a positive 
network, as with the other two jurisdictions.     
7.2.2.4 The Importance of human rights principles in criteria 
compliance 
In Victoria, the human rights expressed in the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (VIC) were only sporadically applied in the reviewed 
guardianship cases.25 It was only in the PJB decisions that Article 12 of the CRPD 
was used, explained and applied.26 The right to full legal capacity and the right to 
support for the exercise of this right contained in Article 12 of the CRPD are not 
found within the Victorian Charter. Section 5 of the Victorian Charter preserves rights 
and freedoms that are not contained within the Charter.27 I have argued in Chapter 
428 that section 5 of the Victorian Charter could be used so that Victorian Courts and 
VCAT applying guardianship legislation could apply Article 12 of the CRPD in their 
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 AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 186 (18 July 2009); RB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 532 (12 May 
2010); PJB (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 643 (17 May 2010); Centre for Disability Law & Policy 
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decisions. Article 12 of the CRPD is international law relating to legal capacity. It is 
directly related to Victorian state guardianship legislation which removes legal 
capacity when a guardian or administrator is appointed. 
There was an absence of express references to Article 12 of the CRPD in all of the 
decided NSW guardianship cases involving accommodation. There are no provisions 
in the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) to prohibit references to international human 
rights law. In fact, ‘guardian’ is defined expansively in the NSW guardianship 
legislation to include an appointment under that Act, any other Act or any other law.29 
International human rights law has referred to the right to a qualified guardian in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 1971 (United Nations) clause 
5.30 If the NSW Guardianship Tribunal has recognised an appointment of a guardian 
from another jurisdiction that has applied this declaration when making the 
appointment, then this could amount to a validation for referring to Article 12 of the 
CRPD. The tribunal could have referred to Article 12 of the CRPD to protect legal 
capacity in relation to the avoidance of the appointment of a guardian.  However this 
did not occur. 
In NSW, the absence of a charter of human rights and the absence of many express 
human rights principles in the guardianship legislation did not materially affect criteria 
compliance.31 The absence of the use of Guardianship Principle 2 in Queensland 
and the Victorian Charter to apply Article 12 of the CRPD is a partial explanation for 
NSW’s criteria compliance being similar to Queensland and Victoria.  
Despite Queensland’s guardianship legislation containing a set of 12 human rights-
based guardianship principles, its level of criteria compliance was inferior to Victoria 
and even slightly less than NSW. None of the reported guardianship decisions 
involving accommodation explained the meaning or application of Guardianship 
Principle 2 which provides that all adults have the same human rights irrespective of 
their decision-making capacity. 32  This principle could have been utilised to 
incorporate the rights contained in Article 12 of the CRPD into Queensland 
guardianship decisions. This did not occur. Instead, Queensland’s Guardianship 
Principle 8, which recognises the importance of maintaining an adult’s existing 
supportive relationships, was frequently used to justify decisions against the 
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 United Nations, 'Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons' (United Nations, 1975) 
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240 
 
evaluation criteria. 33  This principle recognises the importance of maintaining an 
adult’s existing supportive relationships. 34  In circumstances where the adult’s 
support network was made up of persons who disagreed about the adult’s 
accommodation or level of disability, or would not communicate with each other, then 
the statutory guardian was generally appointed for accommodation. This 
appointment was justified by QCAT (or its predecessor QGAAT) by indicating that 
the statutory guardian would maintain existing supportive relationships by 
communicating with all members of the adult’s support network. The appointment 
may have been contrary to the adult’s will and preferences. 
7.2.2.5 The importance of legislative provisions which require support 
and which emphasise the importance of support networks 
The Queensland guardianship legislation, which both requires support to be provided 
for an adult35 and recognises the importance of the adult’s support network,36 has 
had little observable effect upon the evaluation criteria compliance level compared 
with Victoria and NSW. Where there is no support network, or where the network is 
disrupted by internal disagreements, or where the network is concerned with the 
personal interests of the network above those of the individual, then the Queensland 
provisions alone have very little if any effect in increasing criteria compliance. Nor 
has the absence of these specific provisions in Victoria and NSW resulted in 
observable differences in criteria compliance. Where there is either an absence of a 
support network or a dysfunctional support network in Queensland Victoria or NSW, 
then an appointment against the evaluation criteria is often made.37 
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7.2.2.6 The effect upon criteria compliance of giving legislative 
paramount status to the protective principle of welfare and best 
interests 
NSW was the only guardianship jurisdiction that gave a paramount legislative status 
to welfare and interests above the autonomy principles of following the wishes of the 
person and applying the least restrictive alternative. 38  Queensland and Victoria, 
legislatively, provided each of these three guardianship principles with an equivalent 
status.39 
Nevertheless the legislative paramount status given to the protective principle of 
welfare and interests in NSW has had a negligible effect upon criteria compliance as 
compared with Queensland and Victoria. There are two explanations for this result. 
First, in NSW, it was possible in a number of instances to comply with the evaluation 
criteria where the welfare and best interests of the person were consistent with their 
will and preferences. This occurred in all three guardianship jurisdictions where if 
there was a positive support network to protect the individual’s welfare and interests, 
tribunals found no need for a guardianship appointment.40 Where the individual was 
settled in residential accommodation with no likelihood of future accommodation 
decisions then in NSW as well as in Queensland and Victoria a guardianship 
appointment was avoided, preserving the individual’s decision-making ability.41 
A second and possibly stronger explanation why the paramount status for the 
protective principle of observing the welfare and interests of the person did not result 
in a significantly lower level of criteria compliance in NSW than in Queensland or 
Victoria is the importance placed upon the protective principle in Queensland and 
Victoria. Decisions of Queensland and Victorian guardianship tribunals give de facto 
paramountcy to the protection of the individual’s welfare and best interests above the 
autonomy principles. There is a natural tension between the protective and 
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autonomy guardianship principles.42 Guardianship legislation is applied in all three 
jurisdictions as primarily protective in nature. It is generally only where the risk to 
welfare, health and safety have been addressed that a tribunal or court is willing to 
focus and apply the guardianship principles of following the wishes of the person and 
adopting the least restrictive alternative, generally, to avoid the appointment of a 
guardian. The concept of primary importance placed upon the protective principle will 
be developed in the conclusion to this chapter and in Chapter 8. 
There are examples in all three jurisdictions to express applications of the autonomy 
principles of following the wishes of the person and applying the least restrictive 
alternative. 43  The express application and use of the autonomy guardianship 
principles demonstrate their importance in the application of the guardianship 
legislation in each jurisdiction. 
There are also examples where a protective order for a guardian for accommodation 
has been made but discontinued upon review. This is where the order is unable to 
be implemented as the individual chooses their own accommodation against the 
decision of the appointed guardian. The statutory guardian was initially appointed in 
the welfare and best interests of the person.  Autonomy has been re-claimed by the 
individual. The tribunal has claimed the decision as being in the welfare and interests 
as well as the least restrictive decision.44 This appears to be a contradiction in the 
application of the general principles. However, it demonstrates an inability to 
implement an accommodation decision and because of this, the tribunal deems it 
better to reinstate autonomy, again, using welfare and best interests as a justification 
for the decision reversal. 
7.2.2.7 Summary 
Legislative differences between the three jurisdictions appear not to have had a 
material effect upon the observed compliance with the evaluation criteria. Express 
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application of the CRPD, and Article 12 in particular, was not observed in Victoria 
(except for the PJB decisions), despite the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities or in Queensland. There was also no express application of Article 
12 of the CRPD in the NSW guardianship jurisdiction. Queensland’s 12 human 
rights-based general principles were frequently observed as a justification to make a 
restrictive order against the individual’s will and preferences. All three jurisdictions 
demonstrated instances of following the will and preferences of an individual and 
applying the least restrictive alternative where the tribunal or court was of the opinion 
that the welfare of the individual was not compromised. All three followed and 
applied the protective principle of welfare and best interests before applying the 
autonomy principles of following the wishes of the person or applying the least 
restrictive alternative.  
7.3 Criteria compliance: genuine decision-making autonomy 
within a protective framework 
A guardianship jurisdiction operates within a framework of protection. 45  It has 
generally as its only tools the appointment of a substitute decision-maker (guardian 
or administrator) to protect a person with impaired decision-making ability from 
abuse, exploitation and neglect. 46  A guardianship tribunal, by avoiding the 
appointment of a guardian for accommodation, is generally making a decision that is 
compliant with supported decision-making as contained within Article 12 of the 
CRPD.   
The observed level of compliance with the evaluation criteria involving guardianship 
accommodation decisions from 16 August 2008 was approximately one third to 
slightly less than one half (Victoria) of the available reported cases. Queensland had 
a slightly lower level of compliance than either Victoria or NSW. Instances of partial 
compliance were included in the criteria compliance category.  
Partial compliance is full compliance for accommodation but non- compliance with 
Article 12 in other guardianship or administration matters. It most commonly arose 
where there was previous conflict of interest or undue influence from members of the 
individual’s support network resulting in an administrator being appointed. Partial 
compliance may also arise where accommodation is settled but support network 
disagreements give rise to a perceived need for a guardianship order in another area 
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such as contact with the individual. 47  The tribunal was then able to avoid the 
appointment of a guardian for accommodation leaving the individual free to choose 
their own future accommodation with or without support. These appointments were 
made using express references to applying the least restrictive alternative and 
following the individual’s wishes.48 
7.3.1 Criteria compliance without reference to Article 12 or human rights 
While criteria compliance was found in all three jurisdictions, it is significant that 
there were no express references to Article 12(2) or (3) of the CRPD, or any other 
human rights principles, in either the NSW or Queensland guardianship cases 
involving accommodation. Nor did the Queensland tribunals expressly refer to the 
second Guardianship Principle of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(QLD), a principle which provides persons with the same human rights as all other 
persons. This principle is also found in the preambles to some United Nations human 
rights declarations and conventions.49 
Similarly, in Victoria VCAT is not making decisions compliant with the supported 
decision-making principles found in Article 12(3) CRPD by applying the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (VIC). Section 5 of the Victorian Charter 
was only used in one case to incorporate Article 12 CRPD rights,50 and in only a few 
additional cases was the Charter referred to to incorporate human rights other than 
Article 12 rights into guardianship decisions dealing with accommodation.51 There 
must be another explanation for the observed criteria compliance level in 
Queensland and Victoria. 
The most plausible explanation for the absence of express reference to supported 
decision-making as contained within Article 12 of the CRPD appears to be tribunals 
using their guardianship legislation as a code. In other words, the tribunals are 
treating the guardianship legislation as the only source of law that governs their 
decisions.52 The right to full legal capacity and the right to be supported to exercise 
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full legal capacity are not expressly contained in the guardianship legislation of any 
of the three jurisdictions. Although in Queensland Guardianship Principle 7(3)(a) 
provides an adult with a right to necessary support to participate in decision-making, 
there is no recognition of the right to full legal capacity. 53  The presumption of 
capacity in Queensland’s guardianship legislation is not the same as legal capacity 
in Article 12 of the CRPD.54 Capacity is a rebuttable presumption of fact in that 
jurisdiction. If evidence is produced to displace the presumption then decision-
making capacity is lost.55 It is not possible to lose legal capacity for an adult if Article 
12 of the CRPD is adhered to. 
In Queensland, there is no explanation of what is meant by human rights or which 
human rights are protected by Guardianship Principle 2 of the guardianship 
principles. There is a lack of clarity56 in Queensland’s Guardianship Principles as to 
whether Guardianship Principle 2 allows or requires Article 12(2) and (3) of the 
CRPD to be used and followed. 
The guardianship jurisdictions are created by statute. Their decisions are without 
reference to material extrinsic to the guardianship legislation such as United Nations 
human rights instruments. This could be an explanation for the NSW tribunal’s lack 
of reference to Article 12 of the CRPD in their guardianship cases. However it does 
not fully explain why in Victoria the tribunals are not referring to section 5 of the 
Victorian Charter, which maintains international law, in order to apply Article 12 of 
the CRPD. It may be that the tribunals are reluctant to consider rights outside the 
enumerated civil and political rights expressed within the Charter. However lack of 
familiarity with the CRPD or the Victorian Charter seems to be an inadequate 
explanation for the absence of references to Article 12 of the CRPD in the decided 
reported cases.  
There was a similar level of observed compliance with the evaluation criteria in all 
three jurisdictions in 2014-2015 as there was in 2008 when the CRPD became 
applicable in Australia. This is so even in Victoria where there has been adequate 
time to become familiar with the operation of the Victorian Charter. 
The reason for significant compliance levels with the evaluation criteria is found 
within the guardianship legislation itself. The guardianship enactments of Victoria, 
NSW and Queensland share two autonomy (self-determination) and one protective 
(welfare or best interests) general principles.57 The derivation of these principles can 
be traced to the need to develop guardianship legislation in place prior to the 
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Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC). The protective principle of 
maintaining the welfare and best interests of the person appears to have arisen from 
two sources. First, the need to protect from abuse, neglect and exploitation persons 
with an intellectual disability who formerly resided in institutions but now resided in 
the community following de-institutionalisation.58 Second, there is the United Nations 
concept of a right to a qualified guardian to make decisions for a person with an 
intellectual or psycho-social disability.59 This concept is in contrast to the rationale 
behind the incorporation of the two autonomy principles of obeying the wishes of the 
person and applying the least restrictive alternative. Though provisions in the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two United Nations 
declarations of 1971 and 1975 were consistent with a right of decision-making 
autonomy for adults,60 these rights were not made explicit as they are in the self-
determination rights contained in the CRPD.61 There existed an implicit recognition 
that an adult has a right to make his or her own decisions and that the appointment 
of a guardian effectively removed this right to the extent of the appointment.62 The 
co-existence of the two sets of principles lead to a tension between protection and 
autonomy.63  
It has been demonstrated from the relevant cases that when an individual’s welfare 
and interests are not compromised, then it is possible to avoid the appointment of a 
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guardian for accommodation. This will then comply with the two autonomy principles 
of following the wishes of the person and applying the least restrictive alternative.64 
7.3.2 Article 12 of the CRPD versus the application of Australian 
guardianship legislation 
Article 12 of the CRPD recognises that all persons with disabilities have the right to 
make and act upon their own decisions. 65  The State Party is required to ‘take 
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support 
they may require in exercising their legal capacity’.66 In providing the support needed 
to exercise legal capacity safeguards must be present to enable the will and 
preferences of the person to be observed and to prevent conflict of interest and 
undue influence from occurring. 67  On the other hand, guardianship legislation 
contains both the autonomy principles of Article 12 plus a protective principle. The 
legislation focuses on finding a reason to apply the protective principle; if this reason 
is found, then the result is generally a guardianship order contrary to Article 12. 
When no reason is found to activate the protective jurisdiction, then the autonomy 
principles can be followed with the avoidance of a guardianship order. Article 12 
envisages protection for an individual requiring support to exercise legal capacity in 
unspecified ways other than a guardianship order.68 
7.3.3 Summary 
The analysis in this section, headed Criteria compliance: genuine autonomy within a 
protective framework, throws some light on the contradictory roles of the current 
guardianship regimes in Victoria, NSW and Queensland. On the one hand, the 
guardianship jurisdictions are protective in nature and function. They are empowered 
with the ability to appoint a substituted decision-maker to prevent the abuse, 
exploitation and neglect of persons primarily with decision-making disabilities. This 
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appointment will generally be made for the welfare and best interests of the 
individual.69  However such an appointment will remove self-determination to the 
extent of the appointment. This however is not the end of the purpose of the 
guardianship tribunals. They also have the autonomy function of observing the 
wishes of the person and applying the least restrictive alternative. To the extent the 
tribunals are able to observe this function, the evaluation criteria will be met and the 
individual’s decision-making autonomy will be preserved. This was the case in 
between one-third and one half of the guardianship accommodation cases. This 
result was derived from a direct application of the guardianship autonomy principles 
rather than from the application of Article 12 of the CRPD. Compliance generally only 
occurred when it was safe to do. 
7.4 Trends observed from applying the benchmark criteria and 
important features to guardianship cases in Victoria, NSW 
and Queensland 
7.4.1 The tension between protection (welfare and best interests) and 
autonomy (following the individual’s will and preferences and 
applying the least restrictive alternative) 
The evaluation criterion of following the will and preferences comprises the major 
element of decision-making autonomy and the essence of supported decision-
making.70 This element has been incorporated into a policy recommendation for 
Commonwealth legislation to comply with Article 12 of the CRPD.71 
Compliance with this criterion focuses upon the tension between autonomy and 
protection. The protective element is the welfare or best interests of the individual.72 
Queensland’s guardianship legislation does not use the phrase ‘welfare or best 
interests’. The element representing autonomy is the principle of obeying the wishes 
of the person. 73  This corresponds with obeying the will and preferences of the 
person in this evaluation criterion. 
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The cases in the three jurisdictions have shown that where there are welfare or best 
interests concerns these can override following the individual’s will and preferences. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 identified a number of factors that can be categorised as welfare 
or best interests considerations. Where these factors arise, and are not presently 
addressed by the individual’s living circumstances and informal support networks, 
then it is likely that an appointment of a guardian for accommodation will be made 
contrary to this criterion. It does not appear to matter that the welfare or best 
interests are an equal consideration in Victoria and Queensland, but rather the 
paramount consideration as in NSW.  
The following are factors that are linked to maintaining the welfare or best interests 
of the person. Where these factors are present, and appear to compromise the 
welfare of the person, then an appointment of a guardian for accommodation is 
frequently made contrary to the criterion of obeying the person’s will and 
preferences. These factors are: 
7.4.1.1 Welfare and medical best interests 
The individual’s health, welfare and safety comprise their welfare and medical best 
interests. If these are not accommodated, then protection will generally trump 
autonomy with the appointment of a guardian against the criterion of adhering to the 
individual’s will and preferences. Where the present accommodation and support 
appears to be in opposition to medical professional opinion then an appointment of 
the Public Guardian (NSW and Queensland) or OPA (Vic) is likely for 
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accommodation.74 The individual’s health may be adversely affected by the place 
where the individual resides. The person’s health may be at risk from falls, squalor, 
or wandering due to the individual’s cognitive and physical condition and lack of 
adequate supports.75 Should this be the case, an appointment of an accommodation 
guardian is likely in the medical best interests of the person. 76  Appointing an 
independent guardian for accommodation, contrary to this criterion, is likely in the 
following circumstances: where the individual’s informal supporter or support network 
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is oblivious to the person’s health needs; 77  if the supporter lacks the ability to 
understand the individual’s health condition and needs due to their own cognitive 
disability;78 and where the individual’s support network lacks the time to attend to the 
individual’s health needs because of their own health needs.79 It is also likely where 
it is not possible or practicable to accommodate an individual according to their will 
and preferences due to concerns for their health and safety.80 When there are safety 
concerns for the individual and the public due to behavioural issues with an 
individual with multiple disabilities then an appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation will frequently be made to protect the individual and the public.81 
An individual who has been subjected to physical or sexual assaults or neglect from 
their support network may also have a guardianship order for accommodation to 
protect their welfare and medical best interests.82 Guardianship orders are made in 
those situations in the medical best interests of the individual and to prevent further 
abuse, neglect and exploitation. 
However a tribunal decision that follows the individual’s will and preferences can be 
consistent with their medical best interests. Occasionally there are instances where 
the medical best interests are upheld by avoiding the appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation. For example, the person’s medical state and self-worth may be 
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improved by enabling them to choose their accommodation; 83  enabling them to 
remain in their accommodation of choice that is in their medical best interests,84 or 
by appointing a person of their own choosing for accommodation decisions who will 
make the decision in their medical best interests.85 These last situations may be 
examples of partial compliance with this criterion. However, a guardianship tribunal 
avoided the appointment of a guardian based upon medical best interests less 
frequently than it made an appointment to protect those same interests.86 
It is possible for a state Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) to override the 
accommodation choice of an appointed Public Guardian, where a mental health 
facility was the accommodation choice. For example this was done in accordance 
with the will and preferences of an individual who sought release as a voluntary 
patient from a NSW mental health facility placement. 87  The revocation of a 
temporary placement order by the MHRT because of no discernible mental illness 
enabled the individual to leave the facility according to her will and preferences. This 
overrode the appointed NSW Public Guardian’s decision based upon medical best 
interests to place the individual in the mental health facility because of her 
alcoholism and borderline personality disorder. The decision of the NSW MHRt was 
upheld by the Supreme Court of NSW.88 
7.4.1.2 Disputes between members of the individual’s support network, 
or the support network and third parties 
This situation arises where the individual’s support network consists of multiple 
persons with differing views concerning the individual’s welfare and disabilities, for 
example, the individual’s level of cognition and disabilities,89 or their accommodation, 
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for example, the individual’s place of residence. 90  In these situations a tribunal 
appointment will be made in the person’s best interests, contrary to their will and 
preferences.   
Where members of an individual’s support network will not communicate with each 
other, a guardianship tribunal may find this situation unworkable and appoint an 
independent decision-maker OPA (Victoria) or Public Guardian (NSW and 
Queensland) for accommodation. This will frequently be against the will and 
preferences of the individuals as expressed by them or as evinced by their enduring 
documents.91 
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Disputes may also arise between the individual’s support network and government 
service providers, for example regarding accommodation or the level of services for 
an individual with an intellectual or multiple disabilities. 92  Where these types of 
disputes arise, an appointment of an independent decision-maker based on the 
welfare and best interests of the person is likely regardless of the views of the 
person. 
7.4.1.3 Summary 
The protective nature of this jurisdiction prevails in all three states in two main 
situations: welfare and medical best interests, and disagreements between members 
of the individual’s support network or between the support network and third parties.   
Disagreements enliven protection as the tribunal is of the opinion that the 
disagreement prevents actions by a support network in the best interests of the 
individual. 
Generally there are very few examples of placing the will and preferences of the 
individual above their welfare and best interests. The only examples found were 
where a guardianship order was unable to be implemented because of non-
compliance by the individual of an accommodation decision of an appointed 
guardian.93 This is an example of autonomy being re-claimed by the individual’s non-
compliance with a guardianship order. That situation still represents a failed attempt 
of protection over autonomy. Compliance with the autonomy criterion of adhering to 
the person’s will and preferences occurred on a secondary basis to maintaining their 
welfare and interests. This appears to be the case in Victoria and Queensland, even 
where these considerations are on an equal footing. This demonstrates the dominant 
effect of welfare/best interests or care and protection considerations. 
7.4.2 The evaluation criterion of applying the least restrictive alternative 
This criterion is usually met by a guardianship tribunal avoiding the appointment of a 
guardian for accommodation94 or by discontinuing a guardianship appointment for 
accommodation upon review.95 It operates in conjunction with the first evaluation 
criterion to support the will and preferences of an individual. Frequently a 
guardianship tribunal will cite both principles of obeying the wishes of the person and 
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applying the least restrictive alternative to avoid making a guardianship appointment 
for accommodation.96  
There are several observed examples from the guardianship jurisdictions where the 
least restrictive alternative is applied by not making a guardianship appointment for 
accommodation. This leaves the individual free to make his or her own 
accommodation decisions in the future. They are as follows: 
a) Where there is no need for an appointment of a guardian as all of the 
individual’s welfare needs are satisfied by the support of their informal support 
network.97 The network has satisfied the protective principle of the general 
principles, so the tribunal is free to maintain the autonomy principles for the 
individual. This will be developed further in the conclusion to this chapter. 
b) Where there is no need for the continued appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation as the welfare issue that formerly led the tribunal to make this 
appointment has been resolved.98 
c) Where there is no decision to be made regarding the individual’s 
accommodation. The situation may be that the individual has advanced 
dementia and their health needs are met by the present accommodation.99 
d) Where it is futile to restrict an individual’s autonomy by an accommodation 
appointment because the individual has not abided by the decision of the 
guardian, for example adults with a psycho-social disability who leave their 
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accommodation and it is not appropriate to make a restrictive appointment.100 
Here protection has initially been preferred over autonomy. This has occurred 
even in a jurisdiction such as Queensland where protective and autonomy 
principles are on an equivalent level.101 After a restrictive order has failed due 
to non-compliance by the individual, the tribunal has cited adherence to the 
autonomy principles of applying the least restrictive alternative by revoking the 
order.102 If the individual had demonstrated some ability to comply with the 
order it is likely the order would have been continued, demonstrating the 
tribunal’s preference for protective principles over autonomy.103 
There is a presumption of decision-making capacity in Queensland where this 
presumption has not been rebutted; no guardianship order for accommodation is 
possible.104 The finding of legal capacity prevents the making of a guardianship 
order. The presumption of capacity can lead to an application of the least restrictive 
alternative by not rebutting this presumption, thus maintaining decision-making 
autonomy. 
Infrequently, the appointment of a guardian for accommodation may comply with the 
application of the least restrictive alternative. This situation was discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4. It operates as an anomaly as it is actually an example of 
substitution and not support. The circumstances may be that an individual expresses 
a preference for different accommodation but is unable to achieve this without 
assistance. The individual has also expressed a preference for a particular person to 
assist in gaining the desired accommodation, and the proposed person is willing to 
adhere to the individual’s accommodation choice. There is a lack of supported 
decision-making options currently available to tribunals, so appointments of a 
guardian may reflect this lack of tribunal alternatives.105 The appointed person will 
give effect to the person’s will and preferences in their choice of accommodation. 
This will be further discussed when considering the potential ramifications of the 
appointment of a supportive guardian in the lapsed Guardianship and Administration 
Bill 2014 (VIC) in Chapter 8. 
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Summary 
The criterion of applying the least restrictive alternative has been expressly applied 
in each guardianship jurisdiction to avoid the appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation.106 It functions synergistically with the first evaluation criterion by 
avoiding the appointment of a guardian which enables the individual’s will and 
preferences to remain unrestricted. This allows the individual to exercise their will 
and preferences in the future.   
In the tribunal’s process of decision-making this criterion appears to be applied on a 
secondary basis by tribunals after applying the principle of protection of an 
individual’s welfare and interests. This is the same as was observed with the 
application of the first criterion of observing the will and preferences of the individual. 
The interrelationship between this criterion and an important facilitating feature has 
been demonstrated in all three jurisdictions; namely, that the presence of a positive 
informal support network has led guardianship tribunals to avoid the appointment of 
a guardian for accommodation applying the least restrictive alternative.107 
7.4.3 The important feature of the presence of a positive informal 
support network 
The evaluation criteria consisting of obeying the will and preferences of a person and 
applying the least restrictive alternative were selected as the evaluation criteria as 
they can be directly applied by a court or guardianship tribunal. Though the features 
of a positive network and conflict of interest or undue influence between the 
individual and their support group are unable to be directly applied by a guardianship 
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tribunal, it was found that their presence or absence is important as it affects criteria 
compliance. 
The informal support network, generally consisting of a trusted group of others 
selected by the individual, and concerned only with the interests of the individual,108 
is an essential component of supported decision-making.109 It is often the vehicle 
used to identify and communicate an individual’s will and preferences.110 
In previous chapters I have demonstrated that the presence of a positive informal 
support network has the effect of being linked to compliance with the evaluation 
criteria. 111  A positive informal support network appears to negate the militating 
factors that lead a guardianship tribunal to appoint a guardian to protect the welfare 
and best interests of the individual. For example, a positive informal support network 
may protect the health, welfare and medical best interests of a person.112 It may 
assist in enabling the individual to continue to reside in accommodation of their 
choice.113 It may protect the individual from abuse, neglect and exploitation that may 
have arisen from a dysfunctional support network.114 
By contrast, a dysfunctional support network is frequently associated with 
appointments of a guardian contrary to the evaluation criteria. Such a support 
network may make decisions against the welfare and medical best interests of the 
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person, 115  for example, the support network may be unable to understand the 
medical needs of the person; 116  or may not have the time to attend to those 
needs. 117  The support network may be unwilling or unable to work with the 
individual’s paid service providers;118 or unwilling or unable to communicate with 
other members of the support network. 119  Finally, the support network may be 
dysfunctional because it is concerned with its own personal interests and not those 
of the individual.120 
The absence altogether of a positive informal support network will generally be 
associated with the appointment of a guardian for accommodation.121 This would 
appear congruent with an effort to protect the individual from abuse, neglect and 
exploitation.122 Even where there is no positive support network there may still be 
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criteria compliance where no accommodation decision needs to be made,123 where 
there is partial criteria compliance because an administrator has been appointed,124 
or where appointing a guardian for accommodation has proven meaningless, as the 
guardianship decision could not be implemented due to the individual’s refusal to 
comply with it.125 
Summary 
The important facilitating feature of the presence of a positive informal support 
network generally has been seen as enhancing compliance with the evaluation 
criteria. This may be associated with the network removing welfare and best interest 
issues that would otherwise generally have led to an appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation. 126  The positive informal support network provides a protective 
function for the individual, removing the need to restrict autonomy through the 
appointment of a guardian. However, where a support network is dysfunctional the 
tribunal may appoint a guardian for accommodation to protect an individual from 
abuse, neglect or exploitation. Where there is no positive informal support network, 
an appointment of a guardian for accommodation will also be the likely outcome from 
a guardianship tribunal hearing.   
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7.4.4 The important feature of the presence of conflict of interest or 
undue influence between the individual and their support network 
7.4.4.1 Conflict of Interest 
A conflict of interest occurs when the supporter/support network is concerned with 
their own interests, usually financial, above those of the individual.127 The aim of the 
supporter is to benefit from the relationship. The intent of guardianship legislation is 
to protect the vulnerable person from abuse. All three guardianship jurisdictions have 
case examples of this type of conflict. The incidence of this was observed more 
frequently in Queensland.128 However this may be attributable to more available 
reported accommodation guardianship cases than in NSW or Victoria. There was 
one example out of 21 Victorian cases, approximating 5% of cases; but 11% of the 
NSW cases and 13% of the cases in Queensland demonstrated conflict of interest 
between the individual and their support network. On the other hand, in some cases 
where individuals had significant financial assets no conflict of interest was found129 
as the interests of the support network were not placed above those of the individual.  
Conflict of interest may appear as a non-financial element such as control of the 
individual’s residence.130  However, controlling the individual’s place of residence 
may lead to a financial benefit to the supporter either through a change in a person’s 
will,131 a property settlement following a marriage dissolution,132 an acquisition of the 
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individual’s funds derived from social security income,133 or not having to pay their 
own accommodation costs.134 
In conclusion, the cases demonstrate that there are a variety of situations where the 
interests of the network conflict with the interests of the individual – the network had 
obtained a financial advantage from the individual. The tribunal generally resolves 
the conflict by appointing statutory substitute decision-makers. These appointments 
function both to redress the wrongfully obtained advantage and to monitor and 
safeguard the individual from future disadvantages arising from their support 
networks. They enliven the protective nature of the jurisdiction in the tension of 
protection verses autonomy. 
7.4.4.2 Undue influence 
This type of situation involves a transaction that favours the supporter over the 
individual. It demonstrates a power imbalance where the dominant party (supporter) 
receives the benefit of a transaction from the weaker party (individual). The 
transaction is usually the acquisition of the individual’s home135 or substantial funds 
from the sale or mortgage of the individual’s home. 136  There may also be the 
acquisition of other financial assets by the supporter from the individual.137 
The appointment of both a guardian for accommodation and the appointment of an 
administrator is the frequent outcome of these types of cases. This is aimed to 
prevent further abuse and exploitation of the individual. It forms the basis of 
protective appointments.138  
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7.4.4.3 Avoidance of an appointment 
There are however examples where a tribunal has avoided the appointment of a 
guardian for accommodation following financial abuse or exploitation of the individual 
amounting to undue influence or conflict of interest. This thesis deals with this 
situation under the heading of ‘partial compliance’. The evaluation criteria are met 
regarding accommodation as no guardian is appointed. This leaves the individual 
free to choose their own accommodation. The restriction handed down by the 
tribunal concerns finances and not where the person resides. Protection is achieved 
by controlling the individual’s finances to prevent further abuse. This has been noted 
in situations where no further accommodation decision is likely to be made;139 where 
the control of the individual’s finances will mean the individual is free and able to 
choose their accommodation without likely potential abuse; 140  and where a 
separation between financial abuse and non-financial support is provided by the 
individual’s support network. 141  This last example is illustrated by a financially 
abusive relationship with a positive support network for non-financial matters in 
accordance with the will and preferences of the individual. All of these examples of 
partial compliance demonstrate a guardianship tribunal’s willingness to apply the 
general principles of both obeying the wishes of the person and applying the least 
restrictive alternative whenever possible or practicable.142 
Summary 
The presence of conflict of interest and of undue influence between the individual 
and their support network are important factors that generally result in an 
appointment of a guardian for accommodation against the evaluation criteria. Such 
an appointment is generally made to protect the individual from future abuse, neglect 
and exploitation from their support network. The appointment of both a guardian for 
accommodation and a financial administrator is most frequently seen in cases where 
the conflict of interest or undue influence involves the acquisition of a financial 
benefit to the support network.   
However partial compliance with the evaluation criteria may occur where an 
administrator is appointed but not a guardian for accommodation. This leaves the 
individual free to make their own accommodation choices in the future with or without 
support. The tribunal’s protection in one area enables the evaluation criteria to be 
observed in another. The label of partial compliance for this thesis means full 
compliance for accommodation with non compliance to Article 12 in some other area 
of decision-making. 
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Conflict of interest and undue influence between the individual and the support 
network may compromise the welfare and interests of the individual. It raises the 
protective considerations of this jurisdiction that will generally override autonomy 
considerations. 
7.5 Conclusion 
7.5.1 Introduction 
This chapter has drawn together and analysed the trends found in the three previous 
chapters which applied the benchmark criteria and important features to 
guardianship cases involving accommodation. Nearly one-third to one-half of the 
available reported guardianship cases in the three jurisdictions dealing with 
accommodation complied with the evaluation criteria. The hypothesised impact of 
the legislative differences in the guardianship regime in the three jurisdictions was 
not borne out by the actual level of compliance that was demonstrated by the cases. 
Of note is New South Wales that was anticipated to have a lower level of criteria 
compliance than Victoria or Queensland as it had neither a Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities (VIC) nor did it have a set of principles and acknowledgement of 
supported decision-making found in the Queensland guardianship jurisdiction. In 
addition, NSW placed the protective principle of the welfare and interests of the 
person as the paramount principle ahead of the autonomy-based principles of 
observing the wishes of the person and applying the least restrictive alternative. 
The legislative differences in the three jurisdictions appear to have been overborne 
by several factors. First, in Victoria, there was a near absence of the application of 
Article 12 of the CRPD and only a few express applications of the Victorian Charter. 
Second, in Queensland, there was a complete absence of the application of Article 
12 of the CRPD. There was also an absence in Queensland of any express 
references to Guardianship Principle 2 providing adults with the same human rights 
as all other adults. Third, in NSW, the requirement to place the principle of the 
paramountcy of the person’s welfare above their wishes did not prevent following the 
wishes of the person and applying the least restrictive alternative. It was possible in 
NSW (as well as Queensland and Victoria) to obey the individual’s wishes when it 
was consistent with their welfare and best interests. Finally, the legislative provisions 
in the Queensland guardianship regime which recognise support networks and which 
require support to be provided did not affect criteria compliance when there was no 
support network or there was a dysfunctional support network. 
Compliance with the evaluation criteria was still observed as significant. This level of 
compliance is not due to direct application of Article 12 of the CRPD but to factors 
extrinsic to Article 12. The direct application of the general principles of following the 
wishes of the person, applying the least restrictive alternative and considering the 
person’s welfare and best interests, partially reflects the intent of Article 12. The level 
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of criteria compliance has remained constant with the relevant cases from 2008 to 
2015. It has not shown an increase with additional years of CRPD applicability. It 
appears to have been a result of the direct application of the general principles with 
protection being given a higher status than autonomy when there is a perceived risk 
to an individual’s welfare and best interests. 
7.5.2 Genuine Autonomy within a Protective Framework 
The heading title at 7.3 ‘criteria compliance: genuine autonomy within a protective 
framework’, was chosen to highlight that guardianship legislation is protective 
legislation. This means that autonomy is present, but is subservient to the protective 
nature of the jurisdiction. Even though two of the three general principles correspond 
with the evaluation criteria, there is a very strong emphasis placed upon the third 
general principle of protection. Financial abuse, medical best interests and the 
functionality of the individual’s support network are protective factors that override 
compliance with the evaluation criteria. This framework maintains principles of 
autonomy within its general principles. The principles of obeying the wishes of the 
person and applying the least restrictive alternative correspond with the evaluation 
criteria derived from Article 12 of the CRPD. Article 12 of the CRPD appears to be 
ignored because of a tendency to treat the respective guardianship legislation as a 
repository of all legal requirements. The explanation for the significant criteria 
compliance appears to rest with the ability of guardianship tribunals to apply all of the 
three general principles when reaching their decision. It was observed that it was 
often possible to comply concurrently with both the protective and autonomy-based 
general principles. This was most notable in NSW where the protective principle 
assumed a paramount status.143 It was observed that the Queensland and Victorian 
guardianship jurisdictions also appear to be giving priority to the protective principle 
over the autonomy principles even though it is given an equal weighting in their 
enactments.  
7.5.3 Autonomy verses protection  
It was demonstrated in all three jurisdictions that welfare or best interest 
considerations could override observing the will and preferences of the individual. 
Where conditions are present that compromise the individual’s welfare or interests 
then an appointment of a guardian for accommodation will be a likely result. There 
are factors that have been observed as being responsible for compromising an 
individual’s welfare or best interests. These were reduced to two categories. They 
were welfare and medical best interests, and disputes between the individual’s 
support network or the support network and third parties. Generally concerns for an 
individual’s health and well-being can lead to a restrictive appointment against the 
individual’s will.   
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There is a tension between autonomy, represented by adhering to the will and 
preferences of an individual, and protection represented by the appointment of a 
substituted decision-maker (guardian). The decisions demonstrate a hierarchy in the 
way a guardianship tribunal balances the tension.  
The following sub-headings analyse various aspects of autonomy that will be used 
as the basis for recommendations in Chapter 8 for guardianship tribunals to use their 
existing legislation to better comply with Article 12 of the CRPD. They include an 
identification that the autonomy principles are secondary to the protective principles 
and applied only where it is safe to do so from a protective standpoint. I discuss a re-
evaluation of the guardianship tribunal’s approach in the application of the protective 
principle and the need to apply the autonomy principles on at least an equivalent 
basis. I also discuss re-claiming autonomy when an order cannot be implemented 
and partial autonomy. 
7.5.3.1 Aspects of Autonomy: Primary and Secondary Autonomy 
Autonomy can be divided into primary and secondary autonomy. Primary autonomy 
represents a concept that considerations relating to self-determination should be of 
foremost importance in a tribunal’s considerations. Secondary autonomy relates to a 
tribunal considering self-determination after considering the welfare, interests, safety 
and risk factors that underpin protection. The cases from the guardianship 
jurisdictions demonstrate autonomy is most frequently secondary and not primary. 
Primary autonomy may be reflected by a guardianship tribunal considering first how 
to best maintain the will and preferences of the individual. Secondary autonomy is 
reflected by a guardianship tribunal questioning how to protect the welfare and 
interests of the person before considering the maintenance of self-determination. A 
requirement to look at the need to follow all of the guardianship principles equally 
may elevate autonomy to an equivalent level with the protective best interests’ 
principle. 
What is the position of autonomy in the CRPD? 
7.5.3.2 Autonomy in the CRPD 
Autonomy has been given a paramount or primary status in the CRPD. It is the first 
mentioned general principle in Article 3.144 The general principles form the underlying 
framework of the convention.145 Autonomy is found in the Preamble to the CRPD.146 
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The right to support to exercise full legal capacity for all adults is the basis of Article 
12.147 Autonomy is so fundamental to the CRPD that Quinn has stated that a country 
should not be able to become a party to the CRPD unless it adopts the General 
Principles and Article 12 without reservation.148 Therefore, the right of all adults to be 
able to make their own decisions with or without support is of paramount importance 
in the CRPD. 
How do guardianship tribunals resolve the tension between protection and 
autonomy? 
7.5.3.3 Approaches of the tribunal to autonomy and protection—‘need’ 
as reflecting ‘protective best interests’ 
Following an initial entry point to the legislation (through a finding of disability or the 
rebuttal of a presumption of capacity) the guardianship legislation in all three 
jurisdictions looks at the need to make a guardianship order.149 The concept of ‘need 
for a guardianship order’ raises issues of protection, best interests, welfare and risk 
for the individual. The historical basis of guardianship legislation is protection of the 
estate and person. 150  The requirement to safeguard welfare and prevent risk 
permeates the application of guardianship legislation. Considerations of protection 
are at the forefront of every appointment of a guardian. It is the first consideration of 
a tribunal rather than the application of the general principles that include both 
autonomy and protection. The legislation could be directed to require that the 
general principles be applied prior to, or simultaneously with, the consideration of the 
need for a protective order. That would better adhere to the evaluation criteria. 
Although ‘welfare and interests’ are on an equal footing in the guardianship 
principles in Victoria and Queensland, the application of ‘need’ for an order favours 
protection over autonomy in all three jurisdictions. A guardianship tribunal or court 
                                                                                                                                       
146
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) Preamble [n]. Recognizing the importance for persons with 
disabilities of their individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their own 
choices. 
147
 Gerard Quinn and Suzanne Doyle, 'Taking the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities Seriously: The Past and Future of the EU Structural Funds  as a Tool to Achieve 
Community Living' (2012) 9 The Equal Rights Review 69; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (came into force 3 May 2008) art 
12(2)-(4). 
148
 Gerard Quinn, 'Rethinking Personhood: New directions in Legal Capacity Law and Policy (An Idea 
Paper) How to Put the 'shift' into Paradigm Shift' (University of British Columbia, 29 April 2011) 
<http://www.arts.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/CIC/July_2011/Gerard_Quinn_s_Keynote_April_29_2
011.pdf>; Gerard Quinn, 'Concept Paper "Personhood and Legal Capacity" Perspectives on the 
Paradigm shift of Article 12 of the CRPD' (Harvard Law School, 2010) 
<www.inclusiveirelandie/document/HarvardLegalcapacitygqdraft2.doc>. 
149
 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (VIC) s 22; Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 3 
(definitions of ‘person in need of an order’); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) s 12. 
Appointment 1(b) there is a need for a decision in relation to the matter or the adult is likely to do 
something…that involves unreasonable risk to the adult’s health, welfare or property and (c) without 
an order the adult’s needs will not be met or the adults interests will not be adequately protected. 
150
 Burningham, above n 9; Salzman, above n 42. 
268 
 
could look at the need to preserve the wishes of the person and apply the least 
restrictive alternative concurrently with a need to protect the individual’s welfare and 
interests. 
7.5.3.4 Safe autonomy 
There were no reported cases of the autonomy principles overriding the protective 
principle in the situation where there was a risk to the individual’s health and safety, 
a dysfunctional support network, or the absence of an informal support network. 
Tribunals did not begin their reasoning by seeking to apply the guardianship 
principles of autonomy before looking at welfare and best interest considerations that 
demonstrated the need for a guardianship order. Indeed it was the other way around. 
Risk to the individual, either financially or medically, took precedence over the 
individual’s choice. ‘Safe autonomy’ means autonomy is secondary to protection. It is 
another term to qualify autonomy as applied by guardianship tribunal decisions 
examined in this thesis. 
When does autonomy take precedence over protection? 
7.5.3.5 Autonomy re-claimed 
It was only in the situation where the risk could not be overcome because a 
guardianship order could not be implemented against the individual that autonomy 
prevailed over protection. 151  As discussed above, these very limited situations 
generally involved an individual with a psycho-social disability who was subject to a 
guardianship order for accommodation. The person did not comply with the order 
and chose their own accommodation against the decision of the appointed statutory 
guardian. The order was discontinued upon review as it had no effect upon the 
individual. It was an unnecessary restriction upon self-determination. A young, 
mobile individual, able to disregard an accommodation order, fits this scenario.152 
The guardianship order for accommodation is likely to remain upon review where the 
person or their network disagree with the accommodation chosen by the guardian 
but are compliant with the order.153 
The cases in this exception demonstrate that there must not only be a need for a 
protective order but the perceived ability to give effect to the order. If this second 
element is absent, then the guardianship order may be discontinued upon review.  
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Can a tribunal provide autonomy for accommodation while favouring protection in 
other areas of decision-making? 
7.5.3.6 Partial compliance and partial autonomy 
These situations amount to full compliance for accommodation with the evaluation 
criteria. The term ‘partial compliance’ was selected because in addition to 
compliance for accommodation it denotes non-compliance with Article 12 in one or 
more other areas of decision-making. These cases are included in the figures for 
compliance with the benchmark criteria. 
There appears to be an intermediate level of restriction. A tribunal may restrict some 
guardianship or administration decisions but not accommodation decisions. This 
occurs when the risk has been demonstrated from past abuse. The risk to the 
individual is not seen in the area of accommodation; it is seen by the need to protect 
the individual from further financial or other abuse. 154 These ’partial’ compliance 
situations occur for financial abuse  where there is an administration order but either 
no guardianship order for accommodation or where an individual is appointed as 
guardian who meets the individual’s will and preferences.155 
A second example of partial compliance arises where there is a perceived need by a 
tribunal to protect an individual from contact from a particular person. This person 
may have been responsible for physical, sexual or financial abuse of the adult in the 
past. The tribunal avoids the appointment of a guardian for accommodation but 
appoints a guardian to prevent contact of the individual by a particular person.156 
What is understood by ‘autonomy’ in the Australian guardianship regime? 
7.5.3.7 Explanation of autonomy 
This section summarises the concepts of autonomy discussed in the previous 
headings in this conclusion dealing with the tension between autonomy and 
protection. Autonomy is understood as self-determination maintained by observing 
the guardianship principles of applying the least restrictive alternative and obeying 
the wishes of the person. It is best observed by avoiding a guardianship order for 
accommodation. Autonomy is secondary in the guardianship regime to protection. 
This means that it is considered only after the primary consideration of the protective 
welfare and best interests of the person. A guardianship tribunal is only free to 
consider the person’s autonomy after it is safe, after welfare is protected. The ability 
to re-claim autonomy is a specific exception to the principle of considering the 
autonomy principles only where it is safe. Finally, there are examples of partial 
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autonomy where the welfare and interests of an individual can be protected by an 
administration or guardianship order, depending upon the circumstances, enabling 
autonomy to continue for accommodation decisions. 
7.5.4 Applying the least restrictive alternative 
This criterion operated synergistically with following the will and preferences of the 
individual. It was expressly applied and referred to by tribunals and courts when 
making a decision in compliance with the evaluation criteria. 
When there was no risk to the individual’s welfare and best interests then a tribunal 
was willing to apply and state this criterion to avoid a guardianship order for 
accommodation. The presence of a positive informal support network often meant 
the risk factors were overcome and no appointment was necessary. In other 
instances, there was no accommodation decision to be made so that even though 
the support network was dysfunctional the criteria could be met. This criterion was 
also met where risk factors of welfare and best interests were present but the 
appointment of a guardian would be meaningless as the individual would not comply 
with an order. This criterion complements the first criterion.  
7.5.5 The positive informal support network as protection in the tension 
between protection and autonomy 
A positive informal support network that consists of a trusted group of others, 
selected by the individual, operating harmoniously with only the interests of the 
individual is an important feature in all guardianship jurisdictions. It can be the 
vehicle to inform and communicate the individual’s will and preferences to third 
parties.157 
The guardianship principles have been described in this thesis as highlighting the 
tension between protection and autonomy. A positive informal support network fits 
within this model by removing the need for a tribunal to use its protective functions. 
Protection for the individual is encompassed within the support network. The positive 
functioning informal support network meets the individual’s welfare and best interests 
needs. It is a safeguard that protects the individual from abuse. This enables a 
guardianship tribunal to focus upon the autonomy principles by dismissing an 
application for a guardian or by discontinuing an appointment of a guardian for 
accommodation upon review. The research shows that guardianship tribunals 
appear to consistently be of the opinion that there is ‘no need’ for the appointment of 
a guardian in this case. The protection principle of observing the welfare and 
interests of the individual is met without a guardianship order. 
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Where there is no informal support network or the support network is dysfunctional, 
then an appointment of a guardian for accommodation is likely in all three 
guardianship jurisdictions. The tension between protection and autonomy is resolved 
by a guardianship tribunal in favour of protection. The presence of the dysfunctional 
support network demonstrates that the welfare and interests of the individual are not 
being met by the network and require the tribunal’s assistance. 
This illustrates that there is a close relationship between criteria compliance and the 
presence of a positive informal support network. It also may demonstrate that criteria 
compliance may be increased by the creation of a positive support network where 
none exist or by transforming a dysfunctional support network into a positive support 
network.  
The positive informal support network provides the necessary safeguards to 
supporting the exercise of legal capacity in Article 12(4) of the CRPD. Ideally such a 
support network recognises the autonomy, will and preferences of the individual. It is 
free from conflict of interest and undue influence with the individual. It operates only 
as long as support is needed and only in those areas where the individual seeks 
support.  Therefore the Convention model of support is reflected in this finding and 
could avoid many unnecessary guardianship decisions. 
In summary, the positive informal support network represents protection for the 
individual. If it exists and is functioning well then an appointment of a guardian may 
be unnecessary. The tribunal is able then to observe the autonomy principles 
because the individual’s protection is already observed and avoid the appointment of 
a guardian. This concept will be expanded in Chapter 8 dealing with future 
directions. 
7.5.6 The presence of conflict of interest or undue influence between the 
individual and the support network 
Both conflict of interest and undue influence are generally associated with the 
support network acquiring a financial benefit from the individual. The network is 
concerned with their own financial interests above that of the supported individual. In 
circumstances of partial compliance a guardianship tribunal may be able to protect 
an individual from further financial abuse by appointing an administrator while 
making no appointment of a guardian for accommodation. 
As with the feature of a positive support network, this feature cannot be directly 
applied by a guardianship tribunal. Its presence generally affects criteria compliance 
negatively by the guardianship tribunal appointing a guardian for accommodation 
who will protect the individual’s welfare and interests from abuse, neglect and 
exploitation. This type of case represents a significant proportion of the cases 
examined, accounting for 47 of the 304 available reported guardianship cases 
involving accommodation in the three jurisdictions. 
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Conflict of interest and undue influence between the individual and their support 
network undermines the autonomy of the individual. The decision is no longer the 
individual’s but the decision of the network to benefit the network.158 The removal of 
the individual’s autonomy underpins the need for the tribunal to protect the 
individual’s welfare and interests and protect the individual from further abuse and 
exploitation by their network. 
Conflict of interest or undue influence relates to the protective principle in the tension 
between protection and autonomy. It places the welfare and best interests of the 
individual at risk whereas if the support network is dysfunctional. This creates the 
need to protect the welfare and interests of the individual by a guardianship order. 
7.5.7 Summary 
In conclusion, the evaluation criteria compliance seen in the three jurisdictions has 
demonstrated a significant level of compliance without direct references to supported 
decision-making as contained in Article 12 of the CRPD. This is attributable to the 
direct application of the autonomy principles contained in the general principles of 
each jurisdiction’s guardianship legislation.159 The following chapter will look at future 
directions in this area of supported decision-making and compliance with Article 12 
of the CRPD. It will consider possible alternative methods to enhance compliance 
with the evaluation criteria and Article 12. 
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Chapter 8  
Future Directions, Recommendations and Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to utilise the trends and findings from the case data 
obtained in chapters 4, 5 and 6, and discussed and analysed in chapter 7, to suggest 
methods to increase compliance with the evaluation criteria. This presupposes the 
continuation in Australia of adult guardianship legislation in both the immediate and 
medium term.1 The chapter concludes with a consideration of the research questions 
from the literature review found at the end of Chapter 1 and the contributions made 
by this research.  
The proposed changes to the present Australian guardianship regime include an 
alteration in guardianship tribunals’ approaches to the application of guardianship 
legislation; an outline of informal methods designed both to create an informal 
support network where none exists and to transform a dysfunctional support network 
into a positive informal support network; and legislative amendments to existing 
guardianship legislation to introduce supported decision-making measures. 
The continued retention of guardianship legislation in Australia is inconsistent with 
the right to have and exercise full legal capacity in Article 12 of the CRPD.2 The 
United Nations CRPD Committee recommended the immediate abolition of adult 
guardianship legislation to be replaced by supported decision-making as this best 
represents an adult’s autonomy will and preferences.3 Despite the recommendations 
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from the CRPD committee for Australia to take immediate steps to replace its 
guardianship regime with supported decision-making,4 changes are unlikely to occur 
within the next 10 to 15 years for the following reasons. 
First, outside circles of support and other types of informal support networks, there is 
an absence of supported-decision making options in Australia. State governments 
are reluctant to adopt supported decision-making in their guardianship legislation 
without proof of success from empirical studies from overseas jurisdictions.  
However, there is a paucity of empirical research into the efficacy of existing 
supported decision-making models in guardianship legislation. This means that 
models may be viewed as experimental, unwise to be adopted.5 For example, some 
supported decision-making options such as agreements may limit an individual to a 
particular supporter, alienate family and friends from the individual and restrict the 
individual’s abilities from the community’s perspective.6 An unsuccessful legislative 
model of support may result in a backwards step in promoting full legal capacity for 
persons with a cognitive disability. 
Second, a significant and increasing 7  number of persons with certain types of 
disabilities do not easily fit within the framework of a supported decision-making 
model. These include persons with profound intellectual disabilities, advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease, advanced Huntington’s disease, occasional psycho-social 
disabilities such as catatonic depression, and persons in a coma.8 It is my opinion 
that the facilitated state of decision-making classified by Bach and Kerzner9 and 
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10 disabilities such as advanced dementia being unable to be supported. 
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 Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, 'A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal 
Capacity' (2011) <http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/disabilities-call-for-papers--bach-kerzner>. 
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Gerard Quinn10 (discussed in chapter 1), is substituted decision-making and not 
supported decision-making. This is because in some instances, for example those 
enumerated above, the will and preferences of the individual cannot be ascertained 
by at least one other person. The decision-maker’s personal opinions may cloud any 
decision compromising the potential of maintaining autonomy by a substituted 
judgement.11 Devi has criticised the facilitated decision-making model proposed by 
Bach and Kerzner as an instance of ‘best interest’ decision-making.12 These difficult 
situations were recognised during the drafting of Article 12 but full legal capacity was 
accepted as creating a universal right.13 
Third, no country has completely abandoned the concept of adult guardianship or 
substituted decision-making.14 This includes jurisdictions such as Sweden, Germany 
and the western provinces of Canada that have had well-developed forms of 
supported decision-making over the past 20 years.15 The perceived need for adult 
guardianship persists in all countries where supported decision-making models have 
been developed to protect individual autonomy. 
Fourth, there is a lack of community awareness that persons with a psycho-social 
disability, intellectual impairment or early Alzheimer’s disease are able to make their 
own decisions with support.16 This may explain the low rate of usage in Canada of 
legislative supported decision-making such as co-decision-making and support 
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agreements.17 Further acceptance of supported decision-making by those dealing 
with supported adults such as financial institutions, health professionals and 
landlords is essential for its efficacy.18 Where a doctor or bank refuses to deal with 
an adult with a cognitive disability without an appointed guardian or administrator 
then supported-decision making becomes meaningless. It must be effective against 
third parties. 
Finally, the source of exploitation, abuse and neglect for a person with a cognitive 
disability is frequently the person’s support network of family and friends. These are 
the very people who would be responsible to provide support for the individual.19 
Often, informal support networks break down causing significant harm to the 
individual. It is recognised that this type of abuse and exploitation can also occur in 
formal appointments of substitution either by the individual (power of attorney or 
enduring guardian) or by the tribunal (guardian).20  
For these reasons adult guardianship legislation is likely to continue in Australia for 
the immediate future. The following subsections will consider possible methods of 
increasing compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD under the existing guardianship 
regime. The trends discussed in chapter 7 will be utilised for this purpose. The 
recommendations will include changes in the application of existing guardianship 
legislation; non-legislative methods to increase and improve the use of the positive 
informal support network; and possible legislative models such as the Guardianship 
and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC) with its supportive guardians. 
8.2 Tribunal’s approach to the application of the guardianship 
legislation needs to change  
Guardianship tribunals administer legislation that contains principles protecting the 
welfare and interests as well as the decision-making autonomy of a person. A 
change in the way the tribunal exercises its discretion in applying the legislation 
could result in increased compliance with the evaluation criteria and Article 12.  
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Education and training of tribunal members in the use and application of the National 
Decision-making Principles in the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) 
Final Report Equality, Capacity and Disability21 could increase criteria compliance.  
These principles re-state the rights and duties found in Article 12 of the CRPD.22 The 
ALRC recognises that guardianship is likely to continue but should be a last resort, 
with support to maintain the individual’s will and preferences and facilitate 
autonomy.23 
A tribunal could look at the need to make a guardianship order, not as the primary 
need to make a restrictive order to protect an individual’s welfare or property, but as 
the need to preserve the individual’s decision-making autonomy. This is seen from 
the perspective of preserving the interests of the individual to make their own 
decisions with or without support. A tribunal has discretion to give different weight to 
the guardianship principles, except in NSW where the protective principle is of 
paramount importance. The guardianship tribunals could give primary importance to 
the guardianship principles dealing with self determination and apply these principles 
prior to asking itself if there is a need to make a protective guardianship order by 
removing rights in order to safeguard the individual from possible harm.   
Too few of the reported guardianship cases involving accommodation placed primary 
importance upon observing the will and preferences of the individual and adopting 
the least restrictive alternative on an equal level with welfare and interests 
considerations.24 An approach which prioritises these values is easier in Victoria and 
Queensland where all guardianship principles are given an equivalent status. 
However, it is still possible in NSW to consider all the guardianship principles even 
though welfare and the adult’s interests are given a paramount status.25 
8.2.1 Compliance with Article 12 could be increased with its direct use in 
the guardianship cases 
There was a near total absence of the application and use of Article 12 of the CRPD 
in the decided guardianship cases in all three jurisdictions. Guardianship legislation 
was being used as the sole source of law to be applied. Despite the possibility in all 
three jurisdictions that reference could be made to international human rights, only 
one reported case and its appeal applied Article 12 of the CRPD.26 Another Victorian 
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Supreme Court decision applied Article 12 in a succession matter.27  In all (nearly 
200) relevant decided cases in the Queensland guardianship jurisdiction, there was 
a total absence of reference to human rights encompassed in the second 
guardianship principle. None of the Queensland cases identified the applicable 
human rights, how they were derived, or how they should be upheld and protected 
by users of the Act. The PJB decisions demonstrate that it is currently possible to 
use and apply Article 12 of the CRPD in guardianship decisions using existing 
guardianship legislation.28 The guardianship legislation does not need to be seen  as 
a code or the repository of all law and procedure to be followed.  
Victoria could utilise section 5 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
2006 (VIC) to refer to and apply international law in the context of Article 12 of the 
CRPD and directly apply this to a guardianship decision.   
Likewise, in Queensland, Guardianship Principle 2 (the right of all adults to the same 
basic human rights regardless of a particular adult’s capacity must be recognised 
and taken into account) could be used to incorporate Article 12 rights into the use of 
guardianship legislation. This could be achieved by recognising autonomy and the 
right to support to exercise this human right. A change in the use of the Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) by QCAT could interpret ‘human rights’ in 
Guardianship Principle 2 to include those rights in Article 12 of the CRPD and how 
they are to be applied by all users of the Act.   
In NSW the guardianship principles may provide discretion to refer to, and apply, 
Article 12 of the CRPD, despite the paramount status of the protective principle of 
the welfare and interests of the person. The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
could refer to Article 12(4) of the CRPD when applying the principles of following the 
wishes of the person and adopting the least restrictive alternative.   
8.2.2 Primary verses secondary autonomy 
From my research it is apparent that the autonomy guardianship principles of 
following the wishes of the person and adopting the least restrictive alternative are 
applied on a secondary basis to the protective principle of the welfare and interests 
of the person. The primary guardianship principle applied by the tribunals is the 
protective best interests of the person. Autonomy principles are applied by 
guardianship tribunals only when it is safe, after the individual’s welfare is protected.   
Guardianship tribunals in Queensland and Victoria could give primary or at least an 
equivalent consideration to the autonomy guardianship principles. No guardianship 
principle is given paramountcy in those jurisdictions. This change in the application 
of the guardianship principles may result in fewer guardianship appointments but an 
increased compatibility with the evaluation criteria. This is not possible in NSW 
where the protective principle assumes a legislative paramount status, though it 
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could still be possible in NSW to give more weight to the autonomy guardianship 
principles, the protective principle has been applied to dismiss guardianship orders 
for accommodation where they are of no effect and cannot be implemented.29  
8.2.3 Changes in the application of the ‘need’ to make a guardianship 
order 
Once guardianship tribunals rebut the presumption of capacity (Queensland),30 or 
find that because of disability the person is unable to make reasonable judgements 
(Victoria),31  or find that disability results in the restriction of a major life activity 
(NSW),32 they next look at the need to make a guardianship order. This becomes the 
need to restrict autonomy by transferring decision-making capacity to a substitute. 
The tribunal is directed immediately to a consideration of the protective principle of 
welfare and best interests. There is no consideration of ‘need’ from the perspective 
of preserving the individual’s will and preferences. This could amount to giving a 
double consideration to the protective principle of the welfare and best interests of 
the person. Initially, when ascertaining if there is a need for a guardianship order, 
and again when applying the guardianship principles. This could be changed by 
applying the guardianship principles as a first consideration; or by reconsidering the 
application of the ‘need’ for an order. The tribunal could consider the need to 
preserve full legal capacity as required by Article 12(2) of the CRPD.   
There could be a change in the use of the concept of ‘need’ for a guardianship order. 
The present use of ‘need’ solely for the purpose of satisfying the protective best 
interests and welfare of the person is open to alternative interpretations. This could 
have the meaning of a ‘need’ to apply all of the guardianship principles. This includes 
a ‘need’ to obey the wishes of the person and adopt the least restrictive alternative. 
Following this changed conceptualisation of ‘need’ may result in an increased 
compliance with the evaluation criteria. 
This concept involves a reconsideration of the use and meaning of ‘need’ for a 
guardianship order. It involves a change from considering ‘need’ only in relation to 
the protective principle. There is a need based on international human rights law to 
consider upholding the autonomy principles as well as the protective principle. A 
tribunal could direct itself to the question, are we adopting the least restrictive 
alternative and following the wishes of the person? This question could be asked by 
tribunal members at the same time as the need to protect the welfare and best 
interests of the person. 
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8.2.4 Summary 
A change in the guardianship tribunals’ approach to the application of existing 
guardianship legislation is likely to result in increased compliance with Article 12 of 
the CRPD. This is by direct application of Article 12, giving primary or equal status to 
the guardianship autonomy principles, and considering the need to preserve self-
determination alongside the need to protect the welfare and interests of the person. 
The changes in the guardianship tribunals’ approach to the application of 
guardianship legislation is designed to place the autonomy principles of Article 12 as 
a central consideration rather than as  secondary to the application of the protective 
principles. 
8.3 Non-legislative approach to improving compliance with 
Article 12 of the CRPD—the positive informal support network 
The recommendations in this sub-section arise solely from the research findings of 
this thesis. The informal support network, consisting of a group of trusted others, 
selected by the individual, working harmoniously and concerned only with the 
interests of the individual, is closely linked with compliance with the evaluation 
criteria by guardianship tribunals. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis have shown 
the correlation between an effective support network and the avoidance of an 
appointment of a guardian for accommodation. There is no ‘need’ for the 
appointment of a guardian as the individual’s welfare and interests are met by the 
support network. The network fulfils the protective requirements for the individual so 
it is unnecessary to make an appointment. The tribunal is then free to apply the 
autonomy guardianship principles to avoid the appointment of a guardian. The 
proposition is that by increasing the number of positive informal support networks 
there will be increased compliance with Article 12. 
The incidence of compliance with the evaluation criteria is substantially decreased 
where there is either no informal support network; where the network cannot meet 
the welfare and medical best interests of the individual; where the network is unable 
to act with other members of the network or with the individual’s service providers; or 
where the personal interests of the network conflict with, and override the interests 
of, the individual. These situations have been categorised as non-existent or 
dysfunctional support networks in previous chapters. The problem can be stated as 
how to create a positive informal support network where none exists; or how to 
transform a dysfunctional support network into a positive one. 
Resolution of network disagreements 
Disagreements between members of the individual’s support network concerning the 
place of residence of the individual, the individual’s level of cognitive disability, or 
communication issues between the individual’s support network, or the network and 
third parties, have resulted in many of the guardianship appointments against the 
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evaluation criteria. Approximately one-third of the appointments of a guardian for 
accommodation against the evaluation criteria, were directly attributable to this type 
of network disagreement.33 If these matters could be resolved by means other than a 
guardianship tribunal hearing then there would be many fewer appointments of a 
guardian for accommodation. This could be achieved within the guardianship tribunal 
framework by alternate dispute resolution by conferencing, mediation, or outside the 
guardianship tribunal by education from service providers or the public guardian or 
public advocate.34 Guardianship applications are likely to be made by individuals 
who are unaware that the result of the family disagreement will be the appointment 
of the public guardian possibly against the will and preferences of the individual and 
members of the individual’s support network.  
A number of possibilities already exist. For example, trained staff members of the 
NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) had provided advice with 13, 907 
telephone enquiries in 2014 prior to a guardianship hearing. This helped parties to 
find informal means of resolving disputes in accord with Article 12 without a 
guardianship tribunal hearing.35 However, VCAT and QCAT do not engage in pre-
hearing telephone conferencing to resolve disagreements and avoid unnecessary 
guardianship hearings.36  
Further, all of the civil and administrative tribunals in the three jurisdictions examined 
by this thesis have legislative provisions for mediation.37 Mediation is a non-judicial 
process controlled by a mediator. The mediator is independent of the network 
members. The mediator brings the parties together to attempt to resolve their 
differences. If successful, the dispute is resolved without a guardianship hearing. 
The Productivity Commission’s Access to Justice Arrangements (Report 2014) 
mentions that mediation is successful in resolving disputes in nearly 70% of cases.38 
VCAT however, does not engage in mediation in guardianship matters as these 
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could result in protective orders and may compromise the individual’s welfare and 
interests.39 
It is recommended that selective mediation and conferencing to resolve network 
disagreements can avoid guardianship hearings and preserve individual autonomy. It 
is recommended that the costs of the conference or mediation be borne by the state. 
These costs are likely to be more than off-set by the cost savings of avoiding the 
guardianship hearing following a successful conference or mediation.   
All of these bodies have statutory functions within the guardianship enactments to 
inform and protect the rights of adults with disabilities.40 The Public Guardian (NSW 
and Queensland) and the Public Advocate (Victoria) could disseminate information 
more thoroughly about guardianship, support networks and the avoidance of a 
possible guardianship order. Protection of the rights of persons with cognitive 
disabilities is advanced through informing and educating individuals and their support 
networks that a guardianship hearing is likely to resolve the disagreement by the 
appointment of an independent statutory guardian which will remove the right of self-
determination to the extent of the appointment. The Public Advocate in Victoria has 
adopted an information and individual advocacy function since its inception.41 This is 
likely to have resulted in the protection of the right of self-determination for many 
persons by the avoidance of guardianship tribunal hearings. The extent of this 
assumption is not known as Victoria makes very few of the written reasons for 
decided guardianship cases available to the public.42 Information concerning the 
likely resolution of a network disagreement in a guardianship hearing could 
legislatively be provided by the Public Guardian in NSW and Public Advocate in 
Queensland.43  
Service providers such as carers’ organisations and advocacy organisations that are 
aware of how the guardianship tribunal system operates could provide education and 
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counselling to individuals and networks to assist in resolving network disputes to 
avoid a guardianship hearing.44 
If even half of the network disputes are resolved either by alternate dispute 
resolution at the tribunal, education from the Public Guardian or Public Advocate, or 
from information, training and advice from service providers, then there is likely to be 
a flow-on effect of a substantial increase in compliance with the evaluation criteria 
and compliance with the principles of autonomy contained in Article 12 of the 
CRPD.45 This is through the avoidance of tribunal hearings that are likely to result in 
the appointment of the statutory substitute decision-maker against the will and 
preferences of the individual.   
There are however, some difficulties envisaged in the implementation of mediation 
and alternate dispute resolution for support networks. Some disagreements between 
network members may be intractable. The situations involving a support network that 
is physically or sexually abusive to the individual is also likely to be unsuitable to be 
resolved through mediation. 
Creation of a positive informal support network where the person is isolated 
and lacks a support network 
The cases in chapters 4-7 have demonstrated that a guardianship order for 
accommodation will usually be made against the will and preferences of a person 
who lacks a support network.46 This appointment is generally made to protect the 
welfare of the person from exploitation and neglect and sometimes to protect the 
person from being subject to the criminal justice system. 47  Occasionally, the 
evaluation criteria could be met when a person was isolated without a support 
network. This occurred when there was no accommodation decision to be made,48 
where autonomy was re-claimed as the guardianship order could not be 
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implemented,49 or where there was partial compliance by the appointment of an 
administrator.50 
There are a number of difficulties envisaged in the creation of a positive informal 
support network where the individual is presently isolated.51 First, the network needs 
to gain the trust of the individual. It is the individual’s choice whether or not to receive 
support from a network.52 A network usually consists of a group of family or friends 
with a long-standing relationship with the individual.53 It may be an arduous task to 
develop a support network out of a void in a person’s life. Any attempt at establishing 
a network may risk rejection by the individual. However there has been some 
success with court appointed mentors in Sweden, Quebec and Germany.54 In the 
South Australian supported decision-making project, 26 of the 52 applicants were 
rejected on the basis that they either lacked a support network or no one in their 
network was willing to act as a supporter.55 The NSW 26 person supported decision-
making project shared the difficulties in finding subjects, obtaining supporters and in 
training the individual to trust the supporter to assist in making their own decisions.56 
A similar result was noted in the 18 person supported decision-making project in 
rural Victoria for isolated persons with an intellectual disability. It was difficult and 
time consuming to develop a relationship of trust with the volunteer supporters.57 
The smaller supported decision-making project in the Australian Capital Territory had 
the same shortcomings in failing to obtain persons to be supporters in their 6 person 
project.58 All of these projects, although they avoided guardianship appointments, 
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shared the limitations of small numbers of participants. 59  It may be difficult to 
extrapolate these results to the broader community. 
A second limitation is the availability of persons to constitute an informal support 
network. The two year NSW supported decision-making project had difficulties in 
obtaining 26 persons to be supported for their project. It took nearly 12 months 
before clients were obtained largely from the NSW Trustee and Guardian and the 
NSW Public Guardian to conduct the relatively small project.60 It is anticipated that 
there may be difficulty in finding suitable persons to constitute a support network. 
This scarcity may be compounded in rural settings where there is a scarcity of 
potential candidates.   
A third limitation is the cost of training, supervising and monitoring the newly created 
support network. Much of the success of the South Australian supported decision-
making project was attributable to the skills of Cher Nicholson, who acted as trainer, 
educator and monitor for the 26 supporters in the project.61 It is anticipated that even 
if the support network is voluntary, there will be considerable financial costs in 
training, supervising and monitoring the newly created network for an isolated 
individual. Who should fund this service? Should it be the Federal government as 
they are the State Party responsible for providing supports to exercise legal capacity 
in Article 12(3) of the CRPD?62 The Federal government is also charged with the 
responsibility of providing services under the NDIS. The state governments may also 
have responsibility to fund this service as guardianship legislation is entirely a state 
matter. Nonetheless, the cost of training and monitoring supporters when creating a 
support network may be significant.63 
In summary, the issues of trust, availability of supporters and funding of trainers and 
monitors for supporters are substantial issues to be addressed. This may be more 
problematic than overcoming disagreements within an existing support network. 
 
Transforming a dysfunctional support network into a positive informal support 
network 
This situation involves an existing support network that either does not understand or 
address the welfare and interests of the individual or places the interests of the 
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network above those of the individual. It includes the situations where there is 
conflict of interest or undue influence between the individual and the support 
network. This situation may be as problematic as the previous situation but for 
different reasons. The support network exists, but has failed the individual in the 
past. There must be education, training and monitoring if the network is to succeed 
in the future. There may be a reluctance to enable a support network that has been 
responsible for serious abuse, neglect or financial losses to the individual to continue 
in that role, even with supervision.64 The potential risk of harm to the individual may 
outweigh the trust the individual has in their network. This network will require 
monitoring and a possible registration of decisions.65 The education, supervision and 
monitoring of the existing dysfunctional support network will involve a cost burden. 
The same questions arise regarding who should be responsible for these costs as in 
the previous example where the person was isolated and lacked a support network. 
In summary, a positive informal support network is an essential component of 
supported decision-making. It is often the vehicle that enables decisions to be made 
for an individual with a cognitive disability.66 The positive informal support network 
operates as protection in the tension between autonomy and protection underpinning 
guardianship legislation. By strengthening the informal support network a 
guardianship tribunal can focus upon autonomy and avoid a guardianship order. 
There are, however, a number of problems in creating a network where none exists 
or in transforming a dysfunctional network into a positive support network. The 
resolution of these problems will require attention. It may be more cost effective to 
transform a support network that is dysfunctional only by reason of network 
disagreements to a positive one through education, mediation and counselling. 
8.4 Legislative approaches to increasing compliance with the 
evaluation criteria contained within Article 12 of the CRPD 
Greater compliance with the evaluation criteria may be achieved by benchmarking 
supported decision-making against the Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 
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(VIC) as well as instituting other possible legislative reforms to increase compliance 
with Article 12. 
The Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC) 
This Bill represented the first attempt in Australian guardianship legislation to include 
supported decision-making within a traditional guardianship enactment. However it 
had not passed both houses before the Victorian Parliament was prorogued prior to 
the 2014 Victorian election. So far the new Victorian government has failed to 
indicate any interest in progressing any change to the current Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1986 (VIC) to include supported decision-making. 
The 2014 Bill was an attempt to replace Victoria’s existing guardianship legislation 
with a new statute. However it retained the tribunal appointments of substitute 
decision-makers for personal and financial decisions (guardians and administrators). 
It also retained the Office of Public Advocate (Victoria). The changes that were 
potentially significant for increasing compliance with the evaluation criteria are as 
follows: 
(a) The introduction of a functional test of mental capacity coupled with a 
presumption of capacity.67 The functional capacity test is similar to the test of 
capacity in the Queensland guardianship legislation,68 but with an additional 
requirement to retain information to make the decision. 69  The functional 
capacity test is contrary to the evaluation criteria and supported decision-
making in Article 12 of the CRPD. Its effect is to remove decision-making 
ability and not to provide support to exercise legal capacity. 70  The 
presumption of capacity in the Victorian Bill may, however, increase 
compliance with the evaluation criteria. This would be achieved by avoiding a 
tribunal appointment of a guardian for accommodation where there is 
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity. The distinction 
remains however between the concept of full legal capacity in the CRPD and 
a rebuttable presumption of capacity in the Victorian Bill.  
(b) A change in the wording of the guardianship principles to better reflect current 
notions of human rights, support and  objections to the use of the term ‘best 
interests’. Best interests was removed and replaced with the terms ‘social and 
personal well-being’.71 There were concerns that using ‘best interests’ would 
be paternalistic and patronising. The change appears to accept the 
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recommendations of the submissions by the Office of Public Advocate 
(Victoria) to remove the phrase and concept.72  
(c) The appointment by VCAT of a supportive guardian.73 This terminology is 
misleading. It is not an appointment by VCAT of a substitute (guardian). It is 
the appointment of a supporter to assist the person to make their own 
decisions. The supportive guardian can assist in all decisions except for 
significant financial transactions that include loans, guarantees, the buying 
and selling of real property (apart from obtaining a tenancy for the person) 
and the buying and selling of shares.74 VCAT could appoint a supportive 
guardian either upon application or of VCAT’s choosing when it believes such 
an appointment is more appropriate than a guardianship appointment. To 
make a supportive guardianship appointment, VCAT would require the person 
to have a disability, not oppose the appointment, and achieve decision-
making capacity with the assistance of the supportive guardian. The 
appointment must be more appropriate than appointing a guardian or 
administrator and must enable the personal and social well-being of the 
person to be met.75 
The 2012 Victorian Law Reform Commission Report on the review of Victoria’s 
guardianship legislation recommended a variety of supported decision-making 
alternatives to be incorporated into guardianship legislation.76 These included the 
appointment of supporters, support agreements, representation agreements and the 
VCAT appointment of co-decision-makers (to make a joint decision with the 
person).77 The only supported decision-making alternative that was adopted in the 
Bill was the tribunal appointment of a supporter. Lana Kerzner has recommended 
that there should be a variety of legislative supported decision-making alternatives to 
cater for the variety of cognitive disabilities.78 For example, the appointment of a 
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supportive guardian may not assist a person experiencing the middle stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease. This person could be assisted by the appointment of a co-
decision-maker.79 
The effect of the 2014 Victorian Bill upon likely criteria compliance  
The Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC), as the first attempt at 
supported decision-making in Australian guardianship legislation, is likely to have its 
primary effect in raising public awareness of supported decision-making. A person 
who would receive VCAT’s authority as supportive guardian could improve the 
understanding of third parties such as health professionals and service providers that 
a person with a cognitive disability could be supported to make their own decisions. 
Lack of public awareness and lack of public education are primary obstacles to the 
recognition of support to exercise legal capacity.80 
Based on my research I believe that the appointment of a ‘supportive guardian’ 
pursuant to the 2014 Victorian Bill would have had a negligible effect on increasing 
the rate of compliance with the evaluation criteria. This is because an appointment of 
a supportive guardian would appear likely to correspond with the current situation of 
a positive informal support network. The positive informal support network functions 
as protection, obviating the need for a guardianship appointment.  
The situation that was an exception to the appointment of a substitute decision-
maker in chapters 4 and 5, that is, where the appointment of a guardian was the 
least restrictive alternative, as it followed the will and preferences of the person who 
otherwise could not be assisted, may be avoided by the appointment of a supportive 
guardian. The supportive guardian could follow the accommodation wishes of the 
person residing in unwanted accommodation. The supportive guardian could assist 
the individual to obtain their desired accommodation. This situation occurred where 
an individual, chosen by the person, was appointed guardian for accommodation by 
the tribunal or court where the person resided in unwanted accommodation and 
chose another person to assist in obtaining accommodation. The move could not be 
made without an appointment and no supported decision-making options existed.81  
There were no legislative provisions in the 2014 Bill to create an informal support 
network where none exists; nor were there any mechanisms to transform a 
dysfunctional support network into a positive informal support network. There were 
provisions to delay a hearing if the registrar sought counselling or mediation for the 
parties. However, these facilities are already available in the VCAT Act.82 
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It is my opinion that the change in terminology in the guardianship principles from 
‘best interests’ to ‘personal well-being’ would have had a negligible effect upon 
criteria compliance in the 2014 Victorian Bill. This is because VCAT and an 
appointed substitute decision-maker (guardian) would have a responsibility to 
determine the ‘well-being’ of the person. Self-determination may continue to be 
removed under a different label. The interpretation of ‘well-being’ may be dependent 
upon a court or tribunal’s approach to the change in terminology. The criticisms that 
the approach was patronising and paternalistic could be equally applied if the term 
‘well-being’ is to be used by an appointed guardian. 
With regard to the change to a presumption of capacity in the 2014 Victorian Bill, my 
opinion, based upon the Queensland cases, is it would have led to a small increase 
in compliance with the evaluation criteria. Decision-making autonomy is maintained 
where there is insufficient evidence to rebut capacity.83 This was evident in 8 of the 
relevant Queensland cases where a guardian was not appointed because the 
presumption of capacity was not rebutted. The presumption of capacity may, 
however, lead to some increase in compliance with the evaluation criteria by the 
avoidance of the appointment of a guardian. 
The use of the term ‘to provide support’ to exercise legal capacity in the 2014 
Victorian Bill was unlikely to increase compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD. This 
same statement is contained in the Guardianship Principles in the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (QLD)84 where it has not resulted in a greater level of criteria 
compliance than in NSW or Victoria. This may be due to the absence of provisions in 
the Queensland Act to create, train, educate or monitor a support network. To state 
that a person has a right to support without doing more may of itself be of negligible 
benefit. 
Finally, the 2014 Victorian Bill adopted a functional test of decision-making capacity. 
This is predicted to have little effect upon increasing compliance 85  because, 
according to the CRPD Committee, this still confuses mental capacity with legal 
capacity.86 It is against the meaning of ‘full legal capacity’ in Article 12 of the CRPD, 
as stated by the CRPD committee, as functional capacity can be lost.87 Every adult, 
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irrespective of the level of cognitive functioning, has full legal capacity to make and 
act upon decisions in Article 12(2) of the CRPD.  
In summary, I anticipated that the principal effect of the Guardianship and 
Administration Bill 2014 (VIC) would have been an increased awareness of the 
position of a supporter (supportive guardian) to assist a person with a cognitive 
disability to make their own decisions. The authority of VCAT in the appointment of a 
supportive guardian could increase awareness of the position of a supporter to third 
parties dealing with people with a variety of cognitive disabilities. It is unlikely to have 
resulted in increased compliance with the evaluation criteria as there are no 
legislative provisions regarding training, education or supervision of the supportive 
guardians. The proposed legislative change, should it ever be implemented by the 
current Victorian government, may not, in and of itself, lead to significant increases in 
compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD. 
Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (VIC) 
In contrast to the opposition with the Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 
(VIC), no similar opposition arose in the Victorian Parliament to prevent the passage 
of the Powers of Attorney Bill 2014 (VIC).88 The new Act, in addition to consolidating 
legislation concerning enduring and non-enduring guardians and attorneys, creates 
‘supportive attorneys’. 89  A supportive attorney, like a supportive guardian is a 
supporter. The supportive attorney may be authorised by the principal to gather 
information,90 communicate91 and give effect to the principal’s decisions.92 These 
decisions can be health, personal or financial decisions, excluding significant 
financial matters involving the buying or selling of real property or shares.93 
The decision-maker is the principal and not the supportive attorney. The principal 
must satisfy the same tests of mental capacity as those needed to execute a power 
of attorney.94 Should the principal lose mental capacity, then the supportive attorney 
cannot act.95 
I anticipate this new limited form of support in legislation to be of some assistance for 
persons with physical, sensory or communication issues who may require limited 
assistance. It does not help persons with cognitive disabilities who do not meet the 
mental capacity test to create a power of attorney. This Act appears in partial 
compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD. It is a method of support to exercise legal 
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capacity in accord with Article 12(3). However, it denies legal capacity on an equal 
basis with all others, or universal legal capacity, in contravention of Article 12(2).  
This is because a test of mental capacity is a pre-requisite. 
Direct incorporation of Article 12 of the CRPD into Australian guardianship 
legislation 
Guardianship legislation is underpinned by the ability to limit or remove legal 
capacity and transfer this capacity to a substitute decision-maker. This is 
inconsistent with the CRPD Committee’s interpretation of legal capacity in Article 12. 
This would appear to make a complete incorporation of Article 12 into guardianship 
legislation impossible as the appointment of a guardian is incompatible with full legal 
capacity in Article 12(2) of the CRPD. 
While directly incorporating subclauses of Article 12 of the CRPD such as Articles 
12(3), 12(4) or 12(5)96 may be possible, their inclusion is unlikely to affect criteria 
compliance. A statement in the Queensland Guardianship Principles which 
approximates Article 12(3), namely that the adult must be given any necessary 
support, and access to information, to enable the adult to participate in decisions 
affecting the adult’s life, has not led to an increase in criteria compliance beyond that 
of Victoria and NSW.97 Indeed in my survey of the guardianship accommodation 
cases it was not even mentioned. The concept of following the will and preferences 
of a person in Article 12(4) of the CRPD already exists in following the wishes of the 
person set out in current Australian guardianship legislation.98 
If support measures to exercise legal capacity are also added to existing 
guardianship legislation there may be an increase in compliance with the evaluation 
criteria. A potential example of one legislative change is to state that ‘the tribunal or 
public guardian is to provide training for, and monitor the operation of, the 
individual’s support network’. This legislative change may increase criteria 
compliance by avoiding the appointment of a guardian at the cost of training and 
monitoring the individual’s informal support network.   
Other legislative forms of supported decision-making 
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis is entirely doctrinal. I have not examined in any 
depth the legislative forms of supported decision-making found in Canada and 
Europe discussed in the literature review. Nor have I undertaken any empirical 
research into existing models of supported decision-making found in overseas 
guardianship legislation which include support agreements, representation 
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agreements, co-decision-making and mentorship. These supported decision-making 
options have been criticised as being experimental legislation with little or no 
research or trials before their enactment.99 Kohn and Blumenthal100 have criticised 
the lack of empirical evaluations of legislative supportive decision-making for not 
showing the frequency of usage, its efficacy, the efficacy of supporters, the ability to 
control undue influence from supporters or any greater protection from abuse than 
that provided by guardianship legislation. Overall there is a general paucity of 
empirical research which demonstrates the value of legislative supported decision-
making.101 This is an area for future research.  
Gooding102 has written that the lack of empirical evidence in favour of legislative 
supported decision-making should not preclude its enactment. The decision is a 
political and moral one.103 Gooding indicates that many countries have abolished the 
death penalty despite a lack of empirical evidence that lengthy criminal sentences 
act as a greater deterrent to the commission of major crimes than capital 
punishment.104 I do not agree with this reasoning. The abolition of capital punishment 
causes no harm to the offender. Ill-conceived legislative supported decision-making 
may harm the individual. Legislative supported decision-making should be 
approached with caution. If it causes greater harm than guardianship through an 
increased exposure to undue influence, isolation of family and friends or net 
widening through an erroneous belief that a supporter is an appointed substitute 
decision-maker, then it disadvantages the individual.105 
Browning in a short study of several Canadian legislative supported decision-making 
models in British Columbia, Alberta, the Yukon Territory and England, observed that 
the infrequency of use was related to the lack of an informal support network.106 This 
was particularly evident in the Yukon Territory.107 Problems were associated with 
each manifestation of legislative supported decision-making according to 
Browning.108 In an 8 year study, Surtees examined the frequency of co-decision-
making applications and appointments in Saskatchewan, finding very few 
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applications and appointments of a co-decision-maker were made.109 From these 
limited studies and from research in this thesis, it is postulated that the creation, 
education and monitoring of an informal support network will be needed to 
accompany legislative supported decision-making models which would increase 
compliance with the evaluation criteria.   
8.5 Conclusion 
This section will revisit the research questions developed from the literature review 
appearing at the end of Chapter 1. It discusses the extent to which these questions 
have been addressed by the research. It shows how the findings of the research 
have met some of the gaps in knowledge distilled from the literature review. The 
chapter concludes by restating the significant and original contributions of this 
research with a summary of the important findings. 
Research questions arising from Australia’s ratification of the CRPD 
The first two research questions related to the continued existence of adult 
guardianship legislation in Australia despite Australia’s ratification of the CRPD. They 
were, first, can guardianship still exist or is it totally incompatible with the support 
paradigm created by Article 12 of the CRPD? And second, can a functional capacity 
test exist in Australian guardianship legislation to limit the exercise of legal capacity 
and still fall within the meaning of legal capacity in Article 12(2) of the CRPD?   
A different result is obtained from the standpoint of the United Nations CRPD 
Committee than from the standpoint of Australian state governments responsible for 
guardianship legislation. The CRPD Committee is unequivocal in its 
recommendation for the immediate abolition of guardianship legislation and its 
replacement by supported decision-making as it best represents the autonomy, will 
and preferences of the person.110 It sees the functional capacity test as incompatible 
with Article 12 of the CRPD as it is a test to deny and remove legal capacity.111 
Article 12(2) does not place any restrictions on the exercise of legal capacity for 
adults. The view presently shared by the Australian state and territory governments 
is that guardianship legislation can continue to exist along with a functional test for 
mental capacity. The reasons for the Australian position, given at the 
commencement of this chapter, are an absence in Australia of supported decision-
making coupled with an absence of evaluation of overseas supported decision-
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making; the inability to support all persons with cognitive disabilities; the universal 
continuation of adult guardianship despite long-standing supported decision-making; 
the lack of public awareness of the ability to be supported to exercise decision-
making; and the fact that an individual can be most at risk from the very persons who 
are expected to provide support.   
The Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC) was an example of the 
retention of both adult guardianship legislation and a functional test of decision-
making capacity in Victoria. This legislation was debated in the Victorian parliament 
over 6 years after Australia’s ratification of the CRPD. It was also debated for more 
than 2 years following the CRPD’s Committee’s recommendations in their concluding 
observations that Australia, to comply with the CRPD, must take immediate steps to 
abolish guardianship. The attempt to retain guardianship legislation in disregard to 
the CRPD Committee’s recommendations demonstrates a view contrary to universal 
legal capacity.  
Question three was whether Australia’s current guardianship regimes (tribunals and 
courts) preserve autonomy in accordance with the principles of Article 12 of the 
CRPD? The benchmark criteria and important features applied to guardianship 
cases involving accommodation in Queensland, NSW and Victoria have provided an 
answer to this question. Autonomy is generally preserved by enabling the individual 
to be free to make their own accommodation decisions according to their will and 
preferences. This is usually the case when a guardianship order for accommodation 
is avoided or dismissed upon review. This enables the individual to make their own 
accommodation decisions with or without support. This occurred in a significant 
number of cases. This compliance with decision-making autonomy as required by 
Article 12 ranged from just under one-third (Queensland and NSW) to nearly one-
half (Victoria) of the relevant available decisions. This level of compliance was 
attributable to a direct application of the guardianship principles which are congruent 
with principles of self-determination contained in Article 12 of the CRPD, namely 
following the wishes of the person and adopting the least restrictive alternative.  
Question four was whether or not Australia’s current guardianship tribunals and 
courts applied the principles of autonomy contained in Article 12 of the CRPD. It was 
observed that all three guardianship jurisdictions applied the principle of protecting 
the welfare and best interests of the person as a primary criterion above maintaining 
autonomy. Therefore the research provided a comprehensive answer in the negative 
to this question. I examined available written reasons for guardianship decisions 
involving accommodation in Queensland, NSW and Victoria decided after the 
application date of the CRPD in Australia (16 August 2008).112 There was a glaring 
absence of references to the CRPD generally, or to Article 12 of the CRPD. In 
Queensland, there were no references to the CRPD in any of the nearly 200 relevant 
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cases involving accommodation, despite its Guardianship Principles providing that all 
persons must enjoy the same human rights and respect for their dignity and self-
worth.113 The Queensland cases omitted any reference to, or explanation of, the 
meaning of providing ‘the same human rights’ and did not use this principle to refer 
to the CRPD or to any other human rights instrument. It was as if Queensland’s 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (QLD) and Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(QLD) were to be used as the sole repository of applicable law. 
Victoria had only one guardianship case involving accommodation, followed up by its 
Supreme Court appeal that discussed and applied Article 12 of the CRPD.114 This 
observance is despite section 5 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
2006 (VIC) which preserves international law.115 In the available guardianship cases 
involving accommodation there were few references to, or applications of, the rights 
contained in the Victorian Charter.116 
Like Queensland, the NSW guardianship cases involving accommodation did not 
include any references to Article 12 of the CRPD. NSW does not have a charter of 
human rights and their guardianship legislation does not make any references to 
preserving existing human rights. NSW has a number of tribunals and courts capable 
of applying Article 12 of the CRPD in guardianship decisions, including the 
Guardianship Tribunal, Administrative Decisions Tribunal (and Appeals Panel), the 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (from 1 January 2014), the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal. None of the 9 NSW Supreme Court decisions referred to the CRPD. 
The guardianship legislation was being used as the sole source of law to be applied 
to the guardianship decisions.  
The final research question was how could compliance with the principles of self-
determination in Article 12 of the CRPD be increased while retaining guardianship 
legislation in Australia? This question has been addressed in this chapter using the 
trend analysis in chapter 7 as support for the discussion. The potential for increased 
compliance with Article 12 was discussed in three ways: a change in the use of 
existing guardianship legislation; developing and strengthening the person’s support 
network; and legislative changes to facilitate supported decision-making. 
Tribunals and courts could change their approach using their existing guardianship 
legislation. Article 12 of the CRPD could be used and directly applied in guardianship 
decisions. All three guardianship jurisdictions give primary importance to the 
principle of protection over the autonomy principles. This is despite the autonomy 
principles of adopting the least restrictive alternative and following the will and 
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preferences of the person being given equal importance in Queensland and Victoria. 
It is more difficult in NSW where the welfare and interests are the paramount 
consideration. 117  When a guardianship tribunal considers the need for a 
guardianship order, it could also consider the need to maintain self-determination. 
There are some cases where the maintenance of autonomy is in the person’s 
welfare and best interests.118 
The presence of an informal support network, consisting of a group of trusted others, 
chosen by the person, working in harmony with other members of the network, and 
having only the interests of the person is at the heart of Article 12 compliance. The 
positively functioning support network protects the welfare and best interests of the 
person. The tribunal is able to concentrate upon the autonomy guardianship 
principles. It is often able to avoid a guardianship order finding no need for the 
appointment. It may be possible to improve the functioning of a person’s support 
network by resolving disagreements between network members; creating a network 
where the person is isolated, without a support network; or by  transforming a 
dysfunctional network into a positively functioning network. These have been 
discussed previously in this chapter.119 
The final approach for increasing compliance with Article 12 autonomy principles 
discussed in this chapter was legislative reform of existing guardianship legislation. 
The Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (VIC) with its supportive guardian 
provisions were discussed earlier in this chapter.120  
There are many legislative forms of supported decision-making. These were not 
considered in this chapter as the thesis focused on decided Australian guardianship 
cases, and there continues to be a lack of empirical evaluation of overseas 
supported decision-making found in guardianship legislation. Without the attention 
and recognition of the importance of a support network, legislative supported 
decision-making may be of limited use in improving compliance with the evaluation 
criteria.121 
Significant and Original Contributions and a Summary of the Findings 
The significant and original contributions of this research are first, the development 
of a benchmark derived from Article 12 of the CRPD to measure compliance with the 
CRPD in Australian guardianship cases involving accommodation. This benchmark 
could be used in the future to assess compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD in 
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other Australian guardianship jurisdictions or with mental health legislation which 
also removes legal capacity. 
Further, I reviewed and analysed all reported cases dealing with accommodation in 
three Australian guardianship jurisdictions from the date of the application of the 
CRPD in Australia (16 August 2008) until 1 July 2015. This amounted to 304 decided 
reported cases from the three jurisdictions. These jurisdictions represented 
approximately 80% of Australia’s population. By selecting these jurisdictions, a large 
and meaningful case sample was obtained for analysis. 
These cases were then benchmarked against the criteria to determine compliance 
with Article 12 of the CRPD and supported decision-making.  Useful trends and 
conclusions were derived which could be used as a basis for further research and 
legislation. 
Finally, in this chapter, I made recommendations to improve compliance with Article 
12 in law, policy and practice based upon the results of my research. 
Findings 
The thesis is able to state the extent to which current Australian guardianship 
legislation in the three most populous states complies with the principles contained in 
Article 12. Tribunals and courts administering guardianship legislation in 
Queensland, Victoria and NSW are not applying supported decision-making to 
exercise full legal capacity by a direct application of Article 12 of the CRPD. There is 
a near total absence of express references to Article 12 of the CRPD in decided 
reported guardianship cases involving accommodation since the CRPD became 
applicable in Australia. 
Guardianship legislation in Queensland, Victoria and NSW is generally being used 
and applied as the sole source of law when deciding whether or not to appoint a 
substituted decision-maker. Victoria had only sporadic references to their Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (VIC) and only one guardianship case and 
its appeal which discussed and applied Article 12 of the CRPD.122 However, despite 
the lack of direct references to Article 12 of the CRPD, there was a significant 
amount of compliance with the principles of decision-making autonomy contained in 
Article 12. The level of compliance ranged from nearly one-third to nearly one-half of 
the available reported guardianship cases involving accommodation in Queensland, 
Victoria and NSW. This was explained by a direct application of the autonomy 
guardianship principles of following the wishes of the person and applying the least 
restrictive alternative found in each guardianship enactment. 
There is a tension between autonomy and protection within the guardianship 
principles. Protection is represented by the maintenance of the person’s welfare and 
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best interests while autonomy is reflected by adopting the least restrictive alternative 
by generally making no guardianship order and obeying the person’s wishes. The 
tension between protection and autonomy has historically been resolved in favour of 
protection by tribunals in all three guardianship jurisdictions. The protective 
guardianship principle is only given an express paramount status in NSW. This 
means that autonomy is only considered after a court or tribunal is convinced that 
the welfare and interests of a person are adequately protected. Queensland and 
Victorian guardianship tribunals have continued to give a de-facto primary 
importance to the protective principle. 
The presence of a positive informal support network plays a prominent role in the 
tension between protection and autonomy. The informal support network, selected 
by the person, operating harmoniously with all other network members, with only the 
interests of the person at heart is an important component of Article 12 compliance. 
It operates as the protective element in the tension between protection and 
autonomy. The positive informal support network protects the welfare and interests 
of the person removing the need for a guardianship order. The court or tribunal is 
free to apply the autonomy guardianship principles to avoid the appointment of a 
guardian. 
The presence of conflict of interest or undue influence between the person and their 
support network enhances the likelihood of a protective guardianship order. The 
individual’s autonomy is removed by a dysfunctional support network that has 
wrongfully influenced an individual to the benefit of the network. A decision will 
generally be made for the protection of the individual’s personal and financial 
interests to prevent further abuse from their own support network. 
Overall Conclusion 
This is very early days for supported decision-making in Australia. There are 
currently no forms of legislative supported decision-making in Australia’s 
guardianship regime other than the recognition of the importance of informal support 
networks.123 
However a paradigm shift away from substituted decision-making towards supported 
decision-making is emerging in Australia and internationally. This is demonstrated by 
the supported decision-making trials in South Australia, the Australian Capital 
Territory, New South Wales and Victoria; the Guardianship and Administration Bill 
2014 (VIC), the 2012 VLRC Final Report; and the Australian Law Reform 
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Commission’s inquiry into the incorporation of Article 12 of the CRPD into 
Commonwealth laws and programs.124 
An impetus towards supported decision-making in state-imposed guardianship may 
come from the Commonwealth sector. The National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(NDIS) is based upon an individual funded model. The individual funding will 
frequently be linked with support to operate the package. 125  Success of self-
managed NDIS packages with or without support may assist in the move away from 
substituted decision-making in adult guardianship to supported decision-making, 
maintaining the individual’s full legal capacity. 
The complete elimination of adult guardianship and its replacement by supported 
decision-making is presently aspirational only in Australia. This thesis has focused 
upon the current position of Australia’s guardianship legislation and cases vis-a-vis 
the principles of supported decision-making in article 12 of the CRPD. It has done 
this by developing a benchmark to assess compliance and then applying this 
benchmark to decided guardianship cases involving accommodation in Queensland 
Victoria and NSW. The research has found significant compliance with the rights 
expressed in Article 12, without reference to Article 12, by applying the legislative 
guardianship principles. 
Chapter 7 and this chapter have used the findings of the research to suggest 
strategies to improve compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD while retaining the 
existing guardianship regime. These strategies were to alter the tribunal or court’s 
use of existing guardianship legislation to look at the need to preserve autonomy and 
place the autonomy principles on an equal basis with the protective principle; to 
develop, train, and assist informal support networks to protect the individual’s welfare 
without the need for an appointed substitute; and its introduction of possible 
legislative forms of supported decision-making which could be incorporated within 
existing guardianship legislation. 
The aspirations of a fully supported regime to replace substituted decision-making 
found in guardianship legislation may be realisable in the medium to long term. The 
first steps are to increase compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD through policy, 
practice and legislation. Education and public awareness is vital. Once there is public 
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acceptance that a person with a significant cognitive disability can be assisted or 
supported to make their own decisions then it will be possible for guardianship 
legislation to be replaced by supported decision-making policy practices and 
legislation. The recommendations of the CRPD Committee for the replacement of 
guardianship legislation with supported decision-making remain aspirational. It is 
hoped and anticipated that the changes that are occurring in Australia and 
internationally will make these aspirations a reality. 
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